delivered the opinion of 1he Court.

Petitioner in this case presents a claim that evidence offered against him at his trial should have been suppressed because it was seized at nighttime in violation of governing statutory provisions. The search which led to the seizure was conducted by officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department at approximately 9:30 p. m. within the District of Columbia. *432Armed .with a search warrant, the officers entered petitioner’s apartmertt for the purpose of discovering violations of a federal narcotics statute, and seized a substantial amount of contraband narcotics. The parties urge upon us differing theories concerning which federal or District of Columbia statute bears on the legality of this search, and we must therefore interpret and reconcile several recent congressional enactments dealing with nighttime searches which seem to embody somewhat inconsistent views.1

The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s description of this congeries of statutes as a “ ‘bramble-bush of uncertainties and contradictions,’ ” 2 and a mere summary of the statutes attests to the accuracy of that observation:

District of Columbia Statutes: The older of the two, conceivably relevant District of Columbia statutes, D-. C. Code § 33-414 (1973),3 was enacted in 1956 and authorizes *433search warrants for violations of the District of Columbia narcotics laws. This section does not limit the time during which searches may be made,- stating plainly that “[t]he judge or commissioner shall insert a direction in the- warrant that it may be served, at any time in the day or- night.” This liberal time provision is in direct contrast to the more restrictive provisions of the second *434District of Columbia statute to be considered, D. C. Code § 23-521 (f)(5),4 which specifically requires that search-warrants be served in the daytime unless certain con*435ditions set forth in § 23-522 (c)(1) are met. These conditions essentially require a showing of special need to search at night, and concededly have not been satisfied in this case.

*436Federal Statutes and Rules: The general provision governing federal search warrants is found in Fed. Rule Grim. Proc. 41.5 At the time the search in this case *437took place, Rule 41 (c) provided that warrants must be served in the daytime except where “the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched.”6 In such event the war*438rant could direct “that it be served at any time.” This provision was incorporated in the Rules in 1948 as a replacement for language previously contained in the Espionage Act of 1917.7 A second federal statute relating only to searches for “controlled substances” is found in 21 U. S. C. §879 (a),8 which was enacted in *4391970. That section 'provides that a' warrant may- .be served “at any time of the day or night” so long as the issuing authority “is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.” ' This provision in turn is the successor to a provision in 18 U. S. C. § 1405 (1964 ed.),9 enacted in 1956 to relax the “positivity” test of Rule 41 in cases involving certain narcotic drugs.10 ■ Congress had passed this statute in response to the complaints of law' enforcement officers that the positivity requirement gave commercial narcotics dealers a definite’ ¿d vantage over federal agents. Rule 41 is therefore not applicable to searches governed by the more specific narcotic search statutes.11

*440Tbie facts of this case must be understood in the context of thes'e statutes. On February 11, 1971, an Assistant United States Attorney applied to a United States Magistrate sitting in the District of Columbia for a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner’s apartment for evidence of illegal narcotics. The application included the brief notation: “Violation: U. S. Cr; Title 26. Sections: 4704a.” In connection with the application., an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department vice squad appeared before the Magistrate and swore that he had reason to believe petitioner was concealing property held in violation of 'that same cocte provision.12 *441The officer supplemented his personal testimony with a written affidavit, outlining the basis for the application in more detail and alleging specifically that “illegal drugs are sold and possessed in violation of the United States Code, Title 26,. Section 4704a.”13 The affidavit concluded with the language: “I am positive that Lonnie Gooding is secreting narcotics inside his apartment at 1419 Chapin Street NW in violation of the US Code.”

The Magistrate then issued a warrant directing the Chief of Police or “any member of MPDC” to search petitioner’s apartment.14 The warrant specifically noted *442that facts had been set forth in ah affidavit alleging a violation of 26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a) (1964 ed.) and that those facts established probable cause to make the search. The warrant also stated that the search could be made “at any time in the day or night.” • This phrase was accompanied by a footnote reference to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (c), presumably because-the police officer had asserted he was “positive” the drugs were in petitioner’s apartment. One of the briefs filed in this case suggests that the warrant form was preprinted and contemplated application of Rule 41 standards.15

The search warrant was executed on February 12, 1971, at 9:30 p. m.16 The officers engaged in the search were *443all members- of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, and the search uncovered a substantial quantity of contraband narcotic materials. They were seized and formed the basis for charging petitioner with violations of 26 U. S. C. § 4704 (a) (1964 ed.)17 and 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1964 ed.).18 Following his indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on April 6, 1971, petitioner filed a .motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the February 12 search.

. Several grounds were asserted in support of the motion, particularly that “[t]he search warrant was executed at night but the application for the warrant did not comply with the D. C. Code provisions for nighttime search *444warrants . . . 19 Although no provisions of the D. C. Code were' explicitly referred to, petitioner’s argument apparently was that Title 23 of the D. C. Code, requiring that a special showing of need be made to justify a search at night, governed this search, and that its requirements had not been met. The District Court found this reasoning persuasive and granted the motion to suppress. Rejecting the Government’s argument that the warrant was not issued under Title 23 but rather under 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a), the court stated:

“Whatever be the standards generally for issuance of a nighttime search warrant in federal narcotics cases in other parts of the country, however, the Court finds that the existence of 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) does not remove such cases from the explicit requirements for' search warrants in the District of Columbia under the newly enacted Title 23, D. C. Code.”20

Having decided that District of Columbia law applied, the District Court admitted to some uncertainty about the status of D. C. Code § 33-414, the provision dealing specifically with violations of local drug laws. The court noted with some puzzlement that no mention of this provision was found in the legislative history of Title 23, and that some language in the legislative history suggested that the provisión had simply been overlooked.21 Nevertheless, the court determined that

“[p] ending prompt review of this determination *445or congressional action, and-pending interpretation of 33 D. C. Code § 414 (h) in light of the new Title 23 provisions, search warrants which are to be-executed in the nighttime should comply in all respects with 23 D. C. Code § 523 (b).”22

Concededly the warrant issued in this case did not comply with the requirements of Title 23.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court,23 although none of the three judges who composed the panel completely agreed with any other ón the proper rationale. All three agreed,'however, that 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a), rather than any provision of the District of Columbia Code, was the provision which determined the legality of this search. All three likewise agreed that the affidavit submitted by the District of Columbia police officer satisfied the requirements of that section. Judge Wilkey and Judge Fahy found that no greater showing for a nighttime search was required by § 879 (a) than was required by its predecessor statute governing federal narcotics searches, 18 U. S. C. 1:1405 (1964 ed.), and that the affidavit need establish only probable cause to believe that the-property would be on the premises at the time of the search24 Judge Robinson believed that § 879 (a) *446did require an additional showing for a nighttime search, but concluded that such a showing had been made in this case:25 •

Petitioner urges that we reverse the Court of Appeals on either or both of two alternative grounds. First, petitioner repeats his assertion, sustained by the District Court, that Title 23 of the D. C. Code is the statute applicable, to the search in this case and that, as the Government has conceded, the requirements of that title have not been satisfied. Second, petitioner argues that, if 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) is considered to be the applicable provision, a special showing for nighttime searches must be made. We agree with the Court of Appeals that 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) is the statute applicable to this case, and that its provisions have been satisfied-here.26

I

The unique situation of the District of Columbia, for .which Congress legislates both specially. and as a part *447of the Nation, gives rise to the principal difficulties in this case. For we deal here not with statutory schemes enacted by independent legislative bodies, but with possibly overlapping schemes enacted by a single body. Despite the potential overlap, however, we think that the operative facts surrounding this search. strongly indicate that the standards for .issuance of a warrant should be governed by the nationwide federal legislation enacted by Congress — that is, 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) 27— rather than by the local D. C. laws. To begin with, an Assistant United States Attorney, who had discretion to proceed either under federal or under local law, filed the application for the search warrant alleging a violation of the United States Code. Application was made to a United States Magistrate, located in the United States District Court building, and neither the application nor the supporting affidavits contained any mention of the local narcotics laws. After the materials were seized, petitioner was indicted for violations of federal law.

Petitioner contends, however, that Title 23 of the D. C. Code should apply to this case because the executing officers, as well as the officer swearing to the affidavit presented to the Magistrate, were not federal officers but officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. He argues that the provisions of 21 U. S. C. § 8.79 (a) were intended to apply solely to agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and'Dangerous Drugs, none of whom were involved here, whereas Title 23 of the D. C. Code was intended to provide comprehensive regulation of District of Columbia police officers investigating both local and' federal offenses. Petitioner reinforces his argument by noting that the former federal statute *448regulating drug searches specifically provided that “a search warrant may be directed to any officer of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing a violation of any of such provisions,” 28 while no such section appears in' 21 U. S. ’ C. § 879. Therefore, says petitioner, the District of Columbia police’ were no longer to be considered federal agents for the purpose of enforcing federal drug laws.

Although petitioner’s arguments cannot be dismissed lightly, we find them ultimately unpersuasive.’ . Coricededly there are hints in the statutory framework and legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, that indicate the policing function under those provisions would-be the primary responsibility of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.29 But this focus on the Bureau’s role seems entirely natural in view of one of the Act’s stated purposes to “collect the diverse drug *449control and enforcement laws under one piece of legislation to facilitate law enforcement; drug research, educational and related control facilities.” 30 In providing a comprehensive federal scheme for the control of drug abuse, Congress could be expected to pay special attention to the federé! agency set up to enforce the laws. But this attention does not mean that Congress at the same time wished to dispense with the aid of other enforcement personnel who had previously given assistance.

. The failure of Congress to include a special provision authorizing District of Columbia police officers to obtain search warrants for investigating federal offenses cannot be taken as a deliberate exclusion in view of .the overall statutory framework. The provision included in the previous federal statute may well have seemed unnecessary, both in light of the history of cooperation between the District of Columbia police .and federal officers and in view of the provisions of D. C. Code § 4r-138 providing that “[a]ny warrant for search or arrest, issued by any magistrate of- the District, may be executed in any part of the District by any member of the police force . . ..”31 Thus, both custom and statute already assured the availability of District of Columbia police. Furthermore, the legislative history relating to § 879 (a) stresses the need for stronger enforcement of the federal narcotics laws, a. goal hardly advanced by reducing the forces available to .execute those laws. In fact, the provision *450which is now § 879 (b), permitting “no-knock” searches under certain conditions, was one of the most controversial sections of the entire bill, and was defended primarily by the pressing need for added enforcement weapons to combat the increased drug traffic.32

Finally, the interpretation urged by petitioner would leave District of Columbia officers able to execute general federal search warrants under amended Fed. 'Rule Crim. Proc. 41, but would deny them that authority under the federal drug search statute. ' Rule 41 now pro: vides that “a federal law enforcement officer” — defined in the Rule to include “any category of officers authorized by the Attorney General to request the issuance of a search warrant” — may make applications under the Rule. The Attorney General has since listed the Metropolitan Police Department ahiong those agencies *451which are so authorized.33 If petitioner’s contention were accepted, it would seemingly mean that the general search warrant statute applicable to the District of Columbia would govern District of Columbia police officers investigating federal drug cases, but would not govern them when investigating other federal crimes.. This result would obtain despite the fact that District of Columbia police officers historically played a prominent role in the enforcement of federal drug laws under 18 U. S. C. § 1405 (1964 ed.).

There is little indication that Title 23 of the D. C. Code was intended to serve the sweeping purpose which petitioner attributes to it.34 The search warrant provisions upon which petitioner relies were part of the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, which substantially reorganized the District of Columbia court system, providing for a new local court of general jurisdiction and relieving the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of much of its local burden.35 Prior to that time all local felonies had been tried in the United States District Court, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by their terms had applied. The creation of the new Superior Court created the need for a new set of pro*452cedural rules, and, though some important changes were made, the new rules quite closely tracked the Federal Rules. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the general provision relating to search warrants, found in D. C.^Code § 23-521 et seq. and then incorporated in similar form into the rules36 promulgated *453Feb. 1, 1971, for the new Superior Court, was intended to be a counterpart to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41. The Federal Rule; as discussed infra, did - not apply to narcotics cases in the federal courts since more specific provisions, first those of 18 U. S. C. § 1405 (1964 ed.) and then, those of 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a), controlled.37

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Federal Rule 41 has been subsequently modified to more closely resemble the District of Columbia statute and rule. The new Federal Rule, though less specific than the local rule, provides that a search warrant must be served in the daytime, “unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime,’.’ and abandons the old, cumbersome positivity standard. The concern for individual privacy revealed in the provisions of the District of Columbia search statute may thus be found in the new Federal Jtule as well, but Congress’ as it had in the earlier version of the Rule, *454nevertheless showed its clear intention to leave intact other special search warrant provisions, including, of course, the provisions relating to searches for controlled substances.38 In those limited cases Congress has considered the need for privacy to be counterbalanced by the public need for more effective law enforcement. We do not believe that Congress, by enacting a general search warrant provision for the District of Columbia, has struck a different balance in federal drug cases simply because District of Columbia police officers are involved.

. We therefore conclude, as did all the judges of the Court of Appeals, that the statute applicable to this case is 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a). Our remaining task is to determine whether the requirements of that section have been met.

IX

.“A search warrant relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be served at any time of the day. or night if the judge or United States magistrate issuing, the warrant is satisfied that there is probable cause' to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.” 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a).

Only the last seven words of the statute are really in controversy. here.. Petitioner contends that this language, not found in the predecessor statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1405 (1964 ed.), was intended to require some special showing of need for searches conducted at night rather than during the day. His contention was adopted, at least in part, by Judge Robinson in the Court of Appeals. The Government, on the other hand, contends that it must show only probable 'cause to believe that the *455sought-after property will be on the premises at the.time of the search, and that if there is probable cause to believe the property will' be on the premises at night, such a showing sufficiently meets the requirement imposed by the last seven words of § 879 (a).

The language of the statute by itself is not crystal clear on this issue. Petitioner insists- that the last phrase requires with unmistakable clarity a separate finding of probable cause to justify a nighttime search. Thus, according to petitioner, the issuing magistrate would have to satisfy himself that there was not only probable cause for the search, but also probable cause for believing that the search should be conducted at nighttime rather than during the daytime. While this is a possible meaning, it is by no means the only possible meaning attributable to the words.

Petitioner’s interpretation really assumes that the statute reads: “There is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and, if served at night, for its service at such time.” But the statute does not include the italicizéd four words; it makes no distinction whatever between day and night, and literally read would apparently require that a special showing be made for a daytime search as well. The idea that a particularized showing must be made for searches in the daytime is completely novel and lacks even a single counterpart in other search statutes enacted by Congress.

Petitioner suggests that since Congress was concerned about the greater intrusion resulting from nighttime searches, it would be logical to apply the language, “probable’ cause ... for its service at such time,” only to nighttime searches. But even this interpretation, which is by no means a literal reading of the language, is not wholly convincing. -The'traditional limitation placed on nighttime searches, as evident from the earlier *456language of Rule 41, is to require, not that there be probable' caüse for searching at night, but that the affiant be positive that the property is in fact located on the property to be searched- Thus Congress’ very choice of the words “probable cause” would indicate that the earlier limitation of “positivity” was not to apply, while offering no other immediately ascertainable standard fon what should constitute “probable cause” for executing a search warrant during the night.

This roundabout way of limiting nighttime searches, if that were in fact the statute’s intent, would sharply contrast with the manner in which Congress has required special showings for nighttime searches in other statutes. For example, Title 23 of the D. C. Code, discussed supra, specifies that the warrant “be executed during the hours of daylight” (emphasis added) unless certain itemized conditions are met. Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 41, as amended in 1972, states: “The warrant shall be served in the daytime unless the issuing authority, • by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause ■ shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime.” (Emphasis added.) The fact that Congress, when it has intended to require such special showings for nighttime searches, has done so in language largely free from ambiguity militates against petitioner’s assertion that the language, of § 879 (a) on its face supports his position. ■

The legislative history lends no support to petitioner’s interpretation, but in fact cuts the other way.- ■ Both the House and the Senate Committee Reports on the bill incorporated a summary prepared by the Department. of Justice, where much of the -bill’s drafting had taken places which stated:

“Section 702 (a) [now § 879 (a)] incorporates .18 U. S. C. [§] 1405 and authorizes service of a. search *457warrant at any time of the day or night if probable cause has been established to the satisfaction of the judge or U. S. magistrate issuing the warrant.”39

As previously noted, § 1405 provided that a search warrant could be served at any time of the day or night so long as the issuing officer was “satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the grounds for the-application exist . . . .” Case law had uniformly interpreted the language to mean that probable cause for the warrant itself was all that was necessary for a nighttime search.40 The officers or agents simply had to establish probable cause for believing that the sought-after property would be found in the place to be searched.

There is no ■ suggestion in any of the hearings or debates before Congress that a change from the prior law in this área was intended. The provision itself went unmentioned in the debates and hearings on the bill, a surprising omission if the bill effected "the cutback petitioner says it did. Of like import is the fact that in the long and heated discussions over § 702 (b), the so-called, “no-knock” provision of the bill, no defender of the bill saw fit to argue that any greater intrusion caused by the no-knock provision would be partially offset by the greater difficulty in obtaining warrants executable at night.41 While congressional silence as to a particular provision of a bill during debates which give extensive consideration to neighboring provisions is not easy to interpret, it would be unusual for such a significant *458change as that proposed by petitioner to have entirely escaped notice.

Finally, it is important to note that .the Department of Justice itself submitted this bill to Congress for enactment, including § 879 (a) in its present form. Since the hearings and debates stress that a major purpose of the bill was to supply more effective enforcement tools to combat the increasing use of narcotic drugs, it seems totally illogical to suggest that the Department of Justice would submit a bill making it substantially more difficult to control the traffic in hard drugs. Petitioner suggests that this surrender was necessary to convince Congress to bring additional drugs within the Controlled Substances Act, but that theory rests entirely on speculation. There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history that any price had to be paid, for what was thought to be a much-desired reorganization and expansion of the drug laws, much less the substantial price that petitioner argues had to be paid here.

We therefore conclude that 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) requires no special showing for a nighttime search, other than a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the property or person to be searched at that time.42 We believe that the showing was met in this case. The affidavit submitted by the District of Columbia police officer suggested that there was a continuing traffic of drugs from petitioner’s apartment, and a prior purchase through an informer had confirmed that drugs were available. This was sufficient to satisfy 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a). The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is

Affirmed.

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall , concur, dissenting.

The petitioner is charged' with possession of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1964 ed.) and 26 U. S. C. §4704 (a) (1964 ed.). He moved the District Court to suppress certain evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant secured by and directed to the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. The District Court granted the suppression motion on the ground that the search was conducted at night in violation of D. C. Code §§ 23-521-523 (1973) which limit search warrant execution to daylight hours absent specific contrary authorization founded upon the judicial officer’s determination

“that (A) it cannot be executed during the hours of daylight, (B) the property sought is likely to be removed or destroyed if not seized forthwith, or (C) the property sought is not likely to be found except at certain times or- in certain circumstances . . . .” D. C. Code § 23-522 (c) (1).1

Though the warrant here directed a search “at any time in the day or night,” none of the grounds set forth in § 23-522 (c) (1) were contained in either the application or the warrant itself. The police obtained the warrant on February 11, 1971, but they failed to execute it during the day of February 12, waiting instead until 9:30 p. m. on that date. Since they delayed execution until well after the daylight hours had ended, *460the seizure was invalid if governed by D. C. Code §§ 23-521 to 23-523.

The Court holds, however, that the D. C. Code provisions are inapplicable and that the search is-governed by 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a). That section, became effective October 27,1970, as part of the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U. S. C. § 801 et seq.; it relates to search warrants issued in connection with offenses involving controlled substances.' The D. C. Code provisions, however, became effective February 11, 1971, as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal' Procedure Act. The latter Act did not distinguish between local and federal prosecutions in its procedural innovations.2 The purpose of the restriction upon nighttime searches was to limit such intrusions to those instances where there is “some justification for it,”3 thus implementing the “policy generally disfavoring nighttime executions, nighttime intrusions, more characteristic of a ‘police state’ lacking in the respect for due process .and the right of privacy dictated by the U. S. Constitution and history •....” 4

Approximately 60%.of the search warrants issued in the District of Columbia relate to narcotics violations. Congress was aware of this, and, if it had intended to except federal narcotics search warrants from the protections against unnecessary nighttime “police ‘ state” searches, one would expect an expression of such intent. I agree with Judge Gesell that no such intent is indicated. *461Thus,- “ [wjhatever be the standards generally for issuance of a nighttime search warrant in federal narcotics cases in other parts of the country . . . the existence of 21 U. S. C, § 879 (a) does not remove such cases from the explicit requirements for search warrants in the District of Columbia under the newly enacted Title 23, D. C. Code.” 328 F. Supp. 1005, 1007. I would reverse the Court of Appeals and sustain the District Court’s suppression order.

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan join, dissenting.

I agree with my Brother Douglas that the provisions of the District of Columbia Code requiring a showing of need for execution of a search warrant at night govern the search involved in this case, and, accordingly, I join in his dissenting opinion. A majority of the Court, however, rejects this argument and goes on to discuss the standards imposed by 21 U. S. C. § 879 (a) upon issuance of search warrants for nighttime execution in federal narcotics cases. Obviously, the Court’s interpretation of § 879 (a) is of far greater significance, of national rather than purely local concern. I cannot let the .Court’s construction óf § 879 (a) pass without registering my dissent on this issue as well.

The opinion of the Court, it seems to me, analyzes the § 879 (a) issue in a vacuum, without any discussion of some of the important policy considerations which underlie this question of statutory interpretation. Perhaps a partial vacuum would be a more appropriate description, since the Court is. obviously fully cognizant of the substantial governmental interest in enforcement of the narcotics laws, an interest- which- its interpretation of § 879. (a) so well serves. But plainly there are other concerns implicated in our 'interpretation of this con*462gressional enactment restricting the issuance of search warrants — the protection of individual privacy which is the very purpose of the statute’s search warrant requirement and which of course is given constitutional recognition in the Fourth Amendment. The Court seems totally oblivious to these constitutional considerations. Taking them into account, I find that the only acceptable interpretation of the statute is one which requires some additional justification for authorizing a nighttime search over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found upon the search.

Fundamentally at issue in this case is the extent of the protection which we will all enjoy from police intrusion into the privacy of our homes during the middle of the night. The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect our reasonable expectations of privacy from unjustified governmental intrusion. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360-362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In my view, there is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and. more demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let. alone in the. privacy of our homes during the night. The idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their way into the home in the middle of the night — frequently, in narcotics cases, without knocking and announcing their purpose — rousing the residents out of their beds, and forcing them to stand by in indignity in their night clothes'while the police rummage through their belongings does indeed smack of a “ ‘police state’ lacking in the respect for . . . the right of privacy dictated by the U. S. Constitution.” S.Rep. No. 91-538, p. 12 (1969). The public outrage at the series of mistaken'nighttime raids by narcotics agents in Collinsville, Illinois, last *463April, see N. Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1973, p. 1, col. 5; N. Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1973, p. 30, col. 1, serves to emphasize just how inconsistent with our constitutional guarantees such nighttime searchés are.

This Court has consistently recognized that the intrusion upon privacy engendered by a search of a residence at night is of an order of magnitude greater than that produced by an ordinary search. Mr. Justice Harlan observed in holding a nighttime search unconstitutional in Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 498 (1958): “[I]t is difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private home.” In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 477 (1971), the Court again recognized that a midnight entry into a home was an “extremely serious intrusion.” And our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), was in large part based upon our revulsion at the thought of nighttime searches of the marital bedroom to discover evidence of illegal contraceptive use. See id., at 485-486.

It is small wonder, then, that Congress has consistently required more stringent justification for nighttime searches. than that needed to authorize a search during the day. The first congressional enactment setting out comprehensive search warrant procedures, § 10 of Tit. XI of the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217, 229, 18 U. S. C. § 620 (1940 ed.). required that the affiant must be “positive” that the property to be seized was on the premises to justify a nighttime search. When the provisions of the Espionage Act were replaced by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, this requirement of positivity was carried forward in Rule 41. Despite the stringency of this requirement, it remained with us until very recently, until the 1972 amendments to Rule 41. And although the Rule was then modified to require *464“reasonable cause” for nighttime execution of a warrant, significantly the amended Rule retained the principle that nighttime searches require an' additional showing of justification over and above probable cause. Congress has also manifested its concern for protection of individual privacy against nighttime searches in its legislation for the District of Columbia, as Mr. Justice Douglas’ opinion amply demonstrates with respect to enactment of the D. C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act in 1970. Ante, at 460.1

.The strong policy underlying these congressional enactments is clear. As even the Government in this case concedes, “searches conducted in the middle of the night . . . involve a greater intrusion than ordinary searches and therefore require a greater justification.” Brief for United States 14. In my view, this principle may well be a constitutional imperative. It is by now established Fourth Amendment doctrine that increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to justify increasingly intrusive searches. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), after holding that search warrants were required to authorize administrative inspections, we held that the quantum of probable cause required, for issuance of an inspection warrant must be determined in part.by the reasonableness of the proposed search.. As Mr. Justice White stated, “there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing.the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Id., at 536-537. The Court in Camara thus approved the issu*465anee of area inspection warrants in part because such searches “involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.” Id., at 537. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 349 n. 6 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I do not regard this principle as a one-way street, to be used only to water down the requirement of probable cause when necessary to authorize governmental intrusions. In some situations — and the search of a private home during nighttime would.seem to be a paradigm— this principle requires a showing of additional justification for a search over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause. Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 485-486 (1965).

. Of course, this constitutional question is not presented in this case and need not be resolved here. But the long history of congressional authorization of nighttime searches only upon a showing of additional justification, the strong constitutionally based policy which these statutes implement, and the substantial, constitutional question posed by the majority’s interpretation of § 879 (a) are surely relevant to the question of statutory interpretation with which we. are faced. Viewed against this background, I think it is plain that the majority’s interpretation of. the statute should be rejected

' Section 879 (a) provides that search warrants may be executed at night only if “there is probable cause to. believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.” It seems to me quite, clear that the statute, on its face, imposes two distinct requirements: that there be probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, and that there be cause “for its service at such time.” While the Coprt relies on legislative history which suggests that § 879 (a) merely “incorporates” the provisions of its predecessor, 18 U. S. C. § 1405 (1964 ed.), the plain *466fact is that § 879 (a) doés far more than this: it also adds to the language- of § 1405 the final clause — “and for its service at such time” — which is at the heart of the dispute in this case. I can see no plausible interpretation of this final clause other than that it imposes an additional requirement of justification for a search at night over and above a showing of probable cause.

The Court, while conceding this to be a “possible” meaning of the statute’s final clause, argues that “it is by no means the only possible meaning attributable to --the words.” Ante, at 455. Unfortunately, the Court then fails to come forward with any alternative interpretation of these final words of §879 (a). Instead, the Court simply reads the disputed language out of the statute entirely, and decrees that the statute shall be interpreted as if it were not there. The Court'holds that the statute requires only “a showing that the contraband is likely to be on the'property or-person to be searched at that time” to -justify nighttime execution of a search warrant. Ante, at 458. But the showing of probable cause required for issuance of any warrant necessarily includes a showing that the objects to be seized will probably be found on thé premises at the time of the search. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 210-211 (1932); Schoeneman v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 110, 113, 317 F. 2d 173, 176-177 (1963); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F. 2d 310, 315-318 (CA1 1966). ' This requirement is clearly iifiposed by the Fourth Amendment itself. It is also clearly mandated by the first part of the statutory language, which merely incorporates the constitutional requirement of probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The majority’s interpretation of the statute thus leaves the final clause of § 879 (a) — the language in controversy here — totally without meaning. See United States v. Thomas, 294 A. 2d 164, 170 (DC Ct. App.) *467(Kelly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 992 (1972); United States v. Gooding, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 259, 273, 477 F. 2d 428, 442 (1973) (Robinson, J., concurring in result). I cannot subscribe to such an eviseération of the statute.2

*468The Court bases its holding upon the meager recorded legislative history of § 879 (a). But when the language of a statute is as clear and unambiguous as it is here, it is neither helpful nor appropriate to look to its legislative history. Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1949); United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). While committee reports in particular are often a helpful guide to the meaning 'of ambiguous statutory language, even 'they must be disregarded, if inconsistent with the j>l£iin language of the statute. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 89 (1935); George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253-254 (1929). It is. the language of the statute, as enacted by the Congress, that is the law of the land, not the language of & committee report which may or may not represent accurately the views of the hundreds of other legislators who voted for the bill.

In any event, even if resort to examination of the legislative history were appropriate. here, I do not find it nearly so conclusive as does the majority of the Court. The Court relies on a single brief statement on § 879 (a) in the committee report stating that the statute merely incorporated the provisions of § 1405, which had been .construed not to impose any requirement for a nighttime search warrant over and above probable cause. Yet this statement fails to provide any explanation for the language which Congress added to § 1405, the language *469in controversy here. As to the meaning — or, as the Court would have it, the lack of meaning — of this language, the Court relies basically upon the law enforcement goals of the Department, of Justice and the silence of Congress. But, as -we have frequently warned, “[i]t is at best treacherous tó find in, congressional silence alone the adoption of „a controlling rule of law.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946); see H. M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1395-1398 (tent. ed. 1958), and cases there cited. The Court in. effect presumes from Congress’ failure to explain the meaning of the final'clause ,of § 879 (a) its acquiescence in the Justice Department’s apparent view that- this language in fact serves no purpose. , . . .

I would presume the contrary. Congress’ consistent protection of nighttime privacy by imposing restrictions, upon the availability of warrants for nighttime searches; reinforces the unambiguous statutory language. Both lead me to the conclusion. that: .the final' clause of § 879 (a) must be viewed as another congressional mani-. festation of its strong policy against nighttime intrusions into the home. I do not think that this interpretation is at all inconsistent with the narcotics law-enforcement objectives which were the principal focus of this legislation. The requirement that cause be shown for the' necessity of a nighttime search is still a substantial easing of the requirement of positivity which was then embodied in Rule 41, and which would otherwise, have applied to many of the searches now covered by § 879 (a). I respectfully dissent..