having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

The several provisions bearing on the subject, in the act of July 20th, 1868, under which the bond sued on in this case was taken, show the importance attached by the statute to the place as designated in the notice required to be given by the distiller before commencing business. Here the bond, it is to be presumed, followed the notice. The designation of the place is made important to the distiller, to his sureties, and to the government, in several respects. If the place be not as designated iu the notice the distiller is outside of the law and liable to the penalties denounced by the sixth section. If it be within six hundred feet of premises authorized to be used for rectifying, he is liable to suffer as prescribed in the eighth section. The premises having been specified in the notice, the surety, before executing the bond, *656and the assessor, before taking it, may «samine aiid determine how far, in the event of liability on the part of the principal, the property would be available as security for the government and indemnity for the surety.

If the proposition of the counsel for the United States were sustained, the designation of the place, as in this bond, instead of affording a limitation and a safeguard to the surety, might prove but a delusion and a snare, and subject him to liabilities which he could not have foreseen, and to the hazard of which he would not knowingly have exposed himself In such cases, the United States having a lien, the surety is entitled to the benefit of it. He might be willing to bind himself where the lien was upon one piece or parcel of property, and unwilling where it was upon another. His ultimate immunity or liability might depend wholly upon the value of the premises. He had the option to assume the risk or not. This element may have controlled the exercise of his election.

Viewing the subject in the light of these considerations, we cannot assent to the view expressed by the counsel for the government. On the contrary, we think this term of the bond is of the essence of the contract. It is hardly less so than the amount of the penalty. One defines the place where the liability must arise, the other the maximum of that liability for which the sureties stipulated to bo bound. The former can no more be held immaterial than the latter. No distillery having been carried on at the place named, the contract never took effect. The event to which it referred did not occur. There could consequently be no liability within the letter or meaning of the contract. It .was as if the agreement had been for the good conduct of a clerk while in the service of B., aud the clerk never entered his service, but entered into the service of another. Distilling begun and carried on elsewhere was no more within the obligation of the sureties than if it had been begun and carried on there or elsewhere by a person other than Boecker. No other place than that named is, under the. circumstances of this case, within the letter, spirit, or meaning of the bond. *657The specification has no elasticity. It cannot be made to extend to the locality where the distillery here in question was placed. In Miller v. Stewart,* this court said: “Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that the liability of a surety is not to be extended by implication beyond ihe terms of his contract. To the extent, and in the manner, and under the circumstances pointed out in his obligation he is bound, and no further. . . . It is not sufficient that he may sustain no injury by a change in the contract, or that it may even be for his benefit. He has a right to stand upon the very terms of his contract, and if ho does not assent to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is fatal.”

To the same effect is Ludlow v. Simond.† There is' no more learned and elaborate ease upon the subject.

The leading English case is Lord Arlington v. Merricke.‡

These authorities are conclusive of the case before us. It is needless to analyze and discuss them.. Others, without number, maintaining the same principle, might be referred to. Many of those" most apposite to this case are cited in the argument of the counsel for the defendants in error. The rules of the common law upon the subject are as old as the Year Books. Those rules were doubtless borrowed from the earlier Roman jurisprudence, known as the civil law. They obtain throughout the States of our Union. The adjudications.everywhere are in substantia] harmony.

The question here was not as to the law in the abstract, but as to its application to the facts of the case.

A careful examination has satisfied us that the learned judge upon the trial below instructed the jury correctly.

Judgment affirmed.

(with whom concurred Justices CLIFFORD, DAVIS, and STRONG), dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the court in this case. It seems to me that it has a tendency to cast every burden on *658the government and to unduly relieve the sureties of the distiller from responsibility for his acts. By the sixth section of the act of July 20th, 1868, every person intending to he engaged in the business of a distiller is to give notice in writing to the assessor of the district within which such business is to be carried on, stating his name and place of residence, and the place where said business is to be carried on; and if in a city, the residence and place of business is to be indicated by the name and number of the street. He is then, by the seventh section, to execute a bond with at least two-sureties, to be approved by the assessor. Such a notice and such a bond were given in this case. The bond recited, in the preamble to the condition, the fact that the distiller intended to be engaged in the business of a distiller within the second collection district of the State of Maryland, to wit, at the corner of Hudson Street and East Avenue, situate in the town of Cauton, county of Baltimore. Then followed the terms of the condition, namely, that the distiller should in all respects faithfully comply with all the provisions of law, &c., and not suffer the lot on which the distillery stood to be incumbered, &c. Now the sureties contend that if the distillery is actually established on a different lot from that suggested in the recital, though only across the street, or even the adjoining lot on the same side, •they are not^bound. It seems to me that it is for them, and not for the government, to see that the distiller pursues his business on the lot which he gives notice to the assessor that he will use for that purposed They are the guarantors of bis conduct to the government, and not the government to them. If after starting his distillery he changes its location, or after giving notice of the location he changes his mind and commences business on another lot, the sureties ■ought to be bound for the regularity of his conduct. If he should not carry on business in the designated district, but in a different one, subject to the jurisdiction of another assessor, to whom the bond was not given, the result might ■be different. But if he establishes it in the same district, •the 'sureties ought to be liable. The condition is not that *659he shall comply with the law only on that particular lot. That can only be claimed as an inference of law. But does such an inference arise in this case? The fact that the distiller intended to pursue his business on that lot is mentioned, it is true, in accordance with his notice. But this is no part of the substance of the condition ; the substance is that he was going to engage in the business of a distiller in that district, and the sureties guaranteed his compliance with the law. Where a sheriff or marshal is elected or appointed for a particular term, a bond given for the faithful discharge of his duties relates by implication of law to that term alone; and the sureties are not bound for a subsequent term in case of his re-election or reappointment. This is so, whether the condition recites the term of office for which the appointment was made or not. This is the reasonable inference from the whole transaction. But, in the case under consideration, the implication of law and the reasonable inference is that the sureties are bound for the conduct of their principal, though he should change the location of his distillery to any other place within the district. Otherwise the government is liable to be subjected to great frauds. It is the duty of the sureties, rather than that of the government officials, to see that no change is made without the distiller’s pursuing the formalities required by the law. If it is made without those formalities, there would be stronger reason for holding that fact of itself as constituting a violar tion of the bond, than for holding that it discharges the sureties from all obligation whatever.