delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes to us on appeal from a three-judge District Court determination that the Connecticut “seated interview” procedures for assessing continuing *380eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 364 F. Supp. 922 (Conn. 1973). Our independent examination of Connecticut law reveals that the State significantly revised its unemployment compensation system following the District Court’s decision. Some of the amendments are designed to ameliorate problems that the court identified. In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to decide the issues tendered by the parties. We therefore vacate the decision of the District Court and remand for reconsideration in fight of the intervening changes in Connecticut law.

I

In Connecticut, unemployment compensation benefits are paid from a trust fund maintained by employer contributions. Appellant Fusari, State Commissioner of Labor and Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, administers the fund.. Under the Connecticut statute, a claimant first must file an initiating claim and establish his general entitlement to receive state unemployment compensation benefits. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev: §§ 31-230 and 31-235 (1973). Thereafter, the claimant must report to the local unemployment compensation office biweekly and demonstrate continued eligibility for benefits for the preceding two-week period. The claimant must submit forms swearing to his availability for work and to his reasonable efforts to obtain employment during the period in question. He also must submit a form listing the persons to whom he has applied for employment during the preceding two weeks.

Upon receipt of the forms, the paying official may make routine inquiries. If no serious question of eligibility arises, immediate payment is made. If, however, the forms or responses to questions raise suspicion of possible disqualification, the claimant is directed to a *381“seated interview” with a factfinding examiner for a more thorough inquiry into the possible factors that might render him ineligible for benefits. Although the claimant bears the burden of establishing eligibility, Northrup v. Administrator, 148 Conn. 475, 480, 172 A. 2d 390, 393 (1961); Waskiewicz v. Egan, 15 Conn. Supp. 286, 287 (1947), doubtful cases are to be decided in his favor. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. | 31-274 (c).

An examiner’s favorable determination of eligibility results in immediate payment of benefits. If, however, the examiner concludes that the claimant is ineligible, no payment is made. Within a few days the claimant receives a written statement indicating the reasons for disqualification and notifying him of the right to appeal. Benefits for the period in question normally are withheld pending resolution of the administrative appeal.1 The State’s policy, sometimes honored in the breach, is that pendency of an appeal does not affect the claimant’s eligibility to receive benefits for subsequent periods.2

This, appeal arises from a class action challenging the legality of the procedures used for determining continued *382eligibility for benefits.3 Appellees asserted that Connecticut violated the federal statutory requirement that state procedures be designed reasonably to assure the payment of benefits “when due/’ 42 U. S. C. § 5034 and *383also that the Connecticut seated-interview procedures were constitutionally defective in failing to provide a pretermination hearing satisfying the standards of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). At appellees’ request, a three-judge court was convened to hear the matter.5

The District Court’s findings of fact provide some indication of the actual operation of the Connecticut system. The findings reveal that the reversal rate of appealed denials of benefits was significant, ranging from 19.4% to 26.1% during the periods surveyed.6 The District Court also found that a significant delay was required for obtaining administrative review of the examiner’s determination: 89.9% of the 461 intrastate appeals7 filed in *384the month of December 1972 required more than 100 days to resolve. The average delay during that period exceeded 126 days. Moreover, the court determined that the December 1972 figures probably were typical of the delays that might be encountered in other time periods.8

The District Court expressed serious reservations whether the Connecticut system satisfied the “when due” requirement of federal law. It felt foreclosed from so ruling on this statutory issue, however, by this Court’s summary affirmance in Torres v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 405 U. S. 949 (1972). The District Court concluded that Torres was distinguishable on the constitutional issue, and held that the Connecticut procedures violated due process “because (a) a property interest has been denied (b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewable de novo until an unreasonable length of time.” 364 F. Supp., at 937-938. After suggesting a number of alterations of the state system that might raise its operation to a constitutionally adequate level, the court enjoined appellant from denying unemployment benefits under then-existing procedures without first providing a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing. Id., at 938. At appellant’s request, the District Court stayed its injunction pending resolution of an appeal to this *385Court. We subsequently noted probable jurisdiction. 415 U. S. 912 (1974).

II

Following our notation of probable jurisdiction, the Connecticut Legislature enacted major revisions of the procedures by which unemployment compensation claims are determined. Conn. Pub. Act 74-339 (1974).9 Section 31-241, one of the sections under consideration in this appeal, was amended to require that examiners only consider evidence presented in person or in writing at a hearing provided for that purpose.10 Id., § 14, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 31-241. The legislature also completely altered the structure of the Connecticut system of administrative review, substituting a two-tiered Employment Security Appeals Division for the Unemployment Compensation Commission. Conn. Pub. Act 74^-339, supra, §§ 1-12.

The amended statute provides for the creation of a staff of referees to review the examiners’ decisions de novo. § 15. Referees are to be appointed by an Employment Security Board of Review, § 9,11 the three mem*386bers of which are appointed by the Governor. § 3. The statute further provides that the referee section “shall consist of such referees as the board deems necessary for the prompt processing of appeals hearings and decisions and for the performance of the duties imposed by this act.” § 9. Appeals from the referees’ decisions are to be taken to the Employment Security Board of Review and thereafter to the state courts. §§15 and 21, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 31-242 and 31-248, and new § 25 added by the 1974 amendments.

The legislative history indicates that the Connecticut Legislature anticipated that these amendments would have a significant impact on the speed and fairness of the resolution of contested claims. Legislators repeatedly characterized the amendments as a “true reform” of important consequence. See Conn. S. Proc. 2578, 2624, 2629 (May 7, 1974). Particular emphasis was placed on the need to improve the State’s treatment of administrative appeals. It was recognized that Connecticut’s torpid system of administrative appeal was markedly inferior to those used in other States. Id., at 2578, 2621; Conn. H. Proc. 5133-5135, 5152 (May 2, 1974). Revision of the appellate system was designed to remedy that problem. In the words of one member of the House: “The bill . . . sets up a unique system which is designed to cut down that [appellate] backlog.” Id., at 5152.

Ill

.The amendments to the Connecticut statute, which became effective on July 1, 1974, Conn. Pub. Act 74-339, § 36 (1974), may alter significantly the character of the *387system considered by the District Court. Although the precise significance of the amendment to § 31-241 is unclear, the court’s concern for the absence of a right of confrontation, 364 F. Supp., at 935, may be diminished by the requirement that examiners base their decisions only on evidence submitted in person or in writing. Perhaps of greater importance is the revision of the State’s system of administrative appeal. Both in distinguishing Torres and in determining that the Connecticut system failed to satisfy the minimal requirements of procedural due process, the District Court placed substantial reliance on the length of time required to obtain administrative review of the examiner’s decision. The amendments to Connecticut law are designed to remedy this problem.

This Court must review the District Court’s judgment in light of presently existing Connecticut law, not the law in effect at the time that judgment was rendered.12 Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412, 414 (1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960). We are unable meaningfully to assess the issues in this appeal on the present record.

Both the statutory and constitutional questions are significantly affected by the length of the period of deprivation of benefits.13 The basic thrust of the *388statutory “when due” requirement14 is timeliness. See California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121, 130-133 (1971). While we can determine on this record that Connecticut’s previous system often failed to deliver benefits in a timely manner,15 we can only specu*389late how the new system might operate. And, assuming that the federal statutory requirements were satisfied, it would prove equally difficult to assess the question of procedural due process.

Identification of the precise dictates of due process requires consideration of both the governmental function involved and the private interests affected by official action. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 263-266. As the Court recognized in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378 (1971): “The formality and procedural requisites for [a due process] hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” In this context, the possible length of wrongful deprivation of unemployment benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168-169 (1974) (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 190, 192 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an opportunity for consideration and correction of errors made in initial eligibility determinations. Thus, the rapidity of administrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process. The record, of course, provides no indication of the promptness and adequacy of review under the new system. We are unable, therefore, to decide this appeal on its merits.

*390The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of the intervening changes in Connecticut law.

It is so ordered.

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court; however, it may be useful to mention two points which bear further discussion. First, as the Court notes, ante, at 387 n. 12, all parties failed to inform us that after the District Court entered judgment the Connecticut Legislature significantly changed its unemployment compensation system. I agree with the Court that this failure is “difficult to understand.” Ibid. It is disconcerting to this Court to learn of relevant and important developments in a case after the entire Court has come to the Bench to hear arguments.

Even at oral argument we were not informed of the changes in state law although both parties filed their briefs after the new statute was passed. The Connecticut Legislature appears to have changed the system at least in part to expedite administrative appeals and thereby treat claimants more fairly, see ante, at 380, 386, thus meeting in part, at least, the basis of the attack on the system. All parties had an obligation to inform the Court that the system which the District Court had enjoined had been changed; however, only a cryptic reference was made to the change of law. The appellees' brief is 122 pages long and notes the change once, at the end of a footnote. Brief for Appellees 65 n. 52. At that point appellees are contending that the long delay between the seated interview and administrative review of a decision to withhold benefits aggravates the defects which they contend exist in the seated interview itself. There appellees quote Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S *391371, 378 (1971), where the Court said: “The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” (Brief for Appel-lees 64; emphasis appellees’.) Given the fact that the changes in the procedures may well have an effect on “subsequent proceedings,” ante, at 386, the Court should have been explicitly advised that changes had occurred. The only reference to changes in the law actually gives the impression that their effect is negligible.

This Court must rely on counsel to present issues fully and fairly, and counsel have a continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect an outcome.

Second, although I agree wholeheartedly with the Court’s reasoned discussion of the tension between the summary affirmance in Torres v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 405 U. S. 949 (1972), aff’g 333 F. Supp. 341 (SDNY 1971), and the Court’s opinion in California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 (1971), ante, at 388-389, n. 15, we might well go beyond that and make explicit what is implicit in some prior holdings. E. g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 576 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a three-judge district court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached.* An *392unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument. Indeed, upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirm-ances may appear to have established. E. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 671; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 343-344 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 350 (Black, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 614 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).