Rev. Stat. § 1979, amended, 93 Stat. 1284. Section 1983 reads in relevant part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951).

Justice Rehnquist’s dissent faults us for referring to modern tort decisions in construing § 1983. Its argument rests on the unstated and unsupported premise that Congress necessarily intended to freeze into permanent law whatever principles were current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal principles as they evolve. Post, at 65-68; see also post, at 92-93 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The dissents are correct, of course, that when the language of the section and its legislative history provide no clear answer, we have found useful guidance in the law prevailing at the time when § 1983 was enacted; but it does not follow that that law is absolutely controlling, or that current law is irrelevant. On the contrary, if the prevailing view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in the intervening century (which is not the case here), we might be highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a now-obsolete doctrine. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, *35257-258 (1978) (“[O]ver the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well”) (footnote omitted); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 231-232 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Pierson, supra, at 555 (citing modern authority for “the prevailing view in this country’); Wood, supra, at 318-319, and n. 9; Tenney, supra, at 375, and n. 5. Indeed, in Imbler we recognized a common-law immunity that first came into existence 25 years after § 1983 was enacted, 424 U. S., at 421-422. Under the dissents’ view, Imbler was wrongly decided.

See, e. g., the cases cited in nn. 8 and 12, infra; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852); Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 (1859); Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489 (1876); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512 (1885); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550 (1886); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1889); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897).

E. g., Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315, 324-326 (1861); Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298, 314 (1871); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-202 (1862); Parker v. Shackelford, 61 Mo. 68, 72 (1875); Rodgers v. Ferguson, 36 Tex. 544 (1871); see, e. g., Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567, 572-573 (1841); Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. 48 (1859); Von Storch v. Winslow, 13 R. I. 23, 24-25 (1880). Cf. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 307 (1882). See also, e. g., Lane v. Yamamoto, 2 Haw. App. 176, 628 P. 2d 634 (1981); Wilson v. Eagan, 297 N. W. 2d 146, 148-150 (Minn. 1980).

In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, for example, we held that a municipality (as opposed to an individual defendant) is immune from liability for punitive damages under § 1983. A significant part of our reasoning was that deterrence of constitutional violations would be adequately accomplished by allowing punitive damages awards directly against the responsible individuals:

“Moreover, there is available a more effective means of deterrence. By allowing juries and courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending official, based on his personal financial resources, the statute [§ 1983] directly advances the public’s interest in preventing repeated constitutional deprivations. In our view, this provides sufficient protection against the prospect that a public official may commit recurrent constitutional violations by reason of his office.” Id., at 269-270 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), we stated that punitive damages would be available in an action against federal officials directly under the Eighth Amendment, partly on the reasoning that since such damages are available under § 1983, it would be anomalous to allow punitive awards against state officers but not federal ones. Id., at 22, and n. 9. See also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 233 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 257, n. 11; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 460 (1975) (punitive damages available under 42 U. S. C. § 1981).

Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, without squarely denying that punitive damages are available under § 1983, does its best to cast doubt on the proposition. It argues that the phrase “for redress” at the end of the section means that Congress intended to limit recovery to compensatory damages. Post, at 85; see n. 1, supra. This novel construction is strained; a more plausible reading of the statute is that the phrase “or other proper proceeding for redress” is simply an expansive alternative to the preceding phrases “action at law” and “suit in equity,” intended to avoid any unwanted technical limitations that might lurk in the other phrases.

Next Justice Rehnquist points to two other statutes enacted in 1863 and 1870 that provided expressly for punitive remedies. Post, at 85-86. Neither of these statutes enacted a punitive damages remedy as such, although they did create other forms of punitive civil remedies. The Act of March 2, 1863, § 3, 12 Stat. 698, created a civil fine for fraudulent military claims, apparently intended to stimulate suit by private attorneys general. *37The Act of July 8, 1870, § 59, 16 Stat. 207, was the treble damages provision of the revised patent code. These statutes do not support Justice Rehnquist’s speculation that Congress acted expressly when it intended to approve punitive damages, since both statutes created new remedies not available at common law; moreover, they undercut his argument that Congress was hostile to punitive civil remedies in favor of private parties.

Finally, Justice Rehnquist argues that Congress would not likely have approved “this often-condemned doctrine” in the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Post, at 84. This speculation is remarkable, to say the least, given that Congress did approve a punitive civil remedy in an 1870 Civil Rights Act. Act of May 31, 1870, § 2, 16 Stat. 140 (creating private cause of action for fixed penalty on behalf of persons suffering racial discrimination in voting registration). Cf. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 64 (enacting punitive damages statute, including awards for “wanton and reckless disregard,” five years after state court held against doctrine). At any rate, the punitive damages debate, though lively, was by no means one-sided. See, e. g., Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, supra, at 521-523; Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235-237 (1842); Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 559-560 (Iowa 1854); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146, 152-153 (1859); Lynd v. Picket, supra, at 200-201; Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 304, 320 (1869), overruled, Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872); Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S. E. 58 (1895); Cosgriff Brothers v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 236-237, 68 P. 206, 216-217 (1902). See also Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 63-64 (N. Y. 1808) (Kent, C. J.).

Smith uses the term “actual malice” to refer to the standard he would apply. While the term may be an appropriate one, we prefer not to use it, simply to avoid the confusion and ambiguity that surrounds the word “malice.” See n. 8, infra. Indeed, as Smith recognizes, this Court has used the very term “actual malice” in the defamation context to refer to a recklessness standard. Brief for Petitioner 8-9; see Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U. S. 245, 251-252 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 280 (1964).

We note in passing that it appears quite uncertain whether even Justice Rehnquist’s dissent ultimately agrees with Smith’s view that “ill will, spite, or intent to injure” should be required to allow punitive damages *38awards. Justice Rehnquist consistently confuses, and attempts to blend together, the quite distinct concepts of intent to cause injury, on one hand, and subjective consciousness of risk of injury (or of unlawfulness) on the other. For instance, his dissent purports ,to base its analysis on the “fundamental distinction” between “wrongful motive, actual intention to inflict harm or intentional doing of an act known to be unlawful,” versus “very careless or negligent conduct,” post, at 60-61 (emphasis added). Yet in the same paragraph, the dissent inaccurately recharacterizes the first element of this distinction as “acts that are intentionally harmful,” requiring “inquiry into the actor’s subjective motive and purpose.” Post, at 63-64. Consciousness of consequences or of wrongdoing, of course, does not require injurious intent or motive; it is equally consistent with indifference toward or disregard for consequences. This confusion of standards continues throughout the opinion. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent frequently uses such phrases as “intent to injure” or “evil motive”; yet at several points it refers more broadly to “subjective mental state” or like phrases, and expressly includes consciousness (as opposed to intent) in its reasoning. Post, at 63, n. 3, 71-72, n. 7, 72-73. More telling, perhaps, is its citation of cases and treatises, which frequently and consistently includes authority supporting (at most) a consciousness requirement rather than the “actual intent” standard for which the opinion purports to argue elsewhere. See, e. g., post, at 76-77, n. 10, 78-84, n. 12.

If Justice Rehnquist does indeed mean to propose a standard reaching subjective consciousness as well as actual injurious intent, one wonders why the instructions given in this case, supra, at 33, do not meet his standard. It is hard to see how Smith could have disregarded or been indifferent to the danger to Wade unless he was subjectively conscious of that danger. If Justice Rehnquist stands by his “fundamental distinction” and his use of authority, then, he has no apparent reason to dissent from our judgment.

Indeed, the District Judge’s instruction on punitive damages in this case was drawn with only slight alteration from a standard jury instruction manual under Missouri state law. See Tr. 576-577; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 42-43.

This terminological difficulty seems to be responsible in some degree for the dissent’s error in asserting that intent was the majority rule in 1871, post, at 68-84. In particular, the dissent argues that “malice,” “wantonness,” and “willfulness” denoted actual ill will or intent to cause injury. See nn. 10, 12, infra; post, at 60-64, n. 3, 73, n. 8, 76-77, n. 10, 78-84, n. 12. See also n. 6, supra (dissent’s confusion of knowledge with intent); n. 9, infra (concerning “criminal indifference”). With regard to “malice,” the assumption is dubious at best; with regard to “wantonness” and “willfulness,” it is just plain wrong.

“Malice,” as used by courts and lawyers in the last century, was a hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term, carrying a broad spectrum of meanings. See generally, e. g., 2 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages § 394 (3d ed. J. Berryman, 1903); 25 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1666-1669 (1907). As the dissent correctly states, post, at 60-64, n. 3, in some instances (especially when it was modified by terms such as “actual” or “express,” or in criminal law, where terms were generally more strictly construed than in civil law), it meant what the dissent says it meant — actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure. On the other extreme, in tort law, it was often used without modification to mean what was sometimes called “implied malice” — a purely fictional malice that was conclusively presumed to exist whenever a tort resulted from a voluntary act, even if no harm was intended. The term was sometimes, though not often, used in this fictional sense as a ground for punitive damages. E.g., Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 289, 38 P. 903, 904-905 (1894). In other cases it was explained to mean an intent to do the act that caused the injury, as opposed to intent to cause the injury itself. E. g., Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28, 32-33 (1858). More commonly in the punitive damages context, the term meant something in between fictional malice and actual injurious *40intent — “that form of malice . . . where, without ‘deliberate mind’ or ‘formed design,’ the offender has been so grossly and recklessly negligent, so wantonly indifferent to another’s rights, that he should be required to pay damages in excess of mere compensation as a punishment and example.” Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 68 F. 288, 246 (CA2 1894). Accord, e. g., Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 214 (1859); South & N. A. R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266, 273-275 (1879); Yerian v. Linkletter, 80 Cal. 135, 138, 22 P. 70, 71 (1889) (Paterson, J., concurring); Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214, 219, 56 N. W. 434 (1893); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 200-202.

There was considerably less ambiguity or confusion concerning the meaning of “wantonness” in tort law:

“Wanton means reckless — without regard to the rights of others. . . . Wantonly means causelessly, without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others. Wantonness is defined as a licentious act of one man towards the person of another, without regard to his rights; it has also been defined as the conscious failure by one charged with a duty to exercise due care and diligence to prevent an injury after the discovery of the peril, or under circumstances where he is charged with a knowledge of such peril, and being conscious of the inevitable or probable results of such failure.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 2-4 (2d ed. 1905) (footnotes omitted).

The last sentence of that definition could have been written with this case in mind. See also, e. g., 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 292-295 (1912). The word was used with the same meaning in the punitive damages context. See, e. g., Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Orr, 59 Ark. 215, 224, 27 S. W. 66, 68 (1894); Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182, 184-185 (1869); Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398, 403-404, 16 P. 817, 820 (1888).

Finally, “willfulness” did not mean intent to cause injury, but only voluntary action:

‘Wilful. . . generally, as used in courts of law, implies nothing blamable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this: that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent. And wilfully does not imply that an act done in that spirit was necessarily a malicious act. . . .” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 529-530 (2d ed. 1905) (footnote omitted).

*41“Wilful neglect or negligence has been defined as that degree of neglect arising where there is a reckless indifference to the safety of human life, or an intentional failure to perform á manifest duty to the public, in the performance of which the public and the party injured had an interest.” Id., at 535 (footnote omitted).

See also, e. g., 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 944-947 (1912). Again, the punitive damages cases bear this reading out. Cameron, supra, at 219, 56 N. W., at 434; Goetz, supra, at 32-33; Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky., at 152-155; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235, 251 (1858).

Justice Rehnquist’s dissent reads this statement as a requirement of actual intent, post, at 68-69. This misreading depends in part on the faulty assumption, see n. 8, supra, that “malice” always meant intent to injure (post, at 68) — a reading particularly inappropriate in light of the Court’s express definition of malice as including “criminal indifference.” As for the latter point, Justice Rehnquist reasons that the term “criminal indifference” must include an element of actual malicious intent. This surprising interpretation of the word “indifference” rests on the unstated *42and demonstrably false premise that intent to cause injury was always an element of crime. Not only were there crimes of recklessness or negligence (such as reckless homicide), but even crimes of intent commonly required only intent to do the criminal act (and, in some eases, knowledge that the injury would likely follow), rather than actual ill will or purpose to inflict an injury. See, e. g., 1 J. Bishop, Commentaries on Criminal Law §§ 313-322 (5th ed. 1872); J. May, Law of Crimes §§ 30, 31, 232, 233 (2d ed. J. Beale, 1893); see also, e. g., Model Penal Code §2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The case law clearly illustrates that “criminal” did not mean “with injurious intent” in the punitive damages context. E. g., Hopkins v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 36 N. H. 9, 18-19 (1857), overruled on other grounds, Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872); Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex. 105, 112-114 (1880); Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300, 310-311 (1875).

Justice Rehnquist also cites Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852), in support of an actual-intent requirement. Post, at 70. The language used in that case (“wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous”) was precisely the precedent that the Philadelphia Court was exegeting in the passage quoted in text, when it held that “malice” includes “criminal indifference.” Moreover, the Day case did not present any issue of punitive damages; the Court discussed them merely as a sidelight to the costs- and-fees issue presented.

As with Philadelphia, n. 9, supra, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent reads this case as imposing a requirement of actual malicious intent, on the assumption that when the Court said “indifference to consequences” it really meant “intent to cause consequences,” and when it said “recklessness” it really meant “bad motive or intent to injure.” Post, at 70-73. This textual alchemy is untenable. For one thing, Justice Rehnquist’s analysis of the ease reflects the confusion in his dissent of motive with consciousness, see n. 6, supra; post, at 71-72, n. 7. Moreover, the Milwaukee Court did not say, or come close to saying, that recklessness is identical to intent, or that it is material only as evidence of intent; rather, it said that recklessness is “equivalent” to intent, meaning that the two are equally culpable and deserving of punishment and deterrence. 91 U. S., at 493. This also explains the Court’s reference, two sentences later, to “evil motive,” ibid. Justice Rehnquist’s great reliance on this sentence confuses the standard for punitive damages with the rationale for them. Plainly, read in context, what the Court meant is that punitive damages are justified by the moral culpability of evil intent, or by the “equivalent” culpability of “reckless indifference to the rights of others.” See also Cowen v. Winters, 96 F. 929, 934-935 (CA6 1899); Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 80, 8 So. 90, 93 (1890); Memphis & C.R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466, 494-495 (1870); Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 12 Utah 76, 82, 41 P. 564, 565 (1895). The contrary reading adopted by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is flatly inconsistent with the Court’s reiteration of the rule, 91 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added): “that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” Try as he might, Justice Rehnquist cannot transform indifference, conscious or otherwise, into intent.

Justice Rehnquist also relies on a four-sentence capsulization by the Reporter of Decisions of our unreported decision in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Eyser, 91 U. S. 495, decided the same day. While the Reporter’s summary does speak of the absence of “intentional wrong,” id., at 496, the factual context suggests that the basis of decision was the jury instruction that ordinary negligence would warrant punitive damages, com*44bined with the fact that the defendant had taken some affirmative (though insufficient) steps to avoid injury to passersby. Thus, in context, the reference to “intentional wrong” is entirely consistent with the Milwaukee decision’s test of “conscious indifference”; the defendant in Western Union was not indifferent to injury, but instead plainly intended to avoid injury.

In two other eases the Court reaffirmed the Philadelphia “criminal indifference” standard and the Milwaukee “reckless indifference” standard. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S., at 563; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 609-610 (1887).

Justice Rehnquist’s dissent relies on two later decisions of this Court, neither of which supports it. Post, at 74-75. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893), the issue was whether a corporation could be liable in punitive damages for the tort of its employee. The Court, reasoning largely from general principles of respondeat superior, held that such vicarious liability could exist only when the employer had authorized or ratified the tort. In so doing, however, it expressly reaffirmed as “well settled” the general standard announced in the Philadelphia case, including liability for “criminal indifference.” 147 U. S., at 107. Justice Rehnquist cites a passage quoting from one state case suggesting an intent requirement, post, at 74, but he omits to mention the court’s extensive quotations from Philadelphia and Milwaukee, 147 U. S., at 112-113, and its express approval of and quotation from other state cases stating unequivocally that an employer can be liable for its own recklessness in hiring unfit employees, id., at 114-116. See also n. 9, supra. In Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., at 71-90, the issue was whether there was a sufficient amount in controversy. The Court held that allegations of *45“intentional, malicious and repeated interference” with federally protected rights, id., at 89, were enough, if proved, to warrant punitive damages. The Court undertook no statement of a general standard for punitive damages beyond noting the unsurprising principle that such damages are awardable on proof of actual evil motive, id., at 86. Under the allegations, of course, no question of liability for less culpable conduct was presented.

In the often-cited case of Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182 (1869), for example, the court held that punitive damages were proper where the defendant’s pistol bullet, fired at a target, ricocheted and hit the plaintiff:

“In what cases then may smart money be awarded in addition to the damages? The proper answer to this question . . . seems to be, in actions of tort founded on the malicious or wanton misconduct or culpable neglect of the defendant. . . .

“In this case the defendant was guilty of wanton misconduct and culpable neglect. ... It is an immaterial fact that the injury was unintentional, and that the ball glanced from the intended direction. . . . [I]f the act is done where there are objects from which the balls may glance and endanger others, the act is wanton, reckless, without due care, and grossly negligent.” Id., at 185.

In Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555 (Iowa 1854), punitive damages were awarded against a stage company for employing a known drunkard as a driver, the court saying:

“In a case of gross negligence on the part of a stage proprietor, such as the employment of a known drunken driver, and where a passenger has been injured in consequence of such negligence, we think exemplary damages should be entertained.

“If a stage proprietor or carrier is guilty of gross negligence, it amounts to that kind of gross misconduct which will justify a jury in giving exemplary damages, even where an ‘intent or design’ to do the injury does not appear.” Id., at 559 (emphasis in original).

Maysville & Lexington R. Co. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. 122 (1877), held that the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that “willful or intentional *46wrong” was required to award punitive damages in a railroad accident case, remarking:

“The absence of slight care in the management of a railroad train, or in keeping a railroad track in repair, is gross negligence; and to enable a passenger to recover punitive damages, in a case like this, it is not necessary to show the absence of all care, or ‘reckless indifference to the safety of. . . passengers,’ or ‘intentional misconduct’ on the part of the agents and officers of the company.” Id., at 127 (ellipsis in original).

Accord, e. g., Cowen v. Winters, 96 F., at 934-935; Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 63 F., at 245-247; Morning Journal Assn. v. Rutherford, 51 F. 513, 514-515 (CA2 1892); Fotheringham v. Adams Express Co., 36 F. 252, 253-254 (CC ED Mo. 1888); United States v. Taylor, 35 F. 484, 488 (CC SD Ala. 1888); Malloy v. Bennett, 15 F. 371, 373-374 (CC SDNY 1883); Berry v. Fletcher, 3 F. Cas. 286, 288 (No. 1,357) (CC Mo. 1870); Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 608, 2 So. 337, 342 (1886); Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Orr, 59 Ark., at 224, 27 S. W., at 68; Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 555-556 (1860); Florida Railway & Navigation Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394, 419-420, 5 So. 714, 719 (1889); Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 521, 33 S. E. 853, 855 (1899); Drohn v. Brewer, 77 Ill. 280, 282-283 (1875); Citizens’ St. R. Co. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 569-570, 33 N. E. 627, 629 (1893); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466, 470 (1872); Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202, 218 (1869); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 200-202; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss., at 494-495, 500; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152, 161-162 (1871); Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282, 296 (1872); Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 12 Ore. 392, 404-406, 7 P. 508, 517 (1885) (dictum); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, 543-544, 6 A. 545, 552-553 (1886); Hart v. Charlotte, C. &A. R. Co., 33 S. C. 427, 435-436, 12 S. E. 9, 10 (1890); Haley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 66 Tenn. 239, 242-243 (1874); Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex., at 112-114; Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 12 Utah, at 82, 41 P., at 564-565; Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, 286-287 (1873) (dictum); Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128, 132-134 (1882); Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358, 359 (1866); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27, 35 (1871).

Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that a “solid majority of jurisdictions” required actual malicious intent, post, at 84, is simply untrue. In fact, there were fairly few jurisdictions that imposed such a requirement, and fewer yet that adhered to it consistently. Justice Rehnquist’s attempt *47to establish this proposition with case citations, post, at 78-84, n. 12, does not offer him substantial support. Because the point is not of controlling significance, see n. 2, supra, we will not tarry here to analyze his citations case-by-case or State-by-State, but will only summarize the main themes.

Several of Justice Rehnquist’s eases actually offer unequivocal support for the rule that punitive damages are available on a showing of negligence, recklessness, disregard for or indifference to the rights of others, and various other standards short of actual ill will or injurious intent. In this same vein, Justice Rehnquist continues to try to equate consciousness or knowledge with actual ill will or intent to injure, see n. 6, supra.

Other cases do not clearly support either Justice Rehnquist’s view or ours. Some of these contain contradictory language in their formulations, indicating that the present distinction perhaps did not occur to the writers. Others support Justice Rehnquist’s rule only if one makes the questionable assumption, see nn. 8, 9, supra, that terms like “malice,” “wantonness,” and “criminal” always meant actual intent to injure. Still others simply ruled on collateral questions (such as the admissibility of evidence of bad motive or of good faith) without purporting to state any general standard for punitive damages. Some were apparently limited to particular classes of torts. A comparison of this class of eases with those cited supra, this note, reveals that in many instances other decisions of the same courts clear up any ambiguity in favor of a recklessness or negligence standard.

A third class of cases are those in which the courts simply affirmed awards of punitive damages based on evidence of, or jury instructions requiring, actual malicious intent, without discussing whether a lesser showing might also be adequate. Often the cases in this category involved-assault and battery or similar torts, where the facts presented little problem of negligence or recklessness. See also n. 11, supra. As with the previous category, many of the same courts spoke more directly in other cases, making it clear that injurious intent was not required.

Finally, even of those comparatively few cases that do seem to support Justice Rehnquist’s view, many are of debatable authority. In nearly every State there was at least some late 19th-century authority supporting awards on less than ill will or intent to injure. Admittedly, in a few States this was the less accepted view, but in a substantial majority of jurisdictions the prevailing rule (as evidenced by the cases cited supra, this note, and numerous other eases not listed here) was that no such actual malicious intent was required.

Loch Ridge Construction Corp. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 280 So. 2d 745 (1973); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified on other grounds, 615 P. 2d 621 (1980), and 627 P. 2d 204 (1981); Huggins v. Deinhard, 127 Ariz. 358, 621 P. 2d 45 (App. 1980); White v. Brock, 41 Colo. App. 156, 584 P. 2d 1224 (1978); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A. 2d 825 (1967); Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640 (Del. 1970) (Delaware law); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A. 2d 173 (D. C. 1977); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 537 P. 2d 65 (1975); Pendowski v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 484, 411 N. E. 2d 910 (1980), appeal denied (Ill. 1981); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N. W. 2d 911 (Iowa 1976); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P. 2d 254 (1976); Pettengill v. Turo, 159 Me. 350, 193 A. 2d 367 (1963); American Laundry Machine Industries v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A. 2d 407 (1980); Bailey v. Graves, 411 Mich. 510, 309 N. W. 2d 166 (1981); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361, 191 N. W. 2d 433 (1971); Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So. 2d 1381 (Miss. 1979); Stenson v. Laclede Gas Co., 553 S. W. 2d 309 (Mo. App. 1977); Butcher v. Petranek, 181 Mont. 358, 593 P. 2d 743 (1979); Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 37 N. J. 396, 181 A. 2d 487 (1962); Robison v. Katz, 94 N. M. 314, 610 P. 2d 201 (App.), cert. denied, 94 N. M. 675, 615 P. 2d 992 (1980); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1967); Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 291 N. C. 105, 229 S. E. 2d 297 (1976); Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N. W. 2d 63 (N. D. 1981); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N. E. 2d 568 (1981); Smith v. Johnston, 591 P. 2d 1260 (Okla. 1978); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A. 2d 157 (1970); Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R. I. 107, 329 A. 2d 195 (1974); King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 272 S. C. 259, 251 S. E. 2d 194 (1979); Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S. D. 296, 158 N. W. 2d 678 (1968); Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S. W. 2d 43 (Tenn. 1975); Shortle v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 399 A. 2d 517 (1979); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N. W. 2d 437 (1980).

See also, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment d (1979); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 5.38 (1981); C. McCormick, Law of Damages 296 (1935); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 13 (4th ed. 1971); K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 3.4(A) (1980); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F. 2d 1265, 1277-1278, n. 15 (CA3 1979) (en banc).

The instructions in this case recognized this difference in treatment. The jury was instructed:

“If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, then you must award the plaintiff such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for any damages you believe he sustained as a direct result of the conduct of the defendants ....

“In addition to actual damages, the law permits the jury, under certain circumstances, to award the injured person punitive and exemplary damages ....

“If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and if the conduct of one or more of the defendants is shown to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others, then you may assess punitive or exemplary damages in addition to any award of actual damages.” Tr. 642-643 (emphasis added).

Restatement of Torts § 908, Comment c (1939); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c (1979).

Although there is general agreement with the broad principle of § 908, Comment c, there is authority suggesting that the tort of malicious prosecution may have been a poorly chosen illustration of it. See, e. g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 247 S. E. 2d 739 (1978).

Huggins v. Deinhard, 127 Ariz., at 359-360, 621 P. 2d, at 46-47; Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A. 2d 33, 37-38 (D. C. 1982); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N. W. 2d, at 922; Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 291 N. C., at 112, 229 S. E. 2d, at 301-302 (dictum); Hall v. May Department Stores Co., 292 Ore. 131, 144-145, 637 P. 2d 126, 134-135 (1981); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, supra, at 1276-1278 (CA3 1979) (en banc) (Pennsylvania law); Johnson v. Woman’s Hospital, 527 S. W. 2d 133, 141-142 (Tenn. App.), cert. denied (Tenn. 1975).

See, e. g., Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., supra; Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., supra; Cape Publications, Inc. v. *54Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. App. 1980); Meyer v. Nottger, supra; Hall v. May Department Stores Co., supra; Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, supra (en banc) (Pennsylvania law). See also Johnson v. Woman’s Hospital, supra (tort of outrageous conduct). Contra, Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N. E. 2d 157 (1961).

See, e. g., Davis v. Schuchat, 166 U. S. App. D. C. 351, 510 F. 2d 731 (1975) (District of Columbia law); Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334 N. E. 2d 79 (1975); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F. 2d 324 (CA2 1969) (New York law); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S. E. 2d 674 (1975) (dictum). See also Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, supra (false light).

In citing the cases in this footnote and in n. 20, infra, we intimate no view on any First Amendment issues they may raise.

E. g., Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028 (SDNY) (Connecticut and New York law), affirmance order, 614 F. 2d 1290 (CA2 1979); Weenig v. Wood, 169 Ind. App. 413, 349 N. E. 2d 235 (1976); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N. W. 2d 252 (Minn. 1980); Snodgrass v. Headco Industries, Inc., 640 S. W. 2d 147 (Mo. App. 1982); Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 46 (Kan. 1981) (Oklahoma law). See also n. 19, supra.

“Moreover, after Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury.” Carlson, 446 U. S., at 22, n. 9.

As we noted supra, at 33-34, Smith does not challenge the instruction on qualified immunity. We therefore assume for purposes of this case that the instruction was correct. See generally, e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978).

We reject Justice Rehnquist’s argument, post, at 92, that it somehow makes a difference that this suit was brought in federal court — as though it were inappropriate or unseemly that federal courts dare to enforce federal rights vigorously. Indeed, one wonders whether Justice *56Rehnquist would complain as loudly if this § 1983 suit had been brought in state court, as it could have been. Although Justice Rehnquist casts his argument as an attack on meddling by federal courts, the true thrust of his complaint seems to be against federal law — i. e., the Civil Rights Act of 1871. We have explained at length why we think that the policies of that statute call for our holding today.

See, e. g., Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 185, 189, 259 P. 2d 810, 812 (1953); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 709, 496 P. 2d 939, 946 (1972); Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Ore. 449, 283 P. 2d 658 (1955); First National Bank of Des Plaines v. Amco Engineering Co., 32 Ill App. 3d 451, 455, 335 N. E. 2d 591, 594 (1975). See also the numerous cases cited at 25 C. J. S., Damages § 117(1), p. 1114, n. 18.5 (1966).

See also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 56, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (1891) (“we believe that the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound in principle, and unfair and dangerous in practice . . .”); Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, 315 (1879).

See the cases cited in n. 12, infra. Decisions handed down at the time the 42d Congress deliberated leave little question that when a court required a showing of malice in order to recover punitive damages, an inquiry into the actual mental state of the defendant — his motives, intentions, knowledge, or design — was required. The Court reasons that, when used in connection with punitive damages, “malice” really meant something akin to recklessness. The cases simply do not support the claim. The term “malice” often was prefaced with the qualifiers “actual” or “express.” See, e. g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492, 496 (1880); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. 190, 191 (1865); Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt. *61403, 407, 411 (1875); Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va. 139, 146-147 (1884). When it was not, the context in which it was used virtually always makes it completely clear that an inquiry into the actual intentions and motives of the defendant was required before punitive damages could be awarded. See, e. g., Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala. 88, 96-97 (1880); Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark. 387, 393 (1882); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 163-164, 116 P. 530, 539-540 (1911) (“malice of evil motive”); Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C. 484, 489-491 (1871); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116, 124-125 (1871); Curl v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa 417, 428-429, 19 N. W. 308 (1884); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184 (1862); Carli v. Union Depot, Street R. & T. Co., 32 Minn. 101, 104, 20 N. W. 89, 90 (1884); Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524, 529 (1854); Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484-485, 14 A. 488, 489 (1888); Causee v. Anders, 20 N. C. 246, 248 (1839); Windham v. Rhame, 11S. C. L. 283 (1858). And, even standing alone, the term generally was understood to require inquiry into the defendant’s mental state: “In malicious injuries, the injurer foresees the specific evil result and wills it either explicitly or implicitly; in negligent injuries he may foresee a probable danger and may rashly risk the consequences, without being chargeable with a malicious intent.” F. Wharton, Law of Negligence § 15 (1874).

Of course, there was a “technical,” 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 623 (2 ed. 1901), definition of the term that had little to do with actual ill will, but which permitted such a mental state to be presumed from the mere occurrence of an injury. This virtually never was the basis for an award of punitive damages: if it had been, such damages would have been available in every tort action, which never was the rule in any jurisdiction. The Court does not seriously argue otherwise.

Moreover, malice was often the standard employed in jury instructions. E. g., Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374 (1876); Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132, 134 (1877); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, supra; Lynd v. Picket, supra; Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183 (1869). There is not the slightest question that a jury of lay persons would have understood the phrase as requiring actual ill will, desire to injure, or other improper motive on the part of the defendant. “Malice” was defined by a dictionary published at the approximate time § 1983 was enacted as “extreme enmity of heart; a disposition to injure others unjustly for personal gratification or from a spirit of revenge; spite; deliberate mischief.” Stormonth’s English Dictionary 584 (1885). See also Webster’s Dictionary 804 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 873 (1860); 2 Abbott’s Law Dictionary 72 (1879) (“a malig*62nant design of evil... is the idea attached to the word in popular use”). In short, the available authorities demonstrate that for purposes of punitive damages at the time of the 42d Congress, “malice” imported an actual ill will, intent, or improper motive requirement.

In a few cases decided roughly contemporaneously with the enactment of § 1983, the terms “wanton” and “willful” were used, together with other phrases, to define the proper standard for an award of punitive damages. The Court finds little “ambiguity or confusion” surrounding these- terms, and concludes that they clearly indicate a “recklessness” standard. The cases and commentators disagree. As one treatise flatly states: “[T]he term ‘wanton’ has no peculiar legal signification. It has various meanings, depending on the connection in which it is used.” 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 292-293 (1912). The “connection in which [‘wanton’] is used,” ibid., in punitive damages cases virtually always reveals that the word was merely an alternative phrasing of the evil motive requirement. See, e. g., Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539 (1861); Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me. 360, 363 (1883); Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt. 621 (1866); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 11, 42 A. 607, 610 (1899). In the few cases where context does not make clear what was meant by “wanton,” several considerations suggest that it was likely that an inquiry into the motives and intentions of the defendant was intended. As a general proposition, when used in criminal contexts, wanton meant that “the act done is of a wilful, wicked purpose.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 3 (2d ed. 1905). In deciding whether to impose the “quasi-criminal” punishment of punitive damages, this meaning likely would have been that intended by courts using the phrase.

Moreover, as used in a jury instruction — as occasionally was the case, see, e. g., Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, supra, at 124-125; Pike v. Dilling, supra — the term would have been understood by laymen to require some sort of evil or dissolute intention. See Stormonth’s English Dictionary 1146 (1885); Webster’s Dictionary 1490 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 1645 (1860). “Wantonly” most frequently was defined as “lewdly” which in turn was regarded as synonymous with “wickedly.” Webster’s Dictionary 768 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 834 (1860). The Court’s claim that decisions predicating punitive damages on wantonness reflected a recklessness standard is unfounded. The word had no fixed meaning, *63and decisions using it must be examined individually; to the extent the phrase did have a common meaning, it was, particularly in the context of punitive sanctions, one implying some sort of bad intent.

Likewise, the Court’s conclusion regarding the meaning of decisions using the phrase “willful” is unduly simplified. Like “wanton,” the phrase had no fixed meaning, 29 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 114-117 (1895); for the meaning intended in a particular context, reference must be had to the decisions at issue, see n. 12, infra. If one must generalize, criminal law again is useful, given the “quasi-criminal” character of punitive damages: “the word, as ordinarily used, means not merely voluntarily, but with bad purpose,” 29 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 114 (1895). Even more important, however, is the fact that “willful” .seldom, if ever, was an independent standard; rather, “willful injury” or “willfully illegal conduct” were the typical contexts in which the phrase appeared. As to these, even apart from the surrounding language of the punitive damages decisions, it was clear that “[t]o constitute wilful injury there must be design, purpose, intent to do wrong and inflict the injury.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 536 (2d ed. 1905). And, of course, a “willful trespass” or other misdeed meant an intentionally wrongful act. Id., at 525-529. Thus, in jurisdictions using the term “willfully,” the question generally was whether the defendant knowingly and intentionally harmed the plaintiff, or, alternatively, intentionally committed an act he knew to be tortious or unlawful. In both these cases, inquiry into the wrongful motive of the defendant plainly was demanded; of course, recklessness does not satisfy this requirement.

The Court’s discussion of the term “willful negligence” is of little relevance to the common-law standard for punitive damages. The phrase seldom was used, particularly in the punitive damages context, and when it was, it justifiably encountered vigorous criticism. As one court remarked, the phrase “willful neglect” made as much sense as “guilty innocence.” Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 (CA7 1905). Faced with what appeared to be a self-contradictory term, the likely reaction of juries, courts, and Members of the 42d Congress would have been to focus on the unequivocal intent and malice requirements common at the time. In short, whatever general statements may have been made in some treatises regarding “wanton” and “willful,” in determining the meaning of the terms in this context, a more careful inquiry is demanded. As the foregoing discussion and the cases discussed infra demonstrate, that inquiry makes it clear that the Court’s *64recklessness standard was seldom used at the time of the enactment of § 1983.

“Recklessness” generally was defined as “heedlessness” or “negligence,” while synonyms included “careless.” Stormonth’s English Dictionary 832 (1885). In strict legal terms, recklessness is conduct somewhat more dangerous — and therefore unreasonable — than merely negligent conduct, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §500 (1965); despite this distinction, it is plain that recklessness is different from intentionally harmful conduct not just in this type of degree, but in kind, ibid., Comment f.

Undoubtedly, the recklessness or objective unreasonableness of particular conduct will be evidence of the intent of the actor, see n. 8, infra. This point has been recognized by commentators on the subject. In 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages (1882), for example, the author states the general rule that “[tjhere is ... a marked difference legally, as there is practically, between a tort committed with and without malice; between a wrong done in the assertion of a supposed right, and one wantonly committed . . . .” Id., at 716. The author, however, also observed that “such recklessness or negligence as evinces malice or conscious disregard of the rights of others,” will support a punitive damages award. Id., at 724 (emphasis added). It is a far different thing to say, as Sutherland does, that the defendant’s recklessness is relevant to ascertaining ill will than it is to say, as the Court does, that this lack of care itself justifies punitive damages.

The same point was made in Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233, 190 N. W. 746, 747 (1922), where the court wrote:

“If a cow kicks a man in the face, the consequent physical hurt may equal that from a kick in the face with a hob-nailed boot, but the ‘cussedness’ of the cow raises no sense of outrage, while the malicious motive, back of the boot kick adds materially to the victim’s sense of outrage. If a man employs spite and venom in administering a physical hurt, he must not expect his maliciousness to escape consideration when he is cast to make compensation for his wrong.”

See also Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa 543, 546, 22 N. W. 666, 668 (1885) (“To warrant a jury in inflicting damages by way of punishment, it should appear that the act complained of was a willful or malicious wrong. . . . This is a very different state of mind and purpose from that of a person who has no more than good reason to believe his act is wrongful”).

See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 337, 345 (1983) (“[N]o evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the traditional common-law witness immunity in § 1983 actions,” and “[i]n 1871, common-law immunity for witnesses was well settled”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417-418 (1976) (“Tenney squarely presented the issue of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to restrict the availability in § 1983 suits of those immunities which historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various categories of officials”); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561 (1978) (“Although the Court has recognized that in enacting § 1983'Congress must have intended to expose state officials to damages liability in some circumstances, the section has been consistently construed as not intending wholesale revocation of the common-law immunity afforded government officials”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 255 (1978) (“The Members of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did not address directly the question of damages, but the principle that damages are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of rights hardly could have been foreign to many lawyers in Congress in 1871”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 316-318 (1975) (relying upon common-law tradition).

Our decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-554 (1967), was based squarely on an attempt to determine what the 42d Congress intended in enacting § 1983. Chief Justice Warren wrote: “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872).” Similarly, our decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, *68at 421, was “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it” (emphasis added).

Elsewhere in the Arms opinion, the Court stated that an award of punitive damages is available only where there was “some wilful misconduct, *72or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” 91 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added). The Court notes the problems in transforming “indifference . . . into intent,” ante, at 43-44, n. 10, without confronting the equally difficult task of transforming “consciousness]” into inadvertence. Plainly, the question whether a defendant was “conscious” of a certain fact demands inquiry into his subjective mental state, not merely an objective determination of the reasonableness of his conduct. As others have observed: “When willfullness enters, negligence steps out. The former is characterized by advertence, and the latter by inadvertence.” Christy v. Butcher, 153 Mo. App. 397, 401, 134 S. W. 1058, 1059 (1911). Yet, on reflection, the Arms formulation need not be regarded as self-contradictory: reckless and negligent conduct may be considered, and are highly probative, in determining whether to award punitive damages. They serve, however, as evidence of “willful misconduct,” “evil motive,” or a conscious choice to impose known injury on another, not as the standard for liability itself.

This Court’s understanding of the term “willfully” was clearly stated in Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, 702 (1878), where, in an action to recover a $1,000 penalty from a distiller, the Court said: “Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and wilfully, implies not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent. . . .” Likewise, it quoted with approval from a Massachusetts decision stating that “wilfully” ordinarily means “not merely ‘voluntarily,’ but with a bad purpose.” Ibid. See also n. 3, supra.

The Court does not attempt to explain the unequivocal and repeated statements in Prentice regarding the necessity of showing “guilty intention.” It relies instead on the Court’s quotation from a state case that observed in passing that punitive damages have been assessed on “evidence of such willfullness, recklessness or wickedness ... as amounted to criminality.” 147 U. S., at 115. Not only is this statement at best ambiguous, but the Court mentioned the state case only in its discussion of principles of respondeat superior, not in its earlier discussion of the standard for punitive damages.

Legal treatises in use in the 1870’s do not support the majority’s assertion that punitive damages could be awarded on a showing of gross negligence, recklessness, or serious indifference to the rights of others. Instead, they support the rather unsurprising proposition that among the courts of the several States in the late 1870’s, several views regarding punitive damages had evolved. Addison’s Treatise on the Law of Torts says “in all cases of malicious injuries and trespasses accompanied by personal insult, or oppressive and cruel conduct, juries are told to give what are called exemplary damages.” 2 C. Addison, Law of Torts 645 (1876) (emphasis added). The treatise continues: “Wherever the wrong or injury is of a grievous nature, done with a high hand, or is accompanied with deliberate intention to injure, or with words of contumely and abuse, and by circumstances of aggravation, the jury” may award punitive damages. Ibid. In a footnote Addison indicates that “malice” has been interpreted in several ways, including “an intention to set at defiance the legal rights of others,” “wantonness or a willful disregard of the rights of others,” “such a wanton character that it might properly be said to be willful,” and “a disregard for the rights of others. ” Id., at 646-647, n. 1. Plainly, as discussed in greater detail below, different States applied different rules, and that is all the treatise writer purported to say.

A similar pattern is followed in other hornbooks popular at the time. The authors make reference to some decisions articulating an actual-ill-will standard, while citing as well „to decisions accepting a recklessness rule. Compare J. Deering, Law of Negligence § 415, text accompanying n. 1 (1886), with id., at text accompanying n. 7; G. Field, Law of Damages § 78 (1876) (“The rule we have furnished not only requires that the act done should be injurious, and that actual loss be sustained thereby to the plaintiff, but also that it be willfully injurious. The animus of the wrongdoer is an important question to be considered in such cases, as it is in criminal cases. The wrong must be intended, and the result of a spirit of mischief, wantonness, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations, or the rights of others, from which malice may well be inferred”), with id., § 84, at 91, n. 4 (gross negligence applied in an Iowa case); F. Hilliard, Law of Remedies for Torts 598-599 (2d ed. 1873) (detailing different standards prevailing); 2 S. Thompson, Law of Negligence 1264-1265 (1880) (noting conflicting views regarding intent requirement).

Moreover, Professor Greenleaf, one of the most respected legal commentators of his time, entirely denied the existence of any doctrine of punitive *77damages. 2 S. Greenleaf, Law of Evidence § 253 (15th ed. 1892). While his view has prevailed in a substantial minority of American jurisdictions, see supra, in many States it concededly has not been followed. Its importance for our purposes, however, lies in the fact that it was the considered judgment of a respected scholar, published and available at the time § 1983 was enacted. Likewise, in 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages (1882), the author notes that “bad motive” is necessary for an award of punitive damages, while permitting such a motive to be inferred from proof of negligent or reckless conduct. Id., at 716, 724. Similarly, Judge Mayne’s Treatise on Damages, indicated that the applicable standard for an award of punitive damages required some sort of improper motive. J. Mayne, Law of Damages 41 (1856).

See the cases cited by the Court, ante, at 48, n. 13. In this regard, it is useful to consider a position commonly held in 1871, and not infrequently followed today. A number of States adhered to the requirement that actual ill will towards a victim was the standard for punitive damages, but permitted jurors to infer this mental state from the character of the tortfeasor’s conduct. E. g., Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250, 263 (1864) (jury “may infer malice from want of probable cause, but they are not bound so to infer it”); Lyon v. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372, 376 (1868) (“Malice ... is generally to be inferred from facts and circumstances”); Farwell v. Warren, 51 Ill. 467, 472 (1869) (“actuated by malice” which may be inferred from “wanton, willful or reckless disregard”); Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S. E. 2d 739 (1973); Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N. E. 2d 654 (1975). As one lower court described it, “fraud, oppression or malice” are necessary to recover punitive damages, but these elements “may be inferred from acts constituting such gross negligence as to warrant the inference of or be deemed equivalent to an evil intent.” Schuman v. Chatman, 184 Okla. 224, 227, 86 P. 2d 615, 618 (1938). It is important to appreciate, however, that there is a fundamental distinction between the standard for punitive damages and the evidence the jury may rely upon in meeting that standard. To say that reckless behavior may, with other evidence, permit the jury to infer a particular mental state, is not to say, as the Court does, that reckless behavior alone satisfies the punitive damages claimant’s standard of proof.

See,,e. g., Roberts v. Heim, 27 Ala. 678, 683 (1855) (“the law allows [punitive damages] whenever the trespass is committed in a rude, aggravating, or insulting manner, as malice may be inferred from these circumstances”); Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala., at 96-97 (“it is clear . . . that where [a public] officer acts in good faith, he is not liable to exemplary damages”; “there can clearly be no recovery of exemplary . . . damages, without proof of” acts committed “maliciously, and with intent to injure”); Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala., at 378; Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark., at 496 (instruction that “exemplary damages [are] allowed as a punishment for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, or deliberate violence or oppression” held a “textbook principle”); Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark., at 393 (“Exemplary damages ought not to be given, unless in cases of intentional violation of another’s right, or when a proper act is done with an excess of force or violence, or with a malicious intent to injure another in his person or property”); Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295, 299-301 (1883) (emphasis added) (punitive damages denied because “there was no evidence of previous malice, nor of deliberate cruelty, only of hot blood and a certain recklessness”; charge requiring “a wanton and willful manner, and under circumstance of outrage, cruelty and oppression, or with malice” approved); Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 558 (1860) (holding that absence of “bad faith,” “wanton or malicious motives,” or “willfully unjust or oppressive” conduct barred punitive damages; reference in dicta to “reckless disregard” not applied); Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315, 325 (1861); Lyon v. Hancock, supra; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal., at 163-164, 116 P., at 539-540 (“malice of evil motive” necessary to recover punitive damages in California); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930) (reviewing eases limiting punitive damages to amount of attorney’s fees); Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 416, 426-427 (1857) (“settled” that jury can award “vindictive [damages] in proportion to the degree of malice or wantonness evinced by the defendant”); Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182 (1869) (special rule for ultrahazardous activities); Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529 (1871); Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C., at 489-491 (punitive damages “are sometimes allowable ... as punishment of a quasi-criminal character for the wantonness and malice which inspired the wrong of the defendant”; “malignant motives” and “improper motive” required); Yahoola River Mining Co. v. Irby, 40 Ga. 479, 482 (1869) (“bonafide belief” by defendant that he was acting lawfully bars punitive damages); Green v. Southern Express Co., 41 Ga. 515 (1871) (jury charge requiring “a desire to injure the accused” approved); *79Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga., at 134, 135 (instruction that jury might award “vindictive damages, if they believed that the conduct of [the defendant] was malicious, and for the purpose of breaking up plaintiff’s business”); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind., at 124-125 (charge requiring “the spirit of oppressive malice or wantonness” approved); Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30, 34-35 (1873) (punitive damages award reversed since “[t]here [were] no elements of malice, insult, or deliberate oppression in the case . . . [and] appellant was acting under the belief that he had a valid right”); Thomas v. I sett, 1 Greene 470, 475 (Iowa 1848) (“wanton, rude, and aggravating manner, indicating malice or a desire to injure,” needed for punitive damages); Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 559 (Iowa 1854) (special rule for common carriers); Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa 306, 311 (1872) (instruction that malice-in-law would support punitive damages reversed; “This was clearly erroneous. It is an abrogation of the distinction between a simple trespass and its consequences, and a malicious one justifying exemplary damages. A simple trespass, because unlawful, might be, under the instruction, visited with punitive damages, however honestly the defendants may have believed they had the lawful right to take possession of the property in question”); Fuller v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 31 Iowa 187, 204 (1871); Curl v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa, at 428-429, 19 N. W. 308 (instruction permitting punitive damages if defendant “willfully used unnecessary force” held improper: “This instruction is erroneous in that it does not make the recovery of exemplary damages dependent upon malice of the wrong doer. It holds that the willful use of unnecessary force is a ground for allowing exemplary damages. An act willfully done may not be accompanied by malice, that is, a spirit of enmity, malevolence or ill will, with a desire to harm and a disposition to injure”)-, Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa, at 465, 22 N. W., at 668 (Rothrock, J.) (“To warrant a jury in inflicting damages by way of punishment, it should appear that the act complained of was a willful or malicious wrong. There must be a purpose or intent to harass, oppress, or injure another. This is a very different state of mind and purpose from that of a person who has no more than good reason to believe his act is wrongful”)-, Wentworth v. Blackman, 71 Iowa 255, 256-257, 32 N. W. 311, 311-312 (1887) (Rothrock, J.) (reversing award of punitive damages; “malicious act,” which demands inquiry into defendant’s “motives,” required); Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214, 56 N. W. 434 (1893) (Rothrock, J.) (“willful and malicious” conduct necessary); Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567, 572 (1841) (“redress in damages should . . . *80be proportioned to the injury sustained, unless it be where they are given as an example to deter others from similar conduct in future, and really for the purpose of punishing men for their bad motives and intentions”); Biggs v. D’Aquin Bros., 13 La. Ann. 21, 22 (1858) (no punitive damages award-able against party acting in “good faith”); Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me., at 363 (while punitive damages are recoverable “in case as well as trespass,” to recover them jury must find “that the act or omission of the defendant was willful and wanton,” with “wantonly” explicitly defined as “indicating wicked intent”); Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me., at 543 (court approves instruction that punitive damages are awardable if defendant acted “wantonly,” quoting statement requiring that defendant acted “ ‘under the influence of actual malice, or with the intention to injure the plaintiff’”); Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108, 122-123 (1858) (“The man who, from bad and malicious intentions, commits a trespass, ought, in justice, to be dealt with more harshly than one who acts from no vicious feelings, but ignorantly”); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, 287 (1867); Zimmerman v. Helser, 32 Md. 274, 278 (1869) (no punitive damages unless the defendant acts by “mere pretence for the purpose of perpetrating a wrong”); Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298, 304-307, 314 (1870) (“malice, ill-will or corruption” necessary for punitive damages); Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 542, 84 N. E. 1018, 1019 (1908) (punitive damages have not been and are not recoverable); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 198-199 (1867) (refusal to charge that “if from the evidence no evil motive be imputed to the defendant, then the rule of compensation is fixed by law, and . . . exemplary damages are not allowable,” reversed); Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28, 32-33 (1858) (“[I]ntention. . . only becomes material in considering the question of exemplary damages. If the injury is not intentional, but results simply from a want of proper care, nothing more should be recovered than will compensate for the actual damage.. . . [But if] wilfulness — a wrongful act, done intentionally . . .” exists, punitive damages are available); McKeon v. Citizens’ R. Co., 42 Mo. 79, 87 (1867) (neither recklessness nor gross negligence supports punitive damages, which “can be given, if ever in a civil case, only in eases where the injury is intentionally, willfully, and maliciously done”); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 201 (instruction that if defendants, knowing plaintiff’s property “to be exempt, wilfully and maliciously attached [it with] the purpose of harassing and oppressing” him, then punitive damages are awardable explicitly approved as indicating “the facts necessary to be proved in order to justify [the jury] in *81giving exemplary damages”; “malice” includes acts defendant “know[s]” are “wrong and unlawful”); Carli v. Union Depot, Street R. & T, Co., 32 Minn., at 104, 20 N. W., at 90 (punitive damages “properly awarded only where the trespass appears to have been wanton, willful, or malicious, — a conscious violation of the [plaintiff’s] rights”); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352, 366-367 (1866) (punitive damages require “malice, fraud, oppression, or wilful wrong”; no punitive damages if defendant “acts in good faith, and with no intent injuriously to affect plaintiff’s rights”); Memphis & Charleston R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466, 488 (1870) (actual-intent rule “modified somewhat in . . . application, particularly to passenger carriers by steam”); Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872) (no prior decision adopts rule of punitive damages; doctrine rejected entirely); Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L., at 529 (if official acted “not only . . . without authority, but maliciously, he was liable to exemplary damages”; “maliciously” means “from improper motives”); Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484-485, 14 A. 488-489 (1888) (punitive damages “res[t] primarily on a single ground — wrongful motive. . . . [I]t is the wrongful personal intention to injure that calls forth the penalty”; “punitive damages res[t] upon a wrongful motive of the defendant”); King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417, 419-420, 9 A. 705, 706 (1887) (while “malice” may not always mean actual ill will, when awarding punitive damages “malicious motive was required”); Causee v. Anders, 20 N. C., at 248 (punitive damages proper where defendant was “actuated by malice and a total disregard of the laws”); Louder v. Hinson, 49 N. C. 369, 371 (1857) (charge requiring desire “to wreak their vengeance” on the plaintiffs and “harass and insult them” approved); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277, 279-280 (1859); Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508, 522 (1884) (punitive damages available “for the wicked, corrupt, and malignant motive and design, which prompted [the guilty party] to the wrongful act”); Rayner v. Kinney, 14 Ohio St. 283, 287 (1863) (exemplary damages are “a punishment which should only attach to a wrongful intention. [W]here no wrongful intention is found, there is no just ground for the punishment of the defendant”); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa., at 191, 196 (instruction that, absent “actual malice or design to injure, the rule is compensatory damages; but where actual malice exists, a formed design to injure and oppress, the jury may give vindictive damages,” termed “unexceptionable”); M’Cabe v. Morehead, 1 Watts & Serg. 513, 516 (Pa. 1841); Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176, 177 (1867); McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 590, 11 A. 645, 648-649 (Pa. 1887) (charge requiring “a high handed spirit, and a dis*82position to oppress and do wrong” approved); Herreshoff v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 92, 94, 28 A. 104, 105 (1885) (punitive damages “only when the defendant has acted maliciously or in bad faith”); Windham v. Rhame, 11 S. C. L., at 285-287 (where evidence “show[s] a malicious motive . . . damages may be awarded not only to recompense the plaintiff but to punish the defendant”; jury must “ascertain if the act be the result of accident or negligence, or of deliberate and evil purpose,” and in latter instance, where injury results from “malfeasance,” “an amount beyond the pecuniary loss should be given, by way of punishment”; “motive,” “malicious purpose,” and “intention” dispositive; statement that punitive damages require showing that defendant “malevolently with a view to harass, vex and insult the plaintiff” quoted with approval); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266, 268 (1851) (punitive damages if “fraud, malice, or wilful wrong” or “a desire to injure” exist); Neill v. Newton, 24 Tex. 202, 204 (1859) (failure to allege “aggravated circumstances of misrepresentation and deception” bars punitive damages); Bradshaw v. Buchanan, 50 Tex. 492, 494 (1878) (punitive damages award reversed because “there is no evidence tending to show that appellants were actuated by malice ... or that they [acted] wantonly, or with the intent to vex, harass, injure, or oppress him. On the contrary, the evidence strongly tends to show that they were actuated by no such motive”); Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. 64, 78 (1860) (dictum; if an “act were done without malice, the party might not be liable to exemplary and vindictive damages”); Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. House, 148 Va. 879, 886, 193 S. E. 480, 482 (1927) (“well settled” law requires reversing punitive damages award because there was no evidence of “any malicious or willful wrong”); Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128 (1882) (punitive damages no different from compensatory damages in Virginia); Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt., at 626 (emphasis added) (Since punitive damages “depen[d] entirely upon the character and purpose of the defendant’s acts, the usual evidence must be admissible to ascertain the disposition and intention which prompted them”; punitive damages depend on “wickedness and wilfullness”); Lombard v. Batchelder, 58 Vt. 558, 559-560, 5 A. 511, 512 (1886) (“malicious,” “improper,” and “evil” motive necessary); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt., at 11, 42 A., at 610 (“wanton desire to injure”); Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, 287-288 (1873) (after discussing rule in some States, court holds that punitive damages are “to be governed wholly by the malice or wantonness of the defendant”); Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289, 292 (1873) (punitive damages available “on account of the bad spirit and wrong intention of the *83defendant”); Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt., at 407, 411 (instruction requiring that defendant “acted with express malice, intending to injure or disgrace the plaintiff” approved); Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va., at 146-147 (approves, as “correct rule,” statement “when . . . there is no actual malice or design to injure, the rule is to allow compensatory damages; but when actual malice exists, a formed design to injure and oppress, the jury may give vindictive damages”; holds “there being no proof of an intent to injure and oppress the plaintiff, the jury were not authorized to find that the defendant was actuated by malice and consequently they were not justified in giving vindictive damages”); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854) (“where . . . injury is inflicted under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness and malice” punitive damages available); Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. *240, *245 (1862) (punitive damages not award-able “unless the jury should find that the acts [of the defendant] were without apparent cause, and proceeded from wanton or malicious motives”); Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, 186-187 (1869) (charge requiring “aggravation, insult, or cruelty, with vindictiveness or malice” approved; “malice” and “motive” are basis for punitive damages); Hooker v. Newton, 24 Wis. 292, 293 (1869) (approving charge requiring malice and intent to injure); Hamlin v. Spaulding, 27 Wis. 360, 364 (1870) (defendant must act “in bad faith, and, if not with actual malice, at least for the purpose of serving some ulterior object outside of the administration of criminal justice”); Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358 (1866) (not followed outside context of failure to control vicious animals); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 70, 126 N. W. 554, 560 (1910) (“the court has uniformly held that punitory damages are not allowable at all without the element of malice[;] the defendant [must have] acted with bad intent of some sort”).

The Court’s treatment of law prevailing in 1871 relies principally upon state-court decisions from the 1880’s and 1890’s. These cases are admittedly somewhat more relevant to what the 42d Congress intended than the 20th-century eases cited by the Court; particularly if they explain prior decisions, these eases may reflect a well-settled understanding in a particular jurisdiction of the law regarding punitive damages. Yet, decisions handed down well after 1871 are considerably less probative of legislative intent than decisions rendered before or shortly subsequent to the enactment of § 1983: it requires no detailed discussion to demonstrate that a Member of the 42d Congress would have been more influenced by a decision from 1870 than by one from the 1890’s. Accordingly, the bulk of the cases cited by *84the Court must be ignored; they simply illustrate the historical shift in legal doctrine, pointed out in text, from an actual-intent standard to a recklessness standard. If the Court is serious in its attention to 19th-century law, analysis must focus on the common law as it stood at the time of the 42d Congress. Here, notwithstanding the Court’s numerous attempts to explain why decisions do not mean what they plainly say, it remains clear that in a majority of jurisdictions actual malice was required in order to recover punitive damages.

In 1864 the Kansas Supreme Court, although bound by prior precedent, agreed with Professor Greenleaf’s condemnation of punitive damages, see n. 10, supra, and said “were the question an open one, we should be inclined to [compensation only].” Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan., at 261. See also Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 12 Ore. 392, 7 P. 608 (1885).

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Act of May 31, 1870, § 2, 16 Stat. 140, is “revealing.” That statute, like § 1983, was a Reconstruction civil rights statute. It created a private cause of action for persons suffering from racial discrimination in voting registration, and explicitly allowed recovery of a $500 civil penalty by the person aggrieved. Similar provision for recovery of punitive damages is conspicuously absent from § 1983. Likewise, the Act clearly conditions the award of damages on a knowing violation of the civil rights laws. It is difficult to see what comfort the Court derives from the section. It merely demonstrates that when Congress wished to impose punitive damages on a party, it did so explicitly, and, even then, required more than recklessness.

This is not a new concern, see, e. g., Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala., at 96-97 (absent an actual-malice standard for punitive damages “few men, fit for such positions, could be induced to accept public trusts of this character”).

The Court relies all but exclusively on the notion that a recklessness standard for punitive damages is necessary to deter unconstitutional conduct by state officials. The issue is a little more complicated. The deterrence the Court pursues necessarily is accompanied by costs: as our decisions regarding common-law immunities explicitly recognize, see cases cited in n. 6, supra, the imposition of personal liability on officials gravely threatens their initiative and judgment, and scarcely serves to make public positions attractive to competent, responsible persons. While constitutional rights are high on our scale of values, so is an effective performance of the countless basic functions that modern governments increasingly have come to perform. In fashioning a punitive damages standard we should seek to achieve that level of deterrence that is most worth the costs it imposes.

The Court, however, simply ignores the potential costs of the standard it embraces. This single-minded desire to deter unconstitutional official actions would not logically stop at recklessness; awarding punitive damages on the basis of mere negligence, or on a strict liability basis, might result, in the short term, in even less unconstitutional conduct. Yet, just as with the Court’s recklessness standard, this deterrence would come at too costly a price. The Court is unable to give any reason, related to achieving deterrence at a cost sensibly related to benefits obtained, for its choice of a recklessness standard. It offers no response to the obvious distinctions between the standard for punitive damages in state-law tort actions and that in § 1983 actions, where § 1988 provides attorney’s fees and where issues of federalism are involved. It does not even attempt to discuss the plainly relevant question whether insurance may be obtained against punitive damages awards.

While fully recognizing that the issue is a complex one, in my judgment the dangers that accompany the vague recklessness standard adopted by the Court far outweigh the deterrence achieved thereby. Recklessness too easily shades into negligence, particularly when the defendant is an unpopular official — whether because of his official actions, or for more invidious reasons. Punitive damages are not bound by a measure of actual damages, so when a jury does act improperly, the harm it may occasion can be great. These threats occur in an area — the provision of governmental *90services — where it is important to have efficient, competent public servants. I fear that the Court’s decision poorly serves this goal, and that in the end, official conduct will be less useful to our citizens, not better.

In this respect, Congress’ attitude towards punitive damages as revealed by its treatment of the subject in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is highly illuminating. There, in marked contrast to § 1983, Congress explicitly included a right to punitive damages; notably, however, that right was limited to recoveries of $1,000. 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c). While Congress may have thought punitive damages appropriate in some cases, it recognized the dangers that such a remedy creates — unfairness to defendants, stifling of initiative of state officials, comity concerns, and, perhaps most alarmingly, an open-ended incentive to litigate in a field where other such incentives already exist. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V).

Petitioner did not argue, and the Court properly does not decide, whether the $1,000 limit in 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c), also should apply in actions under § 1983. It seems likely that it would. While the Court does not say so, its opinion seems to derive its punitive damages remedy from *91“the laws of the United States,” concluding sub silentio that they “are suitable to carry [§ 1983] into effect.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V). (This follows from the Court’s apparent view that, for example, in one of the several States where punitive damages are not available, a § 1983 plaintiff could recover such damages, thus indicating that it is not “the common law ... of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held,” § 1988, that the Court is applying.) If, therefore, we are to apply a punitive damages remedy “in conformity with the laws of the United States,” then the most relevant law is 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c), limiting punitive damages in certain civil rights actions to $1,000.

The case is materially different from our decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982), where our previous decisions strongly suggested that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required under § 1983. Here, our previous statements as to the standard for a recovery of punitive damages are inconsistent with the Court’s formulation. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S., at 257, n. 11, we implied that the absence of “malicious intention” would preclude an award of punitive damages. And, as discussed above, the standard for punitive damages recoveries in constitutional tort actions was that the ease involve “a tort.. . aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.” Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 86 (1897).