Justice SOTOMAYOR, dissenting from denial of certiorari.In
Honeycutt
v.
United States
, 581 U. S. ----,
137 S.Ct. 1626
,
198 L.Ed.2d 73
(2017), this Court held that joint-and-several liability is not permitted under
98 Stat. 2045
,
21 U.S.C. § 853
(a)(1), which mandates forfeiture of "property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of " certain drug crimes. 581 U. S., at ----,
137 S.Ct., at 1630
. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has since held that the reasoning of
Honeycutt
"appl[ies] with equal force" to
18 U.S.C. § 981
(a)(1)(C), which is worded almost identically to
21 U.S.C. § 853
(a)(1).
United States v. Gjeli
,
867 F.3d 418
, 428 (2017).
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion.
917 F.3d 635
, 652-653 (2019). It upheld a joint-and-several forfeiture order against petitioners under § 981(a)(1)(C), reasoning that
Honeycutt
does not apply to that provision. See
917 F.3d at 652-653
. The Government now concedes error. According to the Government, there is no "distinguishing 18 U.S.C. 981 from 21 U.S.C. 853 for purposes of joint and several liability." Brief in Opposition 6; see also
id.,
at 10 ("[T]he government has agreed that
Honeycutt
's reasoning applies to Section 981(a)(1)(C)"). Nevertheless, the Government maintains that there is an independent ground for the imposition of joint-and-several liability under § 981(a)(1)(C). See
id.,
at 6-9. The Eighth Circuit, however, never addressed that proffered alternative ground for affirmance.
Because the Government now concedes that the rationale of
Honeycutt
applies equally to § 981(a)(1)(C) as it does to § 853(a)(1), I would grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case to allow the Eighth Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of the Government's concession.