Supreme Court of the United States, 1964

Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome

Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome
Supreme Court of the United States · Decided April 27, 1964 · Per Curiam
377 U.S. 126; 84 S. Ct. 1156; 12 L. Ed. 2d 172; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 2240; 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2063; 49 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 51,065 (United States Reports)

Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome

Opinion

Per Curiam.

After finding that the primary employer was not in commerce and ruling that the pre-emption rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, was therefore not applicable, the state court enjoined picketing at the premises of the secondary employer. The judgment must be reversed. The jurisdictional standards established by the National Labor Relations Board (see 23 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 8 (1958)) may be satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the primary or the secondary employer. Truck Drivers Local No. 649, 93 N. L. R. B. 386; Teamsters Local No. 554, 110 N. L. R. B. 1769; Madison Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 134 N. L. R. B. 517. Here, as the record clearly *259 shows, the secondary employer’s operations met the jurisdictional requirements. Since the union’s activities in this case were arguably an unfair labor practice, Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547, the state court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236; Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed.

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