(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

  MULDROW v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

    No. 22–193.      Argued December 6, 2023—Decided April 17, 2024
Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the
  St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another
  because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked
  as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence
  Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to
  transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male
  police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved
  the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in
  the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same
  in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not.
  After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking offi-
  cials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,
  instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol of-
  ficers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had
  a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts.
     Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She
  alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division, had
  “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms
  [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The
  District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Cir-
  cuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that
  the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” 

, 688. Muldrow’s lawsuit could not proceed, the court said, be-
  cause the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary,
  or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working condi-
  tions.”
Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show
2                        MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                                  Syllabus

    that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identi-
    fiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be sig-
    nificant. Pp. 5–11.
       (a) Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to
    hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
    against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
    tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .
    sex.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Both parties agree that Muldrow’s transfer im-
    plicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s employment. The ap-
    plicable statutory language thus prohibits “discriminat[ing] against”
    an individual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employ-
    ment because of that individual’s sex.
       That language requires Muldrow to show that her transfer brought
    about some “disadvantageous” change in an employment term or con-
    dition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 

.
    The words “discriminate against,” the Court has explained, refer to
    “differences in treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton
    County, 

, 681. In the typical transfer case, that worse
    treatment must be “with respect to” employment “terms [or] condi-
    tions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions” phrase is not used
    “in the narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic
    or tangible.” Oncale, 

; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
    Vinson, 

. Still, the phrase circumscribes the injuries
    that can give rise to a suit like this one. To make out a Title VII dis-
    crimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an
    identifiable term or condition of employment.
       What the transferee does not have to show is that the harm incurred
    was “significant” or otherwise exceeded some heightened bar. “Dis-
    criminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g.,
    Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657. Neither that phrase nor any other estab-
    lishes an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to
    add words to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new re-
    quirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands
    something more than the law as written. That difference can make a
    real difference for complaining transferees. By asking whether the
    harm to the transferee is significant, appellate courts have disre-
    garded varied kinds of disadvantage. Pp. 5–7.
       (b) The City’s three main arguments—based on statutory text, prec-
    edent, and policy—do not justify the use of a “significance” standard.
       The Court rejects the City’s textual claim, which invokes the
    ejusdem generis canon—the idea that a general phrase following an
    enumeration of things should be read to encompass only things of the
    same basic kind. Applying that canon to the text of Title VII’s anti-
    discrimination provision, the City claims that because refusing to hire
                     Cite as: 

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                                Syllabus

  or discharging a person causes a significant disadvantage, the “other-
  wise to discriminate against” phrase can apply only to things causing
  an equal level of harm. But the statutory text itself provides a differ-
  ent shared trait: Each kind of prohibited discrimination occurs by way
  of an employment action—whether pertaining to hiring, or firing, or
  compensating, or (as here) altering terms or conditions through a
  transfer. That is a more than sufficient basis to unite the provision’s
  several parts and avoid ejusdem generis problems.
     Contrary to the City’s view, there is also no reason to import a
  significant-harm requirement from this Court’s decision in Burlington
  N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 

. The Court there held that
  Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision—which prohibits an employer
  from taking action against an employee for bringing or aiding a Title
  VII charge—applies only when the retaliatory action is “materially ad-
  verse,” meaning that it causes “significant” harm. 

. White
  adopted that standard for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context.
  The test was meant to capture those employer actions serious enough
  to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
  charge of discrimination.” 

 An action causing less serious harm
  will not deter Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes
  of the ban on retaliation. But that reasoning does not apply to the
  anti-discrimination provision, which flatly “prevent[s] injury to indi-
  viduals based on” protected status, 

, without distinguishing
  between significant and less significant harms.
     Finally, there is reason to doubt the City’s prediction that employees
  will flood courts with litigation in the absence of a significant-injury
  requirement. Courts retain multiple ways to dispose of meritless Title
  VII claims challenging transfer decisions. But even supposing the
  City’s worst predictions come true, that would be the result of the stat-
  ute Congress drafted. This Court will not add words to the statute to
  achieve what the City thinks a desirable result. Pp. 8–10.
     (c) The courts below applied the wrong standard to Muldrow’s suit.
  Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment
  terms or conditions. Her allegations, if properly preserved and sup-
  ported, meet that test with room to spare. The Court recognizes, how-
  ever, that the decisions below may have rested in part on issues of for-
  feiture and proof. The Court leaves such matters for the courts below
  to address on remand under the proper Title VII standard. Pp. 10–11.

, vacated and remanded.

   KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SOTOMAYOR, GORSUCH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS,
J., ALITO, J., and KAVANAUGH, J., each filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
                        Cite as: 

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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–193
                                   _________________


  JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.
       CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                                 [April 17, 2024]

   JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her
employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her
from one job to another because she is a woman. She sued
the City of St. Louis under Title VII, alleging that she had
suffered sex discrimination with respect to the “terms [or]
conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).
The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the
transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment
disadvantage. Other courts have used similar standards in
addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers.
   Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an em-
ployee must show some harm from a forced transfer to pre-
vail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury
satisfies a significance test. Title VII’s text nowhere estab-
lishes that high bar.
                              I
  From 2008 through 2017, Sergeant Muldrow worked as a
plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police Department’s
specialized Intelligence Division. During her tenure there,
she investigated public corruption and human trafficking
2                  MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                     Opinion of the Court

cases, oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the
Gun Crimes Unit. By virtue of her Division position, Mul-
drow was also deputized as a Task Force Officer with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation—a status granting her,
among other things, FBI credentials, an unmarked take-
home vehicle, and the authority to pursue investigations
outside St. Louis. In 2017, the outgoing commander of the
Intelligence Division told her newly appointed successor
that Muldrow was a “workhorse”—still more, that “if there
was one sergeant he could count on in the Division,” it was
Muldrow. 

, *1 (ED Mo., Sept. 11, 2020).
  But the new Intelligence Division commander, Captain
Michael Deeba, instead asked the Department to transfer
Muldrow out of the unit. Deeba wanted to replace Mul-
drow—whom he sometimes called “Mrs.” rather than the
customary “Sergeant”—with a male police officer. See 

at *1–*2. That officer, Deeba later testified, seemed a bet-
ter fit for the Division’s “very dangerous” work. Id., at *2;
App. 139. The Department approved the transfer against
Muldrow’s wishes. It reassigned her to a uniformed job in
the Department’s Fifth District.
  While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the
new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did
not. Instead of working with high-ranking officials on the
departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,
Muldrow now supervised the day-to-day activities of neigh-
borhood patrol officers. Her new duties included approving
their arrests, reviewing their reports, and handling other
administrative matters; she also did some patrol work her-
self. Because she no longer served in the Intelligence Divi-
sion, she lost her FBI status and the car that came with it.
And the change of jobs made Muldrow’s workweek less reg-
ular. She had worked a traditional Monday-through-Fri-
day week in the Intelligence Division. Now she was placed
on a “rotating schedule” that often involved weekend shifts.

, *2.
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

   Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the
transfer. Her complaint alleged that the City, in ousting
her from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d]
against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or]
conditions” of her employment. §2000e–2(a)(1). In later
deposition testimony, Muldrow set out her view of what the
transfer had cost her. She had been moved out of a “premier
position [in] the Police Department” into a less “prestigious”
and more “administrative” uniformed role. App. 105, 114,
120. She had fewer “opportunities” to work on “important
investigations,” as well as to “network” with commanding
officers. Id., at 104. And she lost material benefits—her
weekday work schedule and take-home car. Or as she sum-
marized the situation: “I went from straight days, weekends
off with a take-home car and more visibility and responsi-
bility within the Department to a rotating schedule with
few weekends off, assigned to . . . uniformed patrol,” with
“responsibilities being limited to that of administrative
work” and “supervising officers on patrol.” Id., at 120. Title
VII, Muldrow asserted in her suit, prevented the City from
making those changes to her employment because of her
sex.
   The District Court, viewing the matter differently,
granted the City summary judgment. Under Circuit prece-
dent, the court explained, Muldrow needed to show that her
transfer effected a “significant” change in working condi-
tions producing “material employment disadvantage.”

, *8–*9. And Muldrow, the court held,
could not meet that heightened-injury standard. “[S]he ex-
perienced no change in salary or rank.” Id., at *9. Her loss
of “the networking [opportunities] available in Intelligence”
was immaterial because she had not provided evidence that
it had harmed her “career prospects.” Id., at *8. And given
her continued “supervisory role,” she had not “suffered a
significant alteration to her work responsibilities.” Id., at
*9. Finally, the District Court concluded that the switch to
4                      MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                          Opinion of the Court

a rotating schedule (including weekend work) and the loss
of a take-home vehicle could not fill the gap. Although men-
tioning those changes “in her statement of facts,” Muldrow
had not relied on them in “her argument against summary
judgment.” Ibid., n. 20. And anyway, the court stated, they
“appear to be minor alterations of employment, rather than
material harms.” Ibid.
   The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It
agreed that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the
transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.” 

, 688 (2022). Like the District Court, the Eighth
Circuit emphasized that the transfer “did not result in a
diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.” 

 at 688–689.
And the Circuit, too, maintained that the change in her job
responsibilities was “insufficient” to support a Title VII
claim. 

. In the Fifth District, the court reasoned,
Muldrow still had a “supervisory role” and participated in
investigating serious crimes. 

. So the court
thought Muldrow’s view of the new job—“more administra-
tive and less prestigious”—was unsupported by record evi-
dence and not “persuasive.” 

 The court did not address
Muldrow’s new schedule or her loss of a car, apparently
thinking those matters either forfeited or too slight to men-
tion. Overall, the court held, Muldrow’s claim could not pro-
ceed because she had experienced “only minor changes in
working conditions.” 

   We granted certiorari, 

 (2023), to resolve a
Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a trans-
fer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of
harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something sim-
ilar.1 We now vacate the judgment below because the text
——————
   1 Compare, e.g., 

, 688 (CA8 2022) (case below) (“materially

significant disadvantage”); Caraballo-Caraballo v. Correctional Admin.,

 (CA1 2018) (“materially changes” employment condi-
tions in a manner “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an al-
teration of job responsibilities”); Williams v. R. H. Donnelley, Corp., 368
                      Cite as: 

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                          Opinion of the Court

of Title VII imposes no such requirement.
                               II
                               A
   Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Muldrow’s suit, as described
above, alleges that she was transferred to a lesser position
because she is a woman. That transfer, as both parties
agree, implicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s
employment, changing nothing less than the what, where,
and when of her police work. See Brief for Muldrow 19;
Brief for City 1, 45–46. So the statutory language applica-
ble to this case prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an indi-
vidual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of em-
ployment because of that individual’s sex.
   That language requires Muldrow to show that the trans-
fer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an em-
ployment term or condition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 

 (1998). The words “discrim-
inate against,” we have explained, refer to “differences in
treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton
County, 

, 681 (2020). Or otherwise said, the

——————
F. 3d 123, 128 (CA2 2004) (“materially significant disadvantage”); James
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 

 (CA4 2004) (“signifi-
cant detrimental effect”); O’Neal v. Chicago, 

 (CA7
2004) (“materially adverse”); Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools, 

 (CA10 1998) (“significant change”); and Webb-Edwards v. Or-
ange Cty. Sheriff ’s Office, 

 (CA11 2008) (“serious and
material change”), with Chambers v. District of Columbia, 

,
872, 876–877 (CADC 2022) (en banc) (overruling precedent that de-
manded an “objectively tangible harm” and rejecting a “material adver-
sity” requirement).
6                   MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                      Opinion of the Court

statute targets practices that “treat[ ] a person worse” be-
cause of sex or other protected trait. Id., at 658. And in the
typical transfer case, that “worse” treatment must pertain
to—must be “with respect to”—employment “terms [or] con-
ditions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms [or] conditions”
phrase, we have made clear, is not used “in the narrow con-
tractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or tangi-
ble.” Oncale, 

; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 

 (1986). Still, the phrase circum-
scribes the injuries that can give rise to a suit like this one.
To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee
must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or
condition of employment.
   What the transferee does not have to show, according to
the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “signifi-
cant.” 30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any
similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the
employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 4,
and 4–5, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse,
here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657–658,
681. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything
about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision
to distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers
causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing
not-so-significant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise
establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “sig-
nificance” is to add words—and significant words, as it
were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a
new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as
applied demands something more of her than the law as
written.
   And that difference can make a real difference for com-
plaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers
worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (Af-
ter all, a transfer is not usually forced when it leaves the
employee better off.) But now add another question—
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                           Opinion of the Court

whether the harm is significant. As appellate decisions re-
veal, the answers can lie in the eye of the beholder—and
can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take just a few
examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is
assigned to work at a new job site—specifically, a 14-by-22-
foot wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not
have a “significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin,

 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is re-
quired to take a position involving only nighttime work; a
court decides that the assignment does not “constitute a sig-
nificant change in employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 

 (CA10 2012). And a school
principal is forced into a non-school-based administrative
role supervising fewer employees; a court again finds the
change in job duties not “significant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 

, 821 (CA4 2021) (per curiam).
All those employees suffered some injury in employment
terms or conditions (allegedly because of race or sex). Their
claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII,
compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory
text does not require.2


——————
  2 JUSTICE THOMAS’s concurring opinion appears to disagree in two re-

spects. He initially disputes that courts have applied a heightened-harm
requirement in demanding that a plaintiff show something like “materi-
ally significant disadvantage.” See post, at 1 (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). And as a corollary, he denies that courts will have to change their
treatment of Title VII claims once they start to apply the simple injury
standard set out in this opinion. See post, at 2–3. In light of those views,
we underscore two points. First, this decision changes the legal standard
used in any circuit that has previously required “significant,” “material,”
or “serious” injury. It lowers the bar Title VII plaintiffs must meet. Sec-
ond, because it does so, many cases will come out differently. The deci-
sions described above are examples, intended to illustrate how claims
that failed under a significance standard should now succeed. And as we
will discuss, the decision below is another such example, putting to one
side case-specific issues of forfeiture and proof. See infra, at 10–11.
8                  MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                      Opinion of the Court

                               B
   The City, in defense of that added requirement, makes
three main arguments—one about the text, one about our
precedent, and one about policy. None justifies the use of a
“significance” standard.
   The textual claim invokes the ejusdem generis canon—
the idea that a general phrase following an enumeration of
things should be read to encompass only things of the same
basic kind. Recall the prohibition at issue here: An em-
ployer may not, based on sex, “fail or refuse to hire” or “dis-
charge” any person or “otherwise . . . discriminate against
[her] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment.” §2000e–2(a)(1); see supra, at
5. Refusing to hire or discharging a person, the City notes,
causes a significant disadvantage; so the subsequent “oth-
erwise” phrase, the City claims, can apply only to things
causing an equal level of harm. See Brief for City 16, 25–
27. But the City fails to explain why the presence of signif-
icant disadvantage must be part of the list’s common de-
nominator. The text itself provides a different shared trait.
Each kind of prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an
employment action—whether pertaining to hiring, or fir-
ing, or compensating, or (as here) altering terms or condi-
tions through a transfer. That is a more than sufficient ba-
sis to unite the provision’s several parts and avoid ejusdem
generis problems. There is no need for courts to introduce
a significant-harm requirement.
   The City’s argument from precedent fares no better. It
relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White, 

 (2006), which addressed Title VII’s sep-
arate anti-retaliation provision. Under that section, an em-
ployer may not take action against an employee for bringing
or aiding a Title VII charge. See §2000e–3(a). The Court
held that the provision applies only when the retaliatory
action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it causes “sig-
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

nificant” harm. Id., at 68. The City thinks we should im-
port the same standard into the anti-discrimination provi-
sion at issue. See Brief for City 18–19. But that would cre-
ate a mismatch. White adopted the standard for reasons
peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant to
capture those (and only those) employer actions serious
enough to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

. If
an action causes less serious harm, the Court reasoned, it
will not deter Title VII enforcement; and if it will not deter
Title VII enforcement, it falls outside the purposes of the
ban on retaliation. See 

. But no such (frankly
extra-textual) reasoning is applicable to the discrimination
bar. Whether an action causes significant enough harm to
deter any employee conduct is there beside the point. White
itself noted the difference: The anti-discrimination provi-
sion, we explained, simply “seeks a workplace where indi-
viduals are not discriminated against” because of traits like
race and sex. 

. The provision thus flatly “pre-
vent[s] injury to individuals based on” status, ibid., without
distinguishing between significant and less significant
harms.
   Finally, the City’s policy objections cannot override Title
VII’s text. In the City’s view, a significant-injury require-
ment is needed to prevent transferred employees from
“swamp[ing] courts and employers” with insubstantial law-
suits requiring “burdensome discovery and trials.” Brief for
City 45, 49 (capitalization and boldface omitted). But there
is reason to doubt that the floodgates will open in the way
feared. As we have explained, the anti-discrimination pro-
vision at issue requires that the employee show some in-
jury. See supra, at 5–6. It requires that the injury asserted
concern the terms or conditions of her employment. See
ibid. Perhaps most notably, it requires that the employer
have acted for discriminatory reasons—“because of ” sex or
10                 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                      Opinion of the Court

race or other protected trait. §2000e–2(a)(1). And in ad-
dressing that issue, a court may consider whether a less
harmful act is, in a given context, less suggestive of inten-
tional discrimination. So courts retain multiple ways to dis-
pose of meritless Title VII claims challenging transfer deci-
sions. But even supposing the City’s worst predictions come
true, that would be the result of the statute Congress
drafted. As we noted in another Title VII decision, we will
not “add words to the law” to achieve what some employers
might think “a desirable result.” EEOC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., 

, 774 (2015). Had Congress
wanted to limit liability for job transfers to those causing a
significant disadvantage, it could have done so. By con-
trast, this Court does not get to make that judgment.
                              III
  In light of everything said above, the Court of Appeals’
treatment of Muldrow’s suit cannot survive. The court re-
quired Muldrow to show that the allegedly discriminatory
transfer out of the Intelligence Division produced a signifi-
cant employment disadvantage. See supra, at 4. As we
have explained, that is the wrong standard. Muldrow need
show only some injury respecting her employment terms or
conditions. The transfer must have left her worse off, but
need not have left her significantly so. And Muldrow’s al-
legations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that
test with room to spare. Recall her principal allegations.
She was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious spe-
cialized division giving her substantial responsibility over
priority investigations and frequent opportunity to work
with police commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job
supervising one district’s patrol officers, in which she was
less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily per-
formed administrative work. Her schedule became less reg-
ular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost her
take-home car. If those allegations are proved, she was left
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                     Opinion of the Court

worse off several times over. It does not matter, as the
courts below thought (and JUSTICE THOMAS echoes), that
her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could
advance to other jobs. See supra, at 3–4; post, at 2. Title
VII prohibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the con-
sequences Muldrow described.
  We recognize, however, that the decisions below may
have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The
District Court noted, for example, that Muldrow had failed
to discuss in her argument against summary judgment the
changes in her work schedule and vehicle access; and per-
haps following that lead, the Court of Appeals did not ad-
dress those harms. See supra, at 3–4. In addition, both
courts suggested that some of the allegations Muldrow
made about the nature of the work she did in her old and
new jobs lacked adequate evidentiary support. See ibid.
We leave such matters for the courts below to address. All
we require is that they use the proper Title VII standard,
and not demand that Muldrow demonstrate her transfer
caused “significant” harm.
  We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                  It is so ordered.
                 Cite as: 

 (2024)            1

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 22–193
                          _________________


  JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.
       CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                        [April 17, 2024]

   JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
   I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the Courts of Appeals all
appear to articulate the same principle, but with slightly
varying verbal formulations: A plaintiff bringing a claim
under 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) must show harm that is
more than trifling. Post, at 1–2 (opinion concurring in judg-
ment). And, there is little practical difference between that
principle and the Court’s holding. Ante, at 1 (holding that
an employee “must show some harm”).
   I am not convinced, however, that the Court accurately
characterizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision. I do not read
the Eighth Circuit to have necessarily imposed a height-
ened-harm requirement in the form of a “significance” test.
The Eighth Circuit defined an adverse employment action
as “a tangible change in working conditions that produces
a material employment disadvantage.” 

, 688
(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). It further ex-
plained that “minor changes in duties or working condi-
tions, even unpalatable or unwelcome ones, which cause no
materially significant disadvantage, do not rise to the level
of an adverse employment action.” 

 (alteration and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff
must have suffered an actual disadvantage as compared to
minor changes—i.e., more than a trifling harm. That stand-
ard aligns with the Court’s observation that a plaintiff must
2                  MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

show “some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment
term or condition.” Ante, at 5 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 

 (1998)).
   The Court insists that the Eighth Circuit must have de-
manded more given the weight of Muldrow’s allegations.
Specifically, the Court underscores Muldrow’s claims that
the City of St. Louis “moved [her] from a plainclothes job in
a prestigious specialized division” with a take-home car and
a regular schedule, to a “uniformed job supervising one dis-
trict’s patrol officers,” with no take-home car and an irreg-
ular schedule. Ante, at 10. But, most of those allegations
are forfeited or attributable to a nonparty, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. See 

, *9, n. 20 (ED
Mo., Sept. 11, 2020) (observing that Muldrow did not raise
arguments based on “having to return her take-home [car],”
“changes to her schedule, including having to work week-
ends,” or “having to work in plain clothes”); 30 F. 4th, at 689
(concluding that “the FBI had the sole authority to revoke”
Muldrow’s plainclothes and take-home car privileges). Be-
fore the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow argued only that the City
moved her to a job that was “more administrative and less
prestigious.” Id., at 688. Her “only evidence” in support of
that argument was “her own deposition testimony,” which
neither the District Court nor the Eighth Circuit found per-
suasive. Ibid. And, Muldrow’s testimony certainly did not
establish any “proof of harm resulting from [her] reassign-
ment.” Ibid. After the transfer, Muldrow’s “pay and rank
remained the same, she was given a supervisory role, and
she was responsible for investigating violent crimes, such
as homicides and robberies.” Ibid. Muldrow even conceded
that the transfer “did not harm her future career pro-
spects.” Ibid. At most, then, Muldrow “expresse[d] a mere
preference for one position over the other.” Id., at 689.
   Muldrow failed to prove that there was any nontrifling
change in her job’s prestige—which was her lone theory of
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)            3

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

harm. 

 at 688–689. The Eighth Circuit rejected Mul-
drow’s adverse employment action claim accordingly. I fail
to see how the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning—that a plaintiff
must offer colorable evidence of harm—is equivalent to the
heightened-harm requirement the Court concludes the
Eighth Circuit applied. Ante, at 10 (agreeing that “[t]he
transfer must have left [Muldrow] worse off ”).
  All that said, I recognize that the terms “material” and
“significant” can (but do not always) imply a heightened-
harm requirement. Although I find it unlikely, it is possible
that the Eighth Circuit had such a stringent test in mind
when it stated that a plaintiff must show a “ ‘materially sig-
nificant disadvantage.’ ” 30 F. 4th, at 688. I thus agree to
vacate and remand to the extent the Eighth Circuit’s anal-
ysis is inconsistent with a more-than-trifling-harm require-
ment.
                 Cite as: 

 (2024)           1

                ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 22–193
                          _________________


  JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.
       CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                        [April 17, 2024]

   JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
   I agree with the judgment in this case. Assuming without
deciding that all the facts mentioned by the Court are rele-
vant and properly presented, petitioner’s transfer altered
the “terms” or “conditions” of her employment, 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–2(a)(1), and therefore she can prevail if she can
prove that she was transferred because of her sex.
   I do not join the Court’s unhelpful opinion. For decades,
dozens of lower court judges, with a wealth of experience
handling Title VII cases, have held that not every un-
wanted employment experience affects an employee’s
“terms” or “conditions” of employment. The lower courts
have used various verbal formulations to express this point,
and the Court, dubious about the words they had selected,
granted review to provide guidance. Now, after briefing
and argument, that guidance is as follows: Title VII plain-
tiffs must show that the event they challenge constituted a
“harm” or “injury,” but that the event need not be “signifi-
cant” or “substantial.” See ante, at 10–11.
   I have no idea what this means, and I can just imagine
how this guidance will be greeted by lower court judges.
The primary definition of “harm” is “physical or mental
damage,” and an “injury” is defined as “an act that dam-
ages, harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of
2                  MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

suffering or harm.” Webster’s Third International Diction-
ary 1034, 1164 (1976). These definitions incorporate at
least some degree of significance or substantiality. We do
not typically say that we were harmed or injured by every
unwanted experience. What would we think if a friend said,
“I was harmed because the supermarket had run out of my
favorite brand of peanut butter,” or, “I was injured because
I ran into three rather than the usual two red lights on the
way home from work”?
   I see little if any substantive difference between the ter-
minology the Court approves and the terminology it doesn’t
like. The predictable result of today’s decision is that care-
ful lower court judges will mind the words they use but will
continue to do pretty much just what they have done for
years.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)              1

              KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–193
                          _________________


  JATONYA CLAYBORN MULDROW, PETITIONER v.
       CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                         [April 17, 2024]

   JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in the judgment.
   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for an employer “to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(a)(1). The question presented in this case is whether
transferring an employee—for example, changing an
employee’s job responsibilities or job location—on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title
VII. The answer is yes.
   I therefore agree with the straightforward opinion jointly
authored by Judge Tatel and Judge Ginsburg for the en
banc D. C. Circuit. See Chambers v. District of Columbia,

 (2022). As that court explained, even when a
transfer does not change an employee’s compensation, a
transfer does change the employee’s terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. See 

 at 874–879. Therefore,
a transfer made on the basis of the employee’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII. See 

at 874–875.
   As I see it and as the D. C. Circuit saw it, the issue here
is not complicated. Suppose that an employer says to an
employee in the Columbus office: “We are transferring you
2                      MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

                KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

to the Cincinnati office because you are black. But your
compensation will not change.” Does that violate Title VII?
Of course it does. To begin with, the employer has treated
the employee differently because of race. To be sure, the
fact that a transfer may not involve a change in
compensation can affect the amount of any damages, as
Muldrow’s attorney acknowledged. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41–
42. But a transfer changes the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. Therefore, a discriminatory
transfer violates the statute. “The plain text of Title VII
requires no more.” Chambers, 35 F. 4th, at 875.1
   Unlike the D. C. Circuit, some Courts of Appeals have
held that discriminatory transfers are not prohibited by
Title VII unless the transfer also causes significant
employment disadvantage. Ante, at 4–5, n. 1. Today, this
Court definitively rejects those rulings. Ante, at 6, 7, n. 2.
I fully agree with the Court on that point.
   But the Court’s opinion then goes on to require that a
plaintiff in a discriminatory-transfer case show at least
“some harm” beyond the harm of being transferred on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Ante,
at 6.     I disagree with the Court’s new some-harm
requirement.      No court has adopted a some-harm
requirement, and no party or amicus advocated that
requirement to this Court. More to the point, the text of
Title VII does not require a separate showing of some harm.
The discrimination is harm. The only question then is
whether the relevant employment action changes the

——————
  1 To be sure, the employment action in a transfer case must actually be

a transfer (or denied transfer), which requires a change (or denied
change) in the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. See Brief for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae
17–18. There may be edge cases about what qualifies as a transfer. But
as the Solicitor General notes, a change in an employee’s job location or
job responsibilities readily qualifies. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 11, 22.
                  Cite as: 

 (2024)             3

              KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. A transfer does so. Therefore, as the D. C.
Circuit explained, a transfer on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin is actionable under Title
VII. Chambers, 35 F. 4th, at 874–879.
  All of that said, the Court’s new some-harm requirement
appears to be a relatively low bar. Importantly, the Court
emphasizes that “some harm” is less than significant harm,
serious harm, or substantial harm. Ante, at 6. Therefore,
anyone who has been transferred because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin should easily be able to show
some additional harm—whether in money, time,
satisfaction, schedule, convenience, commuting costs or
time, prestige, status, career prospects, interest level,
perks,      professional        relationships,      networking
opportunities, effects on family obligations, or the like. So
even though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s new
some-harm requirement, I expect that the Court’s approach
and my preferred approach will land in the same place and
lead to the same result in 99 out of 100 discriminatory-
transfer cases, if not in all 100.