concurring in the result.

I concur in the holding that pre-induction review is available in this case, but I reach this conclusion by means of a somewhat different analysis from that contained in the opinion of my Brother Douglas.

At the outset, I think it is important to state what this case does and does not involve. Petitioner does not contend that the Selective Service System has improperly resolved factual questions, or wrongfully exercised its discretion, or even that it has acted without any “basis in fact,” as that phrase is commonly used in this area of law. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122-123 (1946); ante, at 238, n, 7. He asserts, rather, that the procedure pursuant to which he was reclassified and ordered to report for induction — a procedure plainly mandated by the System’s self-promulgated published regulations, 32 CFR, pt. 1642 — is unlawful. Specifically, he asserts that the delinquency reclassification scheme is not authorized by any statute, that it is inconsistent with his statutory exemption as a ministerial student, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (g), and that, whether or not approved by Congress, the regulations are facially unconstitutional.1

*240The pivotal language of § 10 (b)(3), for present purposes, is the statute’s proscription of pre-induction judicial review “of the classification or processing of any registrant . . . I take the phrase “classification or processing” to encompass the numerous discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations which a Selective Service Board must make prior to issuing an order to report for induction. I do not understand that phrase to prohibit review of a claim, such as that made here by petitioner, that the very statutes or regulations which the Board administers are facially invalid.

“Classification is the key to selection,” 32 CFR § 1622.1 (b), and among a local Board’s most important functions is “to decide, subject to appeal, the class in which each registrant shall be placed.” 32 CFR § 1622.1 (c). Classification is a highly individualized process, in which a Board must consider all pertinent information presented to it. Ibid. Thus, a Board may be required to determine, on a conflicting record, whether a registrant is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form, 32 CFR § 1622.14, or whether the registrant’s deferment “is in the national interest and of paramount importance to our national security . . . .” 32 CFR § 1622.20. A Board also exercises considerable discretion in the processing of registrants — for example, in securing information relevant to classification, 32 CFR §§ 1621.9-1621.15, scheduling of physical examinations, 32 CFR, pt. 1628, and scheduling and postponement of induction itself, 32 CFR, pt. 1632.

Congress’ decision to defer judicial review of such decisions by the Selective Service Boards until after induction was, I believe, responsive to two major considerations. First, because these determinations are of an individualized and discretionary nature, a reviewing court must often examine Board records and other docu*241mentary evidence, hear testimony, and resolve controversies on a sizable record. Even though the scope of judicial review is narrow, see Estep v. United States, supra, at 122-123, this cannot be done quickly. To stay induction pending such review would work havoc with the orderly processing of registrants into the Nation’s armed forces. See 113 Cong. Rec. 15426 (Senator Russell) ; cf. Estep v. United States, supra, at 137 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result).

Second, the registrant has been afforded, prior to his induction, the opportunity for a hearing and administrative appeals within the Selective Service System. 32 CFR, pts. 1624-1627. It is properly presumed that a registrant’s Board has fully considered all relevant information presented to it, and that it has classified and processed him regularly, and in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations. Greer v. United States, 378 F. 2d 931 (1967); Storey v. United States, 370 F. 2d 255 (1966); cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 12 (1908); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (1827).

These factors are significantly altered where the registrant contends that the procedure employed by the Board is invalid on its face.

First, such a claim does not invite the court to review the factual and discretionary decisions inherent in the “classification or processing” of registrants, and does not, therefore, present opportunity for protracted delay. To be sure, collateral factual determinations — for example, whether the registrant was subjected to the statute or regulation drawn in question (in this case, the delinquency reclassification procedure) — may sometimes be necessary. But, in general, a court may dispose of a challenge to the validity of the procedure on the plead*242ings. Insubstantial claims can usually be weeded out with dispatch.2

Second, a challenge to the validity of the administrative procedure itself not only renders irrelevant the presumption of regularity,3 but also presents an issue beyond the competence of the Selective Service Boards to hear and determine. Adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments4 has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 539 (1958); Engineers Public Service Co. v. SEC, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 199, 215-216, 138 F. 2d 936, 952-953 (1943), dismissed as moot, 332 U. S. 788. The Boards have no power to promulgate regulations, and are not expressly delegated any authority to pass on the validity of regulations or statutes. Such authority cannot readily be inferred, for the composition of the Boards, and their administrative procedures, render them wholly unsuitable forums for the adjudication of these matters: local and appeal Boards consist of part-time, uncompensated members, chosen ideally to be representative of the *243registrants’ communities;5 the fact that a registrant may not be represented by counsel in Selective Service proceedings, 32 CFR § 1624.1 (b), seems incompatible with the Boards’ serious consideration of such purely legal claims. Indeed, the denial of counsel has been justified on the ground that the proceedings are nonjudicial. United States v. Sturgis, 342 F. 2d 328, 332 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 879; cf. United States v. Capehart, 141 F. Supp. 708, 719 (1956), aff’d, 237 F. 2d 388 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 971.

To withhold pre-induction review in this case would thus deprive petitioner of his liberty without the prior opportunity to present to any competent forum — agency or court — his substantial claim that he was ordered inducted pursuant to an unlawful procedure. Such an interpretation of § 10 (b) (3) would raise serious constitutional problems,6 and is not indicated by the stat*244ute’s history,7 language, or purpose. On the foregoing basis I agree that 110(b)(3) does not forbid pre-induction review in this instance.

*245Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals passed on the merits of petitioner’s challenge to the delinquency reclassification regulations, this issue is ripe for our consideration. Whatever validity the procedure may have under other circumstances, I agree that the delinquency reclassification of petitioner for failure to possess his registration certificate is inconsistent with petitioner’s conceded statutory exemption as a student of the ministry.

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White join, dissenting.

It is clear that in enacting § 10 (b) (3) of the Military . Selective Service Act of 1967,1 Congress intended to *246specify the exclusive methods by which the determinations of Selective Service Boards may be judicially reviewed. Since under the terms of that provision the present suit is plainly premature, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Section 10 (b) (3) provides in pertinent part as follows:

“No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction . . .

It is unquestioned that the overriding purpose of this provision was “to prevent litigious interruptions of procedures to provide necessary military manpower.” 2 To be sure, the provision is somewhat inartistically drawn, but its background and legislative history clearly resolve whatever difficulties might otherwise be presented by the imprecision of the draftsman’s language.

In interpreting the less explicit terms of predecessor statutes,3 this Court had established the general rule that draft classifications could not be judicially reviewed prior to the time a registrant was to be inducted. Review was held to be proper only when challenges to such determinations were raised either (1) in defense to a criminal prosecution following a refusal to be inducted, or (2) in habeas corpus proceedings initiated after induc*247tion. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 377; Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114; Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542; Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549.

Occasionally, however, other federal courts had allowed exceptions to this rule.4 Section 10 (b) (3) was proposed and enacted shortly after the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had, in the well-publicized case of Wolff v. Selective Service Bd., 372 F. 2d 817, permitted just such an exception.5 In adopting the section Congress specifically disapproved those decisions that had deviated from the rule against pre-induction review, and made explicit its absolute commitment against premature judicial interference with the orderly processing of registrants. The Senate Armed Services Committee put the matter this way:

“Until recently, there was no problem in the observance of the finality provision. In several recent cases, however, district courts have been brought into selective service processing prematurely. The committee attaches much importance to the finality provisions and reemphasizes the original intent that judicial review of classifications should not occur until after the registrant’s administrative remedies have been exhausted and the registrant presents himself for induction.” 6

A similar statement of intent was included in the report of the House Armed Services Committee:

“The committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts to review the classification *248action of local or appeal boards before the registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies. Existing law quite clearly precludes such a judicial review until after a registrant has been ordered to report for induction and has responded either affirmatively or negatively to such an order. In view of this inclination of the courts to prematurely inquire into the classification action of local boards, the committee has rewritten this provision of the law so as to more clearly enunciate this principle. The committee was prompted to take this action since continued disregard of this principle of the law by various courts could seriously affect the administration of the Selective Service System.” 7

Although the language of §10 (b)(3) contains no explicit reference to habeas corpus as a remedy for inductees seeking to challenge their classifications, that remedy was plainly recognized and approved by Congress. The section provides for review “after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The remedy for one who responds affirmatively cannot, of course, be by way of “defense to a criminal prosecution” for refusing to be inducted; the only remedy in such a case is habeas corpus, and the Senate Committee Report made quite clear Congress' understanding in this regard:

“A registrant who presents himself for induction may challenge his classification by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his induction. If the registrant does not submit to induction, he may raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution the issue of the legality of the classification.”8

*249Thus there can be no doubt that § 10 (b) (3) was designed to permit judicial review of draft classifications only in connection with criminal prosecutions or habeas corpus proceedings. Today, however, the Court holds that § 10 (b) (3) does not mean what it says in a case like this, where it is “plain on the record and on the face of the Act that an exemption ha[s] been granted.” 9 In such a case, it is said, there is a “clash” between the exemption and the provisions of § 10 (b)(3). With all respect, I am simply unable to perceive any “clash” whatsoever. Exemptions from service are substantive, while § 10 (b) (3) is purely procedural, specifying when substantive rights may be asserted. How the Court can conclude that the provisions of § 10 (b) (3) somehow do “violence to” the divinity student exemption is a mystery to me.10

*250The only other reason the Court offers for its casual disregard of § 10 (b) (3) is the suggestion that obedience to the statute would lead to “unnecessary harshness.” But if the statute is constitutional, we have no power to disregard it simply because we think it is harsh. That is a judgment for Congress, not for us. And the Court does not question the law’s constitutionality.11 To the *251contrary, the constitutionality of § 10 (b) (3) is upheld this very day in Clark v. Gabriel, post, p. 256, in reaffirmation of several previous decisions in which this Court has enunciated and applied the rule against pre-induction review of Selective Service determinations.12

The Court states that its “construction leaves § 10 (b) (3) unimpaired in the normal operations of the Act.” The implication seems to be that the present case is somehow exceptional. But the Court has carved out an “exception” to § 10 (b) (3) in exactly the kind of case where, in terms of the interests at stake, an exception seems least justified. The registrant with a clear statutory exemption is precisely the one least jeopardized by the procedural limitations of § 10 (b)(3). For, as the Government has acknowledged, “the Department of Justice would not prosecute [such a registrant] if he refuses to be inducted, and would promptly confess error if he submits to induction and brings a habeas corpus action.” 13

It is upon those registrants, rather, whose rights are not so clear that the burden of § 10 (b)(3) most harshly falls. For it is they who must choose whether to run the serious risk of a criminal prosecution or submit to *252induction with the uncertain hope of prevailing in a habeas corpus proceeding. Yet the Court has made plain today in Clark v. Gabriel, supra, that a registrant whose exemption from service is not clear will under § 10 (b) (3) be put to just such a fateful choice. In light of Gabriel, the allowance of pre-induction review in the present case thus stands as all the more irrational and unjustified.

I respectfully dissent.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner is enrolled as a student at a theological school preparing for the ministry and was accordingly classified as IV-D by the Selective Service Board. Section 6 (g) of the Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 611, as amended, now § 6 (g) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (see 81 Stat. 100, § 1 (a)), 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (g), gives such students exemption from training and service under the Act.1 He returned his registration certificate to the Government, according to the complaint in the present action, “for the sole purpose of expressing dissent from the participation by the United States in the war in Vietnam.” Shortly thereafter his Board declared him delinquent (1) for failure to have the registration certificate in his possession,2 and (2) for *235failure to provide the Board with notice of his local status. The Board thereupon changed his IV-D classification to I-A. He took an administrative appeal and lost and was ordered to report for induction.

At that point he brought suit to restrain his induction. The District Court dismissed the complaint, 280 F. Supp. 78, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 390 F. 2d 100. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 391 U. S. 912.

As noted, § 6 (g) of the Act states that “students preparing for the ministry” in qualified schools “shall be exempt from training and service” under the Act.3 Equally unambiguous is § 10 (b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 104, which provides that there shall be no pre-induction judicial review “of the classification or processing of any registrant,” 4 judicial review being limited to a defense in a criminal prosecution or, as the Government concedes, to habeas corpus after induction.5 See Estep v. United States, 327 *236U. S. 114, 123-125; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304; Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 377. If we assume, as we must for present purposes, that petitioner is entitled to a statutory exemption as a divinity student, by what authority can the Board withhold it or withdraw it and make him a delinquent?

In 1967 Congress added a provision concerning the immediate service of members of a “prime age group” after expiration of their deferment, stating that they were the first to be inducted “after delinquents and volunteers.” 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. III). Congress has also made criminal the knowing failure or neglect to perform any duty prescribed by the rules or regulations of the Selective Service System. 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. III). But Congress did *237not define delinquency; nor did it provide any standards for its definition by the Selective Service System. Yet Selective Service, as we have noted,6 has promulgated regulations governing delinquency and uses them to deprive registrants of their statutory exemption, because of various activities and conduct and without any regard to the exemptions provided by law.

We can find no authorization for that use of delinquency. Even if Congress had authorized the Boards to revoke statutory exemptions by means of delinquency classifications, serious questions would arise if Congress were silent and did not prescribe standards to govern the Boards' actions. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that, when Congress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets its terms and conditions, a Board can nonetheless withhold it from him for activities or conduct not material to the grant or withdrawal of the exemption. So to hold would make the Boards freewheeling agencies meting out their brand of justice in a vindictive manner.

Once a person registers and qualifies for a statutory exemption, we find no legislative authority to deprive him of that exemption because of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of granting or continuing that exemption. The Solicitor General confesses error on the use by Selective Service of delinquency proceedings for that purpose.

We deal with conduct of a local Board that is basically lawless. It is no different in constitutional implications from a case where induction of-an ordained minister or other clearly exempt person is ordered (a) to retaliate against the person because of his political views or (b) to bear down on him for his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get him out of town so that the amorous interests of a Board member might be better served. *238See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F. 2d 376. In such instances, as in the present one, there is no exercise of discretion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a claimed exemption is deserved. The case we decide today involves a clear departure by the Board from its statutory mandate. To hold that a person deprived of his statutory exemption in such a blatantly lawless manner must either be inducted and raise his protest through habeas corpus or defy induction and defend his refusal in a criminal prosecution is to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness. As the Solicitor General suggests, such literalness does violence to the clear mandate of § 6 (g) governing the exemption. Our construction leaves § 10 (b)(3) unimpaired in the normal operations of the Act.

No one, we believe, suggests that § 10 (b)(3) can sustain a literal reading. For while it purports on its face to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for reviewing a criminal conviction under the Act, everyone agrees that such was not its intent. Examples are legion where literalness in statutory language is out of harmony either with constitutional requirements, United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, or with an Act taken as an organic whole. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U. S. 480, 488-489. We think § 10 (b) (3) and § 6 (g) are another illustration; and the Solicitor General agrees. Since the exemption granted divinity students is plain and unequivocal and in no way contested here,7 and since the scope of the statutory delinquency concept is not broad enough to sustain a revocation of what Congress has *239granted as a statutory right, or sufficiently buttressed by legislative standards, we conclude that pre-induction judicial review is not precluded in cases of this type.

We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand the case to the District Court where petitioner must have the opportunity to prove the facts alleged and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1331.

Reversed.