Wilson v. Chicago Lumber & Timber Co.
Opinion of the Court
This is an action of ejectment to recover the possession of land in the city of Denver, the description of which will soon appear. Plaintiffs claim title under a deed issued by-Henry A. Clough, probate judge of Arapahoe county, to Polinah S. Truax, of date September 17, 1872, pursuant to an act of Assembly-approved February 8, 1872 (Ninth Session, p. 191). Polinah Truax: made a petition to the probate judge of Arapahoe county, in which-she declared that she held, under deed from Jacob Dowing, a former-probate judge, of date 9th September, 1869, land described as follows:
“Beginning at a point 65 feet from the northwest corner of F and Williams-Streets; thence along the west side of F street to Bassett street, 185 feet ; thence westerly at right angles with F street 125 feet; thence southerly on a line parallel with F street 185 feet; thence easterly 125 feet to the place of beginning.”
She then described certain improvements which she had made on the-premises, and declared that she had occupied the same since January 1, 1872, in good faith and in ignorance of any adverse claim. She knew not why her title was challenged, and prayed for a deed to her
The second course in the description of the premises conveyed in the deed extends westerly from F street to the east line of the old bed of the South Platte river, as the same is marked and defined on the map of said city, as per survey of F. J. Ebert, and plaintiffs maintain that this line is at a distance of more than 260 feet from the west line of F street. From this point of intersection, plaintiffs follow the line of the old bed of the South Platte river a distance of 62 feet, and there diverge in a southerly direction for a distance of 87 feet, which brings plaintiffs to a point 106 feet from the north line of Williams street, and 294 feet from the westerly line of F street. Thence the plaintiffs proceed to the place of beginning, 106 feet northerly from the intersection of Williams and F streets, and on the west line of F street.
It may be useful to observe that F street now is called “Fifteenth Street,” and these terms are used interchangeably in the record. The course of this street is northwest and southeast, and the right-angle courses from F or Fifteenth street would be northeast and southwest.
The southwesterly line of the premises claimed by plaintiff is some
We are now to consider whether the deed will admit of this con-' struction in respect to the premises conveyed. It will be observed that Polinah Truax claimed title to no more than 125 feet in depth, and declared that she had a deed from an earlier probate judge for this quantity of land. The presumption is strong that the probate judge would give no more than was claimed by the petitioner.
Secondly, the probate judge declared that the land granted was a portion only of that described in the petition. If it be contended that this referred to the frontage on F street, which was reduced from 185 feet to 144 feet, did the probate judge intend to extend the lines in one direction, after restricting them in another, and so as to make the entire claim very much larger than that which Polinah Truax claimed in her petition ?
Furthermore, plaintiffs reject a part of the description in the fourth course, in order to enlarge the territory claimed by them. This fourth course is “thence in a direct line southerly to a point 106 feet northerly from the north line of Williams street and 125 feet westerly from the westerly line of F street.” Plaintiffs accept the point 106 feet northerly from the north line of Williams street, and cast out the part which declares that it shall be 125 feet westerly from the westerly line of F street, in order to put this point 169 feet further to the southwest. This they are not permitted to do if the description can be made effectual in any other way. The rule is that all calls in a deed must be followed if it be practicable to do so. If, now, we assume that the probate judge found the east line of the old bed of the South Platte river to be within 125 feet from the westerly line of F street, and within the territory described in the petition of Polinah Truax, as to the northwest corner thereof, we shall have no difficulty in giving effect to the calls of the description. This would bring the third course of the description along the east line of the old bed of the South Platte river, 62 feet within the premises claimed by Polinah Truax in her petition, and make the fourth course intelligible in going to a point 106 feet northerly from the north line of Williams street, and 125 feet westerly from the west line of F street. This accords with the judgment of the probate court, that less was given than Polinah Truax had asked in her petition. It was less in a southwesterly direction from F street, and less in the frontage upon F street.
In opposition to this view, plaintiffs contend that the reference to the map of the city of Denver, as per survey of F. J. Ebert, upon which
The rule for which plaintiffs contend, and to which counsel have cited many cases, is of large and wholesome application, where the parties to a conveyance intend to make a map or chart of the premises conveyed the best evidence of the extent of the grant. It is sometimes applied where a statute or a rule of practice has made the map or chart extraordinary evidence of the description of the land. Such was the case of Beaty v. Robertson, 130 Ind. 589, 30 N. E. 706. It has little application to a plat of a town, which is always open to correction from field notes or other competent evidence to show the true lines of survey. O’Farrel v. Harney, 51 Cal. 125; Whiting v. Gardner, 80 Cal. 79, 22 Pac. 71.
This controversy relates entirely to a tract of land west of that described in the petition of Polinah Truax to the probate judge, and between that tract and the bed of Cherry creek. As to that land, the court finds that Polinah Truax acquired no title from the deed by Clough to her, and therefore the plaintiffs have shown no title. Upon that, the judgment will be for defendants.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.