Supreme Court of the United States, 1956

Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided March 26, 1956 · Per Curiam

350 U.S. 495; 76 S. Ct. 490; 100 L. Ed. 2d 639; 1956 U.S. LEXIS 1204; 100 L. Ed. 639 (United States Reports)

Counsel

jRichard P. Tinkham, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners., Victor M. Harding argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Herbert C. Hirschboeck.

Cases that cite this one

46 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

John M. Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company (7th Cir. 1957)
Conner v. Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc. (Tex. App. 1997)
Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson (Utah 2000)
Barnard v. Wassermann (Utah 1993)
In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI) (3d Cir. 2019)
Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Commission (District Court, District of Columbia 1985)
Donahue v. Banner Mutual Insurance (Wis. 1963)
Fredric Eshelman v. Puma Biotechnology, Inc. (4th Cir. 2021)
In re Marriage of Williams (Kan. 2018)
Sandra Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp. (11th Cir. 2018)
Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ex rel. Martin-Marietta Corp. (2d Cir. 2016)
CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. Meissner (District Court, D. Maryland 2009)
Noble Security, Inc. v. MIZ Engineering, Ltd. (District Court, E.D. Virginia 2009)
Brunson v. Heavy Lift Cargo Airlines, Ltd. (In re Pride International, LLC) (United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Louisiana 2006)
California Security Co-Op, Inc. v. Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. (District Court, E.D. Texas 1995)
Scott Martel v. George F. Stafford, Administrator, Etc. (1st Cir. 1993)
Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation (District Court, S.D. Ohio 1992)
Gear v. Constantinescu (District Court, D. New Jersey 1990)
Alexander Proudfoot Company World Headquarters L.P. And Apco, Inc. v. Dennis C. Thayer (11th Cir. 1989)
Sternberg v. O'NEIL (Del. 1988)
United States v. Edward Gluklick (6th Cir. 1986)
Datamatic Services Corp. v. Bescos (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
Jose Demelo and Marie Demelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., Woolsey Marine Industries, Inc. (5th Cir. 1983)
Harris Corporation v. National Iranian Radio and Television and Bank Melli Iran, Defendants (11th Cir. 1982)
Carl Thomas Rauch, III v. Day and Night Manufacturing Corporation (6th Cir. 1978)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Respondent, Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, filed a motion to quash the return of service of summons on the grounds that the District Court acquired no personal jurisdiction over it and that the power of attorney which it had filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Wisconsin did not authorize him to accept service of process for it in this case. After this motion was denied, respondent filed its answer to the complaint in which it again pressed its claim that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Subsequently, however, respondent filed (1) a motion to amend its answer and to interplead; (2) a counterclaim; (3) a stipulation and order adding a party-plaintiff and amending the complaint and answer; and (4) a stipulation that judgment be entered against the alleged insured in favor of the additional party-plaintiff. The latter *496 stipulation included the following provision, together with others consistent with it and confirmatory of its purpose:

“1. That each of the parties to this stipulation voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the above entitled Court without service of process herein, the same as if personal service had been obtained by each against the other.”

Following a trial on the merits, judgment was entered against respondent, but the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed on the ground that respondent’s motion to quash should have been granted. 226 F. 2d 126.

Upon examination of the record and the law, we conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and that respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over it. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to it for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.