Supreme Court of the United States, 1982

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE v. KASSEL Et Al.

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided February 24, 1982 · White, O'Connor

455 U.S. 329; 102 S. Ct. 1496; 71 L. Ed. 2d 187; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 73 (United States Reports)

Counsel

John H. Lederer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John Duncan Varda, Anthony R. Varda, and William C. Lewis, Jr., Mark E. Schantz, Solicitor General of Iowa, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert W. Goodwin, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lester A. Paff, Assistant Attorney General.

Cases that cite this one

2 later published cases cite this decision.

Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance (Iowa 1990)
Commissioners Court of Medina County, Texas v. United States of America Antonio Garcia, III (D.C. Cir. 1982)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

455 U.S. 329

102 S.Ct. 1496

71 L.Ed.2d 187

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE
v.
Raymond KASSEL et al

No. 79-1618

Supreme Court of the United States

February 23, 1982

On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.

Justice WHITE, dissenting.

We granted certiorari in this case to decide one very narrow question: "May a court, without articulating its rationale, summarily deny an application for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988?" Petitioner concedes that "not . . . all cases require opinions," Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 6, but argues that with respect to an application for fees under § 1988 "[t]he combination of discretion and a standard for the exercise of that discretion necessitates a statement of reasons to determine whether the decision is proper." Id., at 12. In my view, such an application is not sufficiently distinguishable from numerous other motions and applications that a court may concededly decide without opinion. Whether this is a good or bad method of exercising discretion in a particular case, or even in general, is not at issue in this case. Because I do not believe that there is any per se rule that a court may never summarily deny an application for fees, I would affirm the decision below.

Justice O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's disposition of this case.

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