Appropriations Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress

Appropriations Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress T h e P resen tatio n C lauses o f th e C o n stitu tio n , A rtic le 1, § 7, clauses 2 and 3, req u ire am en d m en ts o f fu n d in g statutes,- w h e th e r ach iev ed th ro u g h a legislative d isa p p ro v al m echanism o r o th erw ise, to be presen ted to th e P re sid en t in o r d e r to h a v e the fo rce o f law .

C o n g ress can n o t use its p o w e r to a p p ro p ria te m oney to c irc u m v e n t g en eral co n stitu tio n al lim itations o n its p o w er.

August 13, 1980 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR TH E ATTORNEY G E N ER A L This responds to your request for our views on the constitutionality of Congressman Levitas’ amendment to H.R. 7584, the fiscal year 1981 appropriations bill for the Department of State, Justice, Commerce, related agencies, and the Judiciary.1 The purpose of the amendment, which was adopted by the House of Representatives by a voice vote on July 23, 1980, is to prevent the use of funds appropriated under the bill to administer or enforce any regulation which Congress has disap­ proved by legislative veto. 126 Cong. Rec. 19,313 (1980). For reasons stated below, we believe that the amendment is unconstitutional to the extent that it would be invoked by the exercise of power purportedly granted by any legislative veto device, at least where that exercise occurs subsequent to the enactment of the appropriations bill.2

The amendment provides:

Sec. 608. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act shall be available to imple­ ment, administer, or enforce any regulation which has been disapproved pursuant to a resolution of disapproval duly adopted in accordance with the applicable law of the United States.

This amendment is apparently intended to permit Congress to accom­ plish two distinct legislative acts with one set of votes. A vote under the legislative veto provision of some substantive statute, disapproving a rule promulgated by a covered agency, would not only have the purported effect of disapproving the rule, but would also effectively amend the terms of H.R. 7584 by imposing an unconditional limitation on a previously permissible expenditure of funds.3 For example, if Congress, pursuant to § 7(b) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (Pub. L. No. 96-247), voted to disapprove the Attorney General’s standards for prisoners’ administrative remedies,4 the vote would also effect a limitation on title II of H.R. 7584, which designates the functions of this Department for which funds are available. Congress can undoubtedly amend a previously enacted appropriation act to impose additional limitations on the use of appropriated funds. The question raised by this proposal is whether Congress can do so without presenting the amending legislation to the President for his approval or disapproval. This Department has consistently taken the position that the Presentation Clauses of the Constitution mandate the President’s participation in the lawmaking process—no matter what form that process takes.5 You recently reiterated this position in a formal opinion to the Secretary of Education:

I believe it is manifest, from the wording of clause 3 and the history of its inclusion in the Constitution as a separate clause apart from the clause dealing with “bills,” that its purpose is to protect against all congressional

Since the power to appropriate money, and to place binding limitations on the use of that money, is a quintessential legislative act, the conclu­ sion is evident that the Presentation Clauses require amendments of funding statutes, whether achieved through a legislative disapproval mechanism or otherwise, to be presented to the President in order to have the force of law.6

It is well established that Congress cannot use its power to appropri­ ate money to circumvent general constitutional limitations on congres­ sional power. This point was well made in 1933, when Attorney Gen­ eral Mitchell observed, in an opinion to the President, that

Congress holds the purse strings, and it may grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses, and when making an appropriation may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall be devoted and impose conditions in respect to its use, provided always that the conditions do not require operation of the Government in a way forbid­ den by the Constitution. Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such a practice were permissible, Con­ gress could subvert the Constitution. It might make ap­ propriations on condition that the executive department abrogate its functions.7

The Supreme Court has since adopted the essence of Attorney Gen­ eral Mitchell’s position. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), Congress had attached a condition to an appropriations bill forbidding the payment of any funds in that bill to three named individuals. Counsel for Congress argued that the provision was a

• N o t e : T he full text o f the A tto rn ey G en eral’s opinion o f June 5, 1980, for the S ecretary o f Education appears in this volum e at p. 21, supra, and the quoted passage at p. 24. Ed.

6 Mr. Levitas, in support o f his am endm ent, argued that Kendall v. United States. 37 U.S. 524 (1838), forbids the Executive Branch to refuse to execute statutory com m ands from Congress. See 126 Cong. Rec. 19,313 (1980). In Kendall, the C ourt ordered the Executive to pay a certain sum to a c ontractor w ith the Post Office, w here a statute directed that the paym ent be made but the Postm aster G eneral refused to pay it. W e do not doubt the soundness o f that case; it is, how ever, inapplicable to congressional action that does not meet the C onstitution’s prerequisites for legislation.

328 U.S. at 313. The Court, in rejecting the argument made by Con­ gress’ counsel, agreed with the Solicitor General’s argument against the constitutionality of the appropriation rider and established the principle that the spending power may not be used indirectly to achieve an unconstitutional end. The Court reaffirmed this basic tenet in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), by asserting that Congress cannot use a grant of power “in such a manner as to offend . . . constitutional restrictions stemming from the separation of powers.” Id. at 132. The Presentation Clauses constitute an explicit limitation on the power of Congress stemming from the separation of powers, one which this amendment would unconstitutionally contravene.

The Executive’s duty faithfully to execute the law embraces a duty to enforce the fundamental law set forth in the Constitution as well as a duty to enforce the law founded in the acts of Congress, and cases arise in which the duty to the one precludes the duty to the other. We believe that the present case is such a case, because the Levitas amend­ ment intrudes upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive. To regard this provision as legally binding would impair the Executive’s constitutional role and would constitute an abdication of the responsi­ bility of the Executive Branch, as an equal and coordinate branch of government with the Legislative Branch, to preserve the integrity of its functions against constitutional encroachment. We therefore conclude that, if enacted, the Levitas amendment will not have any legal effect, except insofar as it is meant to deny funds for the implementation of regulations that have been subjected to a legislative veto before the bill’s enactment.8 Agencies covered by H.R. 7854 will accordingly be authorized to implement regulations that have purportedly been vetoed by congressional action that does not meet the Constitution’s requisites for legislation.

John M. H arm on Assistant Attorney General Office o f Legal Counsel