(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

    WILKINSON v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                  THE THIRD CIRCUIT

  No. 22–666.      Argued November 28, 2023—Decided March 19, 2024
Congress gives immigration judges discretionary power to cancel the re-
  moval of a noncitizen and instead permit the noncitizen to remain in
  the country lawfully. 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). An IJ faced with an
  application for cancellation of removal proceeds in two steps: The IJ
  must decide first whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of
  removal under the statutory criteria. If the IJ finds the noncitizen
  statutorily eligible, the IJ must then decide whether to exercise discre-
  tion and grant relief. For determining eligibility, Congress has enu-
  merated four statutory criteria, one of which requires the noncitizen
  to “establis[h] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
  unusual hardship to [the noncitizen’s] spouse, parent, or child,” who is
  a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. §1229b(b)(1)(D).
     Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson was arrested and detained by Im-
  migration and Customs Enforcement for remaining in the United
  States beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. Wilkinson applied for
  cancellation of removal based in part on hardship to his 7-year-old,
  U. S.-born son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition and
  relies on Wilkinson for emotional and financial support. To meet the
  hardship standard, Wilkinson had to show that M. “would suffer hard-
  ship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would
  ordinarily be expected to result from [his] removal.” In re Monreal-
  Aguinaga, 

. Considering all of the hardship fac-
  tors presented by Wilkinson in the aggregate, the IJ held that M.’s
  situation did not meet the statutory standard for “exceptional and ex-
  tremely unusual” hardship and denied Wilkinson’s application. The
  Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Third Circuit held that
  it lacked the jurisdiction necessary to review the IJ’s discretionary
  hardship determination. This Court granted certiorari to determine
2                      WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                                Syllabus

    whether the IJ’s “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship deter-
    mination is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under
    §1252(a)(2)(D) or whether that determination is discretionary and
    therefore unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Held: The Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
 review the IJ’s determination in this case. Pp. 7–16.
    (a) The Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction on the basis of
 §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes unreviewable any “judgment[s] regard-
 ing the granting of [discretionary] relief” under §1229b’s cancellation
 of removal provision. Section 1252(a)(2)(D), however, restores juris-
 diction to review “questions of law.” The interaction between these two
 provisions is governed by two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-
 Lasprilla v. Barr, 

, and Patel v. Garland, 

.
 In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that whether a
 noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceed-
 ings for purposes of equitable tolling was a question of fact, not a ju-
 risdiction-restoring “questio[n] of law”. This Court reversed, holding
 that “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of
 law and fact. 

. The Court rejected the Government’s
 argument that “questions of law” referred only to mixed questions that
 are primarily legal rather than primarily factual. Then, in Patel, this
 Court affirmed an Eleventh Circuit holding that it lacked jurisdiction
 to review an IJ’s factual credibility determinations that fell within
 §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar. In so doing, the Court held that
 §1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction in the case because “ques-
 tions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.” Pp. 7–11.
    (b) Wilkinson argues that §1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction in this
 case because the threshold question whether a noncitizen is statutorily
 eligible for cancellation of removal requires a court to assess whether
 an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts.
 Guerrero-Lasprilla compels the conclusion that the application of the
 statutory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a
 given set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. A mixed
 question may require “primarily legal or factual work,” and just be-
 cause it may require a court to immerse itself in facts does not trans-
 form the question into one of fact. U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lak-
 eridge, LLC, 

.
    In this case, the application of the hardship standard—which re-
 quires an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether
 any hardship to a U. S. citizen or permanent-resident family member
 is substantially different from what would normally be expected in the
 removal of a close family member—concededly requires a close exami-
 nation of the facts. As in Guerrero-Lasprilla, a mixed question that
 requires close engagement with the facts is still a mixed question, and
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                                Syllabus

  therefore a “questio[n] of law” reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). And
  as in Patel, the IJ’s underlying factual determinations that Wilkinson
  was credible or that M. had a serious medical condition would be un-
  reviewable factual questions under §1252(a)(2)(D). Pp. 11–12.
     (c) The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,
  nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other precedents limits
  that case solely to judicially created standards like the “due diligence”
  standard for equitable tolling. And this Court has frequently observed
  that the application of a “statutory standard” presents a mixed ques-
  tion of law and fact. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 

. Second, the case of Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v.
  United States, 

, on which the Government relies, has no
  relevance to the question presented here on §1252(a)(2)(D), and the
  Government provides no basis for porting the interpretation of “excep-
  tional hardship” in that case to this one. Nor is the Government’s ar-
  gument from the statutory history of the “hardship requirement” any
  more persuasive. Finally, the argument that a primarily factual mixed
  question is a question of fact was previously rejected in Guerrero-
  Lasprilla, and nothing in §1252(a)(2)(D) supports the Government’s
  view that the phrase “questions of law” is so limited. Pp. 12–15.
Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

  SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KAGAN,
GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting
opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, J., joined.
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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–666
                                   _________________


 SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK
       B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                [March 19, 2024]

   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
   To be eligible for cancellation of removal and adjustment
to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must
meet four statutory criteria. The last requires a showing
that the noncitizen’s removal would result in “exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship” to a U. S.-citizen or per-
manent-resident        family    member.         8    U. S. C.
§1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner Situ Kamu Wilkinson argues
that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to his U. S.-citizen son, who suffers from
a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for emo-
tional and financial support. An Immigration Judge (IJ)
held that this hardship did not rise to the level required by
statute and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) af-
firmed. The Third Circuit dismissed Wilkinson’s petition
for review, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
IJ’s hardship determination.
   The question in this case is whether the IJ’s hardship de-
termination is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), which
gives Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review “questions of
law.” This Court holds that it is. The application of a stat-
utory legal standard (like the exceptional and extremely
2                    WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                        Opinion of the Court

unusual hardship standard) to an established set of facts is
a quintessential mixed question of law and fact. Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr held that such questions are reviewable
under §1252(a)(2)(D). 

 (2020). Accord-
ingly, this Court reverses.
                                I
                                A
   When an IJ finds a noncitizen removable for violating the
immigration laws, Congress provides several avenues for
discretionary relief. Relevant here, an IJ may “cancel re-
moval” of a noncitizen who meets certain statutory criteria.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 

, as added
and amended, 8 U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). Cancellation of re-
moval permits a noncitizen to remain in the country law-
fully. An IJ deciding a noncitizen’s request for cancellation
of removal proceeds in two steps. First, the IJ must decide
whether the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation under the
relevant statutory criteria. Second, an IJ decides whether
to exercise his discretion favorably and grant the noncitizen
relief in the particular case.1 A noncitizen bears the burden
of proving that he both “satisfies the applicable eligibility
requirements” and “merits a favorable exercise of discre-
tion.” §1229a(c)(4)(A).
   Congress enumerated certain statutory criteria to govern
the first step of an IJ’s cancellation-of-removal determina-
tion. For a noncitizen who never received lawful permanent
residence (i.e., a green card), those criteria are stringent.
He is eligible for cancellation of removal only if he meets
four requirements: (1) he “has been physically present in
the United States for a continuous period of not less than
10 years” before he applies; (2) he “has been a person of good
moral character during such period”; (3) he has not been
——————
  1 This second step is not perfunctory. Congress has imposed a statu-

tory cap of 4,000 noncitizens each fiscal year who can have discretion
exercised in their favor. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(e).
                 Cite as: 

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                     Opinion of the Court

convicted of certain criminal offenses; and (4) he “estab-
lishes that removal would result in exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child,”
who is a U. S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.
§§1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). After determining whether a noncit-
izen meets these criteria, an IJ proceeds to step two and
decides whether to exercise discretion to cancel the order of
removal in a particular case.
                              B
   Wilkinson was born in Trinidad and Tobago. After police
officers beat, robbed, and threatened to kill him in 2003,
Wilkinson fled to the United States on a tourist visa. He
has remained in this country ever since, beyond the expira-
tion of his visa. In 2013, Wilkinson had a son, M., with his
girlfriend Kenyatta Watson. Both M. and Watson are U. S.
citizens.
   Wilkinson lived in Pennsylvania and worked to support
M. and Watson. M. lived with Wilkinson and Watson for
the first two years of his life. Then, because Wilkinson
could not take care of his son and work at the same time,
he and Watson decided M. would have a better quality of
life in New Jersey with his mother and her mother. Wil-
kinson took the train to visit his son every weekend and
provided almost half his monthly wages ($1,200 per month)
in informal child support. M. suffers from severe asthma,
which requires hospital treatment multiple times a year.
Wilkinson helped M. with his inhaler and medications and
knew his regimen well. Watson suffers from depression and
does not work, so she also relies on Wilkinson’s financial
and childcare support.
    Wilkinson worked as a handyman and a laborer in con-
struction. In 2019, police found drugs in a house where he
had been hired to work on repairs. Despite Wilkinson’s pro-
tests that neither the house nor the drugs were his, the po-
4                 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                     Opinion of the Court

lice arrested him. When Wilkinson appeared in a Pennsyl-
vania courthouse to contest the charges, he was arrested
and detained by federal immigration officers. The criminal
charges were ultimately withdrawn.
   M. was seven years old when Immigration and Customs
Enforcement detained his father. Afterwards, M. began to
exhibit behavioral issues. M. became sad, acted out, and
broke things. M.’s teacher texted Watson every day saying
that M. was no longer focused and needed to talk to a coun-
selor. Wilkinson called his son every other day from immi-
gration detention. When M. hung up the phone, he cried
and said he wanted his father to come home.
                              C
   Wilkinson conceded before the IJ that he was removable
under §1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his tourist visa. He
asked for relief from that removal, claiming eligibility for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. Relevant here, he also applied
for cancellation of removal based on hardship to his U. S.-
citizen son, M. The U. S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) stipulated that Wilkinson met the first three statu-
tory criteria for eligibility (namely, continuous physical
presence, good moral character, and lack of specific crimi-
nal bars) but contested the last: exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to M. Wilkinson, Watson, and M.’s
grandmother all testified in support of Wilkinson’s applica-
tions for relief.
   In evaluating Wilkinson’s applications, the IJ found Wil-
kinson credible (despite DHS’s attempts to impeach him),
and credited the testimonies of each witness in full. The IJ
then turned to cancellation of removal and recited the
standard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
adopted by the BIA. To meet this standard, a noncitizen
“must demonstrate that a qualifying relative would suffer
hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that
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                      Opinion of the Court

which would ordinarily be expected to result from their re-
moval, but need not show that such hardship would be ‘un-
conscionable.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (quoting In re
Monreal-Aguinaga, 

 (BIA 2021)). In
evaluating whether a noncitizen meets this standard, IJs
must consider a range of factors, including the age and
health of the qualifying family member. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 26a–27a (citing In re Andaloza-Rivas, 

, 323–324 (BIA 2002); Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.
Dec., at 63). “[A]ll hardship factors should be considered in
the aggregate to determine whether the qualifying relative
will suffer hardship that rises to the level of ‘exceptional
and extremely unusual.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a (quot-
ing Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 64).
  The IJ then applied this standard to the established facts.
He found that M.’s asthma was a serious medical condition
and that Wilkinson provided emotional and financial care
to his son. He found that M. had been struggling since Wil-
kinson’s detention. Nevertheless, the IJ held that M. did
not meet the statutory standard for exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship. The IJ reasoned that M. re-
ceived medical insurance from the government and that he
and his family might qualify for other public assistance if
necessary. Although Wilkinson provided emotional sup-
port, the IJ noted that M. had lived without Wilkinson’s
“daily presence” for most of M.’s life. App. to Pet. for Cert.
28a. The IJ recognized that M. and his mother would suffer
some financial hardship from Wilkinson’s removal. Yet the
IJ reasoned that Wilkinson had not provided evidence that
he would be unable to work and support his family from
Trinidad and Tobago. The IJ also noted that M.’s mother
was able to work even though she had primarily been caring
for M. He reasoned that M.’s grandmother, who had helped
care for M. before, could continue to do so.
  Based on “the aggregate of the factors” that he “weighed,”
the IJ found that any financial or emotional hardship was
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                          Opinion of the Court

not “beyond that which would normally be expected from
the removal of a parent and provider.” Id., at 29a (citing
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 65). Ultimately, the
IJ held that “the evidence of hardship” in the case did not
rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Because he held that
Wilkinson was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of re-
moval, the IJ did “not reach determining whether or not to
exercise [his] discretion to grant the application for cancel-
lation of removal.” Ibid. The IJ denied Wilkinson’s appli-
cation. Wilkinson appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.
The BIA affirmed without issuing an opinion.
   Wilkinson petitioned the Third Circuit for review, argu-
ing that the court had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s hard-
ship determination as a mixed question of law and fact. The
Third Circuit held that because the hardship determination
was “discretionary,” it lacked jurisdiction to review it. Id.,
at 3a (citing §1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland, 

 (2022)). It therefore dismissed that part of Wilkinson’s
petition.
   Wilkinson asked this Court to grant certiorari to resolve
whether the IJ’s “determination that a given set of estab-
lished facts does not rise to the statutory standard of ‘ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) . . . or
whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call
unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” Pet. for Cert. i. This
Court granted certiorari. 

 (2023). The Courts
of Appeals are split on this question.2 This Court now holds
——————
   2 Three Circuits have held that courts of appeals have jurisdiction over

hardship determinations because they are mixed questions of law and
fact. See Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 

 (CA7 2022); Singh
v. Rosen, 

 (CA6 2021); Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland,

 (CA4 2021). Six Circuits have indicated that courts of
appeals have no jurisdiction over the BIA’s hardship determinations.
See Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland, 

 (CA8 2022); Flores-
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                         Opinion of the Court

that the application of the exceptional and extremely unu-
sual hardship standard to a given set of facts is reviewable
as a question of law under §1252(a)(2)(D).
                                II
   Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that a court of appeals
may consider final orders of removal via petitions raising
“constitutional claims or questions of law.” In Guerrero-
Lasprilla, this Court held that “the statutory phrase ‘ques-
tions of law’ includes the application of a legal standard to
undisputed or established facts,” also referred to as mixed
questions of law and fact. 

. The statutory
criterion of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
is a legal standard that an IJ must, at the first step, apply
to a set of established facts. This Court therefore holds that
it is a “questio[n] of law” over which §1252(a)(2)(D) provides
judicial review.
   The hardship determination in this case was not discre-
tionary. Because the IJ held that M.’s hardship did not sat-
isfy the statutory eligibility criteria, he never reached the
second step and exercised his unreviewable discretion to
cancel or decline to cancel Wilkinson’s removal. The Third
Circuit therefore erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the IJ’s determination in this case.
                                A
  Section 1252 generally grants federal courts the power to
review final orders of removal. §1252(a)(1). It then strips
courts of jurisdiction for certain categories of removal order.


——————
Alonso v. United States Atty. Gen., 

 (CA11 2022)
(per curiam); Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 

 (CA5
2022) (per curiam); Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland, 

 (CA9
2021) (per curiam); Hernandez-Morales v. Attorney Gen. U. S., 

, 249 (CA3 2020); Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 

, 1183–
1184 (CA10 2020).
8                      WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                           Opinion of the Court

§1252(a)(2). Finally, it restores jurisdiction to review “con-
stitutional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D).3
   Relevant here, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdic-
tion over “judgment[s] regarding the granting of [discre-
tionary] relief under section . . . 1229b.” Section 1229b gov-
erns cancellation of removal. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
therefore strips courts of jurisdiction over a “judgment” on
cancellation of removal. The Third Circuit held that it had
no jurisdiction over the part of Wilkinson’s petition related
to the hardship determination on this basis.
   That holding ignores §1252(a)(2)(D), which restores juris-
diction to review “questions of law.” Two clear rules govern
the interaction between §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (which strips ju-
risdiction over judgments regarding discretionary relief )
and §1252(a)(2)(D) (which restores it for legal questions),
laid out in two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-
Lasprilla and Patel. Guerrero-Lasprilla held that petitions
raising mixed questions of law and fact are always review-
able as questions of law under §1252(a)(2)(D). 

. Patel held that questions of fact underlying denials of
discretionary relief are unreviewable under both
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and §1252(a)(2)(D). 

.
Those two rules resolve this case.
   In Guerrero-Lasprilla, §1252(a)(2)(C) stripped courts of
jurisdiction over two noncitizens’ orders of removal via a
different provision targeting certain criminal convictions.
Those noncitizens had sought to reopen their immigration


——————
  3 This scheme is the result of this Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr,

 (2001), which construed earlier versions of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions as permitting review in habeas corpus proceedings
“to avoid the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by a
contrary interpretation.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

(2020) (citing St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299–305). Congress enacted
§1252(a)(2)(D) to ensure the constitutionality of its jurisdiction-stripping
provisions. See 589 U. S., at 232–234.
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                      Opinion of the Court

cases after being removed because a change in the law re-
garding their criminal convictions rendered them newly el-
igible for discretionary relief. Although the 90-day time
limit to reopen their cases had expired, they argued that
the limit should be “equitably tolled.” 589 U. S., at 225–
226. The BIA denied their request, concluding that each
had failed to demonstrate the requisite due diligence.
When the noncitizens petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review
of that decision, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
decide the question. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
whether a noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reo-
pen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling
was a question of fact, not a “questio[n] of law” that would
restore jurisdiction under §1252(a)(2)(D).
   This Court reversed. The Court held that “questions of
law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of law and
fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla, 

. The “applica-
tion of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts”
is a mixed question. 

 Whether the BIA had correctly
applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to the
facts was therefore a question of law reviewable by a court
of appeals.
   In so doing, this Court rejected the Government’s pri-
mary argument that “questions of law” referred only to
mixed questions that are primarily legal rather than pri-
marily factual. Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned,
would “forbid review of any [BIA] decision applying a
properly stated legal standard, irrespective of how mis-
taken that application might be.” 

. This Court
also rejected the Government’s alternative argument that
“questions of law” should be limited to “ ‘pure’ ” questions of
law based on the statutory context, history, and relevant
precedent. 

 at 230–234. Finally, the Court rejected the
Government’s argument that interpreting “questions of
law” to cover all mixed questions would “undercut Congress’
efforts to severely limit and streamline judicial review.” 

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                      Opinion of the Court

at 235. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) had no effect on the unreview-
ability of factual determinations which, as the Court noted,
are “an important category in the removal context.” 

   The issue of questions of fact came before this Court in
Patel. There, the noncitizen checked a box in his applica-
tion for a state driver’s license indicating that he was a U. S.
citizen when he was not. 

. Because of that
misrepresentation, he became statutorily inadmissible to
adjust his status to permanent resident. Later, in removal
proceedings, the noncitizen conceded he was removable but
argued that he mistakenly checked the box and lacked the
statutory mens rea. The IJ found him not credible, based
partly on the fact that he had a strong incentive to deceive
state officials about his citizenship status to obtain a state
driver’s license. The noncitizen appealed, arguing that the
basis for the credibility determination was clearly wrong:
Under state law, he was entitled to a driver’s license with-
out being a citizen. The BIA determined that the IJ’s fac-
tual findings were not clearly erroneous and dismissed the
appeal. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition for re-
view, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which strips courts of jurisdiction to re-
view “ ‘any judgment regarding the granting of relief ’ ” un-
der the adjustment-of-status provision. Id., at 335. The
court concluded that both whether petitioner had testified
credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to mis-
represent himself as a citizen were factual determinations
that fell within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar.
   This Court affirmed. The Court held that these factual
findings, which formed the basis for the denial of relief, fell
within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision.
Further, §1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction, because
“questions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.”
Ibid. Relying on Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court noted that
questions of fact were the “major remaining category” for
which Congress could still strip courts of jurisdiction. 596
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                      Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 339–340.
                               B
   Wilkinson does not dispute that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) gener-
ally strips courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-
removal decisions. He argues, instead, that §1252(a)(2)(D)
restores jurisdiction in this case because the threshold
question whether a noncitizen is statutorily eligible for can-
cellation of removal requires a court to assess whether an
IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of
facts. This Court agrees that the application of the statu-
tory “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” stand-
ard to a given set of facts presents a mixed question of law
and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.
   Guerrero-Lasprilla held that “the statutory term ‘ques-
tions of law’ ” in §1252(a)(2)(D) “includes the application of
a legal standard to established facts.” 

.
That term included the application of the due diligence
standard for equitable tolling to a given set of facts. Simi-
larly, the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
standard in §1229b(b)(1)(D) is a legal standard that an IJ
applies to facts. The standard may require an IJ to closely
examine and weigh a set of established facts, but it is not a
factual inquiry. It is, inescapably, a mixed question of law
and fact.
   Mixed questions “are not all alike.” U. S. Bank N. A. v.
Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 

, 395–396 (2018).
A mixed question may require “primarily legal or factual
work.” 

. It may “require courts to expound on
the law . . . by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal
standard.” 

 Or it may “immerse courts in case-specific
factual issues—compelling them to marshal and weigh evi-
dence.” 

 That a mixed question requires a court to
immerse itself in facts does not transform the question into
one of fact. It simply suggests a more deferential standard
of review.
12                 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                      Opinion of the Court

   As interpreted by the BIA, the application of the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” standard requires
an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining
whether any hardship to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-resi-
dent family member is “substantially different from, or be-
yond, that which would normally be expected from the de-
portation” of a “close family membe[r ].” Monreal-Aguinaga,
23 I. & N. Dec., at 65. That application concededly requires
a close examination of the facts. Yet that was also true of
the due diligence standard in Guerrero-Lasprilla, which re-
quired a court to evaluate whether a noncitizen was ade-
quately conscientious in his pursuit of a filing deadline. A
mixed question that requires close engagement with the
facts is still a mixed question, and it is therefore a “ques-
tio[n] of law” that is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D).
   Under Patel, of course, a court is still without jurisdiction
to review a factual question raised in an application for dis-
cretionary relief. As in Patel, that would include the IJ’s
underlying factual determination that Wilkinson was cred-
ible, or the finding that M. had a serious medical condition.
When an IJ weighs those found facts and applies the “ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, how-
ever, the result is a mixed question of law and fact that is
reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D).
                              C
   The Government’s counterarguments largely seek to re-
litigate Guerrero-Lasprilla. This Court is unpersuaded.
   First, the Government argues that the statutory stand-
ard is not a legal standard at all. It asks this Court to limit
Guerrero-Lasprilla solely to judicially created standards
like the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling.
Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other prece-
dents supports such a distinction. This Court has fre-
quently observed that the application of a “statutory stand-
ard” presents a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g.,
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)             13

                      Opinion of the Court

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 

(1982) (defining a mixed question as asking whether “the
historical facts . . . satisfy the statutory standard”); Ornelas
v. United States, 

, 696–697 (1996) (same);
U. S. Bank, 

 (same). Guerrero-Lasprilla
itself reflected this understanding. See 

(reasoning that §1252(a)(2)(D) was intended to preserve the
kind of review traditionally available in a habeas proceed-
ing, including review of the “erroneous application or inter-
pretation of statutes” (emphasis deleted; internal quotation
marks omitted)). This Court sees no reason to treat the
statutory hardship standard here any differently from a ju-
dicially created “due diligence” standard.
   Second, the Government argues that a 1928 case, Wil-
liamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 

, and
the statutory history of the hardship requirement preclude
review. In Williamsport, the Court evaluated a wartime
tax-relief provision that was in effect from 1919 to 1921.
That provision allowed the Internal Revenue Service Com-
missioner to use a “ ‘special method’ ” for determining a com-
pany’s tax burden if computation under the regular scheme
would work “ ‘an exceptional hardship.’ ” 

. The
statute granted the Commissioner power to act, for the
most part, without any justification. The Commissioner did
not have to make findings of fact, and had to create a “mea-
gre record” only if he ordered a special assessment. 

. This Court therefore concluded that the IRS’s “excep-
tional hardship” determination was a question of adminis-
trative discretion not subject to judicial review. 

   Williamsport has no relevance to the question presented
here. The Government provides no basis for why this Court
should port the interpretation of “exceptional hardship”
from a 1919 tax-relief provision to a 1996 immigration-re-
lief provision. An IJ applying the “exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship” standard must create an exten-
sive record of his decisionmaking, including detailed fact-
14                 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                       Opinion of the Court

finding and the application of BIA precedent. Additionally,
Williamsport did not evaluate the term “exceptional hard-
ship” against the background of a jurisdiction-restoring pro-
vision like §1252(a)(2)(D), enacted in 2005.
   The Government’s argument from the statutory history
of the “hardship requirement” is no more persuasive. Brief
for Respondent 26. The precursor to cancellation of removal
was suspension of deportation. That relief was available
only to a “person whose deportation would, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to the noncitizen himself or a qualifying
relative. §§244(a)(1)–(5), 66 Stat. 214–216 (emphasis
added). The Government argues that this Court should
read that discretion back into the current version of the
statute.
   The Government’s request to reinstate statutory lan-
guage removed by Congress is particularly unavailing be-
cause Congress chose to retain similar language in provi-
sions governing other forms of discretionary relief subject
to §1252(a)(2)(B)’s bar on judicial review. See, e.g.,
§1182(h)(1)(B) (allowing relief “if it is established to the sat-
isfaction of the Attorney General that the [noncitizen’s] de-
nial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the
United States citizen”); §1182(i)(1) (allowing relief “if it is
established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that
the refusal of admission . . . of such [noncitizen] would re-
sult in extreme hardship to the citizen . . . spouse or par-
ent”); §1255(l)(1) (allowing relief if “in the opinion of the
Secretary of [DHS], in consultation with the Attorney Gen-
eral, as appropriate . . . the [noncitizen] would suffer ex-
treme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon
removal”). Congress could have, but did not, do the same
with the hardship requirement in §1229b(b)(1).
   The Government’s final argument is one this Court al-
ready rejected in Guerrero-Lasprilla: that a primarily fac-
tual mixed question is a question of fact. Such a rule would
                      Cite as: 

 (2024)                      15

                           Opinion of the Court

require a court of appeals evaluating its jurisdiction to de-
termine in every instance whether a particular legal stand-
ard presented a primarily factual or primarily legal inquiry.
Nothing in §1252(a)(2)(D) or its statutory context suggests
that “questions of law” is so limited. See 589 U. S., at 227–
228. This Court declined to require the courts of appeals to
engage in that complex line-drawing exercise in Guerrero-
Lasprilla, and it declines to do so here.
                         *      *    *
   Today’s decision announces nothing more remarkable
than the fact that this Court meant what it said in Guer-
rero-Lasprilla: Mixed questions of law and fact, even when
they are primarily factual, fall within the statutory defini-
tion of “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) and are therefore
reviewable. That holding does not render §1252(a)(2)’s ju-
risdiction-stripping provisions meaningless. As this Court
said in Guerrero-Lasprilla and reiterated in Patel, those
provisions still operate to exclude “agency fact-finding from
review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 234–235; Patel,

 (“[J]udicial review of factfinding is una-
vailable”). The facts underlying any determination on can-
cellation of removal therefore remain unreviewable. For in-
stance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of
a family member’s medical condition, or the level of finan-
cial support a noncitizen currently provides remain unre-
viewable. Only the question whether those established
facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to
judicial review.4 Because this mixed question is primarily
factual, that review is deferential.
   For these reasons, the Court reverses the Third Circuit’s

——————
  4 Similarly, if the IJ decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of

removal at step one, his step-two discretionary determination on
whether or not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case is
not reviewable as a question of law.
16                WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                     Opinion of the Court

“jurisdictional” decision, vacates its judgment, and re-
mands the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                            It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)             1

               JACKSON, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–666
                          _________________


 SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK
       B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        [March 19, 2024]

   JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment.
   The Immigration and Nationality Act plainly constrains
judicial review of discretionary-relief determinations. It
first strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment
regarding the granting of relief ” under provisions including
8 U. S. C. §1229b, which governs cancellation of removal.
See §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Then, the Act restores judicial review
for only a subset of claims—“constitutional claims or ques-
tions of law” raised in a petition for review in the courts of
appeals. §1252(a)(2)(D). Through these provisions, Con-
gress made clear that courts should play a minimal role in
the discretionary-relief process.
   In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

 (2020), the
Court interpreted the phrase “questions of law” in
§1252(a)(2)(D) to include mixed questions of law and fact,
i.e., “the application of a legal standard to undisputed or es-
tablished facts.” Id., at 225. Today, the Court removes any
doubt that the phrase “questions of law” encompasses all
mixed questions, even those that are “primarily factual.”
Ante, at 15. Thus, an immigration judge’s determination
that a “noncitizen’s removal would result in ‘exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship’ ” presents a judicially re-
viewable mixed question.              Ante, at 1 (quoting
§1229b(b)(1)(D)). Pointing to our precedent, the Court
holds that “Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.”
2                  WILKINSON v. GARLAND

               JACKSON, J., concurring in judgment

Ante, at 11.
   I am skeptical that Congress intended “questions of law”
as used in §1252(a)(2)(D) to sweep so broadly, given the
statutory scheme. The legislative history of the provision,
though not conclusive, provides additional evidence to the
contrary. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, p. 175 (2005)
(noting that “[t]he purpose” of the provision was “to permit
judicial review over . . . constitutional and statutory-con-
struction questions, not discretionary or factual questions”
(emphasis added)). As the dissent observes, under a maxi-
malist reading of “questions of law,” the exception to limited
judicial review is poised to swallow the rule. See post, at 2–
4 (opinion of ALITO, J.). If that reading is correct, Congress
went through an awful lot to achieve relatively little.
   I had not yet joined the Court when it decided Guerrero-
Lasprilla. But I agree that Guerrero-Lasprilla controls this
case. The fundamental principle of stare decisis—“that to-
day’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions”—has
“enhanced force” when a decision interprets a statute. Kim-
ble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 

, 455–456
(2015). Congress remains free to revise the statute, and it
should do so if we have strayed from its intent concerning
the scope of judicial review set forth in §1252(a)(2)(D).
   I concur in today’s judgment with the understanding that
the jurisdiction-stripping provision is not “meaningless.”
Ante, at 15. When reviewing denials of discretionary relief,
courts should respect the choice of Congress, reflecting the
will of the People, to limit judicial interference. Courts can-
not review the facts underlying a hardship determination
in the cancellation-of-removal context, and they should
carefully distinguish between application of the “excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship” legal standard,
such as it is, and those unreviewable facts.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              1

                    ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–666
                          _________________


 SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK
       B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        [March 19, 2024]

   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, dissenting.
   I joined the opinion of the Court in Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr, 

 (2020), and continue to believe that it
was correctly decided. I agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent
in this case, however, that the Court errs in reading the
language in Guerrero-Lasprilla “as broadly as possible,” in-
deed “to the outer limits of its possible reach.” Post, at 6, 5.
Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla requires such a reading, and
I accordingly join JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)             1

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–666
                          _________________


 SITU KAMU WILKINSON, PETITIONER v. MERRICK
       B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        [March 19, 2024]

   JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
   In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, Congress
sought to control illegal immigration and streamline the
procedures for removing illegal aliens who had been con-
victed of criminal offenses. A key provision of the Act is 

(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that “no court
shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regard-
ing the granting” of certain forms of discretionary relief. Af-
ter IIRIRA’s enactment, this Court flagged a “substantial
constitutional questio[n]” that would arise if federal habeas
courts were stripped of jurisdiction to review “pure ques-
tion[s] of law.” INS v. St. Cyr, 

 (2001).
Congress responded by enacting an amendment clarifying
that §1252(a)(2)(B) did not “preclud[e] review of constitu-
tional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D).
                              I
  In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

 (2020), this
Court addressed the meaning of this amendment. The case
concerned two criminal aliens who were ordered removed
and then failed to ask to have their removal proceedings re-
opened by the 90-day statutory deadline. They argued,
however, that the deadline should be equitably tolled. The
2                  WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected that argu-
ment, and the issue before us was whether the Court of Ap-
peals had jurisdiction to review such a decision under
§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D).
   The answer to that question depended on whether the
correctness of the BIA’s decisions was a “questio[n] of law”
within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). The aliens urged us
to decide the case on “narrow grounds.” Brief for Petition-
ers in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, O. T. 2019, No. 18–776
etc., p. 15. They did not dispute the relevant facts, see 

, but argued that the BIA had applied the
wrong legal test in holding that they had not acted with suf-
ficient diligence to justify equitable tolling—specifically,
that the BIA had demanded a demonstration of “ ‘maximum
feasible diligence’ ” rather than “ ‘reasonable diligence,’ ”
which they claimed was the right test. Brief for Petitioners
in Guerrero-Lasprilla, at 15.
   The Court ruled for the aliens and in doing so stated
broadly that “questions of law” include all questions that
involve the application of the law to a particular set of facts.

. Under this statement, the phrase “ques-
tions of law” has a stunning sweep. It encompasses all sorts
of discretionary rulings that depend almost entirely on the
relevant facts, as a few examples of mundane trial court
rulings illustrate. For one, take a trial court’s denial of a
request for a continuance or a decision about the length of
a trial day or the days of the week during which a jury is
required to sit. See Morris v. Slappy, 

 (1983).
Such decisions are governed by a legal standard, albeit a
very permissive one: the decisions cannot be “unreasoning
and arbitrary.” 

 But in the rare case in which such a
decision is reversed on appeal, the appellate court is un-
likely to say that the trial court made an error of law be-
cause it mistakenly thought a continuance would be unrea-
sonable and arbitrary. Instead, the question on appeal
would almost certainly be based on an assessment of the
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)            3

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

facts.
   Here is another example. Under the broad language of
Guerrero-Lasprilla, juries decide questions of law whenever
they return a verdict in a criminal or civil case. If, for ex-
ample, a jury in a criminal case finds that a defendant vio-
lated a statute that requires “knowing” conduct, the jury
decides a question of law because it applies the law (as set
out in the court’s instructions on the meaning of “knowing”
conduct, see, e.g., 2B K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Fed-
eral Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal §70:07 (6th
ed. 2010), to the facts as they see them. Likewise, in a rou-
tine negligence case, the jury applies the law (as explained
in the court’s instructions on the meaning of “negligence,”
see, e.g., 3A id., Civil §155:30 (2012), to the facts shown at
trial.
   When Congress responded to St. Cyr by enacting
§1252(a)(2)(D), did it mean to adopt this maximalist under-
standing of “questions of law”? St. Cyr never suggested that
Congress was obligated to go that far, and if Congress had
wanted to achieve the end that results from the Court’s
broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla, Congress might as
well have repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) outright. Under the
Guerrero-Lasprilla formulation, the net effect of
§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D) is as follows. Before the
enactment of those provisions, pure findings of fact were
subject to review, but under a very deferential standard—
namely, they could be overturned only if “ ‘any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-
trary.’ ” Nasrallah v. Barr, 

 (2020). Af-
terwards, pure findings of fact were not reviewable at
all. Is it plausible that this pipsqueak of a change was
Congress’s cure for what it saw as undue delay in the con-
clusion of removal proceedings for criminal aliens? I hardly
think so.
4                  WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

                               II
   I dissented in Guerrero-Lasprilla because I feared that
the Court’s sweeping language would lead to “absurd re-
sults in light of the statute’s structure” and would “trans-
form §1252(a)(2)(D)’s narrow exception into a broad provi-
sion permitting judicial review of all criminal aliens’
challenges to their removal proceedings except the precious
few that raise only pure questions of fact.” 

 (THOMAS, J., joined by ALITO, J., dissenting). Under
this reading, “the exception” for “questions of law” “all but
swallows the rule.” 

.
   We are permitted to exercise at least a modicum of “ ‘com-
mon sense’ ” when we interpret a statute, see West Virginia
v. EPA, 

 (2022), and Guerrero-Lasprilla’s
broad language defies common sense. If the Congress that
enacted §1252(a)(2)(D) had wanted to bring about the result
that the broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla suggest, it
could have simply repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) and stated in
§1252(a)(2)(D) that courts cannot review pure questions of
fact. Qualifying the broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(D) by
adding an exception that all but eliminates the prohibition
would have been a very odd way of achieving that result.
What the Court says that Congress did—combining the
broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(B) with the nearly congru-
ent exception in §1252(a)(2)(D)—would be the equivalent of
a city council adopting an ordinance banning all dogs from
a park with an exception for all dogs that weigh under 125
pounds. Or the council passes an ordinance prohibiting all
persons from riding a bicycle without a helmet but then
adopts an exception for all persons under the age of 90.
When Congress enacted §1252(a)(2)(D), it was not engaging
in such silliness.
                          III
  Accepting of the judgment in Guerrero-Lasprilla—that
the BIA’s understanding of the scope of equitable tolling
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)            5

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

is a question of law—does not require that we take the lan-
guage in the Court’s opinion to the outer limits of its possi-
ble reach. But that is what the Court has now done. As
Justice Breyer, the author of the opinion in Guerrero-
Lasprilla, recognized in an earlier opinion for the Court, the
concept of a question of law does not always encompass all
applications of the law to a set of facts. In Merck Sharp &
Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 

 (2019), the decision
hung on the question whether the Food and Drug Admin-
istration would have approved a change in a drug’s label.
The Court recognized that this question contained both le-
gal and factual elements, but the Court did not hold that
the question was one of law simply because it involved the
application of law to a set of facts. 

 at 316–318. Rather,
the Court considered which element was most likely to be
contested and asked whether the answer to the question
whether the FDA would have approved the change would
generally turn on a judgment about the law or the facts.

   If that same mode of analysis is applied here, the answer
is clear—and it is the opposite of the one given by the
Court. Whether “removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to the “spouse, parent, or
child” of the alien subject to removal is overwhelmingly a
question of fact. §1229b(b)(1)(D). The only legal component
consists of the meaning of the everyday terms “hardship,”
“exceptional,” and “unusual.”
   The facts of this case illustrate the degree to which the
factual element involved in the question at hand over-
whelms the slim legal component. Below, petitioner argued
that the Immigration Judge misunderstood “the depth of
the emotional relationship between Petitioner and his
Child,” the amount of “care and support that Petitioner’s
Child would receive if Petitioner is removed,” and “the
Child’s uncommon and difficult situation, in light of his
family’s unwillingness to provide him access to care for his
6                 WILKINSON v. GARLAND

                     ALITO, J., dissenting

mental health needs.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 21–3166
(CA3), pp. 16–17. All those issues are entirely factual, and
there is no legal principle that can help an immigration
judge, the BIA, or a court assess whether any “hardship”
resulting from petitioner’s removal would be “exceptional
and extremely unusual.” That question must be decided by
the application of what the decision-maker knows from ex-
perience about human nature and family relationships.
Consequently, the question should not be classified as a
“question of law” under §1252(a)(2)(D).
  The Court, however, reads Guerrero-Lasprilla as broadly
as possible. As it sees things, all “[m]ixed questions” are
“questions of law,” even if they are “primarily factual.”
Ante, at 15. And since the question here is overwhelmingly
factual, what the Court seems to mean by “primarily” is an-
ything that falls short of 100%.
  That is not what Congress meant when it enacted
§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D), and I therefore respect-
fully dissent.