Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 38 U. S. C. §§ 901-950 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), compensation for a permanent partial disability must be determined in one of two ways. First, if the injury is of a kind specifically identified in the schedule set forth in §§8(c)(1)-(20) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908 (c)(1)-(20), the injured employee is entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for a specific number of weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity has actually been impaired. Second, in all other cases, § 8 (c)(21), 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c)(21), authorizes compensation equal to two-thirds of the difference between the
Cross is employed by Potomac Electric Power Co. (Pepeo) as a cable splicer — a job that requires strength and agility. In 1974, he earned a total of $21,959.38, including overtime pay of $8,543.30. In December of that year, he injured his left knee in the course of his employment, thereby suffering a permanent partial loss of the use of his leg. The physical impairment is described as a 5 to 20% loss of the use of one leg, but the resulting impairment of his earning capacity is apparently in excess of 40%.
Because he worked in the District of Columbia, respondent Cross is entitled to compensation under the LHWCA.
The Administrative Law Judge allowed the larger recovery. He held that an injured employee is not required to accept the specific amount authorized by §§ 8 (c) (2) and (19) for the partial loss of the use of a leg, but instead may recover an amount based on the formula set forth in § 8(c) (21) for “all other cases.” Using that formula, the Administrative Law Judge found that respondent Cross’ permanent loss of earning capacity amounted to approximately $130 per week, and ordered Pepeo to pay him two-thirds of that amount each week for the remainder of his working life. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. Cross v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 7 BRBS 10 (1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also affirmed. 196 U. S. App. D. C. 417,
I
The language of the Act plainly supports the view that the character of the disability determines the method of compensation. Section 8 identifies four different categories of disability and separately prescribes the method of compensation
It is also noteworthy that the statutory direction that precedes the schedule of specifically described partial disabilities mandates that the compensation prescribed by the schedule “shall be paid to the employee, as follows.”
In sum, we find nothing in the statute itself to support the view that the reference to “all other cases” in § 8 (c)(21) was intended to authorize an alternative method for computation of disability benefits in certain cases of permanent partial disability already provided for in the schedule.
The legislative history of the Act is entirely consistent with the conclusion that it was intended to mean what it says. Although that history contains no specific consideration of the precise question before us,
“Obviously, the phrase 'in all other cases’ signifies that the provisions of the paragraph shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are not confined to a specific*276 member or specific members.” Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494 (1933).
Nothing in the original legislative history of the federal Act or in the legislative history of subsequent amendments
Ill
The weight of judicial authority also supports a literal reading of the Act.
During the first half century of administration of the LHWCA, federal tribunals consistently construed the schedule benefits provision as exclusive. Although the exclusivity question did not explicitly arise until 1964, prior to that time
It was not until 1975 that the Benefits Review Board announced its dissatisfaction with the Williams construction of the statute and concluded that claimants suffering from a permanent partial disability may elect to proceed under either the schedule or § 8 (c)(21).
While the federal decisional authority on this question is scarce, state-law authority apparently is not. The lower court cited, and the respondents rely upon, the “recent trend in workmen’s compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits.” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328.
IV
Respondents suggest two reasons why this settled construction is erroneous. They submit that it does not fulfill the fundamental remedial purpose of the Act and that it may produce anomalous results that Congress probably did not intend. The first submission is not entirely accurate; the second, though theoretically correct, has insufficient force to overcome the plain language of the statute itself.
The LHWCA, like other workmen’s compensation legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended to provide a certain recovery for employees who are injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault and precludes the assertion of various common-law defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for work-related harms, statutes of this kind do not purport to provide complete compensation for the wage earner’s economic loss.
It is true, however, that requiring resort to the schedule may produce certain incongruous results. Unless an injury
As this Court has observed in the past, it is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended that the LHWCA produce incongruous results. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 412-413 (1932). But if “compelling language” produces incongruities, the federal courts may not avoid them by rewriting or ignoring that language.
If anomalies actually do occur with any frequency in the day-to-day administration of the Act, they provide a persuasive justification for a legislative review of the statutory compensation schedule. It would obviously be sound policy for Congress t<5 re-examine the schedule of permanent partial disability benefits more frequently than every half century.
The judgment is
Reversed.
Section 8, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 908, provides, in part, as follows:
"Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows:
“(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66% per centum of the average weekly wages, which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or subdivision (e) of this section, respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as follows:
“(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks’ compensation.
“(2) Leg lost, two hundred and eighty-eight weeks’ compensation.
“(3) Hand lost, two hundred and forty-four weeks’ compensation.
“(4) Foot lost, two hundred and five weeks’ compensation.
“(5) Eye lost, one hundred and sixty weeks’ compensation.
“(18) Total loss of use: Compensation for permanent total loss of use of a member shall be the same as for loss of the member.
“(19) Partial loss or partial loss of use: Compensation for permanent partial loss or loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss or loss of use of the member.
“(20) Disfigurement: Proper and equitable compensation not to exceed $3,500 shall be awarded for serious disfigurement of the face, head, or neck or of other normally exposed areas likely to handicap the employee in securing or maintaining employment.
“(21) Other cases: In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation shafi be 66% per centum of the difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the deputy commissioner on his own motion or upon application of any party in interest.”
Cross’ 1975 earnings amounted to $12,086.48, in contrast to 1974 earnings of $21,959.38.
The District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, D. C. Code §§ 36-501 to 36-504 (1973 and Supp. V-1978), adopts the LHWCA as the workmen’s compensation law for the District of Columbia. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 471 (1947). Section 1 of the Act, D. C. Code §36-501 (1973), provides:
“The provisions of chapter 18 of title 33, U. S. Code, including all amendments that may hereafter be made thereto, shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs; except that in applying such provisions the term ‘employer’ shall be held to mean every person carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, and the term ‘employee’ shall be held to mean every employee of any such person.”
Under §§8 (e)(2) and (18), an employee suffering a total loss of the use of one leg is entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages
This computation is derived from § 8(c) (21), 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c) (21), quoted in n. 1, supra. It should be noted that “wage-earning capacity” under § 8 (c) (21) is not necessarily measured by an injured employee’s actual postinjury earnings. Section 8 (h) of the Act, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. §908 (h), provides:
“The wage-earning capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability under subdivision (c) (21) of this section or under subdivision (e) of this section shall be determined by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity: Pro*273 vided, however, That if the employee has no actual earnings or his actual earnings do not fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity, the deputy commissioner may, in the interest of justice, fix such wage-earning capacity as shall be reasonable, having due regard to the nature of his injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment, and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.”
196 U. S. App. D. C., at 420-421, 606 F. 2d, at 1327-1328.
Before analyzing the statute and its history in detail, Judge MacKinnon wrote:
“Nothing in section 8 permits an employee whose injury is unquestionably confined to one of those set out in the schedule to circumvent Congress' conclusive presumptions with a showing of lost earning capacity in excess of the specified benefit. The majority holds otherwise, and does so despite the fact that during the fifty-two year old regime of an essentially unaltered statutory scheme no federal court has ever read section 8 in that manner while a number of federal courts have adopted a contrary approach. I am not unsympathetic to the result the majority’s holding achieves, but I submit that it is within the province of the legislative branch to weigh and decide whether this result ought to obtain.” Id., at 422-423, 606 F. 2d, at 1329-1330.
In addition to permanent partial disability, the Act provides for permanent total, temporary total, and temporary partial disability. The remedies for permanent and temporary total disability — essentially two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly wages during the period of the disability — are set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of § 8, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908 (a) and (b). The remedy for temporary partial disability — two-thirds of the difference between the employee’s preinjury average weekly wages and his postinjury wage-earning capacity during the period of disability, up to a maximum of five years — is set forth in § 8 (e), 33 U. S. C. §908 (e).
Indeed, it should be noted that the words “other cases” appear twice in subparagraph (21). See n. 1, supra.
33 U. S. C. § 908 (c) (emphasis supplied). See n. 1, supra.
Judge MacKinnon’s dissenting opinion reviewed the legislative history in detail; although he discovered no clear answer to the exclusivity question, see 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 425, 606 F. 2d, at 1332, he found that, to the extent any conclusions could be drawn, the legislative history supported the view that the schedule and “all other cases” categories were intended to be mutually exclusive. Id., at 425-429, 606 F. 2d, at 1332-1336.
Act of Mar. 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.
1922 N. Y. Laws, ch. 615, § 15 (3). The 1922 Act was an extensive revision of the Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1914, 1914 N. Y. Laws, ch. 41. A schedule covering particular cases of permanent partial disability initially appeared in the 1914 Act. See 1914 N. Y. Laws, ch. 41, § 15 (3). This schedule was retained, in a slightly revised form, in the 1922 Act. The schedule adopted by Congress in the LHWCA was substantially identical to the New York schedule of 1922. Congress selected the New York statute as the model for the LHWCA because that statute was considered one of the best workmen’s compensation laws of its time. See H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1926).
In 1972, Congress considered and failed to pass an amendment to § 8 (c) that would have permitted an employee suffering from a permanent partial disability caused by a scheduled injury to recover both the schedule benefits and two-thirds of his lost wage-earning capacity after expiration of the schedule period. See S. 2318, § 7, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1972); H. R. 12006, §7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and H. R. 15023, §7, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act: Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 38 (1972). Although Pepeo relies heavily upon Congress’ rejection of this proposed amendment as support for its position that schedule benefits are exclusive, this action is of marginal relevance in this case because the amendment would have authorized cumulative, not alternative, remedies. Pepco’s reliance upon 1949 and 1966 amendments to the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U. S. C. §8101 et seq., is similarly misplaced. These amendments, authorizing cumulative remedies under the FECA, shed little light upon Congress’ intention with respect to alternative remedies under the LHWCA. See Act of Oct. 14, 1949, ch. 691, § 104, 63 Stat. 855; Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 536.
See, e. g., Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F. 2d 137, 143-144 (CA2), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 913 (1955). It should be noted, however, that this principle was announced in response to employer attempts to defeat an injured employee’s claim for schedule benefits on the ground that the employee had suffered no actual loss of wages or wage-earning capacity. Prior to 1964, the federal courts apparently had not been confronted with an employee, entitled to compensation under the schedule, who attempted to secure a greater recovery by establishing an actual loss of wages or wage-earning capacity in excess of the schedule benefit.
Although the question arose in a significantly different context, another 1964 decision, Flamm v. Hughes, 329 F. 2d 378, 380, suggests that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the schedule and “other cases” provisions mutually exclusive.
Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1 BRBS 357, 363-365 (1975). In Mason, the Board rejected Williams in favor of American Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 269, 426 F. 2d 1263 (1970), a decision upon which the court below also relied. See 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. The opinion in Jones, however, does not address the exclusivity issue presented in this case. Rather, Jones held merely that a scheduled injury can give rise to an award for permanent total disability under § 8 (a) where the facts establish that the injury prevents the employee from engaging in the only employment for which
See Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979); Brandt v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8 BRBS 698 (1978); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BRBS 552 (1978); Richardson v. Perna & Cantrell, Inc., 6 BRBS 588 (1977); Longo v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 BRBS 357 (1975). It should be noted that two of these decisions, Dugger and Longo, involved permanent total, not permanent partial, disability; therefore, comments in those decisions pertaining to the exclusivity issue are dicta. See n. 17, supra. It should also be noted that the Benefits Review Board is not a policymaking agency; its interpretation of the LHWCA thus is not entitled to any special deference from the courts. See Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 202 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 94, 628 F. 2d 85, 94 (1980) cert. denied, post, p. 905; Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F. 2d 752, 757, n. 5 (CA7 1979).
In the Board’s most recent examination of the exclusivity issue, Collins v. Todd Shipyards, supra, Chairman Smith vigorously dissented from the majority’s conclusion that § 8 (c) (21) benefits are available for scheduled injuries. 9 BRBS, at 1027-1036. Chairman Smith acknowledged that the contrary construction could produce inequitable results, but concluded that the statutory language would support no other construction: “The statute is not ambiguous or indefinite. It needs no strained interpretation or construction. The statutory language contained in Section 8 (c) clearly indicates that the schedule awards and the Section 8 (c) (21)
The majority quoted the following passage from a leading treatise on workmen’s compensation law:
“ 'Although it is difficult to speak in terms of a majority rule on this point, because of significant differences in statutory background, it can be said that at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field. But in recent years there has developed such a strong trend in the opposite direction that one might now, with equal justification, say that the field is dominated by the view that schedule allowances should not be deemed exclusive, whether the issue is treatment of a smaller member as a percentage loss of a larger, or treatment of any scheduled loss as a partial or total disability of the body as a whole.’ ” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 214-215, 606 F. 2d, at 1328-1329, quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 58.20, pp. 10-212 to 10-214 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
The trend away from exclusivity identified by Professor Larson has developed, at least in part, in eases involving scheduled injuries which result in either total disability or permanent partial disability extending in effect to other parts of the body. See id., § 58.20, pp. 10-196 to 10-206, 10-214 to 10-220. We are concerned here solely with a case in which
With respect to the limited question before us, it appears that, despite the recent trend to the contrary, a significant number of jurisdictions continue to view schedule benefits as exclusive in cases of permanent partial disability. See, e. g., E. Blair, Reference Guide to Workmen’s Compensation Law §11:07, p. 11-24 (1974); 11 W. Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation §2322 (a), pp. 562-565 (Perm. ed. 1957). Indeed, Professor Larson’s treatise indicates that exclusivity, although perhaps no longer the majority view, nonetheless represents the view of “many jurisdictions.” See 2 A. Larson, supra, § 58.00, p. 10-164; § 58.20, pp. 10-206 to 10-212; see also id., § 58.13, p. 10-174.
As Professor Larson noted in the passage quoted by the court below, “at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field.” Id., § 58.20, p. 10-212, quoted in 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. See n. 19, supra.
See, e. g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410, 415 (1963); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953); Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414 (1932).
The LHWCA clearly does not attempt to compensate injured employees for their entire loss. In all four classes of disability covered by the Act, see n. 8, swpra, the maximum compensation available is expressly designated to be less than an employee’s actual economic loss. In this respect, the LHWCA is typical of most workmen’s compensation statutes. See 1 A. Larson, supra n. 19, § 2.50, p. 11; Small, The General Structure of Law Applicable to Employee Injury and Death, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1027-1028 (1963).
The compromise nature of workmen’s compensation legislation is well recognized:
“Workmen’s compensation acts are in the nature of a compromise or quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in tum, do the employees. Employers give up the common-law defenses of the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk. Employees are assured hospital and medical care and subsistence during the convalescence period. In return for a fixed schedule of payments and a fixed amount in the event of the worker’s death, employers are made certain that irrespective of their fault, liability to an injured workman is limited under workmen’s compensation. Employees, on the other hand, ordinarily give up the right of suit for damages for personal injuries against employers in return for the certainty of compensation payments as recompense for those injuries.” 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 55, p. 102 (3d ed. 1975).
See also E. Blair, supra n. 20, §1:00, pp. 1-1 to 1-2; W. Prosser, Law of Torts 531-532 (4th ed. 1971). This Court has previously recognized that the concept of compromise is central to the LHWCA, as adopted by the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act:
“A prime purpose of the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability.” Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S., at 476.
Under the schedule, Cross is entitled to an award of approximately $3,200 to $12,800, depending upon the ultimate conclusion with respect to the degree of his disability. See n. 4, supra. Under §8(c)(21), in contrast, Cross was awarded $86.76 per week for the remainder of his working life, which, according to counsel in this case, could amount to well over $100,000. Brief for Petitioner 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 31, 34, 36. This dramatic disparity may be partially attributable to the fact that Cross received an exceptional amount of overtime compensation in the year preceding his injury.
It is possible that, had Cross’ disability been temporary in duration, he might have been entitled to a larger recovery than is available under the schedule for his permanent disability. On the basis of the evidence presented below, the maximum award available to Cross under the schedule is approximately $12,800. Because compensation for temporary partial disability under § 8 (e) is based upon lost wage-earning capacity rather than a schedule, Cross could have received approximately $22,400 for a temporary partial disability, assuming that the loss of wage-earning capacity demonstrate^ in this case was found to continue for the 5-year maximum temporary partial disability period. See 33 U. S. C. § 908 (e).
As The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, stated in another case in which plain statutory language led to a seemingly incongruous result:
“Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978).
Compensation for permanent partial disability apparently presents particularly complex and troublesome problems in the workmen’s compensation field. See generally Burton, Permanent Partial Disabilities and Workers’ Compensation, 53 J. Urb. L. 853 (1976). Such problems are appropriately solved by legislative, not judicial, action. Although § 8 (e) has been amended in minor respects since its enactment, the present
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The Court in this case and the dissent in the Court of Appeals argue rather persuasively (but, for me, not convincingly) that, although they reach an incongruous result, see
That, of course, is of no help or comfort to respondent Cross, the particular litigant here, who suffered the injury and who, as the Court concedes, ante, at 283, might have had a greater award had his injury been less enduring. That does not make much sense to me and, while I realize that statutory inequities occasionally exist in the area of workmen’s compensation where seemingly arbitrary lines must be drawn somewhere, I cannot believe that by the language of this statute Congress intended such a result.
Soon after the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950, became law in 1927, this Court unanimously announced the principles to be applied in resolving questions of statutory construction that arise under it:
“The measure before us, like recent similar legislation in many States, requires employers to make payments for the relief of employees and their dependents who sustain loss as a result of personal injuries and deaths occurring in the course of their work, whether with or without fault attributable to employers. Such laws operate to relieve persons suffering such misfortunes of a part of the burden and to distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are deemed to be in the public interest and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results.”*286 Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414 (1932).
See also Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953).
Today’s decision departs from these principles by reaching, rather than avoiding, a harsh and incongruous result.
The starting point, of course, is the statute’s definition of “disability.” Section 2 (10) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (10), defines “disability” as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” As used in the Act, therefore, “disability” is an economic concept, rather than a medical one. An injury is not compensable under the Act unless it results in some diminution in the employee’s earning power.
Not surprisingly, then, the amount of compensation that the Act provides depends upon the amount of wages lost by the injured employee due to his injury. A worker who suffers permanent total disability, and therefore is unable to earn any wages, receives two-thirds of his average weekly wages. § 908 (a). One who suffers temporary total disability receives two-thirds of his average weekly wages as long as he remains disabled. § 908 (b). One who suffers temporary partial disability receives two-thirds of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and his wage-earning capacity after the injury, payable as long as the disability continues, but not longer than five years. § 908 (e).
The Act’s treatment of permanent partial disability should be read against this background. As the Court notes, § 908 (c) contains 20 subsections establishing compensation for permanent partial disability caused by particular injuries. That compensation is two-thirds of the worker’s weekly wages for a specified number of weeks for the injury listed. Subsection (21) then provides that “[i]n all other cases in this
This interpretation is far more in harmony with the overall purpose of the Act than is the Court’s construction. The House Committee that considered the legislation explained that workers’ compensation “has come to be universally recognized as a necessity in the interest of social justice between employer and employee,” and that this Act would provide an injured worker with “compensation during the period of his illness or inability to pursue his usual employment . . . (Emphasis added.) H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1927).
An additional purpose of the statute was to afford prompt relief to covered workers “without the delay and expense which an action at law entails.” Id., at 20. The inclusion of a schedule of benefits in § 908 (c) serves this goal by providing an easily ascertainable award to a person who suffers one of the scheduled injuries.
Although the Court states that the “weight of judicial authority” supports its view, it is able to cite only a single Federal District Court decision in point,
Thus, the anomalous results the Court’s decision imposes upon respondent Cross and other claimants under the LHWCA
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court’s decision also rejects the consistent interpretation of the Benefits Review Board, the agency which administers the LHWCA. In four cases, in addition to this one, the Board has ruled that the schedule of benefits set out in §§ 908 (c) (1) to (20) is not the exclusive method of compensation for an employee who suffers permanent partial disability from a scheduled injury. Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979); Brand v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8 BRBS 698 (1978); Richardson v. Perna & Cantrell, Inc., 6 BRBS 588 (1977); Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1 BRBS 357 (1975). Cf. American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 269, 426 F. 2d 1263 (1970); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BRBS 552 (1978), aff’d, 587 F. 2d 197 (CA5 1979); Longo v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 BRBS 357 (1975) (employee who suffers permanent total disability due to a scheduled injury is not limited to compensation provided by the schedule).
The Administrative Law Judge found that respondent Cross’ average weekly wage was $332.48. The schedule of benefits provides that a worker who completely loses the use of a leg shall receive two-thirds of his average weekly wage for 288 weeks. §908 (c)(2). Because Cross lost no more than 20% of the use of his leg, the most he can recover under the schedule is 20% of the compensation awarded for the total loss of the use of a leg. § 908(e) (19). Therefore, the maximum amount available to him under the schedule is $332.48 X % X 288 X 20% = $12,767.23.
$332.48 X % X 288 X 5% = $3,191.81.
It is significant that this language appears in the House Committee’s Report, since that Committee amended the bill to provide for the schedule of benefits after it had passed in the Senate without a schedule. See 67 Cong. Rec. 10614 (1926).
Compare S. Rep. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1949), discussing an amendment that provides a schedule of benefits, similar to that con
“Under the present act an employee may receive compensation to the extent of 66% percent of whatever loss he has sustained in wage-earning capacity as caused by the injury. Unless the injury results in wage loss, no compensation can be paid. The absence of a schedule covering members and functions of the body has presented two principal difficulties, the first of which is the extreme difficulty in determining fairly and objectively the precise extent to which a particular physical impairment diminishes the injured employee’s wage-eaming capacity.”
The Court of Appeals appropriately noted that on occasion the schedule may overcompensate a claimant. For example, a lawyer who loses an arm due to an accident at work may not suffer any diminution in his earning ability, but he would be eligible for compensation under the schedule. 196 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 421, n. 28, 606 F. 2d 1324, 1328, n. 28 (1979). To this extent, the schedule is an exception to the principle that disability is an economic concept rather than a medical one, but it is an exception that Congress deliberately chose to make. In addressing the second of the “principal difficulties” presented by the then absence of a schedule in the FECA, the Senate Report concluded:
“A particular physical impairment to a member or function of the body does not always cause a proportional reduction in earning capacity. An employee having a loss of a member or function may be able to return to employment without apparent wage loss. In that event, notwithstanding the severe physical loss to him, he may not under the present act be paid compensation for his physical impairment. It is understandable that employees with such losses expect some form of indemnity for their loss.” S. Rep. No. 836, at 17.
In relying upon this legislative history of the FECA, I do not mean to suggest that that history is part of the legislative history of the LHWCA. As the Court notes, ante, at 275, the legislative history of the LHWCA is silent concerning the reasons why Congress included a schedule. Although Congress’ intent in this matter cannot be discerned with absolute certainty, it is plausible that its reasons for adopting a schedule for the FECA were the same as its reasons for having one for the LHWCA.
The other federal cases cited by the Court are clearly distinguishable. In Flamm v. Hughes, 329 F. 2d 378 (CA2 1964), the court rejected a claim that it was unconstitutional for Congress to provide a schedule for some injuries, but not for others. The plaintiff, however, was dissatisfied with the award obtained under § 908 (c) (21), and hoped to obtain a larger award from a schedule. The court did not address the question whether the schedule provides an exclusive remedy for a claimant who can prove a wage loss greater than that specified by the schedule. The Court acknowledges that Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F. 2d 137 (CA2), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 913 (1955), which held that proof of lost wages is irrelevant when an employee seeks to recover under the schedule, did not decide the question before us. Ante, at 277, n. 15.
The one paragraph per curiam affirming the District Court’s decision in Williams does not discuss the exclusivity issue.
See n. 1, supra.
The inadequate compensation awarded to respondent Cross is only one of a number of peculiarities resulting from today’s decision. Under the rule announced by the Court, a person who suffers a temporary partial disability may receive more compensation than one who suffers a like but permanent partial disability, even though the latter injury is obviously more serious and will cause a greater loss of earnings. In this case, if
Today’s decision also creates a significant disincentive for the seriously injured workers who otherwise might wish to return to work. The courts and the Benefits Review Board have held that a worker who is unable to do any work as the result of a scheduled injury may be compensated for permanent total disability, and the Court does not question this rule. See ante, at 277-278, n. 17. A worker who has been permanently and totally disabled receives two-thirds of his average weekly wages. § 908 (a). A worker who takes a low-paying job because a scheduled injury makes him unable to work at his old job will be considered permanently partially disabled. His compensation will be limited to the scheduled amount, even though that amount may be insufficient to make up the difference between his former earnings and his earnings at the new job. Such a worker will learn quickly that it is to his advantage not to attempt to do any work. See Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1 BRBS, at 365; Brandt v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8 BRBS, at 701-702.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Et Al.
- Cited By
- 296 cases
- Status
- Published