delivered the opinion of the court.

To uphold the ruling made by the Court of Claims would-be, we think, to take a narrow view of the legislative intention in this case and to give substantial effect to the technical defences which have distinguished this litigation. There ' is no defence now on the merits, nor was there when the case went to Congress. It went there, not because the United States was not bound by the covenants of.the lease, but for-the reason that, in the opinion of the Court of Claims, Cross had not the legal right to enforce the obligation. Saffarans had undertaken to assign the lease to Cross, and no question was made as to his ownership until the Secretary of the-' Treasury attempted to rescind the contract. Then it was; discovered that the assignment lacked legal formality, and' the government availed itself of this defence, and this only,' in the Court of Claims to defeat the action. In this state of-case Congress was called upon to act.

The technical defect in the mode of assignment was the only obstacle encountered by Cross in the prosecution of his claim, yet while it remained it was effectual to prevent a recovery. To remove it and allow a trial on the merits required the assent of Congress, and this was given. That the waiver by Congress .of the right of the United States to make this defence was not limited to any particular suit, but was extended to the entire controversy respecting the lease, seems clear enough from the language of the. resolution/ itself. The Court of Claims was told if it found Gross to be the equitable owner of the lease, and in justice and equity entitled to -the rents (if any) due. thereon from the United States, to render judgment in his favor, notwithstanding any technical defect in the assignment of the lease. And to leave no room for-doubt on the subject the court was directed further, to take bond from Cross to indemnify the government “ against any demand which may be set up and .established by or on behalf of the heirs or representatives of Saffarans under or by virtue of said contract or lease.” Why the-extent of this reqüirement if the waiver was'only applicable to the rents in controversy in the proceeding then *484 pending before Congress? We caiinot suppose, without an express declaration to that, effect, that Congress intended to legislate in -a manner that would enable a creditor of the government to obtain only a part of his claim when the lohole of it was deemed by the court that tried the case to be meritorious.

It is true the lease was at an end when Congress acted and the court reheard the cause, and Cross could by proper amendment to his petition have embraced also that portion of his demand for which .he now sues; and that would have been the proper course for him to have pursued, but he was not compelled to take it. In covenant for non-payment of rent, payable at different times, a new action lies as often as the respective sums become due and payable. As this suit is-for instalments of rent not due when the first suit was instituted-, and as they were not included in it in any stage of the proceeding, the plea of former recovery has no application.

On the finding of facts by the court below judgment should have been rendered for the claimant for $69,515.

It is, therefore, ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the. Court of Claims, with directions to enter

Judgment for that sum.