delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced by Hoadley, the appellant, a citizen of California, Jan. 5, 1870, in the District Court for the twelfth judicial district of that. State, to quiet his title to certain of the pueblo lands of the city of San Francisco, granted to that city by the act of Congress passed July 1,1864, 13 Stat. 333, sect. 5, of which, so far as it is material for the determination of this cause, is as follows: —

“ That all the right and title of the United States to the lands within the corporate limits of the city of San Francisco . . . are hereby relinquished and granted to the said city and its successors, for the uses and purposes specified in the ordinances of said city, ratified by an act of the legislature of the said State, approved on the 11th of March, 1858. ...”

He claimed as one of the beneficiaries under this grant by the operation of-the city ordinances referred to. The question to be determined is whether he was so in fact.

Sect. 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, is as follows: —

“ Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State court, where the matter .in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred *5 dollars, and arising under tbe Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, . . . either party may remove said suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district.”

After the passage of' this act, Hoadley removed his suit to the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of California, alleging that it was one arising under tbe Constitution and laws of tbe United States. In tbe Circuit Court be amended bis bill, setting forth in detail tbe particulars of bis claim to tbe benefit of tbe act of Congress through tbe city ordinances. To this amended bill tbe city demurred, assigning for cause, among others, that it did not show that tbe Circuit Court bad jurisdiction. Upon tbe bearing of this demurrer, tbe court entered an order remanding tbe cause to tbe State court, and from that order tbe present appeal has been taken.

By sect. 5 of tbe act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 471, it is provided “ that tbe order of tbe Circuit Court dismissing or remanding tbe cause shall be reviewable by tbe Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as tbe case may be.” This is a modification of tbe previous legislation upon this subject, under which we held, in Insurance Company v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 270, and Railroad Company v. Wiswall, 23 id. 508, “that tbe remedy in such a case was by mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of error to review what has been done.”

We have, therefore, jurisdiction of this appeal, but we are clearly of tbe opinion that tbe Circuit Court did not err in-remanding tbe cause. Tbe questions -involved did not arise under tbe laws of the United States, but under tbe ordinances of tbe city as ratified by tbe act of tbe legislature. Tbe act of Congress operated as a release to tbe city of all tbe interest of tbe United States in tbe land. Tbe title of tbe United States was vested in tbe city. Whether tbe city took tbe beneficial interest in tbe property as well as tbe legal title depended upon tbe effect to be given to tbe act of tbe legislature and tbe ordinances, and not upon tbe act of Congress. Tbe case is precisely the same in principle as it would have been if tbe city bad, previous to tbe act of Congress, conveyed tbe land to Hoadley by deed, with covenants of warranty. If *6 in such a case a controversy should arise between Hoadley and. the city as to whether or not the title granted to. the city inured to his benefit under the warranty, the question would not be as to the effect of the grant from the United States, but as to that pf the conveyance from the city. The cáse would not arise under the laws of the United States, but under tho deed and its covenants. Decree affirmed.