Rebar Trade Action Coal. v. United States
Opinion of the Court
*1254This action is before the court on a motion for judgment on the agency record challenging various aspects of the U.S. Department of Commerce's ("Department" or "Commerce") final determination in the first administrative review of the antidumping duty ("ADD") order covering steel concrete reinforcing bar ("rebar") from Mexico. See [Rebar Trade Action Coalition's] Mot. J. Agency R., Dec. 13, 2017, ECF No. 23; see also Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar From Mexico,
Plaintiff challenges three aspects of Commerce's final determination. See Mem. Pl. [RTAC] Supp. Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R., Dec. 14, 2017, ECF No. 27 ("Pl.'s Br.").
*1255For the reasons that follow, the court remands to the agency for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion Commerce's (i) decision not to collapse six fixed asset owning companies affiliated with Simec, (ii) application of the transactions disregarded and major input rules, (iii) decision not to apply total facts available to Simec, or facts otherwise available to Simec's cost reporting, and (iv) decision not to apply adverse inferences.
BACKGROUND
Commerce initiated this first administrative review covering subject imports entered during the period of review, April 24, 2014 through October 31, 2015. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews,
In its final determination, as it had done in its preliminary determination, Commerce collapsed Grupo Simec S.A.B. de C.V., Orge S.A. de C.V., Compania Siderurgica del Pacifico S.A. de C.V., Grupo Chant S.A.P.I. de C.V., RRLC S.A.P.I. de C.V., Siderurgica del Occidente y Pacifico S.A. de C.V., Simec International 6 S.A. de C.V., Simec International 7 S.A. de C.V., and Simec International 9 S.A. de C.V. ("Grupo Simec" or the "collapsed group"), and determined that the companies should be treated as a single entity because record evidence showed that there was a significant potential for manipulation of price or production. See Final Decision Memo at 31-32; Final Results,
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and
DISCUSSION
I. Commerce's Decision Not to Collapse the Non-Producers
Plaintiff challenges Commerce's decision not to collapse six companies that were affiliated with Simec, the parent company, *1256and owned fixed assets used to produce the subject merchandise at issue here, but were themselves non-producers. See Pl.'s Br. at 9-17. Defendant argues that Commerce's determination is in accordance with law and is supported by substantial evidence because Commerce does not have a practice of collapsing non-producers that own fixed assets and, even if it did, the six non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies did not have a significant potential to manipulate price or production. See Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. J. Agency R. at 11-14, Mar. 7, 2018, ECF No. 30 ("Def.'s Resp. Br."); see also
Commerce's regulation permits it to
treat two or more affiliated producers as a single entity where those producers have production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities and [Commerce] concludes that there is a significant potential for the manipulation of price or production.6
(i) The level of common ownership;
(ii) The extent to which managerial employees or board members of one firm sit on the board of directors of an affiliated firm; and
(iii) Whether operations are intertwined, such as through the sharing of sales information, involvement in production and pricing decisions, the sharing of facilities or employees, or significant transactions between the affiliated producers.
Although Commerce's collapsing regulation speaks of treating two or more affiliated producers as a single entity, Commerce has developed a practice of collapsing non-producers with affiliated producers of subject merchandise if the non-producers meet the factors set out in
*1257In the final determination, Commerce explains that it did not collapse the six fixed asset owning companies because they are not producers of the subject merchandise and that nothing on the record contravenes that conclusion. See Final Decision Memo at 32; see also [Simec's] Fifth Suppl. Questionnaire Resp. at Ex. S5-1, CD 179, bar code 3524835-01 (Nov. 22, 2016) ("Fifth Suppl. Questionnaire Resp.") (listing nine fixed asset owning companies affiliated with Simec; six of which were not collapsed). Instead, the six companies owned fixed assets, i.e., the facilities and production equipment, and leased those fixed assets to the collapsed companies to produce the subject merchandise.
Commerce failed to explain why it did not use the
Commerce's decision is also unsupported by substantial evidence. Commerce's only explanation for its determination is that the fixed asset owners lacked access to the assets, and therefore could not produce the subject merchandise.
II. Commerce's Application of the Transactions Disregarded and Major Input Rules
Plaintiff challenges Commerce's decision to adjust the costs incurred by the non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies by relying on the books and records of Grupo Simec and of certain collapsed fixed asset owners, as not in accordance with law and unsupported by substantial evidence.
In the calculation of normal value, Commerce may revise prices between affiliates using the transactions disregarded and major input rules, if Commerce determines that the reported prices are below market value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)-(3) ;
In the final determination, Commerce concludes that the six non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies provided services to Grupo Simec at below-market rates. See Final Decision Memo at 32. Commerce, therefore, revised the general and administrative expenses ("G & A"), reported fixed overhead costs, and financial expenses of the cost data pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)-(3). See
In the final determination, Commerce does not explain why it relied on the cost experiences of certain collapsed fixed asset owning companies to revise the costs of the non-collapsed group, and Defendant's explanation is a post hoc rationalization of Commerce's selection. Further, even if it was reasonably discernable that Commerce relied on the cost experiences of certain collapsed fixed asset owners because they served as good comparators for the cost experiences of the non-collapsed companies, that explanation is not supported by the record. Commerce does not identify record evidence demonstrating that the cost experiences of the companies in the collapsed group that owned fixed assets were similar to those of the companies in the non-collapsed group, and finds similarity based solely on the fact that the two groups owned fixed assets.
The Defendant-Intervenors argue that Plaintiff's challenge to Commerce's application of the transactions disregarded and major input rules is "factually inaccurate" because Commerce had the necessary information it needed to make the adjustments to the cost data. See Def.-Intervenors' Resp. Br. Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. J. Agency R. at 18, Mar. 8, 2018, ECF No. 34. More specifically, the Defendant-Intervenors argue that "the financial results of the Non-Producing Asset Owners" were consolidated, and cite to several record documents as support.
Commerce also did not explain why it valued a major input at cost. The relevant regulation provides that Commerce will value a major input using the higher of the transfer value, market value, or cost.
III. Commerce's Decision Not to Apply Total or Partial Facts Available
Plaintiff challenges Commerce's decision not to apply total facts available to calculate Simec's dumping margin, or in the alternative, not to apply facts otherwise available to Simec's cost reporting, given that necessary information was missing from the record. See Pl.'s Br. at 26-31. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Simec's reporting methodology delayed the disclosure of information necessary for Commerce to understand Simec's corporate structure and identify all of its affiliated fixed asset owning companies, see
Under certain circumstances, Commerce may use facts otherwise available. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). Commerce shall use facts otherwise available to reach its final determination when "necessary information is not available on the record," a party "withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce]," fails to provide the information timely or in the manner requested, "significantly impedes a proceeding," or provides information Commerce is unable to verify. See
In the final determination, Commerce explains that Simec responded "fully and timely" to "all of the Department's questionnaires, including answering all questions related to their corporate structure and identifying all producers of subject merchandise." Final Decision Memo at 25 (citation omitted). Commerce also explained that Simec's reporting methodology reconciled any and all discrepancies caused by reporting on a plant-based level, as opposed to a company-based level. See
The court cannot sustain Commerce's determination not to apply facts otherwise available because Commerce's decision assumes that its collapsing analysis and its application of the transactions disregarded and major input rules are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(1), Commerce shall apply facts otherwise available if necessary information is missing from the record. The fact that Commerce received everything it requested does not mean that information necessary to support Commerce's final determination was not missing from the record. Commerce's contention that it was able to reconcile Simec's costs and understand Simec's corporate structure for collapsing purposes, see Final Decision Memo at 25-26, is based on an unsupported collapsing analysis. See
IV. Commerce's Decision Not to Apply Adverse Inferences
Plaintiff argues that Commerce should have applied total adverse inferences to calculate Simec's dumping margin, or in the alternative, adverse inferences to Simec's cost reporting. See Pl.'s Br. at 31-38. Defendant argues that record evidence does not indicate that Simec misreported information, was uncooperative, or engaged in tactics that resulted in necessary information being withheld from Commerce. See Def.'s Resp. Br. at 17-23. For the reasons that follow, the court cannot sustain Commerce's determination not to apply adverse inferences and the issue is remanded to the agency for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
Commerce will apply an adverse inference after deciding that use of facts otherwise available is warranted. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), Commerce may apply an adverse inference if it "finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability[.]" 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). "The statute does not provide an express definition of 'the best of its ability.' " Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States,
Here, Commerce determined that Simec's reporting methodology was not evasive, the costs reported were reconciled, and that it was able to adjust costs for the non-collapsed fixed asset holding companies pursuant to the transactions disregarded and major input rules. See Final Decision Memo at 25-27. Consequently, Commerce did not resort to total facts available to reach its final determination, and specifically determined that facts otherwise available with an adverse inference should not be used to calculate either Simec's dumping margin generally or applied to Simec's cost reporting.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Commerce's decision not to collapse the six fixed asset owning companies is remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce's application of the transactions disregarded and major input rules is remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce's decision not to use total facts available to calculate Simec's dumping margin, or facts otherwise available to Simec's cost reporting is remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce's decision not to apply adverse inferences is remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that Commerce shall file its remand redetermination with the court within 90 days of this date; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days thereafter to file comments on the remand redetermination; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days to file their replies to comments on the remand redetermination.
Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition.
The briefs filed in this action contain significant bracketing of information designated as confidential. The court, having reviewed the briefs and mindful of the need to have readable public opinions, requested that the parties confer and identify the information that could be unbracketed and made public. See Letter [Requesting Identification Info. to be Unbracketed] at 2-3, June 8, 2018, ECF No. 44. The parties filed a joint status report complying with the court's request and identifying five terms and concepts that could be unbracketed uniformly throughout the parties' filed submissions. See Joint Status Report, June 19, 2018, ECF No. 49. As a result, in this opinion, the court will make public information that may appear bracketed in the briefs filed on the docket of this action and in relevant administrative record documents.
Although 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) -(b) and
On September 1, 2017, Defendant submitted indices to the public and confidential administrative records underlying Commerce's final determination. These indices are located on the docket at ECF No. 19-2-3. All further references in this opinion to administrative record documents are identified by the numbers assigned by Commerce in these indices.
Further citations to Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2016 edition.
If affiliated producers are collapsed, those companies may be considered a single entity. Collapsing entities allows sales of one collapsed entity to be considered sales of the other for purposes of Commerce's dumping margin calculation. See
The leases were provided at [ [ ] ]. See Final Calc. Memo at 2.
Defendant-Intervenors argue that Commerce engaged in the collapsing analysis, without explicitly referring to the individual factors of
Defendant argues that even if, as Plaintiff claims, the [ [ ] ] leases evidenced a "close relationship" between the six fixed asset owning companies and the companies in the collapsed group and created the potential for manipulation, Commerce accounted for this issue by applying the transactions disregarded and major input rules of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)-(3). Def.'s Resp. Br. at 14 (quoting Pl.'s Br. at 16); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)-(3). Defendant's explanation is unpersuasive because it is a post-hoc rationalization, not relied upon by Commerce, and the transactions disregarded and major input rules are distinct from Commerce's collapsing analysis pursuant to
The leases were provided at [ [ ] ]. See Final Calc. Memo at 2.
Defendant's argument that
In response to Commerce's question to provide a list of shareholders of rebar producing companies, see Fifth Suppl. Questionnaire Resp. at 4-5, Simec produced exhibit S5-7, which lists [ [ ] ], [ [ [ [ ] ] ] ] as the shareholder of [ [ ] ], a collapsed company, and [ [ ] ], [ [ ] ] [ [ as the ] ] shareholder of [ [ ] ], a collapsed company. See
In the preliminary collapsing memorandum, Commerce notes that the financial statements of some of the collapsed companies record [ [ ] ] between the collapsed companies. Prelim. Collapsing Memo at 8 (citing Second Suppl. Questionnaire Resp. at Ex. D-26A).
For the final determination, Commerce relied on the financial experience of [ [ ] ] fixed asset owning companies to estimate the general and administrative expense ratio of the six non-collapsed fixed asset owners. Final Calc. Memo at 3; Final Decision Memo at 32-33. The [ [ ] ] companies were [ [ ] ]. See Fifth Suppl. Questionnaire Resp. at Ex. S5-1. However, to calculate the financial expense ratio of the non-collapsed group, Commerce relied on the consolidated financial records of Grupo Simec. Final Calc. Memo at 3.
Defendant, likewise, does not identify record evidence supportive of Commerce's determination, reiterates that it was reasonable for Commerce to use as comparators the [ [ ] ] collapsed companies that owned fixed assets, and argues that no record evidence undermines Commerce's position. See Def.'s Resp. Br. at 15-16.
For example, record evidence shows that in the Mexicali and Guadalajara plants the non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies took on the [ [ ] ] of the depreciation expenses in those plants. See Fifth Suppl. Resp. at Ex. S5-1, Ex. S5-2. However, Commerce's cost adjustments to the non-collapsed group rely on data from the collapsed asset owners who took on the [ [ ] ]. See Final Calc. Memo at 2-3, Attach. I.
Both the Defendant and the Defendant-Intervenors challenge Plaintiff's argument that Commerce's calculations did not include the depreciation expenses of the six non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies. See Def.'s Resp. Br. at 16-17; Def.-Intervenors' Resp. Br. at 18-19; see also Pl.'s Br. at 23-25. In its reply, however, Plaintiff explains that in light of the responsive briefs filed in this action it acknowledges that Commerce's final calculations do reconcile the depreciation expenses [ [ ] ], and not just the [ [ ] ] collapsed fixed asset owning companies. See Reply Br. Pl. [RTAC] at 9 n.4, Apr. 11, 2018, ECF No. 35. Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains its challenge to Commerce's cost adjustment of the depreciation expenses because there is no independent documentation on the record corroborating the financial experiences of the non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies affiliated with Simec. See
Plaintiff argues that Commerce's valuation should have included profit, and accordingly Commerce should have valued the leases using a market value. See Pl.'s Br. at 22-23. The Defendant-Intervenors argue that Commerce is not required to create a "fictitious market" to value the leases, see Def.-Intervenors' Resp. Br. at 19-21, and Defendant argues that Plaintiff's approach is "unreasonable" because it would have required Commerce to construct a value from an absence of evidence. See Def.'s Resp. Br. at 16. Yet, Commerce does not explain why the cost experiences of the [ [ ] ] collapsed fixed asset owners are good comparators for the transactions disregarded rule but not for the major input rule.
Plaintiff argues that Commerce should have applied "total adverse inferences to Simec" because Simec's reporting "obscured" the roles of various Simec affiliates involved in the production of rebar, "distorted and understated fixed asset expenses," and [ [ ] ]. See Pl.'s Br. at 26-31 (citation omitted). Further, Plaintiff argues that Simec's overall approach to responding to Commerce's questionnaires led to the omission of the non-collapsed fixed asset owning companies' individual financial statements and the leases from the record. See
Parties and Commerce sometimes use the shorthand "adverse facts available" or "AFA" to refer to Commerce's reliance on facts otherwise available with an adverse inference to reach a final determination. However, AFA encompasses a two-part inquiry pursuant to which Commerce must first identify why it needs to rely on facts otherwise available, and second, explain how a party failed to cooperate to the best of its ability as to warrant the use of an adverse inference when "selecting among the facts otherwise available." See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) -(b). Commerce may, for example, rely on facts otherwise available when the information it requests is provided out of time or not in the "form or manner requested." 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(B). However, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d), prior to resorting to facts otherwise available Commerce must, where practicable, provide the party with an opportunity to remedy or explain the identified deficiency. If the party's response or remedy "is not satisfactory" or is submitted out of time, Commerce may "disregard all or part of the [interested party's] original and subsequent responses." See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). The phrase "total adverse inferences" or "total AFA" encompasses a series of steps that Commerce takes to reach the conclusion that all of a party's reported information is unreliable or unusable and that as a result of a party's failure to cooperate to the best of its ability, it must use an adverse inference in selecting among the facts otherwise available. Commerce may apply "total facts available" if it determines that none of the information provided is usable or reliable. See Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States,
Here, Commerce used facts otherwise available to make an adjustment to the reported fixed overhead expenses to include certain omitted depreciation expenses, but concluded that an adverse inference was not warranted because Simec complied with Commerce's requests to the best of its ability. See Final Decision Memo at 26-27; see also Final Calc. Memo at 2, Attach. I. Plaintiff's challenge, however, is not just to specific pieces of information, but is a more global challenge to the adequacy of Simec's cooperation and responses throughout the entirety of the review process. Plaintiff alternatively challenges Commerce's determination not to apply facts otherwise available with an adverse inference to Simec's cost reporting. See Pl.'s Br. at 31.
As stated above, Commerce did rely on facts otherwise available with respect to depreciation costs, but concluded that it would not apply an adverse inference. See Final Decision Memo at 26-27. However, Plaintiff is not challenging Commerce's decision to not apply AFA solely on the basis of Commerce needing to make an adjustment to account for certain omitted depreciation expenses. See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 18. Instead, Plaintiff makes a more global challenge based on its contention that throughout the review process Simec continually provided deficient responses.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.