delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases stem from proceedings conducted by the Federal Communications Commission after requests by Midwest Television1 for relief under §§ 74.11072 and *16074.1109 3 of the rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of community antenna television (CATV) systems. Midwest averred that respondents’ CATV systems transmitted the signals of Los Angeles broadcasting stations into the San Diego area, and thereby had, inconsistently with the public interest, adversely affected Midwest’s San Diego station.4 Midwest sought an appropriate order limiting the carriage of such signals by respondents’ systems. After consideration of the petition and of various responsive pleadings, the Commission restricted the expansion of respondents’ service in areas in which they had not operated on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to be conducted on the merits of Midwest’s complaints.5 4 F. C. C. 2d 612. *161On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission lacks authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151, to issue such an order.6 378 F. 2d 118. We granted certiorari to consider this important question of regulatory authority.7 389 U. S. 911. For reasons that follow, we reverse.

I.

CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, amplify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute them by wire to the receivers of their subscribers.8 CATV systems *162characteristically do not produce their own programming, 9 and do not recompense producers or broadcasters for use of the programming which they receive and redistribute. Unlike ordinary broadcasting stations, CATV systems commonly charge their subscribers installation and other fees. 11

The CATV industry has grown rapidly since the establishment of the first commercial system in 1950.12 In the late 1950’s, some 50 new systems were established each year; by 1959, there were 550 “nationally known and identified” systems serving a total audience of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 persons.13 It has been more recently estimated that “new systems are being founded at the rate of more than one per day, and . . . subscribers . . . signed on at the rate of 15,000 per month.” 14 By late 1965, it was reported that there were 1,847 operating CATY systems, that 758 others were franchised but not yet in operation, and that there were 938 applications *163for additional franchises.15 The statistical evidence is incomplete, but, as the Commission has observed, “whatever the estimate, CATY growth is clearly explosive in nature.” Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 738, n. 15.

CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation of distant signals.16 In 1959, only 50 systems employed microwave relays, and the maximum distance over which signals were transmitted was 300 miles; by 1964, 250 systems used microwave, and the transmission distances sometimes exceeded 665 miles. First Report and Order, 38 F. C. C. 683, 709. There are evidently now plans “to carry the programing of New York City independent stations by cable to . . . upstate New York, to Philadelphia, and even as far as Dayton.” 17 And see Chan*164nel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 385 F. 2d 969; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 385 F. 2d 979. Thus, “while the CATV industry originated in sparsely settled areas and areas of adverse terrain ... it is now spreading to metropolitan centers . . . .” First Report and Order, supra, at 709. CATV systems, formerly no more than local auxiliaries to broadcasting, promise for the future to provide a national communications system, in which signals from selected broadcasting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country.18

The Commission has on various occasions attempted to assess the relationship between community antenna television systems and its conceded regulatory functions. In 1959, it completed an extended investigation of several auxiliary broadcasting services, including CATV. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403. Although it found that CATV is “related to interstate transmission,” the Commission reasoned that CATV systems are neither common carriers nor broadcasters, and therefore are within neither of the principal regulatory categories created by the Communications Act. Id., at 427-428. The Commission declared that it had not been given plenary authority over “any and all enterprises which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of communications.” Id., at 429. It refused to premise regulation of CATV upon assertedly adverse consequences for broadcasting, because it could not “determine where the impact takes effect, although we recognize that it may well exist.” Id., at 431.

The Commission instead declared that it would forthwith seek appropriate legislation “to clarify the situa*165tion.” Id., at 438. Such legislation was introduced in the Senate in 1959,19 favorably reported,20 and debated on the Senate floor.21 The bill was, however, ultimately returned to committee.22

Despite its inability to obtain amendatory legislation, the Commission has, since 1960, gradually asserted jurisdiction over CATV. It first placed restrictions upon the activities of common carrier microwave facilities that serve CATV systems. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F. C. C. 459, aff’d, 321 F. 2d 359. Finally, the Commission in 1962 conducted a rule-making proceeding in which it re-evaluated the significance of CATV for its. regulatory responsibilities. First Order and Report, supra. The proceeding was explicitly restricted to those systems that are served by microwave, but the Commission's conclusions plainly were more widely relevant. The Commission found that “the likelihood or probability of [CATV’s] adverse impact upon potential and existing service has become too substantial to be dismissed.” Id., at 713-714. It reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations necessarily creates “substantial competition” for local broadcasting. Id., at 707. The Commission acknowledged that it could not “measure precisely the degree of . . . impact,” but found that “CATV competition can have a substantial negative effect upon station audience and revenues . . . .” Id., at 710-711.

The Commission attempted to “accommodat[e]” the *166interests of CATV and of local broadcasting by the imposition of two rules. Id., at 713. First, CATV systems were required to transmit to their subscribers the signals of any station into whose service area they have brought competing signals.23 Second, CATV systems were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast. See generally First Report and Order, supra, at 719-730. These carriage and nonduplication rules were expected to “insur[e] many stations’ ability to maintain themselves as their areas’ outlets for highly popular network and other programs . . . .” Id., at 715.

The Commission in 1965 issued additional notices of inquiry and proposed rule-making, by which it sought to determine whether all forms of CATV, including those served only by cable, could properly be regulated under the Communications Act. 1 F. C. C. 2d 453. After further hearings, the Commission held that the Act confers adequate regulatory authority over all CATV systems. Second Report and Order, supra, at 728-734. It promulgated revised rules, applicable both to cable and to microwave CATV systems, to govern the carriage of local signals and the nonduplication of local programming. Further, the Commission forbade the importation by CATV of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets, except insofar as such service was offered on February 15, 1966, unless the Commission has previously *167found that it “would be consistent with the public interest,” id., at 782; see generally id., at 781-785, “particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area,” 47 CFR § 74.1107 (c). Finally, the Commission created “summary, nonhearing procedures” for the disposition of applications for separate or additional relief. 2 F. C. C. 2d, at 764; 47 CFR § 74.1109. Thirteen days after the Commission’s adoption of the Second Report, Midwest initiated these proceedings by the submission of its petition for special relief.

II.

We must first emphasize that questions as to the validity of the specific rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of CATY are not now before the Court. The issues in these cases are only two: whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to regulate CATV systems, and, if it has, whether it has, in addition, authority to issue the prohibitory order here in question.24

The Commission’s authority to regulate broadcasting and other communications is derived from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Act’s provisions are explicitly applicable to “all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a). The Commission’s responsibilities are no more narrow: it is required to endeavor to “make available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 151. The *168Commission was expected to serve as the “single Government agency”25 with “unified jurisdiction”26 and “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio.” 27 It was for this purpose given “broad authority.” 28 As this Court emphasized in an earlier case, the Act’s terms, purposes, and history all indicate that Congress “formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the [broadcasting] industry.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137.

Respondents do not suggest that CATV systems are not within the term “communication by wire or radio.” Indeed, such communications are defined by the Act so as to encompass “the transmission of . . . signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds,” whether by radio or cable, “including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.” 47 U. S. C. §§ 153 (a), (b). These very general terms amply suffice to reach respondents' activities.

Nor can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communication, even where, as here, the inter*169cepted signals emanate from stations located within the same State in which the CATY system operates.29 We may take notice that television broadcasting consists in very large part of programming devised for, and distributed to, national audiences; respondents thus are ordinarily employed in the simultaneous retransmission of communications that have very often originated in other States. The stream of communication is essentially uninterrupted and properly indivisible. To categorize respondents’ activities as intrastate would disregard the character of the television industry, and serve merely to prevent the national regulation that “is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio facilities.” Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279.

Nonetheless, respondents urge that the Communications Act, properly understood, does not permit the regulation of CATV systems. First, they emphasize that the *170Commission in 1969 and again in 1966 30 sought legislation that would have explicitly authorized such regulation, and that its efforts were unsuccessful. In the circumstances here, however, this cannot be dispositive. The Commission’s requests for legislation evidently reflected in each instance both its uncertainty as to the proper width of its authority and its understandable preference for more detailed policy guidance than the Communications Act now provides.31 We have recognized that administrative agencies should, in such situations, be encouraged to seek from Congress clarification of the pertinent statutory provisions. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 47.

Nor can we obtain significant assistance from the various expressions of congressional opinion that followed the Commission’s requests. In the first place, the views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by another Congress have “very little, if any, significance.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593; United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313; Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 4. Further, it is far from clear that Congress believed, as it considered these requests for legislation, that the Commission did not already possess regulatory authority over CATV. In 1959, the proposed legislation was preceded by the Commission’s declarations that it “did not intend to regulate CATV,” and that it preferred to rec*171ommend the adoption of legislation that would impose specified requirements upon CATV systems.32 Congress may well have been more troubled by the Commission’s unwillingness to regulate than by any fears that it was unable to regulate.33 In 1966, the Commission informed Congress that it desired legislation in order to “confirm [its] jurisdiction and to establish such basic national policy as [Congress] deems appropriate.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16. In response, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce said merely that it did not “either agree or disagree” with the jurisdictional conclusions of the Second Report, and that “the question of whether or not . . . the Commission has authority under present law to regulate CATV systems is for the courts to decide . . . .” Id., at 9. In these circumstances, we cannot derive from the Commission’s requests for legislation anything of significant bearing on the construction question now before us.

Second, respondents urge that § 152 (a)34 does not *172independently confer regulatory authority upon the Commission, but instead merely prescribes the forms of communication to which the Act's other provisions may separately be made applicable. Respondents emphasize that the Commission does not contend either that CATY systems are common carriers, and thus within Title II of the Act, or that they are broadcasters, and thus within Title III. They conclude that CATV, with certain of the characteristics both of. broadcasting and of common carriers, but with all of the characteristics of neither, eludes altogether the Act’s grasp.

We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language of § 152 (a), in the surrounding language, or in the Act’s history or purposes limits the Commission’s authority to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act’s other provisions. The section itself states merely that the “provisions of [the Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . .” Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the Commission was given “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication . . . .” S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the development of community antenna television systems, but it seems to us that it was precisely because Congress wished “to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, that it conferred upon the Commission a “unified jurisdiction” 35 and “broad authority.”36 Thus, “ [underlying the whole [Communications Act] is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting *173and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138. Congress in 1934 acted in a field that was demonstrably “both new and dynamic,” and it therefore gave the Commission “a comprehensive mandate,” with “not niggardly but expansive powers.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219. We have found no reason to believe that § 152 does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over “all interstate . . . communication by wire or radio.” 37

Moreover, the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities. Congress has imposed upon the Commission the “obligation of providing a widely dispersed radio and television service,” 38 with a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of service among the *174“several States and communities.” 47 U. S. C. § 307 (b). The Commission has, for this and other purposes, been granted authority to allocate broadcasting zones or areas, and to provide regulations “as it may deem necessary” to prevent interference among the various stations. 47 U. S. C. §§ 303 (f), (h). The Commission has concluded, and Congress has agreed, that these obligations require for their satisfaction the creation of a system of local broadcasting stations, such that “all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression.” 39 In turn, the Commission has held that an appropriate system of local broadcasting may be created only if two subsidiary goals are realized. First, significantly wider use must be made of the available ultra-high-frequency channels.40 Second, communities must be encouraged “to launch sound and *175adequate programs to utilize the television channels now reserved for educational purposes.” 41 These subsidiary-goals have received the endorsement of Congress.42

The Commission has reasonably found that the achievement of each of these purposes is “placed in jeopardy by the unregulated explosive growth of CATV.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7. Although CATV may in some circumstances make possible “the realization of some of the [Commission’s] most important goals,” First Report and Order, supra, at 699, its importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations may also “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” id,., at 700, and thus ultimately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local broadcasting stations.43 In particular, *176the Commission feared that CATY might, by dividing the available audiences and revenues, significantly magnify the characteristically serious financial difficulties of TJHF and educational television broadcasters.44 The Commission acknowledged that it could not predict with *177certainty the consequences of unregulated CATV, but reasoned that its statutory responsibilities demand that it “plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.” Id., at 701. We are aware that these consequences have been variously estimated,45 but must conclude that there is substantial evidence that the Commission cannot “discharge its overall responsibilities without authority ovér this important aspect of television service.” Staff of Senate Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., The Television Inquiry: The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities 19 (Comm. Print 1959).

The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting. The significance of its efforts can scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is demonstrably a principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation’s population. The Commission has reasonably found that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regulation of community antenna television systems. We have elsewhere held .that we may not, “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. *178747, 780. Compare National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219-220; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311. There is no such evidence here, and we therefore hold that the Commission’s authority over “all interstate . . . communication by wire or radio” permits the regulation of CATV systems.

There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission’s authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under § 152 (a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,” as “public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). We express no views as to the Commission’s authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any other purposes.

III.

We must next determine whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to issue the particular prohibitory order in question in these proceedings. In its Second Report and Order, supra, the Commission concluded that it should provide summary procedures for the disposition both of requests for special relief and of “complaints or disputes.” Id., at 764. It feared that if evidentiary hearings were in every situation mandatory they would prove “time consuming and burdensome” to the CATV systems and broadcasting stations involved. Ibid. The Commission considered that appropriate notice and opportunities for comment or objection must be given, and it declared that “additional procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary *179hearing, or further written submissions” would be permitted "if they appear necessary or appropriate . . . .” Ibid. See 47 CFR § 74.1109 (f). It was under the authority of these provisions that Midwest sought, and the Commission granted, temporary relief.

The Commission, after examination of various responsive pleadings but without prior hearings, ordered that respondents generally restrict their carriage of Los An-geles signals to areas served by them on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to determine whether the carriage of such signals into San Diego contravenes the public interest. The order does not prohibit the addition of new subscribers within areas served by respondents on February 15, 1966; it does not prevent service to other subscribers who began receiving service or who submitted an “accepted subscription request” between February 15, 1966, and the date of the Commission’s order; and it does not preclude the carriage of San Diego and Tijuana, Mexico, signals to subscribers in new areas of service. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612, 624-625. The order is thus designed simply to preserve the situation as it existed at the moment of its issuance.

Respondents urge that the Commission may issue prohibitory orders only under the authority of § 312 (b), by which the Commission is empowered to issue cease-and-desist orders. We shall assume that, consistent with the requirements of § 312 (c), cease-and-desist orders are proper only after hearing or waiver of the right to hearing. Nonetheless, the requirement does not invalidate the order issued in this case, for we have concluded that the provisions of §§312 (b), '(c) are inapplicable here. Section 312 (b) provides that a cease-and-desist order may issue only if the respondent “has violated or failed to observe” a provision of the Communications Act or a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission under the Act’s authority. Respondents here were not found *180to have violated or to have failed to observe any such restriction; the question before the Commission was instead only whether an existing situation should be preserved pending a determination “whether respondents’ present or planned CATV operations are consistent with the public interest and what, if any, action should be taken by the Commission.” 4 F. C. C. 2d, at 626. The Commission’s order was thus not, in form or function, a cease-and-desist order that must issue under §§312 (b), (c).46

The Commission has acknowledged that, in this area of rapid and significant change, there may be situations in which its generalized regulations are inadequate, and special or additional forms of relief are imperative. It has found that the present case may prove to be such a situation, and that the public interest demands “interim relief . . . limiting further expansion,” pending hearings to determine appropriate Commission action. Such orders do not exceed the Commission’s authority. This Court has recognized that “the administrative process [must] possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself” to the “dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, and that it was precisely for that reason that Congress declined to “stereo-typ[e] the powers of the Commission to specific details . . . .” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219. And compare American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311; R. A. Holman & Co. v. S. E. C., 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47-48, 299 F. 2d 127, *181131-132. Thus, the Commission has been explicitly authorized to issue “such orders, not inconsistent with this [Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i). See also 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). In these circumstances, we hold that the Commission’s order limiting further expansion of respondents’ service pending appropriate hearings did not exceed or abuse its authority under the Communications Act. And there is no claim that its procedure in this respect is in any way constitutionally infirm.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. R ü s0 orderefL

concurring in the result.

My route to reversal of the Court of Appeals is somewhat different from the Court’s. Section 2 (a) of the Communications Act, 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a), says that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . .” (Emphasis added.) I am inclined to believe that this section means that the Commission must generally base jurisdiction on other provisions of the Act. This position would not, however, require invalidation of the assertion of jurisdiction before us today. Section 301, 47 U. S. C. § 301, gives the Commission broad authority over broadcasting, and § 303, 47 U. S. C. § 303, confers authority to “[m]ake such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between stations and to carry out the provisions of this chapter” and also the authority to establish areas or zones to be served by any station. The Commission has ample *182power under these provisions to prevent a Los Angeles television broadcaster from interfering with broadcasting in San Diego. For example, the Commission could stop a Los Angeles television station from owning and operating a wire CATV system which carried the station’s signals into San Diego. The Commission should also be able to prevent a third party from disrupting Commission-licensed broadcasting in the San Diego market.

Even if §§ 301 and 303 in themselves furnish insufficient basis for the Commission to enjoin extraneous interference with the San Diego broadcasting scheme it has authorized, § 2 (a), supra, makes the provisions of the Act, including §§301 and 303, applicable to all wire and radio communication. Hence the Commission is authorized to regulate wire communications to implement the ends of §§301 and 303, and authorized as well to use its express authority over broadcasting to enforce its specific powers over common carriers by wire.