delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the facts, proceeded as follows:

This cause depends ■ on an act of the - state of Maryland, which is in force, in the county pf Washington. The first, section of that statute enacts. *4 “ that it shall not be lawful to bring into this state any negro, mulatto, or other slave, for sale, or to reside within this state ; and any person brought into this state contrary to this act, if a slave before, shall, thereupon, immediately gease to be the property of the person or persons so importing or bringing such slaves within this state,, and shall be free.” The 2d section contains a proviso in favour of citizens of the United States coming into this state with a bona fide inten? tion of settling therein, and bringing slaves with thenp The 4th section enacts, that “nothing in this act contained shall be construed or taken to affect the right of any person or persons travelling op sojor ming with any slave or slayes within this state, such slave or slaves not being sold or otherwise disposed of in this state, but carried by the owner out pf the state, or attempted to be carried.”

This act appears tt> the court not to comprehend the case'- now under consideration. The expressions of that part of the first section which prohibits the importation of slaves, are restricted to cases of importation “ for sale or to reside in this state.” The petitioner was obviously not imported for sale, nor is the court of opinion that the short time, for which she was to continue with Mrs. Rankin can satisfy the words, “ to reside within this state.” The legislature must have intended to prohibit a general residence, pot a special limited residence, where the slave is to remain for that portion of the year for which she was hired that still remained.

If on this point the first section of the act could be thought doubtful, the fourth section seems to re *5 prove that doubt. It declares that “ nothing in the act. contained shall be construed or taken to aflfect the right of any person travelling or sojourning with any slave' or slaves within this state, such' slave or slaves not being sold or otherwise disposed of in this state, but carried by. the owner out of this state, or attempted to be carried.”

This section sufficiently. explains the. residence contemplated by the legislature in the first section. The term sojourning, means something more than “ travelling,” and applies to a temporary, as contra-distinguished from apermanent, residence. The court is also of opinion* that the act contemplates and punishes an importation or bringing into the state by the master or owner of. the. slave. This cons truer tion, in. addition to its plain justice, is supported by the words of the first Section. That section declares* that a person brought into this state as a.&laye con-! trary tq this act, if a slave before, shall, thereupon, cease tube the property of the person or persons so importing orbringing such slave within this state, and shall be free.” It is apparent, that the legislature had in view the case of a slave brought by the owner, since it, is the property of the person importing the slave which is forfeited.

Upon the best consideration we have been able to giye this statute, the court is unanimously qf opinion, that the petitioner acquired no right to free.dóní by having been brought into the county of Washington by Mrs. Rankin for one year’s service, she having been in the course of the yéar carried back tp Virginia by her master,

*6 The circuit court appears, to have considered the case as coming, within the proviso of the 2d section. °Fni°n court wfere even to be thought mistaken, the error does not injure the petitioner, and is, therefore, no cause for reversal. The court is unanimously of opinion, that the judgment aught ta be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.