delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question involved in this case arises on the construction to be given to- the 15th section of the statute of limitations of the State of Texas. It is somewhat peculiar in its terms, and is well suited to the policy of a new State desirous to encourage emigration, and the settlement of its vacant lands.

For this purpose the usual limitation of tweuty years, which alone would protect one -who had entered without title, was held insufficient. Hence the legislation of Texas *115 reduced the term to ten years. This term was also reduced to five years when the disseizor entered with a claim of title under a recorded deed, and had paid the taxes and cultivated the land for that length of time.

The limitation of three years now under consideration was intended to protect settlers under junior grants emanating from the State of Texas against older titles under the former Mexican sovereignty, as well as a fraudulent issue of head-right certificates or land scrip under the Republic. This policy is clearly exhibited in this peculiar term and the provisions of this section.

As respects the instruction requested by the plaintiffs counsel, we are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing it.

There was no dispute that the defendant purchased with full notice of the previous deed to Curtis. The only question was, whether this deed from the sheriff gave him such a title or color of title as is required by the statute.

Unnecessary labor and learning has been expended by counsel, as to the construction of similar statutes in other States, and as to whether the possession of defendent was adverse or not. This section of the statute is its own interpreter. It was not made to protect mere adverse possession; it carefully defines th'e construction of the words used. By the term title, as used in this section, is meant “ a regular chain of transfer from, or under the sovereignty of the soil; and color of title is constituted by a consecutive chain of such transfer down to him or her or them in possession, without being regular, as if one or more of the memorials or instruments be not registered, or not duly registered, or be ouly in writing; or such, like defect,” <^e., $-c.

Now, this ease shows no such “ chain of title or transfer from the sovereignty,” as to constitute either title or color of title. As defined by the act, a link in the chain is absent, which is necessary to make the whole one chain. It is not merely a defect or flaw in some link in the chaiu which may make it weak at that point, but there is no chain at all. A sale of *he sheriff on a judgment against “ A,” confers nei *116 ther title nor color of title to the property of “B.” In Thompson v. Cragg, * the court say: “Nor can there be color of title where there is a complete hiatus in the chain. Color of titles differs from titles only in externals. The substance of both is the same, were this not so. If color of title were something intrinsically and substantially less or weaker than title, then the wisdom of the legislature could not be vindicated,” &e. This construction of the statute as thus settled by the courts of Texas is conclusive, even if we doubted its correctness, which we do not.

Judgment reversed, and a venire db novo awarded.