Doepel v. Jones
Doepel v. Jones
Opinion of the Court
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
It' cannot be seriously disputed that if the agreement was made by Fearnow, the original applicant, that he
Moreover as it is not disputable that the Land Department in its final ruling against.the contestants placed its action upon the prior cancellation of the homestead entry because of the particular agreement referred to which was the basis of the Barnes contest, it must necessarily result that there is an absence of the essential foundation upon which alone the asserted rights of the plaintiffs in error could possibly rest. But putting this latter view aside, we are of opinion that the court below was clearly right in holding that as the facts were admitted which absolutely destroyed the effect of the original Fearnow homestead entry and therefore caused it to be impossible for that entry to be the generating source of rights in favor of the plaintiffs in error, no .equitable rights arose in their favor growing out of the cancellation of that entry and the'issue of the patent to the defendant in error. It seems superfluous to reason to demonstrate that no equitable right to hold the patentee as a trustee could possibly arise in favor of the plaintiffs in error, since the application to enter upon which they rely was in legal contemplation nonexistent and hence could afford no basis for equitable rights of any character.
Affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- DOEPEL, HEIRS AT LAW OF FEARNOW v. JONES
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- A preliminary homestead entry, made in the Territory of Oklahoma under agreement between, the applicant and his mother that he would make the entry, pay rent for the land while the entry was being completed and deed the land to her upon the issuance of patent, is absolutely void under § 24 of the act providing a temporary government for that Territory, etc. (Act of May 2,1890, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81), and confers no rights upon the applicant or his heirs. When such an entry, because of the illegal agreement, has been provisionally cancelled by the Land Department during the entryman’s lifetime, and, after his death, one claiming to be his widow has relinquished her rights therein and made a new entry independently, in her own right, the original entry can afford no basis for the entry-man’s heirs to contest the widow’s entry before the Department upon the ground that her marriage was void, if they do not deny the illegal agreement or seek-to have the original entry re-instated on its merits. The first entry, being a nullity, could beget no equity entitling the heirs to affix a trust to the land when patented to the widow.