Supreme Court of the United States, 1976

Cook v. Hudson

Cook v. Hudson
Supreme Court of the United States · Decided December 7, 1976 · Burger
429 U.S. 165; 97 S. Ct. 543; 50 L. Ed. 2d 373; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 180; 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,246 (United States Reports)

Cook v. Hudson

Concurring Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

concurring in the result.

I join in the Court’s disposition of this case. In doing so, I emphasize that our decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted intimates no view on the question of when, if ever, public school teachers — or any comparable public employees — may be required, as a condition of their employment, to enroll their children in any particular school or refrain from sending them to a school which they, as parents, in their sole discretion, consider desirable. Few familial decisions are as immune from governmental interference as parents’ choice of a school for their children, so long as the school chosen otherwise meets the educational standards imposed by the State. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972).

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam.

Certiorari was granted to consider the question presented: whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a Mississippi public school board may terminate the employment of teachers sending their children not to public schools, but to a private racially segregated school. However, since the grant of certiorari, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), held that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonseetarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes. Moreover, a Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp., 1976), enacted in 1974 after the school board action here complained of, prohibits school boards “from denying employment or reemployment to any person . . . for the single reason that any eligible child of such person *166does not attend the school system in which such [person] is employed.” Though § 37-9-59 was cited in the record at the time of granting the writ, examination of the merits on oral argument in light of Runyon v. McCrary and § 37-9-59 satisfies us that the grant was improvident. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70 (1955).

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.