Springs v. Brown
Opinion of the Court
The exhaustive argument of this case by the counsel on both sides has materially aided the court in reaching its conclusion. Mike Brown, the husband of the defendant Mrs. Jennie Browm, desired to construct an extension of the Carolina Midland Railroad. He negotiated with the company for a lease of this road, and secured the lease, provided he could give satisfactory security for the performance of the covenants thereof. To this end he applied to the Baltimore Banking & Trust Company, now known as the American Bonding & Trust Company of Baltimore City, to guaranty him in such performance. This last-named company undertook to do this, provided it was furnished with satisfactory counter security. Brown tendered the bond of his wife in the penal sum of $20,000, secured by a mortgage of a tract of land in and near the town of Barnwell, S. C. This was not deemed sufficient. Just at this time Brown formed the acquaintance of J. L. Villalonga, a young man who had recently entered into a moderate fortune, and who desired to enter into some business. In an interview with Villalonga in New York, in which he stated the outline of his project, and of the necessity for counter security to the bonding company, Villalonga then agreed to give the necessary security. Carrying out this agreement, he went with Brown to Charleston, and there met Mr. Mordecai, who was the attorney in fact of the bonding company. Villalonga produced before Mr. Mordecai five registered bonds of the state of Georgia, — Nos. 1, 2 3. 4, and 5, respectively, — each for §5,000. These were then and there transferred to Brown. Brown used three of them---Nos. 1, 2, and 3 — for the security of the bonding company, adding thereto the bond and mortgage of Mrs. Jennie Brown, above .spoken of,
It will be noted that, although Villalonga produced and transferred to Brown five registered bonds of the state of Georgia for $5,000 each, Brown used only three of them for this purpose. The two others he used for his own purposes, — as he says, borrowed them from Villalonga. Counsel for complainant speak of this as a forced loan. Still it was a loan, and Villalonga apparently acquiesced in it. Brown promised to pay them, and also promised to give a bond and mortgage of his wife and secure the loan. These were never performed. Still it does not change the character of the transaction; it remained a loan. It is said that Villalonga promised and agreed with Brown that his three bonds so given as security to the bonding company should be first exhausted to the exoneration of his wife’s bond. This Villalonga denies. The question here is as between Villalonga and Mrs. Brown. He certainly never made any such agreement with her personally; and if Brown, acting as her general agent, received such a promise, it was wholly without consideration, and is void. The securities being thus deposited with the bonding company were Mrs. Brown’s bond and mortgage and the three Georgia bonds of Villalonga. They were all hypothecated, and the property of the bonding company in them was qualified. The coupons of his bonds were regularly given to Villalonga, and he was recognized as their owner. The bonds of Villalonga were used by the bonding company. They were sold, and the proceeds were applied to the account of the bonding company with the Greenwood, Anderson & Western Railway. Mrs. Brown’s bond is intact. Villalonga, before this suit began, made a full and complete assignment of all his interests and equities growing out of this transaction to the complainant. The complainant now seeks contribution from Mrs. Brown.
There can be no doubt that the bonding company held the Brown bond and the Villalonga bonds as security for the same liability,— the performance of all the covenants in the lease. The covenants alleged to have been broken were to pay one year’s rent and the interest and taxes. The rent was payable in two semiannual installments; one on the 15th of July, the other on the 15th of Jan-
There is another question: When Brown borrowed the two other Georgia bonds from Villalonga, he used one of them in paying off a mortgage upon his wife’s property which she was offering as security to the bonding company. When he borrowed the bonds, he did not declare his purpose to Villalonga. The conclusion of fact expressed above is that this was a loan to Brown personally. If this be so, Villalonga has no equity growing out of the use of the money. Besides this, there is no direct evidence that Brown was the agent of his wife in the transaction. She had executed and delivered to him her bond and mortgage to the bonding company. By this act she constituted him her agent for the purpose of delivering them to the bonding company as the property stood. We cannot, by implication, extend the authority further. Villalonga never discussed the matter of the mortgage with Mrs. Brown. He owed no duty — was under no obligation — with regard to the property. If he had, as his own voluntary act, paid off the mortgage, he would not have been entitled to be subrogated to its security. A fortiori, if Brown, his donee, did so, that would give him no equity.. Nor was there any implied trust, as between him and Brown, that this incumbrance be removed. Brown took or borrowed the bonds saying nothing of his purpose, if he had any purpose. After he had used the bonds, he told what he had done with them, and promised to make them good. That created no trust. No relief can be given in this suit for the bonds Nos. 4 and 5.
Let a decree be drawn in accordance with this opinion, defendants to pay the costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.