having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is very obvious, we think, that this case is not the case of an entire repeal of a former act which imposed a penalty. The act of 1868 repealed former acts only so far as they were inconsistent with its provisions. It is needful, therefore, to note carefully what its provisions were. Plainly, it had no reference to spirits that had been withdrawn from a bonded warehouse for transportation to another before its enactment. It provided a system for the future, and looked exclusively to that. It regulated conduct from and after its passage, and declared that thereafter no spirits should be removed without payment of the- full tax. It was only as the prior acts might affect spirits in bonded warehouses after its enactment that they could be inconsistent with its provisions. So far those acts were repealed. But spirits which had been removed before were not in its purview. We are unable to perceive how provisions respecting transportation in 1867 can be inconsistent with regulations respecting custody in 1868. The subjects are not the same, and the statutes are rules of action intended for different times. We think, therefore, that in their application to removals of distilled spirits in 1867, the acts of Congress of 1862,1866, and 1867 were unaffected by the act of 1868, and consequently that the plea of the defendants was no sufficient answer to the plaintiffs’ declaration. Hence the demurrer should have been sustained.

Judgment reversed, and the cause remitted for further proceedings

In conformity with this opinion.