after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

If the certificate of the sheriff were the only document in the record, ref erring to the service of the complaint and notice, there would be no doubt as to the correctness of the ruling of the court below. Service upon the wife of the defendant was not service upon him. No theoretical unity of husband and wife can make service upon one equivalent to service upon the other. Personal citation to the defendant, or his voluntary appearance, is the essential preliminary to a purely personal judgment. The statute of the State in force at the time required service in cases other than those brought against corporations, or persons laboring under some disability, as minors, or as being of unsound mind, to be made by delivering a copy to the defendant personally; or, if he could not be found, to some white person of his family above the age of fourteen years, at his dwelling-house or usual place of abode. If it be admitted that substituted service of this kind upon some other member of the family is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against its head, binding him to the payment of money or damages, it can only be where the condition upon which such service is permissible is shown to exist. The inability of the' officer to find the defendant was not a fact to be inferred, but a fact to be affirmatively stated in his return. The substituted service in actions purely in personam was a departure from the rule of the common law, and the authority for it, if it could be allowed at all, must have been strictly followed.

Such we find to be the ruling of the Supreme Court of Oregon. In Trullenger v. Todd (5 Oreg. 39), judgment was entered *448by default for want of an answer by tbe clerk, in vacation, under tbe act of 1868, upon a certificate of tbe sheriff that be had served tbe summons upon tbe defendant “ by delivering a copy thereof to a person of tbe family above tbe age of fourteen years, at tbe dwelling-house or place of abode of tbe defendant ; ” and tbe court held tbe certificate insufficient to authorize tbe entry of judgment in not containing tbe fact that tbe defendant could not be found. Tbe statute, so far as tbe. manner of service was concerned, was similar.to that of 1861, a summons being substituted for tbe notice. “ Tbe statute,” said tbe court, “ in providing bow service shall be made, evidently implies that when a summons is placed in tbe bands of an officer for service, that be will use ordinary diligence, at least, to find tbe party against whom tbe summons is issued, in order that be may make personal service upon him; but after using ordinary diligence, if be should fail to find such party, constructive service may be made; and when such service is made, the certificate should contain the fact that the party could not be found.” Tbe court having thus held tbe judgment void, tbe only question left for its determination was whether it could entertain an appeal from it, as a void judgment could be disregarded and treated as a nullity whenever any right was claimed under it, whether set aside or not. It maintained the appeal solely for tbe purpose of reversing tbe judgment and thus purging its records.

Here it is contended that the recital in the entry of tbe default of the defendant in tbe case in tbe State court, “ that, although duly served with process, be did not come, but made default,” is evidence that due service on him was made, notwithstanding the return of tbe sheriff, and supplies its omission. But tbe answer is, that tbe recital must be read in connection with that part of tbe record which gives the official evidence prescribed by statute. This evidence must prevail over the recital, as tbe latter, in tbe absence of an averment to the contrary, tbe record being complete, can only be considered as referring to tbe former.

"We do not question the doctrine that a court of general jurisdiction acting within tbe scope of its authority — that is, within tbe boundaries which tbe law assigns to it with respect *449to subjects and persons — is presumed to act rightly and to have jurisdiction to render the judgment it pronounces, until the contrary appears. But this presumption can only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts, concerning which the record is silent. It cannot be indulged when the evidence respecting the facts is stated, or averments respecting them are made. If the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. But if the record give the evidence or make an averment with respect to a jurisdictional fact, it will be taken to speak the truth, and the whole truth, in that regard; and no presumption will be allowed that other and different evidence was produced, or that the fact was otherwise than as averred. “ If, for example,” to give an illustration from the case of Galpin v. Page (18 Wall. 366), “it appears from the return of the officer or the proof of service contained in the record that the summons was served at a particular place, and there is no averment of any other service, it will not be presumed that service was also made at another and different place; or if it appear in like manner that the service was made upon a person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant also.”

We are of opinion that the principle here stated applies in this case.. The record from the State court showed service upon the wife of the defendant in that case, and not upon the defendant; and in the absence of any finding of the court that other service was made, or the finding of a fact from which other service must necessarily be inferred, none will be presumed. Other service will not be presumed from its assumption in a recital in the entry of a default. It follows that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed; and it is

So ordered.

with whom concurred Mr. Chief Justice Waite and Mr. Justice Hablan, dissenting.

I dissent from the judgment in this case.

The entry of judgment recites that process was duly served. *450The return of the sheriff, though it does not state all the facts necessary to make the service good, yet does not contradict the recital; and no allegation was made that the defendant could have been found to be personally served with process. Under these circumstances, I think the judgment cannot be assailed collaterally.