after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

We have difficulty in understanding upon what theory the writ of error direct from this court was prosecuted, as clearly there was no jurisdiction to allow it, unless the case is within some of the provisions of the Judiciary Act *554 of 1891, conferring authority to so directly review. The only ground stated in the assignments of error which in the remotest degree refers to a matter which would come within our right to review is the third assignment, which asserts: “The court erred in adjudging that the taking into custody of said books and papers at the time of the lawful arrest of said Lawrence H. Mills, Charles G. Mourraille and Emil S. Duflot was in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.” And this, we assume, is the theory upon which it is deemed we have jurisdiction directly to review, since that is the subject elaborately discussed in the argument at bar on behalf of plaintiff in error. But it is obvious on the face of the record that the error thus assigned and the discussion at bar in regard to it concern themselves, not with the order which it is sought to review, that is, the commitment for contempt, but to another and different order not final in its character, that is, the order of the court directing the return of the books and papers. Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117. Even then, although.it be conceded that a question under the Constitution of the United States was involved in the latter, that concession does not establish that a constitutional question was involved in the order committing for contempt. No conceivable constitutional right of the district attorney arose or could have been involved in committing him for contempt for refusing to obey the order of the court, and, therefore, there is no question presented on this record justifying a direct re-, view of the order committing for contempt.

The case here is not even analogous to Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92, since there the facts were these: A person who as a witness before a special examiner refused to produce books and papers on the ground that to compel him to do so would invade his constitutional rights, was proceeded against for contempt and the authority of this court to directly review the final judgment committing for *555 contempt was rested upon the express ground that the writ of error directly involved the determination of whether the order to produce, and to punish for the refusal to produce, violated the constitutional rights of the witness. Even if it were to be conceded, for the sake of argument, that the court below had proceeded upon an erroneous conception of the Constitution when it ordered the return of the books and papers, that concession would not serve to establish that the order was so dehors the authority of the court as to cause it to be void, and to justify an officer of the court in refusing to respect and obey it: This is obviously true, since it is apparent that, wholly irrespective of the merits of the view which the court took of the constitutional rights of the parties whose books and papers were directed to be returned, the power to direct the return of the books and papers was equally possessed and might have been exerted upon the conception of the abuse of discretion, which was manifested by the taking possession of the books and papers under the circumstances disclosed. Indeed, the basis upon which the assumption that we have jurisdiction to review rests plainly upon a two-fold misconception. The one, that the right to have a direct review of the final contempt order carries with it the right to have at the same time a review of the interlocutory order returning the books — a proposition which directly conflicts with the ruling in the Alexander Case, supra. The other, because, under the view taken by the court below, the seizure of the books and papers violated the constitutional rights of the accused — that, therefore, some constitutional question was involved in the commitment for contempt for refusing to obey the order of the court for the return of the books and papers.

Under the circumstances we are of opinion that the entire want of foundation for the assumption that there was jurisdiction in this court to directly review the order of commitment which caused this writ of error to be prose *556 cuted is, we think, so obvious as not to afford any possible ground for retaining jurisdiction of the cause. That is to say, we are of opinion that the contention upon which the asserted right to prosecute the error directly to this court was based is so devoid of all foundation as to render it necessary to decline to assume a jurisdiction which we have not; and, therefore; the writ of error is dismissed.

Writ of error dismissed.