Nelson v. Moloney

Supreme Court of the United States
Nelson v. Moloney, 174 U.S. 164 (1899)
19 S. Ct. 622; 43 L. Ed. 934; 1899 U.S. LEXIS 1491

Nelson v. Moloney

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, by Chief Judge Parker, that the defences interposed by Nelson “ upon the trial, and relied upon here, are: (1) The stipulation given by the plaintiff on the appeal to this court in a prior action brought to foreclose the mortgage is a bar to the recovery in this action. (2) The bond and mortgage having been given to indemnify bail in a criminal case, they are void, because contrary to public policy.”

The Court of Appeals ruled that the contention that the stipulation given on appeal to that court operated to prevent a recovery, was without support in authority or reason; ” and as to the second ground relied upon to defeat the action, that it was not a part of the public policy of the State of New York to insist upon personal liability of sureties and forbid bail to become indemnified. These conclusions involved no Federal question, nor can we find on this record that any title, right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution or the laws of the United States was specially set up or claimed in the state courts, and that the decision of the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had was against any title, right, privilege or immunity so set up or claimed. But ■it is said that Nelson filed his petition and bond for the removal of the cause from the Supreme Court of the State of New York to the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York on the ground that, at the time of the commencement of the action, he was a citizen of New Jersey and Moloney was a citizen of the State of New York, and that the action taken thereon raised a Federal question. It appeared that Moloney, and Adams, the holder of the record title to the property mortgaged, were both citizens of the State of New York, and it is not claimed that the state court denied the petition, but, on the contrary, conceded that *168 the record was transmitted to the Circuit Court, and that that court, on motion, remanded the cause to the state court because there was no separable controversy wholly between citizens of different States. This being so, the proceedings in relation to the removal Of the cause afforded no ground for the issue of the writ of error.

In Missouri Pacific Railway v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 582, we held that: “If the Circuit Court remands a cause and the state court thereupon proceeds to final judgment, the action of the Circuit Court is not reviewable on writ of error to • such judgment. A state court cannot be held to have decided against a Federal right, when it is the Circuit Court, and not the státe court, which has denied its possession. ... As under the statute a remanding order of the Circuit Court is not reviewable by this court on appeal or writ of error from or to that court, so it would seem to follow that it cannot be reviewed on writ of error to a state court, the prohibition being that c no appeal or writ of error from the decision of a Circuit Court remanding such cause shall be allowed.’ And it is entirely clear that a writ of error cannot be maintained under section 709 in respect of such an order where the state court has rendered no decisiqn against a Federal right but simply accepted the conclusion of the Circuit Court.”

Writ of error dismissed.

Reference

Cited By
1 case
Status
Published
Syllabus
O’Brien being arrested in the State of New York for larceny, Nelson induced Moloney to join him in becoming O’Brien’s bondsman, and gave Moloney a mortgage on his (Nelson’s) real estate in New York to the amount of $10,000, to indemnify him. O’Brien having defaulted in his appearance for trial, Moloney was sued upon the bond, and a judgment was recovered against him, which was wholly paid by him. Before paying it he brought suit against Nelson to recover the amount for which he was so liable, and obtained a judgment in his favor in the trial court, which was reversed in the courts above on the ground that, as, at that time he had paid nothing on the forfeiture, no recovery could be had. . In appealing from the trial court in that case he entered into the usual stipulation that, if the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, judgment absolute might be rendered against him. He then brought this suit to foreclose the mortgage. Meanwhile Nelson had transferred the property mortgaged to one Adams. The defendant contended that the stipulation given by the plaintiff on the appeal to that court in the prior action was a bar to the recovery in this action; and that the bond and mortgage having been given to indemnify bail in a criminal case, they were void because contrary to public policy. But the Court of Appeals held: (1) That the contention that the stipulation operated to prevent a recovery was without support in authority or reason; and (2) That it was not a part of the public policy of the State of New York to insist upon personal liability of sureties, and forbid bail to become indemnified. Held: (1) That these conclusions involved no Federal question; (2) That under the circumstances described in the opinion of the court, the proceedings in relation to the removal of the cause afforded no ground for the issue of the writ of error; (3) That, following Missouri Pacific Railway v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, the state court having proceeded to final judgment in this case, its action is not reviewable on writ of error to such judgment.