after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case the only limitations on the exercise of the power granted to the railway to construct and maintain its bridge, pointed to, are that “the said company shall preserve any water course which its said railway may pass ■ upon, along, or intersect, touch, or cross, so as not to impair its usefulness to the public unnecessarily, . . . and the said company shall not be required to construct a draw in any bridge *589 over and across any stream or bayou, except streams navigable by enrolled and licensed vessels, and when required by law.” And as it appears that the company has constructed a draw of ample width in its bridge over the Atchafalaya River, and as it is not alleged or shown that the bridge as constructed has impaired the usefulness of the river to the public unnecessarily, it follows that the structure must be deemed a lawful one.

The defendant company haying elected to stand upon a general demurrer, we must treat the bill as establishing the fact that the bridge, as constructed and maintained, is a lawful structure, and that the same does not impair unnecessarily the usefulness of the river to the public.

We cannot agree with the proposition of the court below and pressed on us here in the argument of the appellees, that the relief asked for is in the nature of a regulation of commerce, such as could only be prescribed by Congress.

• If built and maintained as a lawful structure, of importance to the public, the company owning it can at all times have recourse to the courts to protect the same. If injuries have been negligently or wantonly inflicted upon the bridge, an action at law can be maintained against the wrongdoers for the damages suffered ; and if such injuries are threatened, and a court of equity can be satisfied that irreparable injuries may be occasioned by careless or wanton action on the part of navigators, a remedy by injunction can surely be' had. Nor do we think that, in a case like that presented in the bill, a court of equity would be constrained to refuse relief by injunction till there had been a trial at law. ■ The ordinary rule that courts of equity will not act where there is a dispute about the title or the extent of the legal rights of the parties, until there has been a trial at law, does not apply to a case like' the present one.

Nevertheless we do not feel constrained, upon the facts that appear in this case, to reverse the decree, below and send the case back for further proceedings on answer and evidence.

Nearly four years have elapsed since the filing of the bill, and the exigency created by the existence of an unusual flood', which was made the principal foundation of the bill, has long *590 since passed away. To now entertain the bill would be to deal with a.state of affairs no longer existing, and which possibly may never recur. The decree dismissing the bill reserved the rights of the complainant to bring an action for the recovery of its damages. The bill does not in terms allege that the defendant company, in towing six barges at once, was doing anything unusual, or out of the course of reasonable navigation. Nor does there appear to have been but a single instance of collision with the bridge in the long period during which it has existed, and in that instance it does not appear, by any allegation in the bill, that the towboat was guiding as many as six barges.

It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellants, that the course of the defendants, in demurring generally to the bill, and of the court in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill, will, as a matter of precedent, leave them in a remediless position; that the decree of the court, particularly when the grounds upon which it was based are considered, would seem to wholly shut the gates of a court of equity against them, no matter how great an exigency might arise.

There is force in this view, and we think the decree dismissing the bill should be without prejudice generally, and not be restricted to saving the complainant’s right to bring an action at law only.

Although we think that the appellants are entitled to such an amendment of the decree, yet, as they do not seem to have made any motion to that effect in the court below, vfhen it may be presumed that court would have readily conceded such amendment, and as they have not confined their contention here to that matter, we shall not relieve them from the costs of this appeal.

The decree of-the court below dismissing the bill is directed to be amended so that the same shall be without prejudice generally, and is otherwise Affirmed.