delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases require but very little discussion, as they have already been before the court and substantially settled in Tomlinson v. Branch and City of Charleston v. Branch, reported in 15 Wall., pp. 460, 470. The result to which we came in those cases was substantially this: that the respective roads and the property of the two companies, which had become consolidated in the hands of the South Carolina Railroad Company, — namely, that of the Canal and Railroad Company, and that of the Louisville and Charleston Railroad Company, — respectively retained their original status towards the public and the State, the same as if they had not been consolidated under a single proprietorship. As one of these roads has become taxable, and the other has not, the rights of the State and the public growing out of this accidental diversity may sometimes raise questions of some embarrassment. This occasions the only difficulty remaining to be solved in these cases. From Branchville to Charleston there is but one road, and that is a part of the original road of the Canal and Railroad Company, used in common for the accommodation of both branches of the property. The Louisville and Charleston Railroad Company had a chartered right to extend their road to Charleston, but were met by the exclusive privileges of the elder company; and hence the purchase of its property and the ultimate consolidation. Now, the fact that the elder company had this exclusive privilege, shows that, even if the consolidation had not taken place, the old road would have continued to do the work of both companies between Branchville and Charleston, and this part of the line would have been now subject to taxation. It does not follow, therefore, that this part of the road, though used for the accommodation of both branches, should be regarded as divisible into proportional parts, one subject to taxa*683tion, and the other not. It is to be regarded as simply the road and property of the old company; in the hands of the new company it is true, but subject to all the liabilities of its original charter. Hence we held that the entire line of road between Branchville and Charleston is subject to taxation; and that prima facie the railroad terminus and depot in Charleston and the property accessory thereto belong to the elder portion of the joint property. But inasmuch as' the charter right of the present company extended to Charleston, we further held, that if it could be fairly shown that any of the company’s property there was acquired by the present company for the accommodation of the business belonging to its original roads, or for the joint accommodation of the entire system of roads under its control, such property would, pro tanto and in fair proportion, be exempt from taxation. This was intended to meet the case of such property as the present company might have acquired in Charleston, either separately or in conjunction with the old company, had no consolidation taken place, and had the line between Branchville and Charleston, used by both, remained the property of the old company. Of course, in carrying out this principle, any repairs or improvements made on the old line or the property of the old company would become a part thereof, and be subject to taxation. But newly acquired property might not be. This is the general principle. The method of carrying it out in detail admits of some latitude for the exercise of deliberation and judgment. We have examined the report of the special master to whom the matter was referred, and the review of that report by the court below, and we think that a result was reached corresponding in the main to the principle which we have endeavored to establish. There is but one item which we regard as calling for any interference with the decree appealed from; that is the item of $25,000 for replacing the tracks and side-tracks within the city limits, which we think fairly belongs to the old road, and should have been taxed in toto, and not pro tanto.

With this modification, decree affirmed.