delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect an assistant public defender who is satisfactorily performing his job from discharge solely because of his political beliefs.

Respondents, Aaron Finkel and Alan Tabakman, commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in order to preserve their positions as assistant public defenders in Rockland County, New York.1 On January 4,1978, on the basis of a showing that the petitioner public defender was about to discharge them solely because they were Republicans, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order preserving the status quo. After hearing evidence for eight days, the District Court entered detailed findings of fact and permanently enjoined 2 petitioner from terminating or attempting to terminate respondents’ employment “upon the sole grounds of *509their political beliefs.”3 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion, judgment order reported at 598 F. 2d 609 (CA2 1979) (table).

The critical facts can be summarized briefly. The Rockland County Public Defender is appointed by the County Legislature for a term of six years. He in turn appoints nine assistants who serve at his pleasure. The two respondents have served as assistants since their respective appointments in March 1971 and September 1975; they are both Republicans.4

Petitioner Branti’s predecessor, a Republican, was appointed in 1972 by a Republican-dominated County Legislature. By 1977, control of the legislature had shifted to the Democrats and petitioner, also a Democrat, was appointed to replace the incumbent when his term expired. As soon as petitioner was formally appointed on January 3, 1978, he began executing termination notices for six of the nine assistants then in office. Respondents were among those who were to be terminated. With one possible exception, the nine who were to be appointed *510or retained were all Democrats and were all selected by Democratic legislators or Democratic town chairmen on a basis that had been determined by the Democratic caucus.5

The District Court found that Finkel and Tabakman had been selected for termination solely because they were Republicans and thus did not have the necessary Democratic sponsors:

“The sole grounds for the attempted removal of plaintiffs were the facts that plaintiffs’ political beliefs differed from those of the ruling Democratic majority in the County Legislature and that the Democratic majority had determined that Assistant Public Defender appointments were to be made on political bases.” 457 F. Supp., at 1293.

The court rejected petitioner’s belated attempt to justify the dismissals on nonpolitical grounds. Noting that both Branti and his predecessor had described respondents as “competent attorneys,” the District Court expressly found that both had been “satisfactorily performing their duties as Assistant Public Defenders.” Id., at 1292.

Having concluded that respondents had been discharged solely because of their political beliefs, the District Court held that those discharges would be permissible under this Court’s decision in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, only if *511assistant public defenders are the type of policymaking, confidential employees who may be discharged solely bn the basis of their political affiliations. The court concluded that respondents clearly did not fall within that category. Although recognizing that they had broad responsibilities with respect to particular cases that were assigned to them, the court found that respondents had “very limited, if any, responsibility” with respect to the overall operation of the public defender’s office. They did not “act as advisors or formulate plans for the implementation of the broad goals of the office” and, although they made decisions in the context of specific cases, “they do not make decisions about the orientation and operation of the office in which they work.” 457 F. Supp., at 1291.

The District Court also rejected the argument that the confidential character of respondents’ work justified conditioning their employment on political grounds. The court found that they did not occupy any confidential relationship to the policy-making process, and did not have access to confidential documents that influenced policymaking deliberations. Rather, the only confidential information to which they had access was the product of their attorney-client relationship with the office’s clients; to the extent that such information was shared with the public defender, it did not relate to the formulation of office policy.

In light of these factual findings, the District Court concluded that petitioner could not terminate respondents’ employment as assistant public defenders consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, specifically holding that the District Court’s findings of fact were adequately supported by the record. That court also expressed “no doubt” that the District Court “was correct in concluding that an assistant public defender was neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee.” We granted certiorari, 443 U. S. 904, and now affirm.

*512Petitioner advances two principal arguments for reversal:6 First, that the holding in Elrod v. Burns is limited to situations in which government employees are coerced into pledging allegiance to a political party that they would not voluntarily support and does not apply to a simple requirement that an employee be sponsored by the party in power; and, second, that, even if party sponsorship is an unconstitutional condition of continued public employment for clerks, deputies, and janitors, it is an acceptable requirement for an assistant public defender.

*513I

In Elrod v. Burns the Court held that the newly elected Democratic Sheriff of Cook County, Ill., had violated the constitutional rights of certain non-civil-service employees by discharging them “because they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders.” 427 U. S., at 351. That holding was supported by two separate opinions.

Writing for the plurality, Mr. Justice Brennan identified two separate but interrelated reasons supporting the conclusion that the discharges were prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. First, he analyzed the impact of a political patronage system7 on freedom of belief and association. Noting that in order to retain their jobs, the Sheriff’s employees were required to pledge their allegiance to the Democratic Party, work for or contribute to the party’s candidates, or obtain a Democratic sponsor, he concluded that the inevitable tendency of such a system was to coerce employees into compromising their true beliefs.8 That conclusion, in *514his opinion, brought the practice within the rule of cases like Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, condemning the use of governmental power to prescribe what the citizenry-must accept as orthodox opinion.9

Second, apart from the potential impact of patronage dismissals on the formation and expression of opinion, Me. Justice Brennan- also stated that the practice had the effect of imposing an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit and therefore came within the rule of cases like Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593. In support of the holding in Perry that even an employee with no contractual right to retain his job cannot be dismissed for engaging in constitutionally protected speech, the Court had stated:

“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the govern*515ment may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U, S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.

“Thus, the respondent’s lack of a contractual or tenure ‘right’ to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this Court has specifically held that the non-renewal of a nontenured public school teacher’s one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U. S. 479]; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [385 U. S. 589]. We reaffirm those holdings here.” Id., at 597-598.

If the First Amendment protects a public employee from discharge based on what he has said, it must also protect him from discharge based on what he believes.10 Under this line of analysis, unless the government can demonstrate “an over*516riding interest,” 427 U. S., at 368, "of vital importance,” id., at 362, requiring that a person’s private beliefs conform to those of the hiring authority, his beliefs cannot be the sole basis for depriving him of continued public employment.

opinion concurring in the judgment avoided comment on the first branch of Mr. Justice Brennan’s analysis, but expressly relied on the same passage from Perry v. Sindermann that is quoted above.

Petitioner argues that Elrod v. Burns should be read to prohibit only dismissals resulting from an employee’s failure to capitulate to political coercion. Thus, he argues that, so long as an employee is not asked to change his political affiliation or to contribute to or work for the party’s candidates, he may be dismissed with impunity — even though he would not have been dismissed if he had had the proper political sponsorship and even though the sole reason for dismissing him was to replace him with a person who did have such sponsorship. Such an interpretation would surely emasculate the principles set forth in Elrod. While it would perhaps eliminate the more blatant forms of coercion described in Elrod, it would not eliminate the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must have a sponsor in the dominant party in order to retain one’s job.11 More importantly, petitioner’s interpretation would require the Court to repudiate entirely the conclusion of both Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart that the First Amend*517ment prohibits the dismissal of a public employee solely because of his private political beliefs.

In sum, there is no requirement that dismissed employees prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance. To prevail in this type of an action, it was sufficient, as Elrod holds, for respondents to prove that they were discharged “solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party.” 427 U. S., at 350.

II

Both opinions in Elrod recognize that party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement for some types of government employment. Thus, if an employee’s private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency. Id,, at 366. In Elrod, it was clear that the duties of the employees — the chief deputy of the process division of the sheriff’s office, a process server and another employee in that office, and a bailiff and security guard at the Jpvenile Court of Cook County — were not of that character, for they were, as Mr. Justice Stewart stated, “nonpolicy-making, nonconfidential” employees. Id., at 375.12

*518As Mr. Justice Brennan noted in Elrod, it is not always easy to determine whether a position is one in which political affiliation is a legitimate factor to be considered. Id., at 367. Under some circumstances, a position may be appropriately considered political even though it is neither confidential nor policymaking in character. As one obvious example, if a State’s election laws require that precincts be supervised by two election judges of different parties, a Republican judge could be legitimately discharged solely for changing his party registration. That conclusion would not depend on any finding that the job involved participation in policy decisions or access to confidential information. Rather, it would simply rest on the fact that party membership was essential to the discharge of the employee’s governmental responsibilities.

It is equally clear that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position. The coach of a state university’s football team formulates policy, but no one could seriously claim that Republicans make better coaches than Democrats, or vice versa, no matter which party is in control of the state government. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Governor of a State may appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments. In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label “policymaker” or “confidential” fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.

*519Having thus framed the issue, it is manifest that the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county .government. The primary, if not the only, responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State.13 As we recently observed in commenting on the duties of counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants in federal criminal proceedings:

“[T]he primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the office of privately retained counsel. Although it is true that appointed counsel serves pursuant to statutory authorization and in furtherance of the federal interest in insuring effective representation of criminal defendants, his duty is not to the public at large, except in that general way. His principal responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of his client. Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the government and to oppose it in adversary litigation.” Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 204.

Thus, whatever policymaking occurs in the public defender’s office must relate to the needs of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests. Similarly, although an assistant is bound to obtain access to confidential information arising out of various attorney-client relationships, that information has no bearing whatsoever on partisan political concerns. Under these circumstances, it would undermine, rather than promote, the effective performance of an assistant public *520defender’s office to make his tenure dependent on his allegiance to the dominant political party.14

Accordingly, the entry of an injunction against termination of respondents’ employment on purely political grounds was appropriate and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

dissenting.

I joined the judgment of the Court in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, because it is my view that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, “a nonpolicymaking, nonconfiden-tial government employee can [not] be discharged . . . from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs.” Id., at 375. That judgment in my opinion does not control the present case for the simple reason *521that the respondents here clearly are not “nonconfidential” employees.

The respondents in the present case are lawyers, and the employment positions involved are those of assistants in the office of the Rockland County Public Defender. The analogy to a firm of lawyers in the private sector is a close one, and I can think of few occupational relationships more instinct with the necessity of mutual confidence and trust than that kind of professional association.

I believe that the petitioner, upon his appointment as Public Defender, was not constitutionally compelled to enter such a close professional and necessarily confidential association with the respondents if he did not wish to do so.*

with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins, and with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins as to Part I, dissenting.

The Court today continues the evisceration of patronage practices begun in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976). With scarcely a glance at almost 200 years of American political tradition, the Court further limits the relevance of political affiliation to the selection and retention of public employees. Many public positions previously filled on the basis of membership in national political parties now must be staffed in accordance with a constitutionalized civil service standard that will affect the employment practices of federal, state, and local governments. Governmental hiring practices long thought to be a matter of legislative arid executive discretion now will be subjected to judicial oversight. Today’s decision is an exercise of judicial lawmaking that, as The Chief Justice wrote in his Elrod dissent, “represents a significant intrusion into the area of legislative and policy concerns.” Id., at 375. I dissent.

*522I

The Court contends that its holding is compelled by the First Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court largely ignores the substantial governmental interests served by patronage. Patronage is a long-accepted practice 1 that never has been eliminated totally by civil service laws and regulations. The flaw in the Court’s opinion lies not only in its application of First Amendment principles, see Parts II-IV, infra, but also in its promulgation of a new, and substantially expanded, standard for determining which governmental employees may be retained or dismissed on the basis of political affiliation.2

*523In Elrod v. Burns, three Members of the Court joined a plurality opinion concluding that nonpolieymaking employees could not be dismissed on the basis of political affiliation. 427 U. S., at 367 (opinion of Brennan, J., with whom White and Marshall, JJ., joined). Two Members of the Court joined an opinion concurring in the judgment and stating that nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employees could not be so dismissed. Id., at 375 (opinion of Stewart, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joined). Notwithstanding its purported reliance upon the holding of Elrod, ante, at 512, n. 6, the Court today ignores the limitations inherent in both views. The .Court rejects the limited role for patronage recognized in the plurality opinion by holding that not all policymakers may be dismissed because of political affiliation. Ante, at 518-520. And the Court refuses to allow confidential employees to be dismissed for partisan reasons. Ante, at 520, n. 14; see ante, p. 520 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The broad, new standard is articulated as follows:

“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Ante, at 518.

The Court gives three examples to illustrate the standard. Election judges and certain executive assistants may be chosen on the basis of political affiliation; college football coaches may not. Ibid.3 And the Court decides in this case that *524party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for selection of the attorneys in a public defender’s office because "whatever policymaking occurs in the public defender’s office must relate to the needs of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests.” Ante, at 519.

The standard articulated by the Court is framed in vague and sweeping language certain to create vast uncertainty. Elected and appointed officials at all levels who now receive guidance from civil service laws, no longer will know when political affiliation is an appropriate consideration in filling a position. Legislative bodies will not be certain whether they have the final authority to make the delicate line-drawing decisions embodied in the civil service laws. Prudent individuals requested to accept a public appointment must consider whether their predecessors will threaten to oust them through legal action.

One example at the national level illustrates the nature and magnitude of the problem created by today’s holding. The President customarily has considered political affiliation in removing and appointing United States attorneys. Given the critical role that these key law enforcement officials play in the administration of the Department of Justice, both Democratic and Republican Attorneys General have concluded, not surprisingly, that they must have the confidence and support of the United States attorneys. And political affiliation has been used as one indicator of loyalty.4

Yet, it would be difficult to say, under the Court’s standard, that “partisan” concerns properly are relevant to the performance of the duties of a United States attorney. This *525Court has noted that “ ‘[t]he office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and independence.’ ” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 423 (1976), quoting Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P. 2d 592, 597 (1935). Nevertheless, I believe that the President must have the right to consider political affiliation when he selects top ranking Department of Justice officials. The President and his Attorney General, not this Court, are charged with the responsibility for enforcing the laws and administering the Department of Justice. The Court’s vague, overbroad decision may cast serious doubt on the propriety of dismissing United States attorneys, as well as thousands of other policymaking employees at all levels of government, because of their membership in a national political party.5

A constitutional standard that is both uncertain in its application and impervious to legislative change will now control selection and removal of key governmental personnel. Federal judges will now be the final arbiters as to who federal, state, and local governments may employ. In my view, the Court is not justified in removing decisions so essential to *526responsible and efficient governance from the discretion of legislative and executive officials.

II

The Court errs not only in its selection of a standard, but more fundamentally in its conclusion that the First Amendment prohibits the use of membership in a national political party as a criterion for the dismissal of public employees.6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court makes new law from inapplicable precedents. The Court suggests that its decision is mandated by the principle that governmental action may not “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. . . .” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943). The Court also relies upon the decisions in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967). Ante, at 514-515; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S., at 358-359 (opinion of Brennan, J.). But the propriety of patronage was neither questioned nor addressed in those cases.

Both Keyishian and Perry involved faculty members who were dismissed from state educational institutions because of their political views.7 In Keyishian, the Court reviewed a *527state statute that permitted dismissals of faculty members from state institutions for “treasonable or seditious” utterances or acts. The Court noted that academic freedom is “a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” 385 U. S., at 603. Because of the ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court held that the law was unconstitutionally vague. The Court also held that membership in the Communist Party could not automatically disqualify a person from holding a faculty position in a state university. Id., at 606. In Perry, the Court held that the Board of Regents of a state university system could not discharge a professor in retaliation for his exercise of free speech. 408 U. S., at 598. In neither case did the State suggest that the governmental positions traditionally had been regarded as patronage positions. Thus, the Court correctly held that no substantial state interest justified the infringement of free speech. This case presents a question quite different from that in Keyishian and Perry.

The constitutionality of appointing or dismissing public employees on the basis of political affiliation depends upon the governmental interests served by patronage. No constitutional violation exists if patronage practices further sufficiently important interests to justify tangential burdening of First Amendment rights. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976). This inquiry cannot be resolved by reference to First Amendment cases in which patronage was neither involved nor discussed. Nor can the question in this case be answered in a principled manner without identifying and weighing the governmental interest served by patronage.

Ill

Patronage appointments help build stable political parties by offering rewards to persons who assume the tasks necessary *528to the continued functioning of political organizations. “As all parties are concerned with power they naturally operate by placing members and supporters into positions of power. Thus there is nothing derogatory in saying that a primary function of parties is patronage.” J. Jupp, Political Parties 25-26 (1968). The benefits of patronage to a political organization do not derive merely from filling policymaking positions on the basis of political affiliation. Many, if not most, of the jobs filled by patronage at the local level may not involve policymaking functions.8 The use of patronage to fill such positions builds party loyalty and avoids “splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [that might] do significant damage to the fabric of government.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736 (1974).

Until today, I would have believed that the importance of political parties was self-evident. Political parties, dependent in many ways upon patronage, serve a variety of substantial governmental interests. A party organization allows political candidates to muster donations of time and money necessary to capture the attention of the electorate. Particularly in a time of growing reliance upon expensive television advertisements, a candidate who is neither independently wealthy nor capable of attracting substantial contributions must rely upon party workers to bring his message to the voters.9 In contests for less visible offices, a candidate may have no efficient method of appealing to the voters unless he enlists the efforts of persons who seek reward through the patronage system. Insofar as the Court’s decision today *529limits the ability of candidates to present their views to the electorate, our democratic process surely is weakened.10

Strong political parties also aid effective governance after election campaigns end. Elected officials depend upon appointees who hold similar views to carry out their policies and administer their programs. Patronage — the right to select key personnel and to reward the party “faithful” — serves the public interest by facilitating the implementation of policies endorsed by the electorate.11 The Court’s opinion casts a shadow over this time-honored element of our system. It appears to recognize that the implementation of policy is a legitimate goal of the patronage system and that some, but not all, policymaking employees may be replaced on the basis of their political affiliation. Ante, at 518.12 But the Court *530does not recognize that the implementation of policy often depends upon the cooperation of public employees who do not hold policymaking posts. As one commentator has written: “What the Court forgets is that, if government is to work, policy implementation is just as important as policymaking. No matter how wise the chief, he has to have the right Indians to transform his ideas into action, to get the job done.” 13 The growth of the civil service system already has limited the ability of elected politicians to effect political change. Public employees immune to public pressure “can resist changes in policy without suffering either the loss of their jobs or a cut in their salary.” 14 Such effects are proper when they follow from legislative or executive decisions to withhold some jobs from the patronage system. But the Court tips the balance between patronage and nonpatronage positions, and, in my view, imposes unnecessary constraints upon the ability of responsible officials to govern effectively and to carry out new policies.

Although the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government are independent as a matter of constitutional law, effective government is impossible unless the two Branches cooperate to make and enforce laws. Over the decades of our national history, political parties have furthered — if not assured--a measure of cooperation between the Executive and *531Legislative Branches. A strong party allows an elected executive to implement his programs and policies by working with legislators of the same political organization. But legislators who owe little to their party tend to act independently of its leadership. The result is a dispersion of political influence that may inhibit a political party from enacting its programs into law.15 The failure to sustain party discipline, at least at the national level, has been traced to the inability of successful political parties to offer patronage positions to their members or to the supporters of elected officials.16

The breakdown of party discipline that handicaps elected officials also limits the ability of the electorate to choose wisely among candidates. Voters with little information about individuals seeking office traditionally have relied upon party affiliation as a guide to choosing among candidates. With the decline in party stability, voters are less able to blame or credit a party for the performance of its elected officials. Our national party system is predicated upon the assumption that political parties sponsor, and are responsible for, the performance of the persons they nominate for office.17

In sum, the effect of the Court’s decision will be to decrease the accountability and denigrate the role of our national political parties. This decision comes at a time when an increasing number of observers question whether our national political parties can continue to operate effectively.18 *532Broad-based political parties supply an essential coherence and flexibility to the American political scene. They serve as coalitions of different interests that combine to seek national goals. The decline of party strength inevitably will enhance the influence of special interest groups whose only concern all too often is how a political candidate votes on a single issue. The quality of political debate, and indeed the capacity of government to function in the national interest, suffer when candidates and officeholders are forced to be more responsive to the narrow concerns of unrepresentative special interest groups than to overarching issues of domestic and foreign policy. The Court ignores the substantial governmental interests, served by reasonable patronage. In my view, its decision will seriously hamper the functioning of stable political parties.

IV

The facts of this case also demonstrate that the Court’s decision well may impair the right of local voters to structure their government. Consideration of the form of local government in Rockland County, N. Y., demonstrates the antidemocratic effect of the Court’s decision.

The voters of the county elect a legislative body. Among the responsibilities that the voters give to the legislature is the selection of a county public defender. In 1972, when the county voters elected a Republican majority in the legislature, a Republican was selected as Public Defender. The Public Defender retained one respondent and appointed the other as Assistant Public Defenders. Not surprisingly, both respondents are Republicans. In 1976, the voters elected a majority of Democrats to the legislature. The Democratic majority, in turn, selected a Democratic Public Defender who replaced both respondents with Assistant Public Defenders approved by the Democratic legislators. Ante, at 509-510, and n. 5.

*533The voters of Rockland County are free to elect their public defender and assistant public defenders instead of delegating their selection to elected and appointed officials.19 Certainly the Court’s holding today would not preclude the voters, the ultimate “hiring authority,” from choosing both public defenders and their assistants by party membership. The voters’ choice of public officials on the basis of political affiliation is not yet viewed as an inhibition of speech; it is democracy. Nor may any incumbent contend seriously that the voters’ decision not to re-elect him because of his political views is an impermissible infringement upon his right of free speech or affiliation. In other words, the operation of democratic government depends upon the selection of elected officials on precisely the basis rejected by the Court today.

Although the voters of Rockland County could have elected both the public defender and his assistants, they have given their legislators a representative proxy to appoint the public defender. And they have delegated to the public defender the power to choose his assistants. Presumably the voters have adopted this course in order to facilitate more effective representative government. Of course, the voters could have instituted a civil service system that would preclude the selection of either the public defender or his assistants on the basis of political affiliation. But the continuation of the present system reflects the electorate’s decision to select certain public employees on the basis of political affiliation.

The Court’s decision today thus limits the ability of the voters of a county to structure their democratic government in the way that they please. Now those voters must elect both the public defender and his assistants if they are to fill governmental positions on a partisan basis.*20 Because voters *534certainly may elect governmental officials on the basis of party ties, it is difficult to perceive a constitutional reason for prohibiting them from delegating that same authority to legislators and appointed officials.

V

The benefits of political patronage and the freedom of voters to structure their representative government are substantial governmental interests that justify the selection of the assistant public defenders of Rockland County on the basis of political affiliation. The decision to place certain governmental positions within a civil service system is a sensitive political judgment that should be left to the voters and to elected representatives of the people. But the Court’s constitutional holding today displaces political responsibility with judicial fiat. In my view, the First Amendment does not incorporate a national civil service system. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.