Supreme Court of the United States, 1963

Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided October 21, 1963 · Court'S

375 U.S. 39; 84 S. Ct. 8; 11 L. Ed. 2d 8; 1963 U.S. LEXIS 387 (United States Reports)

Counsel

Balstone R. Irvine and Walter R. Mansfield for petitioners., Arthur H. Dean, William Piel, Jr., Herman Finkelstein and Lloyd N. Cutler for respondent.

Cases that cite this one

22 later published cases cite this decision. The 20 that cite it most often are listed here.

Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (Supreme Court of the United States 1964)
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States (2d Cir. 1972)
Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana De Seguros Generales v. Maynard Bostrom and James L. Jernigan (5th Cir. 1965)
United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Metromedia, Inc. (2d Cir. 1965)
United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Application of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. (2d Cir. 1964)
Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States (Supreme Court of the United States 1972)
Olympic Refining Company v. Carter (9th Cir. 1964)
Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter (9th Cir. 1964)
United States v. International Business Machines Corp. (District Court, S.D. New York 1975)
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States (2d Cir. 1973)
Fisons Limited and Fisons Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. United States of America, Respondent-Plaintiff (7th Cir. 1972)
United States v. United Fruit Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship Company (5th Cir. 1969)
Younger Brothers, Inc. v. United States (District Court, S.D. Texas 1965)
Lola Burton, as Administratrix of the Estate of William C. Burton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (5th Cir. 1964)
Margaret Hunt Hill, Trustee for Hassie Hunt Trust v. Federal Power Commission, Placid Oil Company v. Federal Power Commission (5th Cir. 1964)
Meredith D. Shattuck and Ulo Vahtra (Ibm), Movants-Appellees v. Helmut Hoegl and Giacomo Barchietto (Xerox) (2d Cir. 1975)
Columbia Artists Management, Inc. v. United States (Supreme Court of the United States 1965)
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States (Supreme Court of the United States 1972)
Dungan v. Sawyer (District Court, D. Nevada 1966)
Honsey v. Donovan (D. Minn. 1964)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

In 1950 the District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an amended consent decree in a gov *40 ernment Sherman Act suit requiring ASCAP inter alia to “grant to any user making written application therefor a non-exclusive license to perform all of the compositions in the ASCAP repertory” subject to a reasonable license fee. On request of petitioners for a license ASCAP refused to fix a fee and, as provided by the amended consent decree, this application was filed for an order to fix a reasonable fee. The District Court found that the consent decree did not require ASCAP to issue the type of license petitioners requested and, therefore, dismissed the application. 208 F. Supp. 896. The petitioners took an appeal to the Court of Appeals and also perfected a direct one to this Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act. 15 U. S. C. § 29. We dismissed the appeal filed here for want of jurisdiction, 371 U. S. 540 (1963). Thereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal perfected there, 317 F. 2d 90, on the ground that all appeals are “routed” to this Court by the Expediting Act and this petition brings that question here once again.

The dismissal that we heretofore entered was based on our unexpressed view that the appeal from an ancillary order of this type was not within the Expediting Act. Direct appeals to this Court are authorized by that Act only from final judgments where the United States is a complainant. The purpose of the Act is to expedite litigation of “great and general importance” where the Government is the aggrieved party. See 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (1903). The controversy which is disposed of by the District Court’s order is entirely between private parties and is outside the mainstream of the litigation in which the Government is directly concerned. Compare Terminal R. R. Assn. v. United States, 266 U. S. 17; Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U. S. 230. In these circumstances, and the order being final rather than *41 interlocutory, we believe that the appeal does lie under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The petition is therefore granted and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration on its merits.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Black acquiesces in the Court’s judgment because of the holding in the prior appeal.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.