The Court grants, vacates, and remands in this case, apparently because it harbors doubt that petitioner's 1987 conviction under Florida law for battery on a law enforcement officer qualifies as a "violent felony" as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause, which covers a felony offense that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." 18 U. S. C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(i). I share no such doubt: As the case comes to us, it is undisputed that petitioner was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer after he " 'struck [an] officer in the face using a closed fist.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. A-1, p. 11. See Fla. Stat. § 784.03 (1)(a) (2018) (a person commits battery when he "[a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other," among other things). Because the record makes "perfectly clear" that petitioner "was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer by striking, which involves the use of physical force against the person of another," App. to Pet. for Cert. A-1, at 11, I would count the conviction as a "violent felony" under the elements clause and would therefore deny the petition. Mathis v. United States , 579 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2243 , 2267, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016) (ALITO, J., dissenting).