delivered the opinion of the court.

The act of 1853 operated to. transfer to the city of Burlington the fee to this strip along the river front, together with full control over it, .subject only to the laws of the State and. individual rights theretofore vested. Indeed, independent of the-act it would' seem that the United States has no control over the question of the uses to which the strip shall be put. United States v. Illinois Central, 154 U. S. 225.

The use to which this land was reserved was not that of a highway albne, but “ other ’public uses.” This does not mean other public uses similar in character. The rule hoscitur, a soeiis does not apply ; for under the act of 1836 the reservation is not simply of this strip but of public squares whose use is obviously not of the same character as that of the highway. Indeed, as well said by the Supreme Court of the State, the fact that the land reserved was two hundred feet wide precludes the idea that it was intended for public travel alone.” The further fact that the-reservation was of a strip along the Mississippi River — a great navigable waterway: — implies that the public uses ter which this strip might be put included all public qses which would tend to facilitate commerce on such highway, including therein whárves, storehouses, etc.

Land devoted to the use of á railroad .is. devoted to public use, and under' the settled "law of Iowa a common highway may be used by a; railroad without further compensation to adjoining landowners. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 341, arid cases from the Supreme Court of Iowa cited in the opinion.

. The public having control over a highway may determine the manner in,which it shalLbe improved, and, as a general-yule, such improvement cannot be enjoined by an abutfing lot or landowner, whatever may be-his ¡right to compensation growing oqUof the injury which duch riaanner of. improvement may brirjg to his property. This being true of ordinary highways, a fortiori is it true'in respect to. this property which was. not reserved for. a highway alone, but for other publicqses,

*373 It does not appear that the plaintiff was pecuniarily damaged. The Supreme Court of Iowa said in . its opinion .that “ there is not one word in the evidence showing that the plaintiff would be damaged in any sum of money by the proposed change.” Whether there be any damage or not, or whether it be true that the plaintiff, having suffered pecuniary injury, is entitled to compensation therefor, its right, if any, is limited to the matter of compensation, and does not in the absence of constitutional, provisions — like those, for instance, found' in the constitution of Illinois — entitle it to an injunction to restrain the proposed change.

The use of this strip for railroad purposes being a public use'and within, the authority granted by the original reservation, the extent of that use is a matter for determination by the public authorities and cannot be restrained by the plaintiff, an adjoining lot owner, Whatever ma be its rights to compensation for the injury to its lots. We see no error in the decision of the Supreme Court of the State, and it is

Affirmed.