Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases call upon the Court to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars respondents’ suits in federal
I
In 1921, New York and New Jersey entered a bistate compact creating the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Authority). 1921 N. J. Laws, chs. 151, 154; see N. J. Stat. Ann. §32:1-1 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §6401 et seq. (McKinney 1979). In accord with the Constitution’s Compact Clause, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, Congress consented to the compact. 42 Stat. 174 (1921). Through the compact, the States created the Authority to achieve “a better co-ordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York,” N. J. Stat. Ann. §32:1-1 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6401 (McKinney 1979), and lodged in the Authority “full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility within [the port] district.” N. J. Stat. Ann. §32:1-7 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §6407 (McKinney 1979). See generally United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1977); E. Bard, The Port of New York Authority (1942). The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH), petitioner in these consolidated cases, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Authority that operates an interstate railway system and other facilities. PATH is entitled to “all of the privileges, immunities, tax exemptions and other exemptions of the port authority” and is subject to suit to the same extent as the Authority. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-35.61 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6612 (McKinney 1979).
Respondents Patrick Feeney and Charles Foster alleged injuries incurred during their employment with PATH. Both filed separate complaints against PATH in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Li
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Feeney’s suit because “the Eleventh Amendment immunity either does not extend to [PATH] or has been waived.” 873 F. 2d 628, 628-629 (1989). The court concluded that PATH did not enjoy the States’ sovereign immunity, principally because the treasuries of New York and New Jersey are largely insulated from PATH’S liabilities. Id., at 631-632. In reaching its conclusion that the States had waived any immunity that PATH possessed, the court relied upon two provisions of an Act governing suits against the Authority and its subsidiaries and passed by New York (in 1950) and New Jersey (in 1951). 1951 N. J. Laws, ch. 204; 1950 N. Y. Laws, ch. 301; see N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-157 et seq. (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7101 et seq. (McKinney 1979). The first section provided that the States “consent to suits, actions or proceedings of any form
“The foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. §32:1-157; N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7101] is granted upon the condition that venue in any suit, action or proceeding against the Port Authority shall be laid within a county or a judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District. The Port Authority shall be deemed to be a resident of each such county or judicial district for the purpose of such suits, actions, or proceedings.” N. J. Stat. Ann. §32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7106 (McKinney 1979).
The court concluded that, despite the “somewhat anomalous” location of an indication of waiver in a venue provision, the statutory provisions demonstrated “an intent to allow the Port Authority to be sued in the designated federal courts and is thus an explicit waiver, albeit partial, of the Eleventh Amendment [immunity].” 873 F. 2d, at 633. The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of Foster’s complaint on identical grounds. 873 F. 2d 633 (1989). Two days before the Second Circuit issued these decisions, the Third Circuit had reaffirmed and elaborated its conclusion that the States had not waived the sovereign immunity that extended to PATH. See Leadbeater v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F. 2d 45 (1989), cert. pending, No. 89-479. That court acknowledged that “[i]t is certainly arguable that the consent to suit statutes, read in light of this venue provision, create the ‘overwhelming implication’ of consent to suit in federal court,” but held that “[n]ot without some unease, we conclude that the venue provision fails to constitute the requisite showing that the states intended to waive P. A. T. H.’s [Eleventh [A]mendment immunity.” Id., at 49. To resolve this conflict, we granted certiorari to
II
The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” This Court has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity to construe the Amendment to “establish that ‘an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.’” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 100 (1984) (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 280 (1973)); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion). The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit is not absolute. States may consent to suit in federal court, see, e. g., Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 241 (1985); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883), and, in certain cases, Congress may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223 (1989).
Respondents challenge PATH’S claim that it is a state agency entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity of New York and New Jersey. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275 (1959), guides our resolution of this issue. In Petty, the Court- considered whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from entertaining an action under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1958 ed.), brought against the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission. Similar to the Authority, the Commission constructed and operated transportation facilities pursuant to a
Well-established law governs abrogation and waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because “abrogation of sovereign immunity upsets ‘the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States,’” Dellmuth v. Muth, supra, at 227 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U. S., at 238), and because States are unable directly to remedy a judicial misapprehension of that abrogation, the Court has adopted a particularly strict standard to evaluate claims that Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity. See id., at 242 (“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute”). Respondents do not assert that Congress has abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity through any of the statutes that underlie their claims against PATH, and such arguments would be unavailing. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S., at 468 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 495 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Similar solicitude for States’ sovereign immunity underlies the standard that this Court employs to determine whether a State has waived that immunity. The Court will give effect to a State’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity “ ‘only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 239-
New York and New Jersey have expressly consented to suit in expansive terms. The statutory consent to suit provision, which provides that the States “consent to suits, actions, or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise . . . against the Port of New York Authority,” N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7101 (McKinney 1979), might be interpreted to encompass the States’ consent to suit in federal court as well as state court. But such a broadly framed provision may also reflect only a State’s consent to suit in its own courts. See, e. g., Atascadero State Hospital, supra, at 241. Sensitive to the values underlying the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has required that consent to suit in federal court be express and thus has construed such ambiguous and general consent to suit provisions, standing alone, as insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 473 U. S., at 241 (general consent to suit provision did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity because the “provision does not specifically indicate the State’s willingness to be sued in federal court”); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944) (“When a state authorizes a suit against itself. . . , it is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts to be astute to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts”). Other textual evidence of consent to suit in federal courts may resolve that ambiguity and sufficiently
In this case, the statutory venue provision suffices to resolve any ambiguity contained in the States’ general consent to suit provision by expressly indicating that the States’ consent to suit extends to suit in federal court. The section provides that “[t]he foregoing consent [of N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-157 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7101 (McKinney 1979)] is granted on the condition that venue . . . shall be laid within a county or judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port of New York District.” N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-162 (West 1963); N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7106 (McKinney 1979). This provision eliminates the danger, identified in Atascadero State Hospital, supra, and Great Northern Life Ins. Co., supra, that federal courts may mistake a provision intended to allow suit in a State’s own courts for a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Petitioner does not deny that the phrase “judicial district, established ... by the United States” refers to the United States District Courts, but rather argues that the reference to venue cannot shape our construction of the general consent to suit provision. Although one might not look first to a venue provision to find evidence of waiver of sovereign immunity, we believe that the provision directly indicates the extent of the States’ waiver embodied in the consent provision. The States passed the venue and consent to suit provisions as portions of the same Acts that set forth the nature, timing, and extent of the States’ consent to suit. The venue provision expressly refers to and qualifies the more general consent to suit provision. Additionally, issues of venue are closely related to those concerning sovereign immunity, as this Court has indicated by emphasizing that “[a] State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.” Pennhurst State School
Finally, petitioner suggests no “reasonable construction,” Atascadero State Hospital, 473 U. S., at 241, that might be given to the venue provision’s phrase, “judicial district, established ... by the United States,” other than that the States consented to suit in federal court. See Brief for Petitioner 36-38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16. We agree with the court below that the phrase cannot reasonably be construed as an ineffectual attempt to limit venue for suits for which Congress has abrogated the States’ immunity. See 873 F. 2d, at 633; see also Leadbeater, 873 F. 2d, at 49 (declining to accept similar construction). Amici curiae supporting petitioner also confess their inability to provide any reasonable alternative construction of the phrase. Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 17. The Third Circuit, in the course of upholding petitioner’s immunity defense in a similar suit, professed similar bafflement regarding the import of the venue provision. See Leadbeater, 873 F. 2d, at 49; supra, at 304. Petitioner essentially presents the choice between giving the venue provision its natural meaning and giving the provision no meaning at all. Charged with giving effect to the statute, we do not find the choice to be a difficult one.
We conclude that the statutory consent to suit provision, elucidated by the venue provision, establishes the States’
Affirmed.
Concurring Opinion
with whom Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with the Court that New York and New Jersey consented, on behalf of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH), to suit in federal court, I write separately to add that their consent is not necessary to our decision today. I do not join Part II of the Court’s opinion
Respondents seek to hold PATH liable under a variety of federal statutes for injuries they have suffered.
Second, to the extent that States retain a common-law defense of state sovereign immunity, States surrendered that immunity, insofar as challenges under federal statutes are concerned, “‘in the plan of the Convention’”
II
Even under the Court’s current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, however, I do not believe that PATH had any defense to waive. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction only over suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.” PATH is a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) which is a bistate agency created by interstate compact; it is not “one of the United States.” By its terms, then, the Eleventh Amendment would appear to be inapplicable. But this Court has created two very limited exceptions to a literal reading of the phrase “one of the United States,” so that immunity applies: (1) where the entity being sued is so intricately intertwined with the State that it can best be un
A
The inherent nature of interstate agencies precludes their being found so intricately intertwined with the State as to constitute an “arm of the State.” The Court developed the “arm-of-the-State” doctrine as a tool for determining which entities created by a State enjoy its Eleventh Amendment protection and which do not. This Court has found that a private suit against a state agency is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781, 782 (1978) (reversing a lower court’s decision to enjoin the State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections). Nonetheless, this Court has long held that counties and cities are not so integrally related to the State that they are shielded from suit in federal court. In Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against counties in federal court, noting that the “Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction [of the federal courts] only as to suits against a State.” The Court continued: “[W]hile the county is territorially a
In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977), the Court noted that “[t]he bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts . . . does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations” and looked to the “nature of the entity created by state law” to determine whether local school boards in Ohio appeared to be more like a county or city or more like an arm of the State. The Court concluded that the school boards’ extensive powers to issue bonds and levy taxes, and their categorization under state law as a form of political subdivision, rendered them “[o]n balance . . . more like a county or city.” Ibid.
The rule to be derived from our cases is that the Eleventh Amendment shields an entity from suit in federal court only when it is so closely tied to the State as to be the direct means by which the State acts, for instance a state agency. In contrast, when a State creates subdivisions and imbues them with a significant measure of autonomy, such as the ability to levy taxes, issue bonds, or own land in their own name, these subdivisions are too separate from the State to be considered its “arms.” This is so even though these political subdivisions exist solely at the whim and behest of their State. See, e. g., ibid; Graham v. Folsom, supra, at 252.
In addition, States may not create an interstate agency without the express approval of Congress; they surrendered their right to do so “in the plan of the Convention” when they accepted the Interstate Compact Clause. The Clause provides:
“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
The Constitution also prohibits States from entering into any “Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” either with other States or with foreign governments. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Thus, it is not within the autonomous power of any State to create and regulate an interstate agency. Each State’s sovereign will is circumscribed by that of the other States in the compact and circumscribed further by the veto power relinquished to Congress in the Constitution. If counties are not “arms” of their States merely because the State conferred a certain autonomy on them — an autonomy it can withdraw at
B
Although this Court has held that a suit in which the State, rather than the nominal defendant, is the real party in interest is a suit against “one of the United States” within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, a State is the real party in interest generally only when the State is directly liable for a money judgment.
“We believe it clear that a judgment against PATH would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey. The Port Authority is explicitly barred from pledging the credit of either state or from borrowing money in any name but its own. Even the provision [permitting] the appropriation of moneys for administrative expenses up to $100,000 per year requires prior approval by the governor of each state and an actual appropriation [by the legislature] before obligations for such expenses may be incurred. Moreover, the [provision’s] phrase ‘salaries, office and other adminstrative expenses’ clearly limits this essentially optional obligation of the two states to a very narrow category of expenses and thus also evidences an intent to insulate the states’ treasuries from the vast bulk of the Port Authority’s operating and capital expenses, including personal injury judgments. No provision commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Authority.” 873 F. 2d 628, 631 (CA2 1989).
Therefore neither New York nor New Jersey is a real party in interest in respondents’ suits, as this Court has understood and applied the concept in the Eleventh Amendment area.
C
This is not to say that the only restriction on whether an interstate agency can be sued in federal court is the Eleventh
But it cannot be disputed that there is no such showing here. Congress has not passed any law conferring any immunity on the Port Authority. Nor did the compact to which Congress consented include any provision attempting to grant immunity from suit in federal court. Consequently, I believe that this Court, following its current view of the Eleventh Amendment, could have rested its decision today on the absence of an Eleventh Amendment defense as well as on waiver.
I join Part I of the opinion of the Court.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
Both Patrick Feeney and Charles T. Foster asserted claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1982 ed.), the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U. S. C. §22 (1982 ed.), and the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C. § 1 (1982 ed.).
The phrase is Alexander Hamilton’s. He used it in a passage reassuring States, which might have been concerned with the securities they issued and might not have wished to honor, that the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III would not annul their defense of sovereign immunity should they be sued in federal court under state law on a writ of debt.
“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual ivithout its consent. This is the general sense, and the*311 general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of every State in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Convention, it mil remain with the States. . . . [Tjhere is no color to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint, but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.” The Federalist No. 81, p. 567 (H. Dawson ed. 1876) (second emphasis added).
This Court has twice before addressed the question whether a bistate entity could raise an Eleventh Amendment defense to federal jurisdiction, and twice rejected the specific immunity claim presented. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275, 279-280 (1959) (not reaching “arm-of-the-State” issue but finding that any Eleventh Amendment bar had been waived); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401-402 (1979) (finding subject to federal jurisdiction at least a bistate entity whose parent States disclaimed any immunity for it, whose compact failed to disclose any congressional intent to protect it from federal jurisdiction, and whose obligations were not binding on either parent State).
The Framers had serious concerns about this problem, as shown by their inclusion of provisions even stricter than those in the Articles of
‘“No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the united states in congress assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.’” Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution — A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 693-694 (1925) (quoting Art. VI, Articles of Confederation).
That the Interstate Compact and State Treaty Clauses reflect a disfavor of intermediate-level sovereigns is well settled. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra, at 694 (“The absence of any powerful national capabilities on the part of the Confederacy, except in the conduct of foreign affairs, underlines the significance of these clauses [in the Articles of Confederation] as insurance against competing political power. This curb upon political combinations by the States was retained almost in haec verba by the Constitution”); V. Thursby, Interstate Cooperation, A Study of the Interstate Compact 4 (1953) (suggesting that one reason for the Compact Clause was that the Federal Government could be endangered by political combinations of the States); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 518 (1893) (declaring that the compacts to which the Compact Clause refers are “those which may tend to increase and build up the political influence of the contracting States, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects placed under their control”); Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 248 (1833) (explaining that agreements between States for political purposes could “scarcely fail to interfere with the general purposes and intent of the [Constitution”).
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979), is not inconsistent with this analysis. In that ease, we noted that the Eleventh Amendment is available only to ‘“one of the United States,’ ” that its protection has never been extended to political subdivisions even though such entities exercise a “ ‘slice of state power,’ ” and that there was “no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment” so as to immunize a bistate agency unless Congress had indicated a desire to place the agency in a special position. Id., at 400-401. The Court noted that neither of the States that created the bistate agency could veto its actions and observed that the conclusion that “TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its control is perhaps most forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its will on TRPA.” Id., at 402.
This Court has also found that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit seeking equitable relief where a state officer defendant is not alleged to have acted contrary to state or federal law and the State is the real party in interest. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982) (interpleader action). However, no State is a real party in interest in an action for prospective injunctive relief brought against an interstate agency, because any injunction would run against the agency, which is not an “arm of the State.” See Part II-A, supra. Therefore, actions for prospective relief against an interstate agency would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as the Court interprets it, whatever the agency’s relationship to the States’ treasuries. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979).
This Court has not decided which arrangements between a State and a nominal defendant are sufficient to establish that the State is the real party in interest for Eleventh Amendment purposes. It may be that a simple indemnification clause, without more, does not trigger the doctrine. Lower courts have uniformly held that States may not cloak their officers with a personal Eleventh Amendment defense by promising, by statute, to indemnify them for damages awards imposed on them for actions taken in the course of their employment. See, e. g., Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F. 2d 1352, 1354, n. 1 (CA9 1988) (“The eleventh amendment prohibits a district court-from ordering payment of a judgment from the state treasury. The court may properly order the officials to pay damages under § 1983, but if the officials desire indemnification under the state statute, they must bring their own action in state court”); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645, 650-651 (CA7 1985) (“[T]he purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is only to protect the state against involuntary liability. If the State chooses to pick up the tab for its errant officers, its liability for their torts
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