delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether a district court may impose summary contempt punishment under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 (a)1 when a witness who has been granted immunity, refuses on Fifth Amendment grounds to testify. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances a judge cannot dispose of the contempt summarily, but must proceed under Rule 42 (b),2 *311which calls for disposition only after notice and hearing, and “a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense.”

I

Respondents Wilson and Bryan, along with one Robert Anderson, were charged in separate indictments with separate bank robberies. Respondent Wilson, and Anderson, were charged with armed robbery of a bank in Tuxedo, N. Y. Respondent Bryan, and Anderson, were charged with armed robbery of a bank in Mount Ivy, N. Y. Prior to Anderson’s trial both respondents pleaded guilty to charges against them, but neither was immediately given a final sentence. Sentencing of Wilson was deferred, and, pending a presentence report, Bryan was given a provisional 25-year sentence, as required by 18 U. S. C. §§4208 (b), (c).

At Anderson’s trial for the two robberies, respondents were summoned as witnesses for the prosecution. When questioned, however, each refused to testify, contending that his answers might incriminate him. The judge then granted them immunity, 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003,3 *312and, relying on Goldberg v. United States, 472 F. 2d 513 (CA2 1973), ordered them to answer forthwith. He informed them that as long as they did not lie under oath they could not be prosecuted by reason of any testimony, but that if they continued to refuse to answer he would hold them in contempt. Respondents nevertheless persisted in their refusals, and the judge summarily held them in contempt. Counsel for Wilson, who acted for both respondents, argued for lenient sentences; however, trial counsel made no objection to the summary nature of the contempt citation,4 nor was any claim made that more time was needed to prepare a defense to the contempt citation.

Both respondents were then sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, consecutive to any sentences imposed for the bank robberies. The judge made it clear that he would consider reducing the contempt sentences, or eliminating them completely, if respondents decided to testify. When counsel pointed out that a presentence study was being prepared on Bryan the judge responded: “I am going to impose the maximum . . . with the deliberate intention of revising that sentence to what might be appropriate in light of the very study that is going to be made.” App. 33.

The trial proceeded, but without Bryan’s testimony the evidence against Anderson on the Mount Ivy robbery was such that at the end of the Government’s case *313the judge granted Anderson’s motion for acquittal. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo robbery. At a later trial Anderson was convicted of that robbery.

Respondents appealed their contempt convictions. The Court of Appeals rejected the claim that their Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated by compelling them to testify after they had been granted immunity, but it accepted their contention that use of the summary contempt power was improper, and it remanded for proceedings under Rule 42 (b). 488 F. 2d 1231 (CA2 1973). The court reasoned that “[i]f . . . counsel had been given ‘a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense,’ Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 42 (h), she might have marshalled and presented facts in mitigation of the charge.” Id., at 1234.5

In requiring Rule 42 (b) disposition the Court of *314Appeals considered itself bound by its own previous decisions, and by this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965). In a previous case the Court of Appeals had held:

“Summary disposition is thus available only when immediate punishment is necessary to put an end to acts disrupting the proceedings, such as threats to the judge, disturbances in the courtroom or insolence before the court. It is not a remedy to be used in a case like this where the contempt consists of no more than orderly refusal in the absence of the jury to answer a question on Fifth Amendment grounds . . . .” United States v. Pace, 371 F. 2d 810, 811 (CA2 1967).

In another case the Court of Appeals had interpreted the language of our Harris decision to require that “[a]bsent . . . disruptive conduct, which affronts the dignity of the court, a hearing pursuant to Rule 42 (b) is required to explore possible exculpatory or mitigating circumstances.” United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196, 1200 (CA2 1973). In the Court of Appeals’ view only a disorderly or obstreperous interference with court proceedings provides an occasion for use of the summary contempt power. -. Id., at 1201-1202.

Because of the importance of this issue in the conduct of criminal trials, and because the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Baker v. Eisenstadt, 456 F. 2d 382, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 846 (1972), we granted certiorari. 416 U. S. 981 (1974). We reverse.

II

Respondents’ refusals to answer, although not delivered disrespectfully, plainly fall within the express lan*315guage of Rüle 42 (a),6 and constitute contemptuous conduct. Rule 42 (a) was never intended to be limited to situations where a witness uses scurrilous language, or threatens or creates overt physical disorder and thereby disrupts a trial. All that is necessary is that the judge certify that he “saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.” Respondents do not contest that these requirements are met here. Indeed, here each refusal was in the context of a face-to-face encounter between the judge and respondents. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (1970); Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 (1925).

The refusals were contemptuous of judicial authority because they were intentional obstructions7 of court *316proceedings that literally disrupted the progress of the trial and hence the orderly administration of justice. Yates v. United States, 227 F. 2d 844 (CA9 1955). Respondents’ contumacious silence, after a valid grant of immunity followed by an explicit, unambiguous order to testify, impeded the due course of Anderson’s trial perhaps more so than violent conduct in the courtroom. Violent disruptions can be cured swiftly by bodily removing the offender from the courtroom, or by physical restraints, Illinois v. Allen, supra; see Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888), and the trial may proceed. But as this case demonstrates, a contumacious refusal to answer not only frustrates the inquiry but can destroy a prosecution. Here it was a prosecution; the same kind of contumacious conduct could, in another setting, destroy a defendant’s ability to establish a case.

The face-to-face refusal to comply with the court’s order itself constituted an affront to the court,8 and when that kind of refusal disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding, as it did here, summary contempt must be available to vindicate the authority of the court as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some incentive to testify. In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168 (1875). Whether such incentive is necessary in a par*317ticular case is a matter the Rule wisely leaves to the discretion of the trial court.9

Our conclusion that summary contempt is available under the circumstances here is supported by the fact that Rule 42 has consistently been recognized to be no more than a restatement of the law existing when the Rule was adopted, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 209 (1968); Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule 42 (a), 18 U. S. C. App. p. 4513; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 (1925),10 and the law at that time allowed summary punishment for refusals to testify, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Nelson v. United States, 201 U. S. 92 (1906); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 *318(1919). See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 382 (1919); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), and cases cited therein, cf. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (1822); In re Savin, 131 U. S. 267 (1889).

Ill

The Court of Appeals considered itself bound by language in Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965), to hold Rule 42 (a) inapplicable to the facts here. The crucial difference between the cases, however, is that Harris did not deal with a refusal to testify which obstructed an ongoing trial. In Harris a witness before a grand jury had been granted immunity, 18 U. S. C. § 6002, and nevertheless refused to answer certain questions. The witness was then brought before a District Judge and asked the same questions again. When he still refused to answer, the court summarily held him in contempt. We held in that case that summary contempt was inappropriate because there was no compelling reason for an immediate remedy.

A grand jury ordinarily deals with many inquiries and cases at one time, and it can rather easily suspend action on any one, and turn to another while proceedings under Rule 42 (b) are completed. We noted in Harris that “swiftness was not a prerequisite of justice .... Delay necessary for a hearing would not imperil the grand jury proceedings.” 382 U. S., at 164. Trial courts, on the contrary, cannot be expected to dart from case to case on their calendars any time a witness who has been granted immunity decides not to answer questions. In a trial, the court, the parties, witnesses, and jurors are assembled in the expectation that it will proceed as scheduled. Here the District Judge pointed out this problem when defense counsel asked for a continuance; he said: “I think we cannot delay this trial. I cannot delay it. I *319have many other matters that are equally important to the people concerned in those cases which are following.”11 Delay under Rule 42 (b) may be substantial, and all essential participants in the trial may no longer be readily available when a trial reconvenes. In Harris this Court recognized these problems in noting that summary punishment may be necessary where a “refusal [is] ... an open, serious threat to orderly procedure.” 382 U. 8., at 165. A refusal to testify during a trial may be such an open, serious threat, and here it plainly constituted a literal “breakdown” in the prosecution’s case.

IV

In an ongoing trial, with the judge, jurors, counsel, and witnesses all waiting, Rule 42 (a) provides an appropriate remedial tool to discourage witnesses from contumacious refusals to comply with lawful orders essential to prevent a breakdown of the proceedings. Where time is not of the essence, however, the provisions of Rule 42 (b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptuous conduct. We adhere to the principle that only “ ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed’ ” should be used in contempt cases, Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821). See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488, 498 (1974). As with all power, the authority under Rule 42 (a) to punish summarily can be abused; the courts of appeals, however, can deal with abuses of discretion without restricting the Rule in contradiction of its express terms, and without unduly limiting the power of the trial judge to act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of a criminal trial.

Reversed.

with whom Me. Justice Rehnquist joins, concurring.

In Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41 (1959), the petitioner had refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer questions put to him by a federal grand jury. He thereafter was immunized by the District Judge but, on returning to the grand jury room, persisted in his refusal to answer questions. He again was taken before the District Judge, who repeated the grand jury’s questions and ordered the petitioner to answer. He again refused. The court then, pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 (a), adjudged him guilty of criminal contempt. This Court, by a 5-4 vote, sustained the judgment, and expressly approved the use of summary proceedings; it did so on the ground that the refusal to answer before the District Judge was a contempt “committed in the actual presence of the court,” within the meaning of Rule 42 (a). 359 U. S., at 47-52.

Less than seven years later, in Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965), the Court, with two new Justices, was confronted with a factual situation identical in all relevant respects to that in Brown. In Harris, however, the Court, again by a 5-4 vote, concluded that the witness’ refusal to answer the questions before the District Judge was not a contempt “committed in the actual presence of the court.” It reasoned:

“The real contempt, if such there was, was contempt before the grand jury — the refusal to answer to it when directed by the court. Swearing the witness and repeating the questions before the judge was an effort to have the refusal to testify ‘committed in the actual presence of the court’ for the purposes of Rule 42 (a). It served no other purpose, for the witness had been adamant and had made his position known. The appearance before the District Court was not a new and different pro*321ceeding, unrelated to the other. It was ancillary to the grand jury hearing and designed as an aid to it.” 382 U. S., at 164-165.

The Court then expressly overruled Brown. Id., at 167.

1 was not on the Court when Brown and Harris were decided. Had I been, I would have joined the Court in Brown and the dissenters in Harris. Although I join the Court’s opinion today, I write separately to express my conviction that Harris, at the most, now stands for nothing more than the proposition that a witness’ refusal to answer grand jury questions is not conduct "in the actual presence of the court,” even when the questions are restated by the district judge and the witness persists in his refusal to answer.1

Summary contempt, especially summary criminal contempt, as the Court indicates, ante, at 319, is not a power lightly to be exercised.2 Nevertheless, summary criminal contempt is a necessary and legitimate part of a court’s arsenal of weapons to prevent obstruction, violent or otherwise, of its proceedings. It is not seriously disputed that a refusal to testify is punishable as a criminal contempt. So long as this Court holds, as it has, that the *322summary procedure of Rule 42 (a) satisfies the requirements of due process, the Rule should be read to mean precisely what it says.

dissenting.-

The question for decision in this case is one of procedure: is the criminal contempt of nonviolently and respectfully refusing to testify at a criminal trial punishable summarily by the trial judge pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 (a), or must the trial judge prosecute the contempt on notice pursuant to Rule 42(b), allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense?1 A trial judge in the District *323Court for the Southern District of New York summarily punished respondents under subdivision (a) of Rule 42 for refusing to testify at a trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965), and the Court of Appeals’ own prior decision in United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196 (1973), which had relied upon Harris, compelled the conclusion that the proper course was to prosecute on notice under subdivision (b) of the Rule. 488 F. 2d 1231 (1973). I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

One Anderson was on trial in the District Court on March 29, 1973, under an indictment for armed robbery of two banks, one in Tuxedo, N. Y., and the other in Mount Ivy, N. Y. Before the trial respondent Wilson pleaded guilty to participation in the Tuxedo bank robbery and respondent Bryan pleaded guilty to participation in the Mount Ivy bank robbery. Neither respondent had been finally sentenced on his plea, however,2 and each refused to testify against Anderson on self-incrimination grounds, and persisted in that refusal even though the trial judge granted him immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003.3 The trial judge thereupon *324summarily adjudged each in criminal contempt and sentenced each to six months’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to his sentence on the robbery conviction,4

*325The Court today declines the Government’s invitation to overrule Harris v. United States, supra, and in that circumstance Harris clearly compels affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Harris interpreted subdivision (a) of Rule 42 as having a narrowly limited scope and expressly excluded its application to a nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination.5 The Court emphasized *326that subdivision (a) reached a narrow category of situations and “was reserved ‘for exceptional circumstances’ . . . such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings.” 382 U. S., at 164. Such acts, the Court held, are not present in the case of a nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination because in such a case “the dignity of the court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped.” Id., at 165.6

The Court stated its rationale for the narrow interpretation of subdivision (a) as follows:

“We reach that conclusion in light of ‘the concern long demonstrated by both Congress and this Court over the possible abuse of the contempt power’ . . . and in light of the wording of the Rule. Summary contempt is for ‘misbehavior’... in the ‘actual presence of the court.’ Then speedy punishment may be necessary in order to achieve ‘summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority.’ ” Id., at 164.

The Court continued:

“Summary procedure, to use the words of Chief Justice Taft, was designed to fill ‘the need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the *327court...We start from the premise long ago stated in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, that the limits of the power to punish for contempt are ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed.’ In the instant case, the dignity of the court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped. The contempt here committed was far outside the narrow category envisioned by Rule 42 (a).” Id., at 165.

Only last Term, the Court again emphasized that summary punishment for contempt “ ‘always and rightly, is regarded with disfavor’ ” in light of the “heightened potential for abuse posed by the contempt power,” Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488, 498, 500 (1974), and is to be resorted to only when necessary for “ ‘immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court.’ ” Id., at 498 n. 6.

I see no escape from the application of Harris to this case based on the difference that respondents were witnesses at an ongoing trial while the witness in Harris was a grand jury witness, brought before the judge and asked the same questions he had not answered before the grand jury. The Court argues that while the delay necessitated by Rule 42 (b) procedures would be unlikely seriously to disrupt grand jury proceedings it would have substantial disruptive effects in a trial. I doubt that compliance with Rule 42 (b) procedures necessarily would have substantial disruptive effects in a trial7 but in any *328event those effects are not the kind of obstruction of court proceedings, Harris, supra, at 164, that justify summary punishment under subdivision (a). For Harris limits application of that subdivision to conduct in the presence of the judge “where immediate corrective steps are needed to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of the court.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U. S. 212, 214 (1971).8 In the case of respondents’ nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination, “the dignity of the court was not being affronted,”9 Harris, supra, at 165, and the absence of that *329crucial element in respondents’ refusal to answer questions foreclosed application of subdivision (a) by the trial judge.