Capella Sales & Services. Ltd. v. United States

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Capella Sales & Services Ltd.’s (“Plaintiff’ or “Capella”) motion, pursuant to USCIT Rule 59(a)(1)(B), for reconsideration of Slip Opinion 16-72. Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. 62 (“Pl.’s Mot.”). Disposition of this motion is within “the sound discretion of the court.” United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 8 C.I.T. 336, 336, 601 F.Supp. 212, 214 (1984). “[T]he Court will not exercise its discretion to disturb a previous decision unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States, 30 C.I.T. 1072, 1074, 441 F.Supp.2d 1350, 1353-54 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff argues for reconsideration because it believes the court did not consider “material points of law” raised by Capella, and that, had the court so considered, “it likely would have reached a different conclusion.” Pl’s Mot., ECF No. 62, at 3, 5; cf. Target Stores, Div. of Target Corp. v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 154, 159, 471 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1349 (2007) (holding that the purpose of reconsideration is “to direct the Court’s attention to some material matter of law or fact which it has overlooked in deciding a case, and which, had it been given consideration, would probably have brought about a different result” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Plaintiffs motion is premised on the assertion that the term “entries” in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(c)(l), (e) is ambiguous. However, as the court has already explained, it is not. See Capella Sales & Servs. Ltd. v. United States, — CIT —, Slip Op. 16-72 (July 20, 2016) at 19-25.

“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (citation omitted). 1 This leaves the rest of Plaintiffs arguments — about the reasonableness of Commerce’s decision, about equity, about policy — irrelevant. Where Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” where “the intent of Congress is clear,” then “that is the end of the matter.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, *1215 104 S.Ct 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). “[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 2

In short: Plaintiffs arguments do not improve with repetition. Their reconsideration will not “[bring] about a different result.” Target Stores, 81 C.I.T. at 159, 471 F.Supp.2d at 1349 (citation and quotation marks omitted); cf. Capella Sales & Servs. Ltd. v. United States, — CIT —, Slip Op. 16-86 (September 14, 2016). Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied.

It is SO ORDERED.