delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must, decide whether the venue provisions of the Judicial Code1 render applicable the doctrine of jorum non conveniens to actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.2 Petitioner instituted such an action against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in October, 1947, in the court below, the United States District Court for . the Eastern District of Illinois. No trial was had before September 1, 1948, the effective date of the present Judicial Code.3 Thereafter the Railroad filed a motion to transfer the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.

The court below found that all 35 witnesses and the petitioner himself live in Irvine, Kentucky, which also was the scene of the accident; that Irvine is 420 miles, “approximately twenty-four hours ... by public transportation,” from East St. Louis, where the court below sits, but only 26 miles from Richmond and 48. from Lexington, in which two cities the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sits. Furthermore, the court below determined that jury schedules at both Richmond and Lexington made early trial possible. Thus concluding that the transfer would serve'the convenience of parties and witnesses, and would be in the interest of *57justice, the District Court granted the Railroad’s motion. Petitioner then filed directly in this Court a “Motion for leave to file petition for order to show cause why writs of mandamus [against the court below] and prohibition [against the Kentucky District Court] should not issue, and petition for same.” Petitioner makes no allegation that the court below abused its discretion; his sole contention is that the order of transfer exceeded the District Court’s authority. Since that issue seemed of importance in the administration of justice,4 we assigned the case for hearing on the motion. 335 U. S. 897 (1948).

Prior to the current revision of Title 28 of the United States Code, forum non conveniens was not available in Federal Employers’ Liability Act suits. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941); Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698 (1942); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 505 (1947). The new Code, however, provides that “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” This is § 1404 (a). The reviser’s notes, which accom*58pany each section of the Code, here read as follows: “Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance' with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,, permitting transfer to a more, convenient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 62 S. Ct. 6, 314 U. S. 44, 86 L. Ed. 28, which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer’s [sic] Liability Act in New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so.”5 The precise issue before us is whether, despite these, expressions, the law remains unchanged. Petitioner so contends.

First. The court below relied on the language of § 1404 (a), supra, which it regarded as “unambiguous, direct, clear.” We agree. The reach of “any civil action” 6 is unmistakable. The phrase is used without qualification, without hint that some should be excluded. From the statutory text alone, it is impossible to read the section as excising this case from “any civil action.”

The only suggestion petitioner offers in this regard is that “any civil action” embraces only those actions for which special venue requirements are prescribed in §§ 139L-1403 of Revised Title 28,7 since these sections *59immediately precede § 1404 (a), and all are within the Venue Chapter '.(§§ 1391-1406, inclusive) of the Code. To accept this contention, we would be required completely to disregard the Congressional admonition that “No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28 ... in which any any [sic] section is placed . ...”8 Furthermore, petitioner's argument proves too much: §§ 1391-1393, which also are in the Venue Chapter and also refer to “any civil action,” would be read as applying only to actions for which special venue requirements are established in neighboring sections of the Code, although they were obviously intended by Congress to be the general venue sections applicable to ordinary actions. It seems more reasonable to hold that § 1404 (a) in terms applies generally, i. e., to “any civil action.”.

Second. Although petitioner wishes to restrict the literal meaning of “any civil action,” he would expand the sense of “may transfer ... to any other district or division where it might have been brought” beyond the exact scope of those words. Obviously, the express language gives no clue as to where the action “might have been brought.” . Yet the essence of petitioner’s position is that the order below, transferring his suit, effects a repeal of § 6 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, which granted him the right to sue in -any district “in which the defend*60ant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action.”9

Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and distinct problems.10 Section 1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously.

The Code,, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as demonstrated by its failure to list the sefetion in the meticulously prepared schedule of statutes repealed.11 We cannot agree that the order before us effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of jorum non conveniens to Liability Act *61suits derives from the Kepner decision. And there this Court expressly stated that “If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative . . . .” 314 U. S; at 54. That opinion discusses § 6 of the Liability Act, to be sure, but this Court did not and could not suggest that the legislative-answer had necessarily to be addressed to that section. Since the words selected by Congress for § 6 denote nothing, one way or the other, respecting forum non conveniens, there was no occasion to repeal that section, expressly or impliedly; Congress chose to remove its judicial gloss via another statute. Discussion of the law hf implied' repeals is, therefore, irrelevant.

Third. Petitioner’s chief argument proceeds not from one side or the other of the literal boundaries of § 1404 (a), but from its legislative history.. The short answer is that there is no need to refer to the. legislative history where the. statutory language is clear. “The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction.”. Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U. S. 244, 260 (1945). This canon of construction has received consistent adherence in our decisions.12

Nevertheless, we need not rest our decision on it solely. For the legislative history does not support petitioner’s position. Petitioner’s argument is based on these twin premises: Congress intendéd no “controversial change” to be incorporated in the Code; and § 1404 (a) is such a change.

*62To establish the former premise, petitioner cites a number of statements by legislative leaders in charge of the Code revision. For example, Representative Keogh, Chairman of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws which initiated the work, said at the hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, “The policy that we adopted . . . was to avoid wherever possible and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as controversial substantive changes of law.”13 And Senator Donnell, Chairman of. the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering the Code, said on the floor that “. . . the purpose of this bill is primarily to revise and codify and to enact into positive law, with such corrections as were deemed by the committee to be of substantial and noncontroversial nature.” 14 But these statements clearly are'not unequivocal promises that no changes would be made. The legislation was announced to be a revision as well as a codification. It is obvious that the changes in law retained in the Code were not considered as “controversial” by these Congressional spokesmen.

Petitioner does not offer any definition of “controversial,” but he does point to one concreté example of what he regards as a. “controversial” measure. This is the *63Jennings'Bill,15 which was under consideration in the House in the spring of 1947, as was the Code revision.16 The Jennings Bill and § 1404 (a) of the Code meet the same problem, the alleged abuses in the selection. of *64forums for Liability Act suits.17 But the Jennings Bill was far more drastic than § 1404 (a). The Jennings Bill would in large part have repealed § 6 of the Liability Act. It would have delimited the available forum for actions brought in state as well as federal courts.18 It would have eliminated the right to sue in any district in which the railroad did business. Initially, this applied only to Federal Employers’ Liability Act plaintiffs, but in final draft the Jennings Bill generally restricted all, including passengers, who might sue railroads for personal injuries. Inasmuch as none Of these changes in the law was contained in the Code, it is evident that § 1404 (a) might well be considered “nóncontroversial” by the same. Congress which would regard the Jennings Bill as “controversial.” 19

*65Moreover, even if we could distill from the legislative history of the Jennings Bill a usable concept of “controversial change,” its application would destroy petitioner’s case. For petitioner concedes that in fact § 1404 (a) did not arouse controversy; he submits the Jennings Bill as contrast. His argument is obviously based not on the actual legislative history of § 1404 (a), but on necessarily vague speculation as to what Congress might have done had it fully realized that jorum non conveniens was henceforth to be applicable in Federal Employers’ Liability Act suits. The requisite assumption, that Congress did not appreciate the significance of its action when it ratified the Code and § 1404 (a) therein, is contrary to the facts shown by the legislative history which is of record. The lack of controversy reflected aware agreement and not the inertia of ignorance.

This was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation. To the contrary, it received close and prolonged study. Five years of Congressional attention supports the Code.20 And from the start, Congress obtained the most eminent expert assistance available. The spadework was entrusted to two lawbook-publishing firms, the staffs of which had unique experience in statutory codification and revision.21 *66They formed an advisory committee, including distinguished judges and members of the bar, and obtained the services of special consultants.22 Furthermore, an advisory committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference.23 And to assist with matters relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, Chief Justice Stone appointed an advisory committee, consisting of himself and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas.24

That these experts assisted in drafting the Code does not mean that Congress blindly approved what outsiders did. This is demonstrated, for example, by the statement of Representative Robsion, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, at the hearing conducted by his *67Subcommittee'in 1947. “We shall do the same as we did last year . . . just \read them line by line and' have you and other expert codifiers and other persons go over the bill with us.”25

" Petitioner almost seems to imply that this very careful Committee consideration vitiates the legislation. But the Committee system is integral in typical legislative procedure; Congress could not function without it.26 A canon of construction which would discount statutory words' 'pro tanto, the greater the expertise or the. more meticulous the Committee consideration devoted thereto, or the longer and more complex the legislation, would be absurd, not least because it would make mockery of the techniques of statutory interpretation which have heretofore been used by the courts.

The experts and the Committees did not attempt to conceal the proposed revisions. “The committee on revision of the laws in the preparation of those preliminary *68drafts,sought to give them the widest possible circulation. We made certain that every member of the legislature got one; we made certain that they were sent to every United States attorney; that they were sent to every member of the Federal judiciary; that they were sent to the appropriate committees of ,the leading State and local bar associations; that they were sent to everyone who ever evidenced any interest in the work at all.”27 Indicative of the success in publicizing, the provisions of the Code is the fact that there was specific treatment of § 1404 (a) and its applicability to Federal Employers’ Liability Act suits in a number of legal periodicals.28

The initial appearance of § 1404 (a) was in the Second Draft of- the Code, adopted by the meeting of May, 1945. Its text has remained unchanged. It was accompanied by a reviser’s note, which recited that “Subsection (a) is new. It was drafted in accordance with a memorandum of Mar. 7, 1945, from the author of Moore’s Federal Practice, stating that recognition should be given the doc*69trine of forum non conveniens . . . 29 The balance of that note was substantially the same as the present reviser’s note; it expressly cited the Kepner case, an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as demonstrating the need fob § 1404 (a). And the reviser’s notes were before the Congress at every subsequent legislative step.

A preliminary draft of the Code was printed late in 1945 for the use of the House Committee on Revision of the Laws. In this draft, the reviser’s notes appear directly below each related section or subsection. Section 1404 (a) and its note were in this draft, which, as noted above, was given very wide circulation.

July 24, 1946; the House ordered to be printed the Report submitted by Representative Keogh of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Revision of the Laws, on the codification of Title 28.30 This Report consisted of a preliminary statement and a full printing of the reviser’s notes.' Section 1404 (a) appears in that Report, together with its note. There was no further action on the Code in the Seventy-Ninth Congress.

In the Eightieth Congress, under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,31 the Code revision passed to *70the jurisdiction of the House Judiciary Committee and was assigned to a Subcommittee of which Representative Robsion of Kentucky was Chairman. At the hearing before this Subcommittee, Professor James William Moore of Yale University, special consultant to the revisers, in summarizing the Code proposals, testified that there were “changes of importance” in the law of venue and specifically mentioned § 1404.32 In April, 1947, the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill with a unanimous recommendation that it be passed.33 This Report again fully reprinted the reviser’s notes. In this Report, the section entitled “Examples of Changes in Law,” which had appeared in the Report on the revision in the preceding Session of Congress, expressly referred to the reviser’s notes for §§ 1391-1406.34

After this painstaking consideration, with its references to § 1404 (a), the-House initially passed the bill on July 7, 1947.35 At that time and in the subsequent consideration in the Senate, the Tax Court provisions occasioned the most discussion; but other specific sections did not pass unnoticed.' Attention was directly called to § 1404 (a) by one witness at the hearings before the Senate) Judiciary Subcommittee, although his interest was not in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act issue.36 No change in § 1404 (a) was included in the Senate amendments; and the revision of Title 28 was enacted by the Congress in June, 1948.37

*71Thus, at almost every stage of the. legislative procedure, attention was directed to the fact of change, and in most instances specific mention was made of § 1404 (a).’ At no stage subsequent to the first formal printing did § 1404 (a) and its accompanying reviser’s note fail to appear. From the start, § 1404 (a) remained the same, and the reference in the note to a Federal Employers’ Liability Act case as showing the need for permitting the application of jorum non conveniens remained unchanged. Now .to hold that Congress did not appreciate what it was enacting in that section would defy the legislative history. We must flatly rej ect petitioner’s thesis that this section was so obscured that its enactment is meaningless. We cannot blind ourselves to the hearings, to the experts, to the Committee reports, to the deviser’s notes and their incorporation in the Committee reports — to a history of the most meticulous Congressional consideration.

Fourth. Petitioner suggests that his action may not be transferred because it was instituted prior to the effective date of the Code. Clearly, § 1404 (a) is a remedial provision applicable to pending actions. And “No .one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure . . . .” Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 147 (1922).38

*72Fifth. Since the petition for mandamus and prohibitibn must be denied because of the view we must take as to the meaning of § 1404 (a) and its applicability to this case; we need not decide whether denial might be placed on other grounds also. “Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against .judges are drastic and extraordináry remedies, . . , As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259, 260 (1947).39

What we hold is that the plain meaning of the., statutory words and the consistent course of the legislative history are opposed to petitioner’s contention that we must disregard § 1404 (a) because Congress knew not what it did. If petitioner’s showing could sustain a decision .that this section was not really enacted, after all, little law wbuld remain.

The motion is

Denied.,

I concur in the result. But in doing so I feel impelled to say two things.

One is that in my view § 1404 (a), taken broadly to include “any civil action,” does effect a partial repeal of. *73§ 6 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and of the other statutes mentioned by Mr. Justice Douglas, including the venue provisions (§ 12) of the Clayton Act involved in our decision in United States v. National City Lines, 334 U. S. 573.

The legislative history, for example, of the Clayton Act venue provisions demonstrates that the change '! 1404 (a) is said to have made was more than the mere removal of a judicial gloss. I think we should not now impugn the validity of our decisions in National City Lines, supra, and in Kepner and Miles1 by characterizing each as a mere “judicial gloss” upon the pertinent statute. Those decisions in. my opinion were true reflections of congressional intent as stated in the respective statutes and, accordingly, the changes made in them by ! 1404 (a) were in the nature of repeals, to the extent that the plaintiffs were deprived of their rights under the preTexisting statutes to have their causes of action tried in the forums where they were properly brought.

In the second place, those changes, although entirely within Congress’ power to make, were neither insubstantial nor noncontrovérsial, in view of the legislative history of the original provisions, for example, the venue provisions of the Clayton Act. Nor do I think the legislative history of ! 1404 (a) demonstrates either the insubstantial or the noncontrovérsial nature of the changes in ! 1404 (a), although they seem to have been so treated by those in charge of the bill.2 It is to be noted, moreover, that *74specific attention was drawn to the effect of § 1404 (a) upon § 6 of the Employers’ Liability Act through reference to the Kepner and Miles decisions, but no like specific reference was made to the venue provisions of the Clayton Act and the National City Lines decision.

These matters make it impossible for me to concur in the view that Congress was in fact “fully informed as to the significance of § 1404 (a).” This, however, is a matter affecting congressional procedure and the manner of conducting legislative business. Accordingly, notwithstanding my doubts that Congress intended to go so far, I acquiesce in the Court’s decisions.