Supreme Court of the United States, 1974

New Orleans Book Mart, Inc. v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided November 11, 1974 · Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Whom

419 U.S. 1007; 95 S. Ct. 327; 42 L. Ed. 2d 282; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3288 (United States Reports)

Cases that cite this one

36 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

Charles Culbertson and Helen Culbertson, His Wife v. Alice Leland (9th Cir. 1975)
King v. South Jersey National Bank (N.J. 1974)
South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City Of Miami (11th Cir. 1984)
South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami (11th Cir. 1984)
Carlos Melara v. James J. Kennedy (9th Cir. 1976)
Joseph A. Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Association (D.C. Cir. 1974)
Terry L. Arcoren v. Wenton Peters and John Schooler (8th Cir. 1987)
First National Bank of the Black Hills v. Beug (S.D. 1987)
Richard W. Bosse v. Crowell Collier and MacMillan (9th Cir. 1977)
Ann Anastasia v. The Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, Etc. (7th Cir. 1976)
Giles v. First Virginia Credit Services, Inc. (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
George R. Wederski v. Gary W. Ramaeker Biagio Gingo (9th Cir. 1992)
Interfirst Bank, Dallas, Texas v. Hanson (Iowa 1986)
Ochs v. L'Enfant Trust (D.C. 1986)
Teran v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Financial Center (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson (Idaho 1981)
Pauline Rust v. Paul Johnson and Nora Johnson, City of Los Angeles v. Paul Johnson, Nora Johnson, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (9th Cir. 1979)
De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 1979)
Charmicor, Inc. v. Deaner (9th Cir. 1978)
Charmicor, Inc. v. Deaner (9th Cir. 1978)
Brooks v. Flagg Brothers, Inc. (2d Cir. 1977)
Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)
Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc. (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
Helfinstine v. Martin (Okla. 1977)
De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 1977)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment.

Dissenting Opinion

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana of transporting allegedly obscene materials in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1465, which provides in pertinent part:

“Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 490 F. 2d 73 (1974).

I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1465, I expressed the view that “[wjhatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly *1008obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioners must be given an opportunity to have their case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which their convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioners should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.

Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.