Fugate v. Frontier W. Va., Inc.
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- Favreau v. Liberty Mutual Group Inc. (District Court, D. Massachusetts 2020)
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Opinion of the Court
Pending before the Court is Defendant Frontier of West Virginia, Inc.'s ("Frontier") motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Kerry Fugate ("Fugate"), began working for Frontier's predecessor company in 1998.
Frontier had a step system for disciplining its employees for absences. (ECF No. 43 at 1.) Each time an employee had two unexcused absences, that employee would receive a "Step", an adverse employment action that would be removed from the employee's record after six months if the employee did not have additional unexcused absences during that period. (Id. ) An employee would be eligible for termination after reaching Step 5. (ECF No. 43 at 1-2.) However, employees would not necessarily move up the Steps in order. (ECF No. 42 at 6 n.3.) For example, if an employee was on Step 1 and had an unexcused absence exceeding three days within six months of the previous incident that placed the employee on Step 1, that employee would move directly to a Step 3. (Id. )
Beginning in 2011, Fugate had several unexcused absences that caused him to oscillate between Step 3 and Step 4. (See ECF No. 42 at 8-9.) Fugate had requested FMLA prior to taking some of these absences, but his requests were denied. (Id. at 9.) On January 2, 2014, Fugate was placed on Step 4 for being absent on December 2, 3, 4, and 5. (See ECF No. 41-15 (Employee Contact Mem.).) Fugate had requested FMLA leave for December 2, 3, and 4, but his request was denied. (See ECF No. 42 at 10.) Thus, his absence during this time period was classified as unexcused. Fugate then oscillated between Step 3 and Step 4 due to tardiness. (Id. at 9.) On December 3, 2014, Frontier placed Fugate on Step 4 for tardiness and informed Fugate that if he had another *505unexcused absence he could be advanced to Step 5 and thus become eligible for termination. (See ECF No. 41-17 (Employee Contact Mem.).)
On January 2, 2015, Fugate left work early to tend to his sick daughter. (ECF No. 42 at 2.) He did not inform a supervisor or seek FMLA leave for this absence. (See id. ) This unexcused absence resulted in him being raised to a Step 5. (Id. at 13.) As a result, Frontier terminated Fugate's employment on January 14, 2015, citing as the cause Fugate's excessive absences after having been warned that further absences would result in disciplinary action. (Id. ) Fugate, however, argues that he did not know he could not use an "exempt day" for this absence under a plan his union created.
Fugate filed the present action against Frontier on January 12, 2017, invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction under
On March 24, 2017, Frontier moved this court to dismiss counts one, four, five, and six of the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22.) By memorandum opinion and order issued on July 19, 2017, the Court granted Frontier's partial motion to dismiss and dismissed counts one, four, five, and six of the Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 31.) The case proceeded on Fugate's remaining FMLA interference and retaliation claims. (ECF No. 42 at 2.)
On December 12, 2017, Frontier filed the present motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 41.) Fugate filed a timely response, (ECF No. 43), and Frontier filed a timely reply. (ECF No. 44.) As such, Frontier's motion for summary judgment is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. That rule provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if there exist factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,
The moving party may meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact exists by use of "depositions, answers to interrogatories, answers to requests for admission, and various documents submitted under request for production."
*506Barwick v. Celotex Corp. ,
"[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 256,
III. ANALYSIS
In its motion for summary judgment, Frontier argues that Fugate's FMLA interference and retaliation claims were filed outside of the statute of limitations provided in the FMLA. (Id. at 13.) Specifically, Frontier argues that the statute of limitations began to run when Frontier last denied Fugate's request for FMLA leave in December of 2013. (Id. at 15.) Fugate, however, contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Frontier terminated him in January of 2015. (See ECF No. 43 at 6.)
The FMLA makes it unlawful for employers to "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter."
Except as provided in paragraph (2), an action may be brought under this section not later than 2 years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought .... In the case of such action brought for a willful violation of section 2615 of this title, such action may be brought within 3 years of the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which such action is brought.
The federal circuit courts of appeals disagree as to whether an employee's termination constitutes a "last event" under the FMLA's statute of limitations. Compare Barrett v. Ill. Dep't of Corr. ,
Even the lower courts within the Fourth Circuit have disagreed as to whether termination constitutes a "last event" under the FMLA's statute of limitations. Compare Sparenberg v. Alliance , No. 14-cv-1667,
In Barrett , the plaintiff's employer had a system of progressive discipline for repeated unexcused absences. Barrett ,
Similarly, here, Frontier had a system of progressive discipline for repeated unexcused absences. See supra Part I. Furthermore, similar to the plaintiff in Barrett , Fugate alleges that, had Frontier properly approved his absences, he would not have received additional Steps and been terminated. (See ECF No. 17 at ¶ 51.) In essence, Fugate's claim is one for denial of leave. Fugate was last denied FMLA leave in December of 2013. (See ECF No. 41-1 at 105 (Fugate Dep.).) It was not until over a year later that Frontier terminated Fugate's employment due to Fugate's tardiness and unexcused absences unassociated with his previous requests for FMLA leave. See supra Part I. Thus, under the facts of this case, the last event for the purpose of determining the statute of limitations was the last denial of leave and not Fugate's ultimate termination. As explained in Barrett , to hold otherwise would allow FMLA claims stemming from wrongful denial of leave where the employer has a progressive absenteeism policy to be brought years after the last denial of leave when the employee is terminated, regardless of whether the denial of leave precipitated the termination. This is particularly salient in the present case considering Fugate's termination occurred over a year after the last alleged FMLA violation.
Fugate relies on Butler and two unpublished district court opinions from Maryland and South Carolina to argue that the Court should adopt the view that the last event under the FMLA's statute of limitations was Fugate's termination. (See ECF No. 43 at 6-8.) However, the district court opinions do not analyze or mention the statute of limitations; they simply state that termination is an event for which an interference claim can be brought. See *508Edusei v. Adventist HealthCare Inc. , No. 13-cv-0157,
Having found that the statute of limitations began to run when Frontier last denied Fugate's request for FMLA leave, which took place between December 5, 2013 and January 2, 2014, Fugate's Complaint must have been filed, at the latest, by January 2, 2016. However, Fugate filed this action on January 13, 2017, outside of the statute of limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed more fully above, the Court GRANTS Frontier's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 41.) A separate Judgment Order will be entered reflecting the Court's ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED .
Also pending in this case are Frontier's motions in limine. (ECF Nos. 47-50.) As this memorandum opinion and order resolves the case, these motions are DENIED AS MOOT .
In 2010, Frontier acquired Verizon's landline business and thus Fugate became an employee of Frontier. (ECF No. 42 at 12.)
The union's plan provided that exempt days could be used for absences due to an employee's personal illness or off duty accident. (See ECF No. 41-2 at 129-30 (Union Agreement).)
The result would be the same under the FMLA's three year statute of limitations for willful violations as the Complaint would have had to be filed, at the latest, by January 2, 2017.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.