delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

Tbe errors assigned upon this record are,- in substance, that tbe contract given in evidence is illegal: —

1. Because it is an assignment of a one-tentb interest in the. claim of Wright,-and not “freely made and executed in tbe presence of at least two witnesses, after the allowance of tbe claim, tbe ascertainment of tbe amount due, and the issuance of a warrant for tbe payment thereof,” as- required by sect. 3477, Rev. Stat.;

■ 2. Because it is tainted with illegality and immorality,' and', is against public policy; and,

3. Because it is. champertous, as it was a bargain to pay ■ one-tentb of whatever might be collected.

1. As to .the first objection, all that need be said is, that there is no claim of. any lien upon tbe fund. - All Wright undertakes to do is to pay “ one-tentb of whatever be may‘realize ' from tbe Choctaw Indians, . . . whenever tbe money Comes into bis bands.” Tebbitts asserts no claim upon-the fund: be only asks that be may be paid by Wright for bis services after tbe money bas been collected, and in accordance with tbe ■ stipulations of tbe contract or memorandum.

2. Tebbitts bas not engaged in any improper oí illegal service. Wright bad a claim against tbe Choctaw Indians, which' they, by their treaty, bad agreed to submit to an adjudication by commissioners to’ be appointed for that purpose. He employed Tebbitts to appear for him professionally before that commission, and enforce bis claim. Tebbitts appeared, and presented an argument in behalf of bis client. • This is all be did, arid all he engaged to doi It was legitimate service rendered in a legitimate employment. To deprive a claimant of the -means of obtaining such professional service would be to deprive him, in many instances, of tbe. means of asserting and *254 enforcing his claim. In this case, so far as any thing appears by the record, Wright neither contracted for nor received any thing else than legitimate and honorable professional assistance. Such an agreement we held to be valid in Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 450; for we then said, speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne, “We entertain no doubt ... an agreement, express ' or implied, for purely professional services, is valid.” Such services, we say, “ rest on the saihe principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable.” In fact, the commission acting on this claim was a quasi court. It was, in no material respect, for all the ■ purposes of' the present controversy, different from the “ Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims,” or the “ Southern Claims Commission,” or the “Mexican Claims Commission,” or “ Spanish Claims Commission,” which have been called together, in pursuance of treaty stipulations or otherwise, to settle and adjust disputed claims, for the purpose of their ultimate payment and satisfaction. There is nothing illegal, immoral, or against public policy, in a professional engagement to present and prosecute such claims before such tribunals.

3. In Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415, we decided that an agreement to pay a reasonable percentage upon the amount of recovery Avas not an illegal contract. Here, after the service had been rendered, and after, as was supposed, the claim had been -secured, Wright agreed to pay ten per cent of the amount eventually realized as compensation for the labor done. We see no reason to find fault with this; and the jury seem also to have adopted this rule, which the parties established for themselves, as presenting the true criterion for estimating the reasonable value of the services rendered.

The judgment is affirmed.