Ross and Morrison v. Reed
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- Tecom, Inc. v. United States (United States Court of Federal Claims 2005)
- United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in the City of Scranton (District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania 1957)
- Atlantic Refining Co. v. United States (Court of Claims 1930)
- McQueen v. Flasdick-Black Land & Lumber Co. (La. 1914)
- Griffin v. American Gold Mining Co. (9th Cir. 1905)
- New River Mineral Co. v. Roanoke Coal & Coke Co. (4th Cir. 1901)
- W.M.M. v. Trump (5th Cir. 2025)
- Hoekstra v. Pershing County Sheriffs Office (District Court, D. Nevada 2025)
- Wang v. Paxton (5th Cir. 2025)
- Trustees for Ohio & Big Sandy Coal Co. v. Commissioner (United States Board of Tax Appeals 1927)
- Whitcomb v. Spring Valley Coal Co. (U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois 1891)
- Lycoming Fire Insurance v. Wright (Vt. 1888)
- County Commissioners of Pueblo County v. Marshall (Colo. 1887)
- United States v. Norton (Supreme Court of the United States 1878)
- Speed v. United States (Supreme Court of the United States 1871)
- People v. Mauran (New York Supreme Court 1848)
- Mayor of Savannah v. President of the Steam Boat Co. (Chatham Superior Court, Ga. 1830)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.'
It is now objected by the plaintiffs in error, that the transcript first mentioned contains nothing but a naked designation- of number, date, person’s name, and number of acres, but no description of the land whatever; not even specifying the county where situate.
To this objection it may be answered, that it is a fact, which will appear from the reports of cases decided in the courts of Tennessee, that the books containing entries for land in the counties of Sullivan and Washington have been lost or destroyed. It is also a fact that the original of the transcript under consideration was directed, by a statute of Tennessee, to be procured and deposited, in the commissioner’s office; and copies therefrom, certified by the clerk, are declared to be eyidence in the. courts of that state; but a conclusive answer is furnished by an examination, of the bill of exceptions: it was not objected to >n the court below.
The same answers may also be given to the. objection taken to the copy of the warrant.
Under the laws of North Carolina for appropriating the vacant lands, an entryys made with the entry taker before a warrant issues: the warrant describes *486 the land specified in the entry: the special or locative calls for appropriation of the land can be seen- and examined as well from a view of the warrant as from the entry. In consequence of various frauds respecting warrants, they were by law to be submitted to a board of commissioners, and if decided to be valid, the original was deposited with the commissioner, and copies, certified by the clerk, were to be received in evidence. The copy of the warrant, in this case, corresponds with these regulations, and was properly received, nor was it objected to in the court below.
The practice in the courts of Tennessee, of attaching a prior entry to a junior grant, to overreach an elder grant in an action of ejectment, was brought into the view of, and-recognized by, this court,'in the case of Polk v. Hill et al.; it is, therefore, not now to be departed from.
The location in this case, upon the face of thq warrant, appears to be sufficiently certain to be sustained, if the objects called for are identified by the testimony, or unless the calls would equally well suit more than one place. These were questions properly submitted to the jury; there was, therefore, no error in the charge and instruction given on this point. Nor was there error in the residue of the instruction. It is a general principle to presume that public officers act correctly until the contrary be shown. It must, therefore, be presumed that the officer, when he surveyed M‘I)owell’s entry, in Reed’s name, had sufficient evidence produced to *487 satisfy him that Reed was the'owner óf it, and this presumption is increased by the act of another officer in issuing the grant; these circumstances furnished prima facie evidence, at least, that he was the owner,
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.