Supreme Court of the United States, 1986

County of Wayne v. Carroll

Supreme Court of the United States · Decided October 20, 1986 · White

479 U.S. 923; 107 S. Ct. 330; 93 L. Ed. 2d 302; 55 U.S.L.W. 3277; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 4435 (United States Reports)

Cases that cite this one

7 later published cases cite this decision.

O'BRIEN v. City of Grand Rapids (District Court, W.D. Michigan 1992)
Harris v. BD. OF EDUC. OF COLUMBUS, OHIO (District Court, S.D. Ohio 1992)
Rushing v. Wayne County (Mich. 1990)
Kenneth Ray Meade v. Grubbs, Badge No. 128, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff of the County of Oklahoma (10th Cir. 1988)
Edward Lewis Higley v. Michigan Department of Corrections (6th Cir. 1987)
Cody Crawford, Jr. v. The Broadview Savings and Loan Company (6th Cir. 1989)
Daniel Browning, D/B/A Daniel Browning Excavating Co. Linda Browning v. Craig R. Pendleton (6th Cir. 1988)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice White,

dissenting.

This case presents the question of which state statute of limitations should be applied in a case brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when more than one state statute arguably can be characterized as addressing “personal injury” claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985). The lower courts continue to struggle with this question. In this case, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 754 F. 2d 662 (1985), concluded that a 3-year, catchall statute should be applied which covers actions brought “to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.” Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5805(8) (1979). The Sixth Circuit chose this section over other 2-year sections which specifically cover intentional torts. See, e. g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2) (1979) (“The period of limitations is 2 years for an *924action charging assault, battery, or false imprisonment.”) In so deciding, the Sixth Circuit has taken an approach directly contrary to its earlier decision in Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F. 2d 340, 344 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 1174 (1986).

I dissented from the denial of certiorari in Mulligan because of the split among the Courts of Appeals in dealing with this question, and I dissent here because the confusion evidenced by this split is underscored by the Sixth Circuit’s change in approach.

Opinion of the Court

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.