delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is yet another case that concerns the standard for summary judgment in an antitrust controversy. The *455principal issue here is whether a defendant’s lack of market power in the primary equipment market precludes — as a matter of law — the possibility of market power in derivative aftermarkets.

Petitioner Eastman Kodak Company manufactures and sells photocopiers and micrographic equipment. Kodak also sells service and replacement parts for its equipment. Respondents are 18 independent service organizations (ISO’s) that in the early 1980’s began servicing Kodak copying and micrographic equipment. Kodak subsequently adopted policies to limit the availability of parts to ISO’s and to make it more difficult for ISO’s to compete with Kodak in servicing Kodak equipment.

*456Respondents instituted this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that Kodak’s policies were unlawful under both § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2 (1988 ed., Supp. II). After truncated discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for Kodak. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate court found that respondents had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue concerning Kodak’s market power in the service and parts markets. It rejected Kodak’s contention that lack of market power in service and parts must be assumed when such power is absent in the equipment market. Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 501 U. S. 1216 (1991).

I

A

Because this case comes to us on petitioner Kodak’s motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of [respondents] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [their] favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986). Mindful that respondents’ version of any disputed issue of fact thus is presumed correct, wé begin with the factual basis of respondents’ claims. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 339 (1982).

Kodak manufactures and sells complex business machines — as relevant here, high-volume photocopiers and mi-crographic equipment.1 Kodak equipment is unique; micro-*457graphic software programs that operate on Kodak machines, for example, are not compatible with competitors’ machines. See App. 424-425, 487-489, 537. Kodak parts are not compatible with other manufacturers’ equipment, and vice versa. See id., at 432,413-415. Kodak equipment, although expensive when new, has little resale value. See id., at 358-359, 424-425, 427-428, 467, 505-506, 519-521.

Kodak provides service and parts for its machines to its customers. It produces some of the parts itself; the rest are made to order for Kodak by independent original-equipment manufacturers (OEM’s). See id., at 429, 465, 490, 496. Kodak does not sell a complete system of original equipment, lifetime service, and lifetime parts for a single price. Instead, Kodak provides service after the initial warranty period either through annual service contracts, which include all necessary parts, or on a per-call basis. See id., at 98-99; Brief for Petitioner 3. It charges, through negotiations and bidding, different prices for equipment, service, and parts for different customers. See App. 420-421, 536. Kodak provides 80% to 95% of the service for Kodak machines. See id., at 430.

Beginning in the early 1980’s, ISO’s began repairing and servicing Kodak equipment. They also sold parts and reconditioned and sold used Kodak equipment. Their customers were federal, state, and local government agencies, banks, insurance companies, industrial enterprises, and providers of specialized copy and microfilming services. See id., at 417, 419-421, 492-493, 499, 516, 539. ISO’s provide service at a price substantially lower than Kodak does. See id., at 414, 451, 453-454, 469, 474-475, 488, 493, 536-537; Lodging 133. Some customers found that the ISO service was of higher quality. See App. 425-426, 537-538.

*458Some ISO customers purchase their own parts and hire ISO’s only for service. See Lodging 144-147. Others choose ISO’s to supply both service and parts. See id., at 133. ISO’s keep an inventory of parts, purchased from Kodak or other sources, primarily the OEM’s.2 See App. 99, 415-416, 490.

In 1985 and 1986, Kodak implemented a policy of selling replacement parts for micrographic and copying machines only to buyers of Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own machines. See Brief for Petitioner 6; App. 91-92, 98-100, 140-141, 171-172, 190, 442-447, 455-456, 483-484.

As part of the same policy, Kodak sought to limit ISO access to other sources of Kodak parts. Kodak and the OEM’s agreed that the OEM’s would not sell parts that fit Kodak equipment to anyone other than Kodak. See id., at 417, 428-429, 447, 468, 474, 496. Kodak also, pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to ISO’s. See id., at 419-420, 428-429, 483-484, 517-518, 589-590. In addition, Kodak took steps to restrict the availability of used machines. See id., at 427-428, 465-466, 510-511, 520.

Kodak intended, through these policies, to make it more difficult for ISO’s to sell service for Kodak machines. See id., at 106-107, 171, 516. It succeeded. ISO’s were unable to obtain parts from reliable sources, see id., at 429, 468, 496, and many were forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenue. See id., at 422, 458-459, 464, 468, 475-477, 482-484, 495-496, 501, 521. Customers were forced to switch to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service. See id., at 420-422.

*459B

In 1987, the ISO’s filed the present action in the District Court, alleging, inter alia, that Kodak had unlawfully tied the sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and had unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of service for Kodak machines, in violation of §2 of that Act.3

Kodak filed a motion for summary judgment before respondents had initiated discovery. The District Court permitted respondents to file one set of interrogatories and one set of requests for production of documents and to take six depositions. Without a hearing, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kodak. App. to Pet. for Cert. 29B.

As to the § 1 claim, the court found that respondents had provided no evidence of a tying arrangement between Kodak equipment and service or parts. See id., at 32B-33B. The court, however, did not address respondents’ § 1 claim that is at issue here. Respondents allege a tying arrangement not between Kodak equipment and service, but between Kodak parts and service. As to the § 2 claim, the District Court concluded that although Kodak had a “natural monopoly over the market for parts it sells under its name,” a unilateral refusal to sell those parts to ISO’s did not violate § 2.

*460The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 903 F. 2d 612 (1990). With respect to the § 1 claim, the court first found that whether service and parts were distinct markets and whether a tying arrangement existed between them were disputed issues of fact. Id., at 616-616. Having found that a tying arrangement might exist, the Court of Appeals considered a question not decided by the District Court: Was there “an issue of material fact as to whether Kodak has sufficient economic power in the tying product market [parts] to restrain competition appreciably in the tied product market [service].” Id., at 616. The court agreed with Kodak that competition in the equipment market might prevent Kodak from possessing power in the parts market, but refused to uphold the District Court’s grant of summary judgment “on this theoretical basis” because “market imperfections can keep economic theories about how consumers will act from mirroring reality.” Id., at 617. Noting that the District Court had not considered the market power issue, and that the record was not fully developed through discovery, the court declined to require respondents to conduct market analysis or to pinpoint specific imperfections in order to withstand summary judgment.4 “It is enough that [respondents] have presented evidence of actual events from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that. . . competition in the [equipment] market does not, in reality, curb Kodak’s power in the parts market.” Ibid.

*461The court then considered the three business justifications Kodak proffered for its restrictive parts policy: (1) to guard against inadequate service, (2) to lower inventory costs, and (3) to prevent ISO’s from free-riding on Kodak’s investment in the copier and micrographic industry. The court concluded that the trier of fact might find the product quality and inventory reasons to be pretextual and that there was a less restrictive alternative for achieving Kodak’s quality-related goals. Id., at 618-619. The court also found Kodak’s third justification, preventing ISO’s from profiting on Kodak’s investments in the equipment markets, legally insufficient. Id., at 619.

As to the §2 claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Kodak’s implementation of its parts policy was “anticompetitive” and “exclusionary” and “involved a specific intent to monopolize.” Id., at 620. It held that the ISO’s had come forward with sufficient evidence, for summary judgment purposes, to disprove Kodak’s business justifications. Ibid.

The dissent in the Court of Appeals, with respect to the § 1 claim, accepted Kodak’s argument that evidence of competition in the equipment market “necessarily precludes power in the derivative market.” Id., at 622 (emphasis in original). With respect to the § 2 monopolization claim, the dissent concluded that, entirely apart from market power considerations, Kodak was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of its first business justification because it had “submitted extensive and undisputed evidence of a marketing strategy based on high-quality service.” Id., at 623.

II

A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5-6 *462(1958). Such an arrangement violates §1 of the Sherman Act if the seller has “appreciable economic power” in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U. S. 495, 503 (1969).

Kodak did not dispute that its arrangement affects a substantial volume of interstate commerce. It, however, did challenge whether its activities constituted a “tying arrangement” and whether Kodak exercised “appreciable economic power” in the tying market. We consider these issues in turn.

A

For respondents to defeat a motion for summary judgment on their claim of a tying arrangement, a reasonable trier of fact must be able to find, first, that service and parts are two distinct products, and, second, that Kodak has tied the sale of the two products.

For service and parts to be considered two distinct products, there must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide service separately from parts. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 21-22 (1984). Evidence in the record indicates that service and., parts have been sold separately in the past and still are sold separately to self-service equipment owners.5 Indeed, the development of the entire high-technology service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for service.6

*463Kodak insists that because there is no demand for parts separate from service, there cannot be separate markets for service and parts. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 3. By that logic, we would be forced to conclude that there can never be separate markets, for example, for cameras and film, computers and software, or automobiles and tires. That is an assumption we are unwilling to make. “We have often found arrangements involving functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.” Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 19, n. 30.

Kodak’s assertion also appears to be incorrect as a factual matter. At least some consumers would purchase service without parts, because some service does not require parts, and some consumers, those who self-service for example, would purchase parts without service.7 Enough doubt is cast on Kodak’s claim of a unified market that it should be resolved by the trier of fact.

Finally, respondents have presented sufficient evidence of a tie between service and parts. The record indicates that Kodak would sell parts to third parties only if they agreed not to buy service from ISO’s.8

*464B

Having found sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement, we consider the other necessary feature of an illegal tying arrangement: appreciable economic power in the tying market. Market power is the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.” Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 14.9 It has been defined as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.” Fortner, 394 U. S., at 503; United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 391 (1956). The existence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the market. Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 17; United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 571 (1966); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 611-613 (1953).

1

Respondents contend that Kodak has more than sufficient power in the parts market to force unwanted purchases of the tied market, service. Respondents provide evidence that certain parts are available exclusively through Kodak. Respondents also assert that Kodak has control over the availability of parts it does not manufacture. According to respondents’ evidence, Kodak has prohibited independent manufacturers from selling Kodak parts to ISO’s, pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors to deny ISO’s the purchase of Kodak parts, and taken steps to restrict the availability of used machines.

*465Respondents also allege that Kodak’s control over the parts market has excluded service competition, boosted service prices, and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service. Respondents offer evidence that consumers have switched to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service, that Kodak service was of higher price and lower quality than the preferred ISO service, and that ISO’s were driven out of business by Kodak’s policies. Under our prior precedents, this evidence would be sufficient to entitle respondents to a trial on their claim of market power.

2

Kodak counters that even if it concedes monopoly share of the relevant parts market, it cannot actually exercise the necessary market power for a Sherman Act violation. This is so, according to Kodak, because competition exists in the equipment market.10 Kodak argues that it could not have *466the ability to raise prices of service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market because any increase in profits from a higher price in the aftermarkets at least would be offset by a corresponding loss in profits from lower equipment sales as consumers began purchasing equipment with more attractive service costs.

Kodak does not present any actual data on the equipment, service, or parts markets. Instead, it urges the adoption of a substantive legal rule that “equipment competition precludes any finding of monopoly power in derivative aftermarkets.” Brief for Petitioner 33. Kodak argues that such a rule would satisfy its burden as the moving party of showing “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” on the market power issue.11 See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c).

Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored *467in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the “particular facts disclosed by the record.” Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 579 (1925); Du Pont, 351 U. S., at 395, n. 22; Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 70 (1977) (White, J., concurring in judgment).12 In determining the existence of market power, and specifically the “responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other,” Du Pont, 351 U. S., at 400; see also id., at 394-395, and 400-401, this Court has examined closely the economic reality of the market at issue.13

Kodak contends that there is no need to examine the facts when the issue is market power in the aftermarkets. A legal presumption against a finding of market power is warranted in this situation, according to Kodak, because the existence of market power in the service and parts markets absent power in the equipment market “simply makes no economic sense,” and the absence of a legal presumption would deter procompetitive behavior. Matsushita, 475 U. S., at 587; id., at 594-595.

Kodak analogizes this case to Matsushita, where a group of American corporations that manufactured or sold consumer electronic products alleged that their 21 Japanese counterparts were engaging in a 20-year conspiracy to price *468below cost in the United States in the hope of expanding their market share sometime in the future. After several years of detailed discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Id., at 577-582. Because the defendants had every incentive not to engage in the alleged conduct which required them to sustain losses for decades with no foreseeable profits, the Court found an “absence of any rational motive to conspire.” Id., at 597. In that context, the Court determined that the plaintiffs’ theory of predatory pricing made no practical sense, was “speculative,” and was not “reasonable.” Id., at 588, 590, 593, 595, 597. Accordingly, the Court held that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the plaintiffs and that summary judgment would be appropriate against them unless they came forward with more persuasive evidence to support their theory. Id., at 587-588, 595-598.

The Court’s requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs’ claims make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court did not hold that if the moving party enunciates any economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment. Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party’s inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision.14 If the plaintiff’s theory is eco*469nomically senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.

Kodak, then, bears a substantial burden in showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. It must show that despite evidence of increased prices and excluded competition, an inference of market power is unreasonable. To determine whether Kodak has met that burden, we must unravel the factual assumptions underlying its proposed rule that lack of power in the equipment market necessarily precludes power in the aftermarkets.

The extent to which one market prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in another, i. e., the “cross-elasticity of demand.” See Du Pont, 351 U. S., at 400; P. Areeda & L. Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis ¶ 342(c) (4th ed. 1988).15 Ko*470dak’s proposed rule rests on a factual assumption about the cross-elasticity of demand in the equipment and aftermarkets: “If Kodak raised its parts or service prices above competitive levels, potential customers would simply stop buying Kodak equipment. Perhaps Kodak would be able to increase short term profits through such a strategy, but at a devastating cost to its long term interests.”16 Brief for Petitioner 12. Kodak argues that the Court should accept, as a matter of law, this “basic economic realit[y],” id., at 24, that competition in the equipment market necessarily prevents market power in the aftermarkets.17

Even if Kodak could not raise the price of service and parts one cent without losing equipment sales, that fact would not disprove market power in the aftermarkets. The sales of even a monopolist are reduced when it sells goods at a monopoly price, but the higher price more than compensates for the loss in sales. Areeda & Kaplow ¶¶ 112 and 340(a). Kodak’s claim that charging more for service and parts would be “a short-run game,” Brief for Petitioner 26, is based on the false dichotomy that there are only two prices *471that can be charged — a competitive price or a ruinous one. But there could easily be a middle, optimum price at which the increased revenues from the higher priced sales of service and parts would more than compensate for the lower revenues from lost equipment sales. The fact that the equipment market imposes a restraint on prices in the aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence of power in those markets. See Areeda & Kaplow ¶ 340(b) (“[T]he existence of significant substitution in the event of further price increases or even at the current price does not tell us whether the defendant already exercises significant market power”) (emphasis in original). Thus, contrary to Kodak’s assertion, there is no immutable physical law — no “basic economic reality” — insisting that competition in the equipment market cannot coexist with market power in the aftermarkets.

We next consider the more narrowly drawn question: Does Kodak’s theory describe actual market behavior so accurately that respondents’ assertion of Kodak market power in the aftermarkets, if not impossible, is at least unreasonable?18 Cf. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986).

*472To review Kodak’s theory, it contends that higher service prices will lead to a disastrous drop in equipment sales. Presumably, the theory’s corollary is to the effect that low service prices lead to a dramatic increase in equipment sales. According to the theory, one would have expected Kodak to take advantage of lower priced ISO service as an opportunity to expand equipment sales. Instead, Kodak adopted a restrictive sales policy consciously designed to eliminate the lower priced ISO service, an act that would be expected to devastate either Kodak’s equipment sales or Kodak’s faith in its theory. Yet, according to the record, it has done neither. Service prices have risen for Kodak customers, but there is no evidence or assertion that Kodak equipment sales have dropped.

Kodak and the United States attempt to reconcile Kodak’s theory with the contrary actual results by describing a “marketing strategy of spreading over time the total cost to the buyer of Kodak equipment.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; see also Brief for Petitioner 18. In other words, Kodak could charge subcompetitive prices for equipment and make up the difference with supracompetitive prices for service, resulting in an overall competitive price. This pricing strategy would provide an explanation for the theory’s descriptive failings — if Kodak in fact had adopted it. But'Kodak never has asserted that it prices its equipment or parts subcompetitively and recoups its profits through service. Instead, it claims that it prices its equipment comparably to its competitors and intends that both its equipment sales and service divisions be profitable. See App. 159-161, 170, 178, 188. Moreover, this hypothetical pricing strategy is inconsistent with Kodak’s policy toward its self-service customers. If Kodak were underpricing its equipment, hoping to lock in customers and recover its losses in the service *473market, it could not afford to sell customers parts without service. In sum, Kodak’s theory does not explain the actual market behavior revealed in the record;

Respondents offer a forceful reason why Kodak’s theory, although perhaps intuitively appealing, may not accurately explain the behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex durable goods: the existence of significant information and switching costs. These costs could create a less responsive connection between service and parts prices and equipment sales.

For the service-market price to affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the “package” — equipment, service, and parts — at the time, of purchase; that is, consumers must engage in accurate life-cycle pricing.19 Life-cycle pricing of complex, durable equipment is difficult and costly. In order to arrive at an accurate price, a consumer must acquire a substantial amount of raw data and undertake sophisticated analysis. The necessary information would include data on price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, in-cludiftg estimates of breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of “downtime,” and losses incurred from downtime.20

Much of this information is difficult — some of it impossible — to acquire at the time of purchase. During the life of a product, companies may change the service and parts prices, and develop products with more advanced features, a *474decreased need for repair, or new warranties. In addition, the information is likely to be customer specific; lifecycle costs will vary from customer to customer with the type of equipment, degrees of equipment use, and costs of downtime.

Kodak acknowledges the cost of information, but suggests, again without evidentiary support, that customer information needs will be satisfied by competitors in the equipment markets. Brief for Petitioner 26, n. 11. It is a question of fact, however, whether competitors would provide the necessary information. A competitor in the equipment market may not have reliable information about the lifecycle costs of complex equipment it does not service or the needs of customers it does not serve. Even if competitors had the relevant information, it is not clear that their interests would be advanced by providing such information to consumers. See 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 404b1 (1978).21

Moreover, even if consumers were capable of acquiring and processing the complex body of information, they may choose not to do so. Acquiring the information is expensive. If the costs of service are small relative to the equipment price, or if consumers are more concerned about equipment capabilities than service costs, they may not find it cost efficient to *475compile the information. Similarly, some consumers, such as the Federal Government, have purchasing systems that make it difficult to consider the complete cost of the “package” at the time of purchase. State and local governments often treat service as an operating expense and equipment as a capital expense, delegating each to a different department. These governmental entities do not lifecycle price, but rather choose the lowest price in each market. See Brief for National Association of State Purchasing Officials et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae; App. 429-430.

As Kodak notes, there likely will be some large-volume, sophisticated purchasers who will undertake the comparative studies and insist, in return for their patronage, that Kodak charge them competitive lifecycle prices. Kodak contends that these knowledgeable customers will hold down the package price for all other customers. Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 9. There are reasons, however, to doubt that sophisticated purchasers will ensure that competitive prices are charged to unsophisticated purchasers, too. As an initial matter, if the number of sophisticated customers is relatively small, the amount of profits to be gained by supracompetitive pricing in the service market could make it profitable to let the knowledgeable consumers take their business elsewhere. More importantly, if a company is able to price discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to prevent the exploitation of the uninformed. A seller could easily price discriminate by varying the equipment/parts/service package, developing different warranties, or offering price discounts on different components.

Given the potentially high cost of information and the possibility that a seller may be able to price discriminate between knowledgeable and unsophisticated consumers, it makes little sense to assume, in the absence of any eviden-tiary support, that equipment-purchasing decisions are based *476on an accurate assessment of the total cost of equipment, service, and parts over the lifetime of the machine.22

Indeed, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak practices price discrimination by selling parts to customers who service their own equipment, but refusing to sell parts to customers who hire third-party service companies. Companies that have their own service staff are likely to be high-volume users, the same companies for whom it is most likely to be economically worthwhile to acquire the complex information needed for comparative lifecycle pricing.

A second factor undermining Kodak’s claim that supracom-petitive prices in the service market lead to ruinous losses in equipment sales is the cost to current owners of switching to a different product. See Areeda & Turner ¶ 519a.23 If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased the equipment, and are thus “locked in,” will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new purchasers.

Moreover, if the seller can price discriminate between its lockéd-in customers and potential new customers, this strategy is even more likely to prove profitable. The seller could simply charge new customers below-marginal cost on the equipment and recoup the charges in service, or offer pack*477ages with lifetime warranties or long-term service agreements that are not available to locked-in customers.

Respondents have offered evidence that the heavy initial outlay for Kodak equipment, combined with the required support material that works only with Kodak equipment, makes switching costs very high for existing Kodak customers. And Kodak’s own evidence confirms that it varies the package price of equipment/parts/service for different customers.

In sum, there is a question of fact whether information costs and switching costs foil the simple assumption that the equipment and service markets act as pure complements to one another.24

We conclude, then, that Kodak has failed to demonstrate that respondents’ inference of market power in the service and parts markets is unreasonable, and that, consequently, Kodak is entitled to summary judgment. It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak did so.25 It is also plausible, as discussed above, to infer that Kodak chose to gain immediate profits by exerting that market power where locked-in customers, high information costs, and discriminatory pricing limited and perhaps eliminated any long-*478term loss. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents, their allegations of market power “mak[e]... economic sense.” Cf. Matsushita, 475 U. S., at 587.

Nor are we persuaded by Kodak’s contention that it is entitled to a legal presumption on the lack of market power because, as in Matsushita, there is a significant risk of deterring procompetitive conduct. Plaintiffs in Matsushita attempted to prove the antitrust conspiracy “through evidence of rebates and other price-cutting activities.” Id., at 594. Because cutting prices to increase business is “the very essence of competition,” the Court was concerned that mistaken inferences would be “especially costly” and would “chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” Ibid. See also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 763 (1984) (permitting inference of concerted action would “deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct”). But the facts in this case are just the opposite. The alleged conduct — higher service prices and market foreclosure — is facially anticompetitive and exactly the harm that antitrust laws aim to prevent. In this situation, Matsushita does not create any presumption in favor of summary judgment for the defendant.

Kodak contends that, despite the appearance of anticom-petjtiveness, its behavior actually favors competition because its ability to pursue innovative marketing plans will allow it to compete more effectively in the equipment market. Brief for Petitioner 40-41. A pricing strategy based on lower equipment prices and higher aftermarket prices could enhance equipment sales by making it easier for the buyer to finance the initial purchase.26 It is undisputed that competition is enhanced when a firm is able to offer various marketing options, including bundling of support and maintenance service with the sale of equipment. Nor do such ac*479tions run afoul of the antitrust laws.27 But the procom-petitive effect of the specific conduct challenged here, eliminating all consumer parts and service options, is far less clear.28

We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any pro-competitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior will go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment. Cf. Matsushita, 475 U. S., at 594-595.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Kodak has not met the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). We therefore affirm the denial of summary judgment on respondents’ § 1 claim.29

*480) — I H — I H-4

Respondents also claim that they have presented genuine issues for trial as to whether Kodak has monopolized, or at*481tempted to monopolize, the service and parts markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. “The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S., at 570-571.

A

The existence of the first element, possession of monopoly power, is easily resolved. As has been noted, respondents have presented a triable claim that service and parts are separate markets, and that Kodak has the “power to control prices or exclude competition” in service and parts. Du Pont, 351 U. S., at 391. Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1. See Fortner, 394 U. S., at 502. Respondents’ evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is, however, sufficient to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly standard of §2. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 112 (1984). Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S., at 571 (87% of the market is a monopoly); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 797 (1946) (over two-thirds of the market is a monopoly).

Kodak also contends that, as a matter of law, a single brand of a product or service can never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act. We disagree. The relevant mar*482ket for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 19. Because service and parts for Kodak equipment are not interchangeable with other manufacturers’ service and parts, the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner’s perspective is composed of only those companies that service Kodak machines. See Du Pont, 351 U. S., at 404 (“The market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability”).30 This Court’s prior cases support the proposition that in some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 468 U. S., at 101-102, 111-112; International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U. S. 242, 249-252 (1959); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936).31 The proper market definition in this case can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the “commercial realities” faced by consumers. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S., at 572.

B

The second element of a § 2 claim is the use of monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advan*483tage, or to destroy a competitor.” United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 107 (1948). If Kodak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have violated §2. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S., at 570-571; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 432 (CA2 1945); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U. S. 585, 600-605 (1985).32

As recounted at length above, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market. Liability turns, then, on whether “valid business reasons” can explain Kodak’s actions. Id., at 605; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d, at 432. Kodak contends that it has three valid business justifications for its actions: “(1) to promote interbrand equipment competition by allowing Kodak to stress the quality of its service; (2) to improve asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs; and (3) to prevent ISOs from free-riding on Kodak’s capital investment in equipment, parts and service.” Brief for Petitioner 6. Factual questions exist, however, about the validity and sufficiency of each claimed justification, making summary judgment inappropriate.

Kodak first asserts that by preventing customers from using ISO’s, “it [can] best maintain high quality service for its sophisticated equipment” and avoid being “blamed for an equipment malfunction, even if the problem is the result of improper diagnosis, maintenance or repair by an ISO.” Id., at 6-7. Respondents have offered evidence that ISO’s provide quality service and are preferred by some Kodak equipment owners. This is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of *484fact. See International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S., at 139-140 (rejecting IBM’s claim that it had to control the cards used in its machines to avoid “injury to the reputation of the machines and the good will of” IBM in the absence of proof that other companies could not make quality cards); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1947) (rejecting International Salt’s claim that it had to control the supply of salt to protect its leased machines in the absence of proof that competitors could not supply salt of equal quality).

Moreover, there are other reasons to question Kodak’s proffered motive of commitment to quality service; its quality justification appears inconsistent with its thesis that consumers are knowledgeable enough to lifecycle price, and its self-service policy. Kodak claims the exclusive-service contract is warranted because customers would otherwise blame Kodak equipment for breakdowns resulting from inferior ISO service. Thus, Kodak simultaneously claims that its customers are sophisticated enough to make complex and subtle lifecycle-pricing decisions, and yet too obtuse to distinguish which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and which are due to bad service. Kodak has failed to offer any reason why informational sophistication should be present in one circumstance and absent in the other. In addition, because self-service customers are just as likely as others to blame Kodak equipment for breakdowns resulting from (their own) inferior service, Kodak’s willingness to allow self-service casts doubt on its quality claim. In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that respondents “have presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Kodak’s first reason is pretextual.” 903 F. 2d, at 618.

There is also a triable issue of fact on Kodak’s second justification — controlling inventory costs. As respondents argue, Kodak’s actions appear inconsistent with any need to control inventory costs. Presumably, the inventory of parts *485needed to repair Kodak machines turns only on breakdown rates, and those rates should be the same whether Kodak or ISO’s perform the repair. More importantly, the justification fails to explain respondents’ evidence that Kodak forced OEM’s, equipment owners, and parts brokers not to sell parts to ISO’s, actions that would have no effect on Kodak’s inventory costs.

Nor does Kodak’s final justification entitle it to summary judgment on respondents’ § 2 claim. Kodak claims that its policies prevent ISO’s from “exploiting] the investment Kodak has made in product development, manufacturing and equipment sales in order to take away Kodak’s service revenues.” Brief for Petitioner 7-8. Kodak does not dispute that respondents invest substantially in the service market, with training of repair workers and investment in parts inventory. Instead, according to Kodak, the ISO’s are free-riding because they have failed to enter the equipment and parts markets. This understanding of free-riding has no support in our case law.33 To the contrary, as the Court of Appeals noted, one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously. Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 14; Fortner, 394 U. S., at 509.

None of Kodak’s asserted business justifications, then, are sufficient to prove that Kodak is “entitled to a judgment as *486a matter of law” on respondents’ § 2 claim. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c).

IV

In the end, of course, Kodak’s arguments may prove to be correct. It may be that its parts, service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment market does discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anticompetitive effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects. But we cannot reach these conclusions as a matter of law on a record this sparse. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying summary judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

with whom Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

This is not, as the Court describes it, just “another case that concerns the standard for summary judgment in an antitrust controversy.” Ante, at 454. Rather, the case presents a very narrow — but extremely important — question of substantive antitrust law: whether, for purposes of applying our per se rule condemning “ties,” and for purposes of applying our exacting rules governing the behavior of would-be monopolists, a manufacturer’s conceded lack of power in the interbrand market for its equipment is somehow consistent with its possession of “market,” or even “monopoly,” power in wholly derivative aftermarkets for that equipment. In my view, the Court supplies an erroneous answer to this question, and I dissent.

I

Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and experience show that the risk of injury to competition from the defendant’s behavior is so pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual judicial inquiry into the balance between the behavior’s pro-*487competitive benefits and its anticompetitive costs. See, e. g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 350-351 (1982). “The character of the restraint produced by [behavior to which a per se rule applies] is considered a sufficient basis for presuming unreasonableness without the necessity of any analysis of the market context in which the [behavior] may be found.” Jefferson Parish Hospital Dish No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 9 (1984). The per se rule against tying is just such a rule: Where the conditions precedent to application of the rule are met, i e., where the tying arrangement is backed up by the defendant’s market power in the “tying” product, the arrangement is adjudged in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1988 ed., Supp. II), without any inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on competition and consumer welfare. But see United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560 (ED Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365 U. S. 567 (1961) (per curiam) (accepting affirmative defense to per se tying allegation).

Despite intense criticism of the tying doctrine in academic circles, see, e. g., R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 365-381 (1978), the stated rationale for our per se rule has varied little over the years. When the defendant has genuine “market power” in the tying product — the power to raise price by reducing output — the tie potentially enables him to extend that power into a second distinct market, enhancing barriers to entry in each. In addition:

“[T]ying arrangements may be used to evade price control in the tying product through clandestine transfer of the profit to the tied product; they may be used as a counting device to effect price discrimination; and they may be used to force a full line of products on the customer so as to extract more easily from him a monopoly return on one unique product in the line.” Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U. S. 495, 513-514 (1969) (Fortner I) (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

*488For these reasons, as we explained in Jefferson Parish, “the law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on competition in the market for a tied product, on the other.” 466 U. S., at 14.

Our § 2 monopolization doctrines are similarly directed to discrete situations in which a defendant’s possession of substantial market power, combined with his exclusionary or an-ticompetitive behavior, threatens to defeat or forestall the corrective forces of competition and thereby sustain or extend the defendant’s agglomeration of power. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966). Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws — or that might even be viewed as procompetitive — can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist. 3 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶ 813, pp. 300-302 (1978) (hereinafter 3 Areeda & Turner).

The concerns, however, that have led the courts to heightened scrutiny both of the “exclusionary conduct” practiced by a monopolist and of tying arrangements subject to per se prohibition, are completely without force when the participant's lack market power. As to the former, “[t]he [very] definition of exclusionary conduct,” as practiced by a monopolist, is “predicated on the existence of substantial market power.” Id., ¶ 813, at 301; see, e. g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 177-178 (1965) (fraudulent patent procurement); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 75 (1911) (acquisition of competitors); 3 Areeda & Turner ¶ 724, at 195-197 (vertical integration). And with respect to tying, we have recognized that bundling arrangements not coerced by the heavy hand of market power can serve the procompetitive functions of facilitating new entry into cer*489tain markets, see, e. g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 330 (1962), permitting “clandestine price cutting in products which otherwise would have no price competition at all because of fear of retaliation from the few other producers dealing in the market,” Fortner I, supra, at 514, n. 9 (White, J., dissenting), assuring quality control, see, e. g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 306 (1949), and, where “the tied and tying products are functionally related, . . . reducing] costs through economies of joint production and distribution.” Fortner I, supra, at 514, n. 9 (White, J., dissenting). “Accordingly, we have [only] condemned tying arrangements [under the per se rule] when the seller has some special ability — usually called ‘market power’ — to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.” Jefferson Parish, supra, at 13-14.

The Court today finds in the typical manufacturer’s inherent power over its own brand of equipment — over the sale of distinctive repair parts for that equipment, for example— the sort of “monopoly power” sufficient to bring the sledgehammer of §2 into play. And, not surprisingly in light of that insight, it readily labels single-brand power over aftermarket products “market power” sufficient to permit an antitrust plaintiff to invoke the per se rule against tying. In my opinion, this makes no economic sense. The holding that market power can be found on the present record causes these venerable rules of selective proscription to extend well beyond the point where the reasoning that supports them leaves off. Moreover, because the sort of power condemned by the Court today is possessed by every manufacturer of durable goods with distinctive parts, the Court’s opinion threatens to release a torrent of litigation and a flood of commercial intimidation that will do much more harm than good. to enforcement of the antitrust laws and to genuine competition. I shall explain, in Parts II and III, respectively, how neither logic nor experience suggests, let alone compels, ap*490plication of the per se tying prohibition and monopolization doctrine to a seller’s behavior in its single-brand aftermarkets, when that seller is without power at the interbrand level.

HH 1 — 4

On appeal in the Ninth Circuit, respondents, having waived their “rule of reason” claim, were limited to arguing that the record, construed in the light most favorable to them, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986), supported application of the per se tying prohibition to Kodak’s restrictive parts and service policy. See 908 F. 2d 612, 615, n. 1 (1990). As the Court observes, in order to survive Kodak’s motion for summary judgment on this claim, respondents bore the burden of proffering evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Kodak possesses power in the market for the alleged “tying” product. See ante, at 464; Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 13-14.

A

We must assume, for purposes of deciding this case, that petitioner is without market, much less monopoly, power in the interbrand markets for its micrographic and photocopying equipment. See ante, at 465-466, n. 10; Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 816 (1985). In the District Court, respondents did, in fact, include in their complaint an allegation which posited the interbrand equipment markets as the relevant markets; in particular, they alleged a §1 “tie” of micrographic and photocopying equipment to the parts and service for those machines. App. 22-23. Though this allegation was apparently abandoned in pursuit of §§1 and 2 claims focused exclusively on the parts and service aftermarkets (about which more later), I think it helpful to analyze how that claim would have fared under the per se rule.

Had Kodak — from the date of its entry into the micro-graphic and photocopying equipment markets — included a lifetime parts and service warranty with all original equip*491ment, or required consumers to purchase a lifetime parts and service contract with each machine, that bundling of equipment, parts, and service would no doubt constitute a tie under the tests enunciated in Jefferson Parish, supra. Nevertheless, it would be immune from per se scrutiny under the antitrust laws because the tying product would be equipment, a market in which (we assume) Kodak has no power to influence price or quantity. See id., at 13-14; United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U. S. 610, 620 (1977) (Fortner II); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1958). The same result would obtain, I think, had Kodak — from the date of its market entry— consistently pursued an announced policy of limiting parts sales in the manner alleged in this case, so that customers bought with the knowledge that aftermarket support could be obtained only from Kodak. The foreclosure of respondents from the business of servicing Kodak’s micrographic and photocopying machines in these illustrations would be undeniably complete — as complete as the foreclosure described in respondents’ complaint. Nonetheless, we would inquire no further than to ask whether Kodak’s market power in the equipment market effectively forced consumers to purchase Kodak micrographic or photocopying machines subject to the company’s restrictive aftermarket practices. If not, that would end the case insofar as the per se rule was concerned. See Jefferson Parish, supra, at 13-14; 9 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1709c5, pp. 101-102 (1991); Klein & Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. Law & Econ. 345, 356 (1985). The evils against which the tying prohibition is directed would simply not be presented. Interbrand competition would render Kodak powerless to gain economic power over an additional class of consumers, to price discriminate by charging each customer a “system” price equal to the system’s economic value to that customer, or to raise barriers to entry in the interbrand equipment markets. See 3 Areeda & Turner ¶ 829d, at 331-332.

*492I have described these illustrations as hypothetical, but in fact they are not far removed from this case. The record below is consistent — in large part — with just this sort of bundling of equipment on the one hand, with parts and service on the other. The restrictive parts policy, with respect to micrographic equipment at least, was not even alleged to be anything but prospective. See App. 17. As respondents summarized their factual proffer below:

“Under this policy, Kodak cut off parts on new products to Kodak micrographics [independent service organizations] ISOs. The effect of this, of course, was that as customers of Kodak micrographics ISOs obtained new equipment, the ISOs were unable to service the equipment for that customer, and, service for these customers was lost by the Kodak ISOs. Additionally, as equipment became obsolete, and the equipment population became all “new equipment” (post April 1985 models), Kodak micrographics ISOs would be able to service no equipment at all.” Id., at 360.

As to Kodak copiers, Kodak’s restrictive parts policy had a broader foundation: Considered in the light most favorable to respondents, see Anderson, supra, at 255, the record suggests that, from its inception, the policy was applied to new and existing copier customers alike. But at least all post-1985 purchasers of micrographic equipment, like all post-1985 purchasers of new Kodak copiers, could have been aware of Kodak’s parts practices. The only thing lacking to bring all of these purchasers (accounting for the vast bulk of the commerce at issue here) squarely within the hypotheti-cals we have described is concrete evidence that the restrictive parts policy was announced or generally known. Thus, under the Court’s approach the existence vel non of such evidence is determinative of the legal standard (the per se rule versus the rule of reason) under which the alleged tie is examined. In my judgment, this makes no sense. It is *493quite simply anomalous that a manufacturer functioning in a competitive equipment market should be exempt from the per se rule when it bundles equipment with parts and service, but not when it bundles parts with service. This vast difference in the treatment of what will ordinarily be economically similar phenomena is alone enough to call today’s decision into question.

B

In the Court of Appeals, respondents sought to sidestep the impediment posed by interbrand competition to their invocation of the per se tying rule by zeroing in on the parts and service “aftermarkets” for Kodak equipment. By alleging a tie of parts to service, rather than of equipment to parts and service, they identified a tying product in which Kodak unquestionably held a near-monopoly share: the parts uniquely associated with Kodak’s brand of machines. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 17. The Court today holds that such a facial showing of market share in a single-brand aftermarket is sufficient to invoke the per se rule. The existence of even vibrant interbrand competition is no defense. See ante, at 470-471.

I find this a curious form of market power on which to premise the application of a per se proscription. It is enjoyed by virtually every manufacturer of durable goods requiring aftermarket support with unique, or relatively unique, goods. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 525.1, p. 563 (Supp. 1991). “[S]uch reasoning makes every maker of unique parts for its own product a holder of market power no matter how unimportant its product might be in the market.” Ibid, (emphasis added).1 Under *494the Court’s analysis, the per se rule may now be applied to single-brand ties effected by the most insignificant players in fully competitive interbrand markets, as long as the arrangement forecloses aftermarket competitors from more than a de minimis amount of business, Fortner I, 394 U. S., at 501. This seems to me quite wrong. A tying arrangement “forced” through the exercise of such power no more implicates the leveraging and price discrimination concerns behind the per se tying prohibition than does a tie of the foremarket brand to its aftermarket derivatives, which — as I have explained — would not be subject to per se condemnation.2 As implemented, the Kodak arrangement challenged *495in this case may have implicated truth-in-advertising or other consumer protection concerns, but those concerns do not alone suggest an antitrust prohibition. See, e. g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F. 2d 468 (CA3 1992) (en banc).

In the absence of interbrand power, a seller’s predominant or monopoly share of its single-brand derivative markets does not connote the power to raise derivative market prices generally by reducing quantity. As Kodak and its principal amicus, the United States, point out, a rational consumer considering the purchase of Kodak equipment will inevitably factor into his purchasing decision the expected cost of aftermarket support. “[B]oth the price of the equipment and the price of parts and service over the life of the equipment are expenditures that are necessary to obtain copying and micro-graphic services.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. If Kodak set generally supracompetitive prices for either spare parts or repair services without making an offsetting reduction in the price of its machines, rational consumers would simply turn to Kodak’s competitors for photocopying and micrographic systems. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F. 2d 792, 796-798 (CA1 1988). True, there are — as the Court notes, see ante, at 474-475 — the occasional irrational consumers that consider only the hardware cost at the time of purchase (a category that regrettably includes the Federal Government, whose “purchasing system,” we are told, assigns foremarket purchases and aftermarket purchases to different entities). But *496we have never before premised the application of antitrust doctrine on the lowest common denominator of consumer.

The Court attempts to counter this theoretical point with a theory of its own. It says that there are “information costs” — the costs and inconvenience to the consumer of acquiring and processing life-cycle pricing data for Kodak machines — that “could create a less responsive connection between service and parts prices and equipment sales.” Ante, at 473. But this truism about the functioning of markets for sophisticated equipment cannot create “market power” of concern to the antitrust laws where otherwise there is none. “Information costs,” or, more accurately, gaps in the availability and quality of consumer information, pervade real-world markets; and because consumers generally make do with “rough cut” judgments about price in such circumstances, in virtually any market there are zones within which otherwise competitive suppliers may overprice their products without losing appreciable market share. We have never suggested that the principal players in a market with such commonplace informational deficiencies (and, thus, bands of apparent consumer pricing indifference) exercise market power in any sense relevant to the antitrust laws. “While [such] factors may generate ‘market power’ in some abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying.” Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 27; see, e. g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., supra.

Respondents suggest that, even if the existence of inter-brand competition prevents Kodak from raising prices generally in its single-brand aftermarkets, there remain certain consumers who are necessarily subject to abusive Kodak pricing behavior by reason of their being “locked in” to their investments in Kodak machines. The Court agrees; indeed, it goes further by suggesting that even a general policy of supracompetitive aftermarket prices might be profitable over the long run because of the “lock-in” phenomenon. “[A] *497seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket,” the Court explains, “if the switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new purchasers.” Ante, at 476. In speculating about this latter possibility, the Court is essentially repudiating the assumption on which we are bound to decide this case, viz., Kodak’s lack of any power whatsoever in the inter-brand market. If Kodak’s general increase in aftermarket prices were to bring the total “system” price above competitive levels in the interbrand market, Kodak would be wholly unable to make further foremarket sales — and would find itself exploiting an ever-dwindling aftermarket, as those Kodak micrographic and photocopying machines already in circulation passed into disuse.

The Court’s narrower point, however, is undeniably true. There will be consumers who, because of their capital investment in Kodak equipment, “will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment brands,” ibid.; this is necessarily true for “every maker of unique parts for its own product.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 525.1b, at 563. But this “circumstantial” leverage created by consumer investment regularly crops up in smoothly functioning, even perfectly competitive, markets, and in most — if not all — of its manifestations, it is of no concern to the antitrust laws. The leverage held by the manufacturer of a malfunctioning refrigerator (which is measured by the consumer’s reluctance to walk away from his initial investment in that device) is no different in kind or degree from the leverage held by the swimming pool contractor when he discovers a 5-ton boulder in his customer’s backyard and demands an additional sum of money to remove it; or the leverage held by an airplane manufacturer over an airline that has “standardized” its fleet around the manufacturer’s models; or the leverage held by a drill press manufacturer whose customers have built their production lines abound the *498manufacturer’s particular style of drill press; or the leverage held by an insurance company over its independent sales force that has invested in company-specific paraphernalia; or the leverage held by a mobile home park owner over his tenants, who are unable to transfer their homes to a different park except at great expense, see generally Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992). Leverage, in the form of circumstantial power, plays a role in each of these relationships; but in none of them is the leverage attributable to the dominant party’s market power in any relevant sense. Though that power can plainly work to the injury of certain consumers, it produces only “a brief perturbation in competitive conditions — not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry about.” Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F. 2d 228, 236 (CA7 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).

The Court correctly observes that the antitrust laws do not permit even a natural monopolist to project its monopoly power into another market, i. e., to “ ‘exploi[t] his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.’ ” Ante, at 480, n. 29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 611 (1953)). However, when a manufacturer uses its control over single-branded parts to acquire influence in single-branded service, the monopoly “leverage” is almost invariably of no practical consequence, because of perfect identity betwéen the consumers in each of the subject aftermarkets (those who need replacement parts for Kodak equipment and those who need servicing of Kodak equipment). When that condition exists, the tie does not permit the manufacturer to project power over a class of consumers distinct from that which it is already able to exploit (and fully) without the inconvenience of the tie. Cf., e. g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L. J. 19, 21-27 (1957).

We have never before accepted the thesis the Court today embraces: that a seller’s inherent control over the unique *499parts for its own brand amounts to “market power” of a character sufficient to permit invocation of the per se rule against tying. As the Court observes, ante, at 479-481, n. 29, we have applied the per se rule to manufacturer ties of foremar-ket equipment to aftermarket derivatives — but only when the manufacturer’s monopoly power in the equipment, coupled with the use of derivative sales as “counting devices” to measure the intensity of customer equipment usage, enabled the manufacturer to engage in price discrimination, and thereby more fully exploit its interbrand power. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922). That sort of enduring opportunity to engage in price discrimination is unavailable to a manufacturer — like Kodak — that lacks power at the inter-brand level. A tie between two aftermarket derivatives does next to nothing to improve a competitive manufacturer’s ability to extract monopoly rents from its consumers.3

*500Nor has any court of appeals (save for the Ninth Circuit panel below) recognized single-branded aftermarket power as a basis for invoking the per se tying prohibition. See Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F. 2d 1318, 1328 (CA6 1992) (“Defining the market by customer demand after the customer has chosen a single supplier fails to take into account that the supplier . . . must compete with other similar suppliers to be designated the *501sole source in the first place”); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F. 2d, at 798 (“[W]e do not see how such dealer investment [in facilities to sell Subaru products] . . . could easily translate into Subaru market power of a kind that, through tying, could ultimately lead to higher than competitive prices for consumers”); A. I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F. 2d 673, 675-677, and n. 3 (CA6 1986) (competition at “small business computer” level precluded assertion of computer manufacturer’s power over software designed for use only with manufacturer’s brand of computer); General Business Systems v. North American Philips Corp., 699 F. 2d 965, 977 (CA9 1983) (“To have attempted to impose significant pressure to buy [aftermarket hardware] by use of the tying service only would have hastened the date on which Philips surrendered to its competitors in the small business computer market”). See also Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F. 2d, at 233 (law-of-the-case doctrine compelled finding of market power in replacement parts for single-brand engine).

We have recognized in closely related contexts that the deterrent effect of mierbrand competition on the exploitation of mirabrand market power should make courts exceedingly reluctant to apply rules of per se illegality to intra-brand restraints. For instance, we have refused to apply a rule of per se illegality to vertical nonprice restraints “because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intra-brand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition,” Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51-52 (1977), the latter of which we described as “the primary concern of antitrust law,” id., at 52, n. 19. We noted, for instance, that “new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer,” and that “[established manufacturers can Use them *502to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products.” Id., at 55. See also Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 726 (1988). The same assumptions, in my opinion, should govern our analysis of ties alleged to have been “forced” solely through mirabrand market power. In the absence of interbrand power, a manufacturer’s bundling of aftermarket products may serve a multitude of legitimate purposes: It may facilitate manufacturer efforts to ensure that the equipment remains operable and thus protect the seller’s business reputation, see United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp., at 560; it may create the conditions for implicit consumer financing of the acquisition cost of the tying equipment through supracompetitively-priced aftermarket purchases, see, e. g., A. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market Practices 378 (1951); and it may, through the resultant manufacturer control of aftermarket activity, “yield valuable information about component or design weaknesses that will materially contribute to product improvement,” 3 Areeda & Turner ¶ 733c, at 258-259; see also id., ¶ 829d, at 331-332. Because the interbrand market will generally punish intra-brand restraints that consumers do not find in their interest, we -should not — under the guise of a per se rule — condemn such potentially procompetitive arrangements simply because of the antitrust defendant’s inherent power over the unique parts for its own brand.

I would instead evaluate the aftermarket tie alleged in this case under the rule of reason, where the tie’s actual anticompetitive effect in the tied product market, together with its potential economic benefits, can be fully captured in the analysis, see, e. g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Disposition of this case does not require such an examination, however, as respondents apparently waived any rule-of-reason claim they *503may have had in the District Court. I would thus reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on the tying claim outright.

J"H HH ) — I

These considerations apply equally to respondents’ §2 claims. An antitrust defendant lacking relevant “market power” sufficient to permit invocation of the per se prohibition against tying a fortiori lacks the monopoly power that warrants heightened scrutiny of his allegedly exclusionary behavior. Without even so much as asking whether the purposes of § 2 are implicated here, the Court points to Kodak’s control of “100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% of the service market,” markets with “no readily available substitutes,” ante, at 481, and finds that the proffer of such statistics is sufficient to fend off summary judgment. But this showing could easily be made, as I have explained, with respect to virtually any manufacturer of differentiated products requiring aftermarket support. By permitting antitrust plaintiffs to invoke §2 simply upon the unexceptional demonstration that a manufacturer controls the supplies of its single-branded merchandise, the Court transforms §2 from a specialized mechanism for responding to extraordinary agglomerations (or threatened agglomerations) of economic power to an all-purpose remedy against run-of-the-mill business torts.

In my view, if the interbrand market is vibrant, it is simply not necessary to enlist § 2’s machinery to police a seller’s in-trabrand restraints. In such circumstances, the interbrand market functions as an infinitely more efficient and more precise corrective to such behavior, rewarding the seller whose intrabrand restraints enhance consumer welfare while punishing the seller whose control of the aftermarkets is viewed unfavorably by interbrand consumers. See Business Electronics Corp., supra, at 725; Continental T. V., Inc., supra, at 52, n. 19, 54. Because this case comes to us on the as*504sumption that Kodak is without such interbrand power, I believe we are compelled to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.