Ralston Purina Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Cases that cite this one
20 later published cases cite this decision. The 18 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission United States of America, County of El Dorado, Respondent-Intervenor (9th Cir. 1989)
- Redmond-Issaquah Railroad Preservation Ass'n v. Surface Transportation Board (9th Cir. 2000)
- Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Surface Transportation Board and United States of America (7th Cir. 1997)
- CMC Real Estate Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (D.C. Cir. 1986)
- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Greyhound Lines, Inc., Intervenor (D.C. Cir. 1984)
- Bloomer Shippers Association v. Interstate Commerce Commission (7th Cir. 1982)
- Frank J. Laird v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Intervenor (3d Cir. 1982)
- Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (D.C. Cir. 1982)
- Bloomer Shippers Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Commission (7th Cir. 1982)
- State of Texas v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission (5th Cir. 1981)
- Curtis, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, and Story, Inc., Intervening (10th Cir. 1981)
- Pre-Fab Transit Co., an Illinois Corporation v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission (7th Cir. 1979)
- Delaney v. Pugh (D. Minn. 2024)
- State v. Winegardner (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017)
- Redmond-Issaquah Railroad Preservation Association v. The Surface Transportation Board (9th Cir. 2000)
- Pogia v. Ramos (Haw. Ct. App. 1994)
- The Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc. (4th Cir. 1976)
- Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n (Supreme Court of the United States 1976)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court setting aside and annulling a decision and order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 607 (WD Ky. 1975).
In 1973, the railroads in southern territory, which lies south of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, proposed new tariffs changing the method of calculating the through rates on vegetable oil, cake or meal, and related articles, which were subject to transit privileges at various points where animal, fish, and poultry feed using these ingredients was made and transshipped. Certain *477 large feed manufacturers protested. The Commission found that the net effect of the new tariffs would be to increase the through rates on the articles involved and that the railroads had “not presented probative evidence in justification” of the new tariffs. Based on the testimony and evidence presented by the protestante the Commission found “strong support on this record for concluding that these shippers will divert a considerable portion of their feed traffic, from railroad to trucks, with the establishment of the proposed rule.” The result, the Commission found, would be “a net loss of revenue to the [railroads] despite the assessment of the higher rates and charges and thus will be self-defeating.” The Commission concluded that the railroads had not met their burden of proof that the proposed tariffs were just and reasonable under § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §15(7), and required that the railroads cancel the schedule. 346 I. C. C. 579, 587-588 (1973).
The District Court set aside and annulled the Commission order for want of substantial evidence to support it. The District Court considered the shippers’ evidence mere conjecture and self-serving and could not accept the Commission’s conclusion that the railroads would lose revenue from the new tariffs. It also thought it “un-controverted” that “the railroads have incurred a loss of revenue from the transportation of meal,” and therefore “clearly established that if there should be a diversion of meal traffic as predicted by the shippers, the carriers would actually be in a better financial position than at present.” 397 F. Supp., at 610.
We reverse the judgment of the District Court. Con-cededly, there was detailed evidence with respect to the anticipated traffic diversion which the Commission credited and thought strongly supported its conclusion. The District Court exceeded its function in reweighing the *478 testimony, which is primarily the task of the Commission. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 23-24 (1942); Illinois C. R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 385 U. S. 57, 69 (1966). On the record before it, the District Court also erred in differing with the Commission and agreeing with the railroads with respect to the impact of the new tariffs on railroad revenue. The court relied on evidence which showed only that under the old rates the railroads sustained a loss on feed outbound from the transit points and which, as a railroad witness testified, Comm’n Tr. 28-29, did not relate to the net gain or loss on inbound meal shipments or on the through movement when both legs were considered together.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.