delivered, the opinion of the Court.

Appellants seek to establish that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-, Virginia may not permit the suspension of workmen’s compensation benefits without a prior adversary hearing. A three-judge United States District Court, over one dissent, rejected appellants’ constitutional arguments. 347 F. Supp. 71 (ED Va. 1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 1110 (1973). Although the parties have focused primarily on the due process issue, the briefs and oral arguments have indicated that under state law a claimant whose workmen’s compensation benéfits have been suspended may have them reinstated by a state trial court pending a full administrative hearing on the merits of his claim. If this is an accurate reading of state law, it is in all probability unnecessary to address any questions of federal constitutional law in this case. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration.

I

This litigation has centered on the role of the Industrial Commission of Virginia (Commission) in overseeing relationships between workmen’s compensation claimants and employers or the employers’ insurance. companies. *785Although the Virginia system for workmen’s compensation is controlled in all significant respects by an extensive statutory scheme referred to as the Act, Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-1 et seq. (1973 and Supp. 1973),1 it operates in a largely voluntary manner through memoranda of agreement between disabled workmen and employers or insurance companies. Compensation is paid out of private funds, in some cases through self-insurance by employers but for the most part through coverage by private insuranee companies. All agreements between employees and employers or insurance companies must be approved by the Commission, which may extend its imprimatur “only when the Commission, or any member thereof, is clearly of the opinion that the best inteiests of the employee or his dependents will be served thereby . . . .” § 65.1-93.

In most instances the parties agree voluntarily on entitlement to benefits.2 When this does not occur, the Commission will grant a hearing to resolve the disagreement, § 65.1-94, and will make an award if found to be due. § 65.1-96. The Commission’s awards are subject to review by appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court and, if unchallenged, are conclusive until changed by the *786Commission. § 65.1-98.3 The Commission has no enforcement power per se. Rather, the Act provides:'

“Any party in interest may file in the circuit or corporation court of the county or city in which the injury occurred, or if it be in the city of Richmond then in the circuit or law and equity court of such city, a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement approved by the Commission, or of an order or decision of the Commission, or of an award of .the Commission unappealed from, or of an award of the Commission affirmed upon appeal, whereupon the court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall render judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same, as though such judgment had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by the court____” § 65.1-100.

The state courts have construed their enforcement duty under § 65.1-100 as purely ministerial. They do not inquire into whether a claimant’s condition continues to justify compensation. Rather, they sinlply enforce agreements and awards that have been approved and not formally rescinded by the Commission.4 Thus, *787a workmen’s compensation claimant in Virginia has at his disposal a ready mechanism in the state trial courts to enforce any facially valid award or agreement. Since judicial enforcement is a ministerial act, this relief appears to be available with a minimum of delay or procedural difficulty.

Termination of benefits due to a change in a claimant’s condition, like the commencement of benefits in the first instance, is a product of voluntary agreement in most cases. But when a dispute arises over a claimant’s condition and his continued entitlement to benefits, the only avenue open to an employer for extinguishing a claimant’s enforcement rights under § 65.1-100 of the Act appears in § 65.1-99. See Bristol Door Co. v. Hinkle, 157 Va. 474, 161 S. E. 902 (1932). This section provides, in relevant part: ' '

• “Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in *788condition, the Industrial Commission ■ may review any award and on such review may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded .... No such review shall affect such award as regards any moneys paid . . . .” Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-99 (1973) .5

Although it may be indisputable that a claimant is no longer entitled to benefits due to a change in his condition, if the claimant refuses to terminate voluntarily an award or agreement, an employer or insurer appears to have no defense against a state court enforcement action until there is a formal determination by the Commission under this section. E. g., Manchester Bd. & Paper Co. v. Parker, 201 Va. 328, 111 S. E. 2d 453 (1959).6 If an employer or insurance company meets the requirements established by the Commission for invoking its review under this section, the Commission in due course will *789conduct a hearing, with notice and the right to participate extended to. all parties.7 At such a hearing, the. enn ployer or insurer bears the burden of proving a change in a claimant’s condition that' justifies rescission of an award or agreement. E. g., Virginia Oak Flooring Co. v. Chrisley, 195 Va. 850, 80 S. E. 2d 537 (1954); J. A. Foust Coal Co. v. Messer, 195 Va. 762, 80 S. E. 2d 533 (1954).

.The last sentence of the above quotation from.§ 65.1-99 prevents an employer or insurance company from recovering benefits erroneously paid prior to the Commission’s formal termination of an award or agreement. See Gray v. Underwood Bros., 164 Va. 344, 182 S. E. 547 (1935). Accordingly, an employer or insurer with cause to beliéve that a claimant is nó longer entitled to benefits has an obvious, incentive unilaterally to cease payment' at the time it'seeks-a § 65.1-99 hearing before the,Commission.If the Commission ultimately holds in its favor, the employer or insurer will not be required to pay any further benefits, and it will have protected itself against unmerited payments in the period -prior to the Commission’s, full, hearing. If the-Commission rules against it, it will be required to reinstate benefits retroactively 'to the date of the application for a hearing, but at least it will have avoided-paying benefits for which there was no true legal obligation.

In order to police this. tendency of employers and insurers to terminate first and .litigate later, the. Com- - mission promulgated its Rule 13. See Manchester Bd. & *790Paper Co. v. Parker, supra8 Rule 13 sets forth certain requirements that an employer or insurer must meet, with precision, see ibid., before it can obtain the § 65.1-99 hearing which is a prerequisite .to formal termination of an award or agreement, on the ground of change in condition.9 For example, the Rule requires employers and *791insurers to continue benefits up to a defined date. And ■since April 1, 1972, the Rule has imposed the following requirements on such applications:

“All applications by an employer or insurer shall be under oath and shall not be deemed filed and benefits shall not be suspended until the supporting evidence which constitutes a legal basis for changing the existing award shall have been reviewed by the Commission, or such of its employees as may be designated for that purpose, and a determination made that probable cause exists to believe that a change in condition has occurred.”

Thus, under Rule 13, as amended, an employer or insurer must pay benefits up to a certain date, must make application under oath, and must submit “supporting evidence which constitutes a legal basis for changing the existing award . . . .” If these requirements are met and if the Commission finds that “probable cause exists to believe that a change in condition has occurred . . . ,” the employer or insurer will be accorded a hearing that may lead to rescission of the prior award or agreement. If the Rule 13 requirements are not met, the request for a hearing will be denied, and the award, or agreement at *792issue.will remain subject to enforcement in the state courts.

Appellant Dillard was the original named plaintiff in this class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He contended that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented Virginia from permitting the suspension of workmen’s compensation benefits'without notice to the claimant and an adversary hearing at the time the Commission makes a probable cause determination pursuant to RuleH3. A three-judge United States District Court, over one dissent, rejected this argument on the merits. 347 F. Supp. 71 (ED Va. 1972). Dillard appealed, but then settled his claim, and we remanded the case for a determination of mootness. 409 U. S. 238 (1972). In an unreported order, the District Court subsequently permitted the intervention of appellant Williams' and reinstated its published opinion. Williams then appealed, bringing up the due process arguments initially ■espoused by Dillard. .

Appellant Williams was injured in the course of employment in April 1972. In May 1972, the Commission approved an agreement between Williams and his employer’s insurance company, one of the appellees herein, for the payment of weekly compensation benefits. In October 1972, the insurance company applied under Rule 13 to the Commission for a hearing to determine whether Williams’ disability had ended. Simultaneously, the insurer discontinued payments. Within a few days the Commission made an ex parte determination that probable cause existed to believe that a change in Williams’ condition had occurred. At this point, Williams made no effort to petition a state court under § 65.1-100 .of the Act to reinstate benefits pending the Commission’s full hearing. In December 1972, the Commis*793sion conducted an -adversary hearing, concluded thát the insurance company had not met its burden of proojt, and reinstated benefits. Oh April 17, 1973, the insurance company again petitioned the Commission, claiming a change in Williams’ condition. The. Commission once more found probable cause on an ex parte basis, and the company for the second time terminated benefits. .Williams again did not resort to the state trial courts for, an enforcement order. Approximately two months later, the District Court permitted Williams to intervene in this lawsuit and, as noted, reinstated its published opinion. Williams then brought this appeal.10

Williams’ constitutional attack on the Virginia system for suspending workmen’s compensation benefits is premised on the assumption that Rule 13, as amended, permits an employer or insurer to shield itself from a state court enforcement Suit under § 65.1-100 of the Act in the interim between á probable cause determination *794by the Commission. and the Commission’s ultimate full hearing under § 65.1 — 99 of the Act. Williams in essence reads the phrase of Rule 13 providing that “benefits shall not be suspended” prior to meeting the requirements of the Rule as meaning that benefits may successfully be suspended once those requirements have been met. If this reading of Rule 13 is incorrect, the complexion of this case changes dramatically, because it is then within the power of a claimant to reinstate benefits simply, by petitioning a state trial court to perform a ministerial duty. It may well be that this perfunctory enforcement power is so readily available that a claimant could render any suspension of benefits de minimis. If so, those in appellants’ class may not be able to establish a constitutionally significant injury under any reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Every indication in the record and in the state authorities is that Williams had at his disposal a state court enforcement right that he simply failed to utilize. See n. 4, supra. As the Commission declared in its motion to dismiss before the District Court:

“Virginia’s statutory framework does not authorize the termination of benefits as alleged by plaintiff, it permits only the initiation of a procedure by which benefits may ultimately be terminatéd. Should plaintiff be. dissatisfied with the temporary cessation of benefits pending an administrative hearing, he is entitled by the provisions of § 65.1-100 to reduce his award to judgment in an appropriate court of record and compel the resumption of benefits. It should be noted that in such a case the court has no discretion ■ and must enter judgment against the employer or his insurer.” (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.) .

*795One of the appellees makes the same point in its brief,11 and Williams’ counsel conceded at oral argument that, if read literally, § 65.1-100 of the Act permits no other result.12 Counsel attempted to overcome this concession by arguing that the Virginia courts have not interpreted Rule 13 recently and that they might today hold that the Rule overrides the language of § '65.1 — 100.13 This argument plainly has no merit, since the Commission is without power to promulgate a rule that would repeal a section of the Act.14 Moreover, it is obvious that the Commission had no such purpose. Rule 13 was designed to protect employees, see Manchester Bd. & Paper Co. v. Parker, 201 Va, 328, 111 S. E. 2d 453 (1959), not to deprive them of rights existing under the Act. It establishes barriers that an employer or insurer must surmount before it may obtain the § 65.1-99 hearing that is a prerequisite to extinguishing a claimant’s right to enforce an award or agreement in state court. The Rule is designed to. serve as a screening device for eliminating obviously unmeritdrious applications for hearings filed by insurers and employers.15 It is not am-" authorization for an *796employer or insurer to suspend payments with assurance that a claimant may not have them reinstated under § 65.1-100 of the Act.

The District Court itself noted that Rule 13 probably ddeS ndt permit ar employer or insurer to escape § 65.1-100 of the Act.16 It reached appellants1 federal constitutional claim only by assuming, arguendo, “that the Rule is authority for the employer or.insurer to terminate payments . . ...” 347 F. Supp., at 75. Based.on what has been brought to our attention and our review of state-•law, such an assumption in all likelihood would be. inaccurate.17 In any event, that court must resolve any *797doubts on. the issue before reaching appellants’ federal claim. If there is significant doubt about the status of state law, the court should consider abstention, as the *798state law question may well be dispositive. E. g., Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498 (1972). If, as appears to be the case, state law clearly provided Williams an adequate state court remedy he did not pursue, then the .court will be presented' with a wholly, different issue from the one it decided. Assuming it is also established that the Commission’s Rule 13 procedures are necessarily ex_parte,18 then the only question is whether the interruption, if any, of benefits between the time of suspension and the time a claimant obtains reinstatement of benefits by petitioning the state courts is of any controlling significance. If the court determines that a claimant as a general rule may obtain reinstatement of benefits without undue delay following a finding of probable cause by the Commission under’ Rule 13, then the court should dismiss the complaint.

We indicate no view on the question decided by the District Court — whether the suspension of benefits without notice and . an adversary hearing denies due process of law, where the funds at issue are private, not public, where the State requires a finding of probable cause and other procedural safeguards short of a prior adversary hearing, and where a full hearing follows suspension of benefits by a period on the average of one month. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

dissenting.

This case involves a class action brought on behalf of all persons who, as a result of sustaining employment-related injuries, are recipients of benefits under the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act, Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-1 et seq. The action challenges the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of that part of the Act allowing a termination of benefit payments by the employer or insurer as a result of an asserted change in condition prior to a full hearing on the alleged change before the Commission. The complaint prayed for an injunction to restrain enforcement of that part of the Act. A three-judge District Court was convened, 28 U. S. C. § 2281, and the challenged portions of the Act were found constitutional, one judge dissenting. 347 F. Supp. 71 (ED Va. 1972).

The Act provides a system allowing the employer and the employee to escape personal injury litigation for on-the-job injuries; it provides for the payment of compensation under fixed rules. Once the Industrial Commission approves an award of benefits, the Commission or. any party in interest may move for review of the award “oh the ground of a change in condition.” Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-99. According to the Commission’s Rule 13, all such applications by an employer or insurer to decrease or terminate benefits “ ‘require that an ex parte inquiry be held by the Commission to determine whether probable cause exists for a change in the award, before any benefits may be temporarily suspended pending a full hearing.’ ” 347 F. Supp., at 79.

Suspension of benefits awarded by the Commission is thus permitted upon an ex parte determination that “probable cause” for termination exists. The parties here do not dispute that the full hearing conducted by the Commission before final termination, with notice *800and opportunity for all parties to be heard, satisfies the requirements of due procéss. At issue is the ex parte suspension of benefits of a Commission’s award prior to that final hearing. The Court does not reach the constitutionality of the suspension, because a claimant, whose benefits have been so suspended, may bring suit in a state court to have them reinstated, pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 65.1-100.

T disagree that the opportunity for a claimant to counteract a termination of benefits payable under an award of the Commission by instituting a state court action is an answer to the constitutional challenge to the termination.* The issue here is the necessity of a hearing before termination of benefits. Any state remedy which places upon the worker the burden of going to court to redress a termination which has already occurred is simply not in point. It places the burden of affirmative action upon that segment of society least able to bear it at a time which could not be less opportune. As Judge Merhige said below in dissent: “Judges need not blind' themselves to what they know as mén. ' I cannot help but believe that the average workingman in Virginia, who has' sustained an injury resulting in a substantial reduction of his weekly income/ suffers a grave and immediate loss. . . . The very thought that the ex parte proceeding permitted by Rule 13 may result in a cessation of milk delivery, or electric power, or fuel to a working ftian and his family, shocks my conscience.”- 347 F. Supp., at 81. *801The opportunity for working-class men .and women in that grave situation to enter state court and do battle with the corporate employers and insurers who have already terminated their benefits without a hearing is no meaningful solution to their problem.

Since I find the state remedy inapposite, I dissent from the remand to consider its impact.