Supreme Court of the United States, 1965

Henry v. Collins

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided March 29, 1965 · Per Curiam

380 U.S. 356; 85 S. Ct. 992; 13 L. Ed. 2d 892; 1965 U.S. LEXIS 1537 (United States Reports)

Counsel

Robert L. Carter, Barbara A. Morris, Jack H. Young and Frank D. Reeves for petitioner in both cases., W. O. Luckett for respondents in both cases.

Cases that cite this one

128 later published cases cite this decision. The 24 that cite it most often are listed here.

Curtis Publishing Company v. Wallace Butts, Wallace Butts v. Curtis Publishing Company (5th Cir. 1965)
John L. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Company, Inc., Anita W. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Company, Inc. (5th Cir. 1980)
Berkey v. Delia (Md. 1980)
Frank Pape v. Time, Incorporated (7th Cir. 1969)
Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (Pa. 1988)
Young v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (6th Cir. 2013)
Costello v. Ocean County Observer (N.J. 1994)
Daniel Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, Inc. (6th Cir. 1988)
Coughlin, James and Coughlin, Patricia, His Wife v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable Inc. (3d Cir. 1986)
Tavoulareas v. Piro (D.C. Cir. 1985)
Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. (D.C. 1980)
Nader v. De Toledano (D.C. 1979)
Patten v. Smith (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)
McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. (Iowa 1976)
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. (Tex. 1976)
Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc. (Idaho 1973)
Bienvenu v. Angelle (La. 1969)
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church (Ariz. 1968)
Thompson v. St. Amant (La. 1967)
The Washington Post Company v. Eugene J. Keogh (D.C. Cir. 1966)
Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. (Pa. 1981)
Dyer v. Davis (La. Ct. App. 1966)
Palmtag v. Republican Party of Neb. (Neb. 2024)
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Crystal Cox (9th Cir. 2014)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgments are reversed.

After petitioner’s arrest on a charge of disturbing the peace, he issued a statement to the effect that this arrest was the result of “a diabolical plot,” in which respondents, the County Attorney and Chief of Police of Clarksdale, were implicated. Respondents brought suits for libel and obtained jury verdicts. The Supreme Court of Missis *357 sippi affirmed. -Miss.-, 158 So. 2d 28;-Miss. -, 158 So. 2d 695.

The following instructions requested by the respondents, approved by the trial judge, were read to the jury:

“The court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that malice does not necessarily mean hatred or ill will, but that malice may consist merely of culpable recklessness or a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed.”

The jury, was also instructed, at respondents’ request, that

“. . . [I] f you believe from the evidence that defendant published a false statement charging that his arrest . . . was the result of a diabolical plot. . . , you may infer malice, as defined in these instructions, from the falsity and libelous nature of the statement, although malice as a legal presumption does not arise from the fact that the statement in question is false and libelous. It is for you to determine as a fact, if you have first determined from the evidence that defendant published the statement in question and that it is false, whether or not the statement in question was actually made with malice.”

The jury might well have understood these instructions to allow recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to inflict harm through falsehood. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 73. “The constitutional guarantees . . . [prohibit] a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made . . . with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280.

For the reasons set out in their respective concurring opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. *358 254, 293-305, and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 79-88, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Goldberg concur in reversal of these judgments, not merely for error in the instructions read to the jury, but on the ground that it would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to subject petitioner to any libel judgment solely because of his publication of criticisms against respondents’ performance of their public duties.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.