delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

By sect. 827 of tbe Revised Statutes of tbe United States relating to the .District of Columbia, it is enacted as follows, viz.:—

“ Where money is payable by two ..or more persons jointly or severally, as by joint obligors, covenantors, makers, drawers, or indorsers, one action may be sustained and judgment recovered against all or any of the parties by whom the money is payable, at the option of the plaintiff. But an action against one or some of the parties by whom the money is payable may, while the litigation therein continues, be pleaded in bar of another action against another or othérs of the said parties.” 14 Stat. 405, § 20.

This is a portion of an act of Congress entitled “ An Act to amend tbe law of tbe District of Columbia in relation to judicial proceedings therein.” In tbe case before us, an action was commenced and tbe process, served upon two of tbe several makers of a promissory note and one of tbe indorsers thereof, there being other makers and other indorsers of tbe note.

The statute is not happily expressed, whatever' may have been the Intention of its framers. It is contended, on tbe one hand, that it was designed merely to modify tbe common-law rule, that,- in case of a joint and several contract, all tbe parties must be sued in one ‘ action, or a separate action be brought against each, and to allow the plaintiff to sue one or more of the parties in one action, and to - omit a portion, of them, at bis [pleasure.

*640 It-'is insisted, on the others band, that it is ah’enactment in the.- spirit of the provisions of numerous State statutes, permitting the bolder -of a note to join the makers and indorsers, at his discretion, ib the same action^ The latter, we are told in the brief, has been the uniform construction of the statute by the courts of the District since its passage, more than ten years .since, and we are of the opinion that it is a sound construction. .The words, “ as by joint obligors, covenantors, makers, drawers, or indorsers,” are inserted by way of illustration,, and, like many other, intended illuminations, serve but to darken the subject. Omitting theste words (as parenthetical), the statute provides that one action may be' sustained against all or any of the parties by whom payable, where money is payable by two or more persons jointly or. severally.

In the present case, there is a sum of f 1,993 payable upon an instrument in writing. It is payable- by Howard, one of the makers of the note: .It is payable also by Burdette, one of the, indorsers of the note, and it is the same sum of $1,993 that is payable by each of them. A collection of the mqney by the bolder from one of the parties- would be a bar to further proceedings by'him against the others. So an action, simply against Howard alone would, in -our opinion, give Burdétte the benefit of the latter clause of the statute ; to wit, that -an "action - against one of the parties, while it continued, might be pleaded in bar of another action against- Mm, as another party to the contract. So far as the. present question is concerned, the act of Congress was. intended to produce the effect of the statutes of several of the States; to wit, “ Persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including the parties to bills of exchange or promissory notes', may'all or any of them be included in the' same' action, at the option of thé plaintiff.” 2 Edm. Stat. of N. Y., p. 32.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia was right, and is - Affirmed.