delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility violates either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

I

On August 13, 1974, the petitioner stabbed and killed Doyle Redding. The petitioner was not apprehended until he turned himself in to governmental authorities about two weeks later. At his state trial for first-degree murder, the petitioner contended that the killing was in self-defense.

The petitioner testified that his sister and her boyfriend were robbed by Redding and another man during the evening of August 12, 1974. The petitioner, who was nearby when the robbery occurred, followed the thieves a short distance and reported their whereabouts to the police. According to the petitioner’s testimony, the next day he encountered Red-*233ding, who accused him of informing the police of the robbery. The petitioner stated that Redding attacked him with a knife, that the two men struggled briefly, and that the petitioner broke away. On cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that during the struggle he had tried “[t]o push that knife in [Redding] as far as [I] could,” App. 36, but maintained that he had acted solely in self-defense.

During the cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the petitioner about his actions after the stabbing:

“Q. And I suppose you waited for the Police to tell them what happened?

“A. No, I didn’t.

“Q. You didn’t?

“A. No.

“Q. I see.

“And how long was it after this day that you were arrested, or that you were taken into custody?” Id., at 33.

After some discussion of the date on which petitioner surrendered, the prosecutor continued:

“Q. When was the first time that you reported the things that you have told us in Court today to anybody? “A. Two days after it happened.

“Q. And who did you report it to?

“A. To my probation officer.

“Q. Well, apart from him?

“A. No one.

“Q. Who?

“A. No one but my—

“Q. (Interposing) Did you ever go to a Police Officer or to anyone else?

“A. No, I didn’t.

“Q. As a matter of fact, it was two weeks later, wasn’t it?

“A. Yes.” Id., at 34.

*234In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor again referred to the petitioner’s prearrest silence. The prosecutor noted that petitioner had “waited two weeks, according to the testimony — at least two weeks before he did anything about surrendering himself or reporting [the stabbing] to anybody.” Id., at 43. The prosecutor contended that the petitioner had committed murder in retaliation for the robbery the night before.

The petitioner was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment in state prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, contending that his constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor questioned him concerning prearrest silence. A Federal Magistrate concluded that the petition for habeas corpus relief should be denied. The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 599 F. 2d 1055. This Court granted a writ of certiorari. 444 U. S. 824 (1979). We now affirm.1

*235II

At trial the prosecutor attempted to impeach the petitioner’s credibility by suggesting that the petitioner would have spoken out if he had killed in self-defense. The petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s actions violated thb Fifth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain silent during his criminal trial, and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 614 (1965). In this case, of course, the petitioner did not remain silent throughout the criminal proceedings. Instead, he voluntarily took the witness stand in his own defense.

This Court’s decision in Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494 (1926), recognized that the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached with his prior silence. The defendant in Raffel was tried twice. At the first trial, a Government agent testified that Raffel earlier had made an inculpatory statement. The defendant did not testify. After the first trial ended in deadlock the agent repeated his testimony at the second trial, and Raffel took the stand to deny making such a statement. Cross-examination revealed that Raffel had not testified at the first trial. Id., at 495, n. The Court held that inquiry into prior silence was proper because “[t]he immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering himself as a witness. . . . When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined. . . .” Id., at 496-497. Thus, the Raffel Court concluded that the defendant was “subject to cross-examina*236tion impeaching his credibility just like any other witness.” Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 420 (1957).2

It can be argued that a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach him. But the Constitution does not forbid “every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 30 (1973). See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U. S. 212, 218, and n. 8 (1978). The “ 'threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.’ ” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 32, quoting Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213 (1971).3 The Raff el Court ex*237plicitly rejected the contention that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence is an impermissible burden upon the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. “We are unable to see that the rule that [an accused who] testifies . . . must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or not.” 271 U. S., at 499.4

This Court similarly defined the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). There the Court held that a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), may be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility. Rejecting the contention that such impeachment violates the Fifth Amendment, the Court said:

“Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege *238cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. . . . Haying voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.” 401 U. S., at 225.

See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 721-723 (1975); Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, 65 (1954).

In determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 32, and n. 20. Attempted impeachment on cross-examination of a defendant, the practice at issue here, may enhance the reliability of the criminal process. Use of such impeachment on cross-examination allows prosecutors to test the credibility of witnesses by asking them to explain prior inconsistent statements and acts. A defendant may decide not to take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-examination. But this is a choice of litigation tactics. Once a defendant decides to testify, “[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.” Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 156 (1958).

Thus, impeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. We conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility.

Ill

The petitioner also contends that use of prearrest silence to impeach his credibility denied him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not *239agree. Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1042, p. 1056 (Chadboum rev. 1970). Each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative. For example, this Court has exercised its supervisory powers over federal courts to hold that prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where silence is not probative of a defendant’s credibility and where prejudice to the defendant might result. See United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 180-181 (1975); Stewart v. United States, 366 U. S. 1, 5 (1961); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S., at 424.5

Only in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), did we find that impeachment by silence violated the Constitution. In that case, a defendant received the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 467-473, when he was arrested for selling marihuana. At that time, he made no statements to the police. During his subsequent trial, the defendant testified that he had been framed. The prosecutor impeached the defendant’s credibility on cross-examination by revealing that the defendant remained silent after his arrest. The State argued that the prosecutor’s actions were permissible, but we concluded that “the Miranda decision compels rejection of the State’s position.” 426 U. S., at 617. Miranda *240warnings inform a person that he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his subsequent decision to remain silent cannot be used against him. Accordingly, “ ‘it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony.’ ” Id., at 619, quoting United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183 (White, J., concurring in judgment).6

In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not present in this case. We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

IV

Our decision today does not force any state court to allow impeachment through the use of prearrest silence. Each jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial. We merely conclude that the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility does not *241violate the Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment, agreeing with all but Part II of the opinion of the Court, and with Part I of the opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment.

concurring in the judgment.

My approach to both of petitioner’s constitutional claims differs from the Court’s. I would reject his Fifth Amendment claim because the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 1 is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak. I would reject his due process claim for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 620.

I

The Court holds that a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf waives any Fifth Amendment objection to the use of his prior silence for the purpose of impeachment. As the Court correctly points out, this holding is squarely supported by Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, in which the Court upheld the use of a defendant’s failure to take the stand at his first trial to impeach his testimony on retrial. Nevertheless, I would not rely on Raffel because such reliance incorrectly implies that a defendant’s decision not to testify at his own trial is constitutionally indistinguishable from his silence in a preeustody context.2 But the two situations are fundamentally different.

*242In the trial context it is appropriate to presume that a defendant’s silence is an exercise of his constitutional privilege and to prohibit any official comment that might deter him from exercising that privilege.3 For the central purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege is to protect the defendant from being compelled to testify against himself at his own trial.4 Moreover, since a defendant’s decision whether to tes*243tify is typically based on the advice of his counsel, it often could not be explained without revealing privileged communications between attorney and client.

These reasons have no application in a prearrest context. The fact that a citizen has a constitutional right to remain silent when he is questioned has no bearing on the probative significance of his silence before he has any contact with the police. We need not hold that every citizen has a duty to report every infraction of law that he witnesses in order to justify the drawing of a reasonable inference from silence in a situation in which the ordinary citizen would normally speak out.5 When a citizen is under no official compulsion what*244ever, either to speak or to remain silent, I see no reason why his voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment.6 For in determining whether the privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in a position to have his testimony compelled and then asserted his privilege, not simply whether he was silent. A different view ignores the clear words of the Fifth Amendment. See n. 1, supra. Consequently, I would simply hold that the admissibility of petitioner’s failure to come forward with the excuse of self-defense shortly after the stabbing raised a routine evidentiary question that turns on the probative significance of that evidence and presented no issue under the Federal Constitution.7

II

For the reasons stated in Part I of my dissenting opinion in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S., at 620-626, I do not agree with the Court’s view that the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 479, contain an implicit assurance that subsequent silence may not be used again'st the defendant. *245See ante, at 239-240. As the Court actually acknowledged in Doyle itself, see 426 U. S., at 619-620, n. 11, any such implicit assurance is far from being unqualified.8 Moreover, I continue to disagree with the Court’s view, repeated today, ante, at 240, that there was “fundamental unfairness present in Doyle.” In my judgment the fairness or unfairness of using a defendant’s postarrest silence for impeachment purposes does not simply depend on whether or not he received Miranda warnings. Rather, it primarily depends on whether it is fair to infer that the defendant was silent because he was asserting his constitutional privilege.9

In any event, since I was unpersuaded by the due process rationale of Doyle,10 I readily concur in the Court’s rejection of a similar argument in this case.

Me. Justice Stewart concurs in Part I of this opinion.

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.

Today the Court holds that a criminal defendant’s testimony in his own behalf may be impeached by the fact that *246he did not go to the authorities before his arrest and confess his part in the offense. The decision thus strikes a blow at two of the foundation stones of our constitutional system: the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to present a defense.

I

The Court’s decision today is extraordinarily broad. It goes far beyond a simple holding that the common-law rule permitting introduction of evidence of silence in the face of accusation or in circumstances calling for a response does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. For in this case the prosecution was allowed to cast doubt on an accused’s testimony that he acted in self-defense by forcing him to testify that he did not go to the police of his own volition, before he had been indicted, charged, or even accused of any offense, and volunteer his version of the events.

The Court’s holding that a criminal defendant’s testimony may be impeached by his prearrest silence has three patent— and, in my view, fatal — defects. First, the mere fact of prearrest silence is so unlikely to be probative of the falsity of the defendant’s trial testimony that its use for impeachment purposes is contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the drawing of an adverse inference from the failure to volunteer incriminating statements impermissibly infringes the privilege against self-incrimination. Third, the availability of the inference for impeachment purposes impermissibly burdens the decision to exercise the constitutional right to testify in one’s own defense.

A

The use of prior silence for impeachment purposes depends, as the majority recognizes, ante, at 238, on the reasonableness *247of an inference that it is inconsistent with the statements that are to be impeached. If the defendant’s prior silence does not make it more likely that his trial testimony was false, the evidence is simply irrelevant. Such an inference cannot fairly be drawn from petitioner’s failure to go to the police before any charges were brought, admit that he had committed a homicide, and offer an exculpatory explanation.

In order for petitioner to offer his explanation of self-defense, he would necessarily have had to admit that it was he who fatally stabbed the victim, thereby supplying against himself the strongest possible proof of an essential element of criminal homicide. It is hard to imagine a purer case of self-incrimination. Since we cannot assume that in the absence of official warnings individuals are ignorant of or oblivious to their constitutional rights, we must recognize that petitioner may have acted in reliance on the constitutional guarantee. In fact, petitioner had most likely been informed previously of his privilege against self-incrimination, since he had two prior felony convictions. App. 28. One who has at least twice before been given the Miranda warnings, which carry the implied promise that silence will not be penalized by use for impeachment purposes, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610 (1976), may well remember the rights of which he has been informed, and believe that the promise is still in force. Accordingly, the inference that petitioner’s conduct was inconsistent with his exculpatory trial testimony is precluded. See Doyle v. Ohio, supra; United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 176-177 (1975).1

*248Moreover, other possible explanations for silence spring readily to mind. It is conceivable that a person who had acted in self-defense might believe that he had committed no crime and therefore had no call to explain himself to the police. Indeed, all the witnesses agreed that after the stabbing the victim ran across the street and climbed a flight of stairs before collapsing. Initially, at least, then, petitioner might not have known that there was a homicide to explain. Moreover, petitioner testified that he feared retaliation if he went to the police. One need not be persuaded that any of these possible explanations represents the true reason for petitioner’s conduct to recognize that the availability of other plausible hypotheses vitiates the inference on which the admissibility of the evidence depends. See United States v. Hale, supra, at 176-177, 180.

The Court implies that its decision is consistent with the practice at common law; but at common law silence is admissible to contradict subsequent statements only if the circumstances would naturally have called for a response. For example, silence was traditionally considered a tacit admission *249if a statement made in the party’s presence was heard and understood by the party, who was at liberty to respond, in circumstances naturally calling for a response, and the party failed to respond.2 Silence was not considered an admission if any of the prerequisites were absent, for in such a case the failure to speak could be explained other than as assent. Similarly, failure to assert a fact could be used for impeachment if it would have been natural, under the circumstances, to assert the fact. But the authority cited by the majority in support of this proposition, ante, at 239, makes it clear that the rule cannot be invoked unless the facts affirmatively show that the witness was called on to speak, circumstances which are not present in this case.3 As we have previously observed, “[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.” United States v. Hale, supra, at 176.

Since petitioner’s failure to report and explain his actions prior to his arrest was not probative of the falsity of his testimony at trial, it was fundamentally unfair and a deprivation *250of due process to allow the jury to draw from that silence an inference that his trial testimony was false. Doyle v. Ohio, supra.

B

The use of prearrest silence for impeachment, purposes also violates the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The privilege prohibits the government from imposing upon citizens any duty to present themselves to the authorities and report their own wrongdoing. See, e. g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85 (1968); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 (1965). As I have explained, in order to offer his exculpatory explanation petitioner would inevitably have had to incriminate himself as to facts that would be crucial in any subsequent prosecution. To penalize him for failing to relinquish his privilege against self-incrimination by permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference from his silence is to place an impermissible burden on his exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965). In practical effect, it replaces the privilege against self-incrimination with a duty to incriminate oneself. The Court attempts to avoid this conclusion by asserting that the burden does not threaten the purposes underlying the Fifth Amendment. See ante, at 236. But it is hard to see how the burden could be more substantial or direct.4

*251It is sophistry to assert that the use of prearrest silence for impeachment does not infringe the privilege against self-incrimination because the fact of the silence will not come out unless petitioner chooses to testify, see ante, at 238. An accused has the absolute right to testify in his own defense, as well as the absolute right to refuse to incriminate himself prior to trial. He may not be forced to choose between those fundamental guarantees. We may not ignore the commands of the Constitution by asserting that the defendant brought his difficulties on himself by exercising the precious right to present a defense. Nor should we piously proclaim the protection of individual liberties but extend that protection only to the prosecution’s case in chief while ensuring that the evidence can come before the jury by the back door. See Harris v. *252New York, 401 U. S. 222, 226-232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

The Court’s reasoning is not saved by its reliance on Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494 (1926). Raffel held that a defendant could be required, upon testifying at a retrial, to disclose his failure to testify at the earlier trial. In my view, Raff el was wrongly decided; our subsequent cases, without expressly overruling it, limited it so severely as to appear to rob it of any continued vitality until its resurrection today. In Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391 (1957), the Court read Raff el as holding simply that a defendant who testifies at a second trial cannot continue to take advantage of the privilege asserted at the first trial. Instead, by taking the stand the defendant “becomes subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any other witness.” 353 U. S., at 420. But Grünewald carefully pointed out that “[t]he Court, in Raff el, did not focus on the question whether the cross-examination there involved was in fact probative in impeaching the defendant’s credibility.” Ibid. The logical underpinnings of Raff el were cut away almost completely by Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965).5 Thus the majority’s statement that Raffel holds that “the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached with his prior silence,” ante, at 235, is both simplistic and overbroad.

*253Further, the Court implies most unfairly that to exclude evidence of petitioner’s prior silence would be to countenance perjury. See ante, at 237-238. The Court quotes from Harris v. New York, supra, but in that case the defendant made two contradictory statements at different times. It was logical to infer, absent an explanation to the contrary, that the defendant was lying on one occasion or the other. See also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). Here there is only one statement, and a silence which is not necessarily inconsistent with the statement. There is no basis on which to conjure up the specter of perjury.

C

Finally, impeachment by prearrest silence impermissibly burdens the constitutionally protected decision to testify in one’s own defense.

Under today’s decision a defendant who did not report his conduct to the police at the first possible moment must, in deciding whether to testify in his own defense, take into account the possibility that if he does testify the jury may be permitted to add that omission to the reasons for disbelieving his defense. This means that a person who thinks he may have done something wrong must immediately decide, most likely without the assistance of counsel, whether, if he is ever charged with an offense and brought to trial, he may wish to take the stand. For if he may later want to take the stand, he had better go to the police station right away to preserve his exculpatory explanation of the events — even though in so doing he must incriminate himself and provide evidence which may be crucial to his eventual conviction. But if he decides not to incriminate himself, he may anticipate that his right to testify in his own defense will be undermined by the argument that his story is probably untrue because he did not volunteer it to the police at the earliest opportunity. All of these strategic decisions must be made before the individual even *254knows if he will be charged and of what offense he will be accused.

To force persons to make this kind of choice between two fundamental rights places an intolerable burden on the exercise of those rights. “It cuts down on the privilege [of testifying in one’s own defense] by making its assertion costly,” Griffin v. California, supra, at 614, and is therefore forbidden.

II

I have explained why I believe the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s prearrest failure to volunteer his version of events to the authorities is constitutionally impermissible. I disagree not only with the Court’s holding in this case, but as well with its emerging conception of the individual’s duty to assist the State in obtaining convictions, including his own — a conception which, I believe, is fundamentally at odds with our constitutional system. See, e. g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552, 569-572 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This conception disparages not only individual freedoms, but also the social interest in preserving those liberties and in the integrity of the criminal justice system. There is no doubt an important social interest in enabling police and prosecutors to obtain convictions. But the Court does not serve the Nation well by subordinating to that interest the safeguards that the Constitution guarantees to the criminal defendant.