delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is whether the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, bars a State from *407independently requiring individuals to accept employment as a condition for receipt of federally funded aid to families with dependent children. More precisely, the issue is whether that part of the Social Security Act known as the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) preempts the provisions of the New York Social Welfare Law commonly referred to as the New York Work Rules. A brief description of both the state and federal programs will be necessary.

The Work Rules were enacted by New York in 19711 *408as part of Governor Rockefeller’s efforts to reorganize the New York Welfare Program. Their aim, as explained by the Governor, is to encourage “the young and able-bodied, temporarily in need of assistance through no fault of their own, to achieve the education and the skills, the motivation and the determination that will make it possible for them to become increasingly self-sufficient, independent citizens who can contribute to and share in the responsibility for their families and our society.” 2

To achieve this, the Work Rules establish a presumption that certain recipients of public assistance are employable3 and require those recipients to report every two weeks to pick up their assistance checks in person; to file every two weeks a certificate from the appropriate public employment office stating that no suitable employment opportunities are available; to report for *409requested employment interviews; to report to the public employment office the result of a referral for employment; and not to fail willfully to report for suitable employment, when available. In addition to establishing a system of referral for employment in the private sector of the economy, the Work Rules permit the establishment of public works projects in New York’s social service districts.4 Failure of “employable” persons to participate in the operation of the Work Rules results in a loss of assistance.5

Like the Work Rules, WIN is designed to help individuals on welfare “acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence which will flow from being recognized as a wage-earning member of society . . . ,” 42 U. S. C. § 630 (1970 ed., Supp. I). The program was enacted as part of the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act,6 whereby States were required to incorporate WIN into their Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) *410plans. 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a)(19), 630 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. I). Every state AFDC plan must provide that certain “employable” individuals, as a condition for receiving aid, shall register for manpower services, training, and employment under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (19) (A) (1970 ed., Supp. I).7 Available services, to be provided by the State, must include “such health, vocational rehabilitation, counseling, child care, and other social and supportive services as are necessary to enable such indi-dividuals to accept employment or receive manpower training_” 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (19) (G) (1970 ed., *411Supp. I). After the required services have been provided, the State must certify to the Secretary of Labor those individuals who are ready for employment or training programs, 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a)(19)(G), 632, 633 (1970 ed. and Supp. I).8 Employment consists both of work in the regular economy and participation in public service programs. 42 U. S. C. §§ 630, 632, 633 (1970 ed. and Supp. I). As with the Work Rules, cooperation in WIN is necessary for employable individuals to continue to receive assistance.

In the court below, appellees, New York public assistance recipients subject to the Work Rules, challenged those Rules as violative of several provisions of the Constitution and as having been pre-empted by the WIN provisions of the Federal Social Security Act. The three-judge District Court rejected all but the last contention. 348 F. Supp. 290 (WDNY 1972). On this point, it held that “for those in the AFDC program, WIN preempts” 9 the New York Work Rules. Id., at 297.10 As *412this holding not only affected the continued operation of the New York Rules but raised serious doubts as to the viability of the supplementary work programs in 22 States, we set the cause for argument, 409 U. S. 1123 (1973).11 We now reverse this holding.

I

The holding of the court below affects the Work Rules only insofar as they apply to AFDC recipients. 348 F. Supp., at 297, 300 and n. 5. New York’s Home Relief program, for example — a general state assistance plan for which there is no federal reimbursement or support12 — remains untouched by the court’s pre-emption ruling. As to AFDC participants, however, the decision below would render the Work Rules inoperative and hold WIN “the exclusive manner of applying the carrot and stick” in efforts to place such recipients in gainful employment. Id., at 300.13

*413This is a sweeping step that strikes at the core of state prerogative under the AFDC program — a program which this Court has been careful to describe as a “scheme of cooperative federalism.” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 542 (1972). It could impair the capacity of the state government to deal effectively with the critical problem of mounting welfare costs and the increasing financial dependency of many of its citizens. New York has a legitimate interest in encouraging those of its citizens who can work to do so, and thus contribute to the societal well-being in addition to their personal and family support. To the extent that the Work Rules embody New York’s attempt to promote self-reliance and civic responsibility, to assure that limited state welfare funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely incapacitated and most in need, and to cope with the fiscal hardships enveloping many state and local governments, this Court should not lightly interfere. The problems confronting our society in these areas are severe, and state governments, in cooperation with the Federal Government, must be allowed considerable latitude in attempting their resolution.

This Court has repeatedly refused to void state statutory programs, absent congressional intent to pre-empt them.

“If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.” Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 202-203 (1952).

*414See also Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U. S. 423, 429 (1966); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 446 (1960); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, 350 (1933); Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (1912).

This same principle relates directly to state AFDC programs, where the Court already has acknowledged that States “have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” King v. Smith, supra, at 318-319; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 478; Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, at 541. Moreover, at the time of the passage of WIN in 1967, 21 States already had initiated welfare work requirements as a condition of AFDC eligibility.14 If Congress had intended to pre-empt state plans and efforts in such an important dimension of the AFDC program as employment referrals for those on assistance, such intentions would in all likelihood have been expressed in direct and unambiguous language. No such expression exists, however, either in the federal statute or in the committee reports.15

Appellees argue, nonetheless, that Congress intended to pre-empt state work programs because of the comprehensive nature of the WIN legislation, its legislative hist*415ory,16 and the alleged conflicts between certain sections of the state and federal laws.17 We do not agree. We reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-emption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive provisions, 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (19), 630 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. I). The subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem, cf. Askew v. American Waterways, 411 U. S. 325 (1973). Given the complexity of the matter addressed by Congress in WIN, a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate, completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive intent. This would be especially the case when the federal work incentive provisions had to be sufficiently comprehensive to authorize and govern programs in States which had no welfare work requirements of their own as well as cooperatively in States with such requirements.

Appellees also rely, as did the District Court, on the legislative history as supporting the view that “the WIN legislation is addressed to all AFDC recipients, leaving no employable recipients to be subject to state work rules.” Brief for Appellees 29. The court below pointed to no specific legislative history as supportive of its conclusion. Appellees do cite fragmentary statements *416which we find unpersuasive. Reliance is placed, for example, on a statement in the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the WIN legislation as follows:

“Under your committee’s bill, States would be required to develop a program for each appropriate relative and dependent child which would assure, to the maximum extent possible, that each individual would enter the labor force in order to become self-sufficient. To accomplish this, the States would have to assure that each adult in the family and each child over age 16 who is not attending school is given, when appropriate, employment counseling, testing, and job training.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1967).18 (Emphasis supplied.)

At best, this statement is ambiguous as to a possible congressional intention to supersede all state work programs.19 “Appropriateness,” as used in the Committee *417Report, may well mean “appropriateness” solely within the scope and confines of WIN. Furthermore, the language employed by Congress in enacting WIN must be considered in conjunction with its operational scope and level of funding, which, as will be shown, is quite limited with respect to the total number of employable AFDC recipients, Part II, infra.

In sum, our attention has been directed to no relevant argument which supports, except in the most peripheral way, the view that Congress intended, either expressly or impliedly, to pre-empt state work programs. Far more would be required to show the “clear manifestation of [congressional] intention” which must exist before a federal statute is held “to supersede the exercise” of state action. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S., at 202-203.

*418II

Persuasive affirmative reasons exist in this case which also strongly negate the view that Congress intended, by the enactment of the WIN legislation, to terminate all existing state work programs and foreclose additional state cooperative programs in the future. Wé note, first, that WIN itself was not designed on its face to be all embracing. Federal work incentive programs were to be established only in States and political subdivisions

“in which [the Secretary of Labor] determines there is a significant number of individuals who have attained age 16 and are receiving aid to families with dependent children. In other political subdivisions, he shall use his best efforts to provide such programs either within such subdivisions or through the provision of transportation for such persons to political subdivisions of the State in which such programs are established.” 42 U. S. C. § 632 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. I).

This section constitutes an express recognition that the federal statute probably would be limited in scope and application.20 In New York, this has meant operation of WIN in only 14 of New York's 64 social service districts, though these 14 districts do service approximately 90% of the welfare recipients in the State. Yet the Secretary of Labor has not authorized additional WIN programs for the other districts, resulting in a lack of federal job placement opportunities in the more lightly populated areas of States and in those without adequate *419transportation of potential enrollees to districts with WIN programs.21

Even in the districts where WIN does operate, its reach is limited. In New York, according to federal estimates, there are 150,000 WIN registrants for the current fiscal year, but the Secretary of Labor has contracted with the State to provide services to only 90,000 registrants, of whom the majority will not receive full job training and placement assistance.22 In fiscal 1971, New York asserts that “17,511 individuals were referred for participation in the WIN Program, but the Federal government allowed only 9,600 opportunities for enrollment.” 23 California claims “over 122,000 employable AFDC recipients” last year, but only 18,000 available WIN slots.24

It is evident that WIN is a partial program which stops short of providing adequate job and training opportunities for large numbers of state AFDC recipients. It would be incongruous for Congress on the one hand to promote work opportunities for AFDC recipients and on the other to prevent States from undertaking supplementary efforts toward this very same end. We cannot *420interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes. The significance of state supplementation is illustrated by the experience in New York, where the Work Rules have aided the objectives of federal work incentives: from July 1 through September 30, 1971, the first months of the Work Rules’ operation, the State Employment Service claimed job placements for approximately 9,376 recipients.25

Moreover, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the agency of Government responsible for administering the Federal Social Security Act — including reviewing of state AFDC programs — has never considered the WIN legislation to be pre-emptive. HEW has followed consistently the policy of approving state plans containing welfare work requirements so long as those requirements are not arbitrary or unreasonable.26 Congress presumably knew of this settled administrative policy at the time of enactment of WIN, when 21 States had welfare work programs. Subsequent to WIN’s passage, HEW has continued to approve state work requirements. Pursuant to such approval, New York has re*421ceived federal grants-in-aid for the operation of its AFDC plan, including its work provisions.27 In interpreting this statute, we must be mindful that “the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong . . . Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 481-482. In this case, such indications are wholly absent.

New York, furthermore, has attempted to operate the Work Rules in such a manner as to avoid friction and overlap with WIN. Officials from both the State Department of Labor and a local Social Service Department testified below that every AFDC recipient appropriate for WIN was first referred there, that no person was to be referred to the state program who was participating in WIN, and that only if there was no position available for him under WIN, was a recipient to be referred for employment pursuant to state statute.28 Where coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one.

In this context, the dissenting opinion's reliance on Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971), Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972), and King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), is misplaced. In those cases it was clear that state law excluded people from AFDC benefits who the Social Security Act expressly provided would be eligible. The Court found no room either in the Act’s *422language or legislative history to warrant the States’ additional eligibility requirements. Here, by contrast, the Act allows for complementary state work incentive programs and procedures incident thereto — even if they become conditions for continued assistance. Such programs and procedures are not necessarily invalid, any more than other supplementary regulations promulgated within the legitimate sphere of state administration. See Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309 (1971); Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853 (SDNY), aff’d, 393 U. S. 323 (1969). See also Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972).

Ill

We thus reverse the holding below that WIN preempts the New York Work Rules. Our ruling establishes the validity of a state work program as one means of helping AFDC recipients return to gainful employment. We do not resolve, however, the question of whether some particular sections of the Work Rules might contravene the specific provisions of the Federal Social Security Act.

This last question we remand to the court below. That court did not have the opportunity to consider the issue of specific conflict between the state and federal programs, free from its misapprehension that the Work Rules had been entirely pre-empted. Further, the New York Legislature amended the Work Rules in 1972 to provide, among other things, for exemption of persons engaged in full-time training and vocational rehabilitation programs from the reporting and check pickup requirements (N. Y. Laws 1972, c. 683), for monthly rather than semi-monthly payments of shelter allowances {id., c. 685) and, most significantly, for a definition of an “employable” AFDC recipient which is claimed by New York to be identical to that now used *423under WIN (id., c. 941). Inasmuch as the court below did not have the opportunity to consider the 1972 amendments as they related to the issue of potential state-federal conflict, the remand should afford it.

We deem it unnecessary at the present time to intimate any view on whether or to what extent particular provisions of the Work Rules may contravene the purposes or provisions of WIN. Such a determination should be made initially by the court below, consistent with the principles set forth in this opinion.29

The judgment of the three-judge District Court is reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

Because the Court today ignores a fundamental rule for interpreting the Social Security Act, I must respectfully dissent. As we said in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286 (1971), “in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state *424eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” See also King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598, 600 (1972). The New York Work Rules fall squarely within this statement; they clearly exclude persons eligible for assistance under federal standards, and it could hardly be maintained that they did not impose additional conditions of eligibility.1 For example, under federal standards, it is irrelevant to a determination of eligibility that a recipient has or has not filed every two weeks a certificate from the local employment office that no suitable employment opportunities are available, yet under the Work Rules, a recipient who fails to file such a certificate is “deemed” to have refused to accept suitable employment, and so is not eligible for assistance. N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law §131 (4) (a) (Supp. 1971-1972).2 Thus, according to the rules of interpretation we have heretofore followed, the proper inquiry is whether the Social Security Act or its legislative history clearly shows congressional authorization for state employment requirements other than those involved in WIN.3

*425The answer is that neither the Act nor its legislative history shows such an authorization. The only relevant work-related conditions of eligibility in the Act are found at 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (19) (1970 ed., Supp. I). In addition to exempting certain persons from registration for and participation in WIN,4 the Act permits States to *426disregard the needs of persons otherwise eligible for assistance who “have refused without good cause to participate under a work incentive program . . . or . . . to accept employment in which he is able to engage.” 42 TJ. S. C. § 602 (a) (19) (F) (1970 ed., Supp. I). The Act thus makes actual refusal to participate in a WIN Program or to accept employment a permissible ground for denying assistance. In contrast, New York has adopted the none-too-subtle technique of “deeming” persons not to have accepted employment because they have not, for example, obtained a certain certificate from the local employment office every two weeks. “Deeming” is a familiar legal device to evade applicable requirements by saying that they have been satisfied when they have not in fact been satisfied. But the federal requirement, which the State may not alter without clear congressional authorization,5 requires an actual refusal to participate in a WIN Program or to accept employment, not a refusal to participate in some other program or a fictitious refusal of employment.6

The legislative history of the Social Security Act confirms this interpretation, for whenever Congress legislated *427with respect to work requirements, it focused on actual refusals to accept employment or to participate in certain special programs clearly authorized by Congress. At no time has Congress authorized States to adopt other work-referral programs or to make refusal to participate in such programs a condition of eligibility, even under the guise of “deeming” such a refusal a refusal to accept employment.

At its inception, the program of Aid to Dependent Children was designed to lessen somewhat the burden of supporting such children. The program provided assistance to children who had been deprived of parental support by reason of the absence of a parent. 49 Stat. 629 (1935). Assistance was provided to supply the needs of such children, thus “releas [ing the parent] from the wage-earning role.” H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1935). See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). Thus, the program’s purposes were in many ways inconsistent with a requirement that the parent leave the home to accept employment. Yet, in operation, the original program failed to provide sufficient inducement for the parent to remain at home, since the amount of assistance was measured solely by the child’s needs. In order further to relieve the pressures on the parent to leave the home and accept work, Congress amended the Act in 1950 so that the aid would include payments “to meet the needs of the relative with whom any dependent child is living.” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (b)(1).

Until 1961, then, the sole emphasis of the Social Security Act’s provisions for assistance to dependent children was on preserving the integrity of the family unit.7 *428In that year, Congress expanded the definition of dependent child to include children deprived of parental support by reason of the unemployment of a parent. 42 U. S. C. § 607. Families with two parents present could, for the first time, receive assistance, and one parent could leave the home to work without impairing the integrity of the family unit. Congress therefore required States participating in the program for aid to families with an unemployed parent to deny assistance under this provision to individuals who refused to accept bona fide offers of employment. Pub. L. 87-31, 75 Stat. 76 (1961). Refusal of actual offers of employment was clearly the contemplated condition. See S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961). Congress then developed this concept, permitting States to establish “Community Work and Training Programs” of work on public projects, Pub. L. 87-543, § 105, 76 Stat. 186, rendered inapplicable by Pub. L. 90-248,81 Stat. 892. Refusal to accept a work assignment on such a project without good cause would be a ground for denial of public assistance. See H. R. Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1962).

When Congress established WIN, it did not abandon its previous policies. Recipients of public assistance could be required only to accept bona fide offers of employment or placement in specified programs. There is no indication whatsoever in the legislative history that Congress intended to permit States to deny assistance because potential recipients had refused to participate in programs not supervised by the Secretary of Labor, as WIN Programs are. The parameters of the WIN Program were designed to accommodate Congress' dual interests jin guaranteeing the1 integrity of the family and in maximizing the potential for employment of recipients of public assistance. Without careful federal supervision, of the sort contemplated by the delegation to *429the Secretary of Labor to establish testing and counseling services and to require that States design employ-ability plans, 81 Stat. 885, state work programs might upset the accommodation that Congress sought. The Work Incentive Program was thus a carefully coordinated system, whose individual parts fit into an integrated whole. It is hardly surprising that Congress did not expressly or impliedly authorize States to develop independent work programs, since the WIN Program represented Congress’ recognition that such programs had to be kept under careful scrutiny if the variety of goals Congress sought to promote were to be achieved.8 I believe that the Court seriously misconceives the purposes of the federal programs of public assistance, in its apparent belief that Congress had the sole purpose of promoting work opportunities, a purpose that precluding additional state programs would negate. Ante, at 418-420.

*430Instead, Congress has consistently indicated its desire to adopt programs that will enhance the employability of recipients of public assistance while maintaining the integrity of families receiving assistance. A work-referral program can do this only if it is regulated, both as to the persons required to participate and as to the terms on which they must participate. And Congress has consistently recognized that such regulation requires close federal supervision of work programs. In my view, this course of legislation, which is not mentioned by the Court, is neither “ambiguous,” “fragmentary,” nor “peripheral,” ante, at 415, 416, 417. No matter how it is viewed, however, one cannot fairly say that the Social Security Act or its legislative history clearly evidences congressional authorization for making participation in state work programs a condition of eligibility for public assistance.9

*431The policy of clear statement10 in Townsend serves a useful purpose. It informs legislators that, if they wish to alter the accommodations previously arrived at in an Act of major importance, they must indicate clearly that wish, since what may appear to be minor changes of narrow scope may in fact have ramifications throughout the administration of the Act. A policy of clear statement insures that Congress will consider those ramifications,11 but only if it is regularly adhered to.

Finally, it is particularly appropriate to require clear statement of authorization to impose additional conditions of eligibility for public assistance. Myths abound in this area. It is widely yet erroneously believed, for *432example, that recipients of public assistance have little desire to become self-supporting. See, e. g., L. Goodwin, Do the Poor Want to Work? 5, 51-52, 112 (1972). Because the recipients of public assistance generally lack substantial political influence, state legislators may find it expedient to accede to pressures generated by misconceptions. In order to lessen the possibility that erroneous beliefs will lead state legislators to single out politically unpopular recipients of assistance for harsh treatment, Congress must clearly authorize States to impose conditions of eligibility different from the federal standards. As we observed in King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 318-319, this rule leaves the States with “considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” The Court today quotes this observation but misses its import. The States have latitude to adjust benefits in the two ways mentioned, but not by imposing additional conditions of eligibility. When across-the-board adjustments like those are made, legislators cannot single out especially unpopular groups for discriminatory treatment.12

For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.