delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts as above, he said:

It was settled in Bigelow v. Forest, 9 Wall. 339, 350, and Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S. 202, that ordinarily the estate acquired by a purchaser of real property condemned and sold Under the confiscation act of July 17th, 1862, terminates with the life of the person for whose act it was seized. The only question in the present case is .whether Waples, the purchaser, occupies a different position because of what was done with reference to the Bradford mortgage. We think- he does not. The saló was made on ,the sentence of condemnation alone! The only suit. ever begun, was that by the United States to secure a condemnation under the law. Bradford intervened for the .protection of his interest in what was to be condemned. He could not in that suit foreclose his mortgage on the property. All he could get and all he sought tó get was payment out of the proceeds of any sale ordered in consequence of the condemnation. His mortgage covered the fee, but the suit, in which he intervened was in its legal effect only to subject the property for the life of the mortgagor. He was interested as well in what was to be condemned as in what remained after the condemnation was exhausted. As his lien was not condemned, his rights under it would have been superior to the title acquired by Waples but for his application *9 to be paid from the proceeds. Having made his application and got thé proceeds, the interest in th'e land bought-by Waples was relieved from his lien, but in no other respect was it enlarged. The only effect of the intervention was to give Waples the title to his tenancy for the life of Hays free of the lien of the mortgage. Whether Bradford can proceed against the property in the hands of the heirs for the recovery of the balance that remained due to him after the application of the proceeds of this sale, is a question we 'need not consider.

Neither are the United States or Wapies subrogated to the rights of Bradford under this mortgage. To the extent of the proceeds actually received by Bradford his debt has been paid out of the mortgaged property. He 'got what he did because of the lien given him by Hays on the fee before the cause of forfeiture arose. This lien, it was adjudged in the condemnation suit, could not be condemned under the seizure that had been made, and so to secure to the purchaser a title to the property for the life of Hays the proceeds of the sale were applied to the extinguishment of the encumbrance that would otherwise have rested upon that estate for life. In this way Waples got all the title the United States undertook to convey; that is to say, an unencumbered right to the use and enjoyment of the property during the life of Hays. It is true that the Unitéd States realized no money from the sale for its own use, but that does not alter the rights of Waples. ' He bought the property for the life of Hays, and that was all he bought. His position was that of a tenant for the life of another. The death of Hays terminated his tenancy.

On the trial the plaintiffs offered in evidence the deed under which Hays took his title. This was objected to because it had not been set forth in the petition, and was not attached thereto, and the lots were not described in the petition as required by sec. 174 of the Code of Practice of Louisiana. This objection was properly overruled. It is well established in Louisiana that if the defendant goes to trial on a petition defective in this particular he waives the objection. Smith v. Blunt, 2 La. 133; Maillon v. Boyce, 14 La. Ann. 621.

The judgment is affirmed.